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INTRODUCTION 
 
DEVELOPMENTAL HEALTH 
 
 In this, my dissertation, I want to analyze the relationship between human 
development and health by seeking to understand their foundations in what both critical 
and psychoanalytic theory have come to call objectification and, more particularly, the 
objectification of culture.  Take, for instance, such modern health science institutions as 
biomedicine and cognitive-behavioral psychology.  In their practice and inquiry, we find 
a guiding assumption about therapeutic causality, namely, that health and illness are 
invariably produced through (at least hypothetically) knowable, locatable, and efficient 
causes, through what a Kantian might call empirical causes.  Supplementing and 
critiquing this assumption, one of my theses is that while we are right to understand 
health and illness to be empirically produced through ordinary (efficient) causal 
mechanisms (which can be biological, chemical, physical, psychological, behavioral, 
etc), we would do well, and be more scientific, to expand our notion of causality in its 
relation to health to include preconscious and unconscious influences—for human health 
and illness are also cultural phenomena ―all the way down‖; they are steeped both in 
history and, as I come to examine in detail, in the secretly lingering forces of prehistory.   
As everyone knows, for instance, a physician‘s white coat, licensure, and, with 
and through these objects, her or his general authority to prescribe medicines and other 
therapeutic objects can mean a lot to a needy patient — not just ―in belief‖ but in and as 
what Žižek calls ―the objectivity of belief‖ — even if the patient is unaware of this need, 
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its dynamics and meanings, its objects of force.  Indeed, what is an ―object of force‖ in 
and between development and health?  My answer to this question is that such an object 
will be something like a ―symbolic placebo.‖  While I do not focus upon the term 
―placebo‖ at too much length, and even rarely employ the term in Part Two, I remain 
interested throughout the dissertation in examining the relationship between 
development, objective causes, and the idea that health arises ―placeboically.‖   
Health and development are linked then, I suggest, in and as a symbolic 
objectification of archaic forces.  In the meetings and exchanges between patients and 
doctors, for instance, these meetings and exchanges reflect what is currently happening, 
true; but my suggestion is that there is always more going on and that this ―more‖ can be 
quite helpfully understood, since we are here dealing with a relation between authority 
and need, as reflecting the development of (both) the patient‘s (and doctor‘s) earliest and 
steadfast relating of need to authority in his or her infancy.  When prescribed amidst, 
through, and as doctoral authority in this or that way, for instance, bioactive medicines 
also embody, they take on and reflect, an unconscious relation to authority and need.  I 
thus ask questions like this:  What is the relationship between the pacifiers and teddy-
bears offered by a baby‘s parents, on the one hand, and the therapeutic objects offered by 
an ordinary physician, on the other hand?  Might the latter be extensions, symbolic 
elaborations of the latter?  Incorporating the psychoanalytic idea that the vicissitudes of 
―memory‖ and ―trust‖ are formed archaically in relation to objects of early need in both 
―individual‖ and ―sociohistorical‖ development, my goal is to develop a theory of 
development which links modern objects and cultures of need to their heritage in what I 
will often call primitive processes of objectification.  ―Primitive‖ may have its negative 
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connotations, denoting ―crude,‖ ―infantile,‖ or even ―barbarous,‖ but I retain the word 
here to the degree that I want to emphasize that modern, more developed cultures can be 
just as primitive as those which are supposedly less developed.  One aspect of the 
persistence of the primitive, in other words, concerns and pivots upon its denial, such that 
so-called modern cultures can be just as primitive as so-called traditional or tribal 
cultures to the degree that the former deny their developmental continuity with the latter.  
But this isn‘t also to say that developed and/or modern cultures aren‘t more symbolically 
developed than traditional or tribal cultures.  The rise of the human sciences in the 
―West‖ exemplifies this, although this isn‘t to say that the sciences aren‘t (often secretly) 
layered in primitive aggression.  Nuclear power has been developed as a useful energy 
and as a destructive weapon together, for instance. 
In the end, then, I focus this analysis on the rise of modern value and valuation.  
My idea is that value is not just the currently scriptive but also the primitively pre-
scriptive objectification of need in relation to the illusion of authority:  Value arises to the 
degree that the wishes that belong to need and authority are constructed and externalized, 
but not just constructed and externalized, objectively.  We could thus say that primitive 
need and authority are always steeped in and filtered through fantasies and illusions.  But 
this then reflects back on our wider theme:  To the degree that precognitive wishing 
secretly influences how the causes of health and illness appear cognitively, consciously, 
and empirically, it turns out that health and illness are secretly also indices of 
development, of progression and regression in tension.   
To defend and expand these points, I develop and weave together the following 
three (main) tactics.  First, without relying too heavily on psychoanalytic material, I 
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examine Kant‘s critical aesthetics and Marx‘s theory of fetishism to reveal and track what 
Kant calls the a priori and what Marx calls the prehistorical or primitive relation between 
development and objectivity; I note as well how each thinker relates these concepts to the 
issue of health in a more or less secret, a partially primitive, way.  Indeed, the distinct 
materials on Kant and Marx comprise the two basic Parts of the dissertation.   
Concerning the former, my idea is that in critiquing the a priori conditions of 
healthy, enlightenment cognition, Kant‘s transcendental philosophy stands out as the first 
scientific examination of what later comes to be called the unconscious:  In examining 
how in judgments of taste we waver between attributing our pleasure to either subjective 
and/or intersubjective factors, on the one hand, or to the object ―itself‖ and other 
objective factors (as if the object contained and exhibited the property of beauty like 
water exhibits wetness), on the other hand, Kant shows not just that but also partly how 
our cognitively subjective and objective judgments of taste are produced through a sly 
form of developmental misattribution:  When we empirically judge some-thing to be 
beautiful, noting how the object seems to contain elements which prompt our subjective 
enjoyment, this judgment secretly reflects and distortedly embodies the persistence of the 
primitive development of our relating of (sensuous) need and (moral) authority (as well 
as our relating of causes to effects).  Thus, for Kant aesthetic judgments on the whole are 
conditioned by what he calls the subreption — something like the cloaking, preserving, 
and distorting through symbols — of precognitive wishes and illusions into objectively 
and subjectively registered forms of cognition and enjoyment.  He thus shows how 
cognition and enjoyment in general secretly rely upon, stem from, are conditioned by, 
and distortedly exhibit primitive material forces, even destructive forces which end up, 
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through what we might call subreptive distortion, appearing as forms of value and culture 
in the course of human development.  In building and rebuilding each other and the earth, 
we transform prehistorical culture into an objective history, our record, of meaning. 
Marx inherits this Kantian legacy to the degree that he examines how values (such 
as money and capital in particular) historically objectify, and so also mis-objectify, their 
archaic conditions.  How and why, for instance, might we say that capitalism is more than 
just metaphorically cannibalistic?  My answer to this question highlights the fact that 
what Kant calls subreption in relation to taste, as if to describe individual development, 
Marx calls fetishization in relation to the wider production and consumption of culture.  
With fetishization at issue, I concentrate on money and gold as key developmental 
objects of value‘s form of appearance.  What we discover is this:  To the degree that 
traces of money‘s prehistorical formation and status as a magical object in tribal cultures 
persist in modern exchange, and so to the degree that money still appears in modern 
society to be the means of fulfilling wishes (despite and in castes, ranks, and classes), 
money secretly reproduces, it recapitulates despite and in its development, a widely 
unknown and unexplored archaic heritage.  Money‘s use in and as capital hints at things 
past, things necessarily partly forgotten, in the present.  Similarly, money can be seen as a 
―placebo‖ to the degree that, while on the one hand it is this or that elaborated form of 
dirt, on the other hand it is often taken as value incarnate, as some ―thing‖ possessing 
social power in-itself.  But Marx is also sharp and quick to point out that, especially in 
modern society, money is not just positively productive (like a placebo, in my terms) but 
also contains deeply destructive elements (like a nocebo).  So somewhat like Kant but 
more globally and historically oriented, Marx traces these appearances not just to their 
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hidden ―historical‖ roots, but to their deeper ―prehistorical‖ roots.  Money can become 
capital, for instance, only insofar as history doesn‘t just recapitulate its positive source 
material but also, together with this, its repressed negative source material, its secret 
prehistorical ―baggage.‖   
In the end, then, Marx traces the valuation of capital as the modern force and form 
of class domination to its secret roots in ―primitive accumulation,‖ wherein various 
peoples are dispossessed, expropriated of any direct means of production, whether these 
means were once ―possessed‖ individually or in common.  As the expropriation and 
hoarding of useful means of sustenance and reproduction, primitive accumulation 
reproduces the divisive, archaic, violent symptoms of prior forms of class; it reproduces 
them in modernity in and as an object-relation between capital and wages.  Money 
therefore stands out as an objective mechanism moving history ―forward‖ while yet 
secretly retaining certain prehistorical and ―regressive‖ elements that continue to demand 
their working through.  This is why Marx is constantly pointing out that while it would 
seem that the ―economy,‖ since a social construction of human power relations, should be 
under our direct control, it is rather something the forces of which move largely ―behind 
our backs.‖ 
Second, to the degree that Kant and Marx both articulate how the modern 
cognition of value (in general) secretly hinges on, branches from, and figuratively 
displays primitively communal and destructive material as objective forms of culture, I 
occasionally employ and analyze some psychoanalytic cultural theory.  For the latter, I 
also want to show, derives from the former; that is, psychoanalysis derives from the 
articulation of the secret (a priori) conditions of experience in Kant, which is rearticulated 
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as the prehistorical (primitively accumulative) conditions of history in Marx. The 
conceptualization of the ―unconscious‖ in the more Freudian sense thus becomes 
possible.  Indeed, to the degree that this is also a theory of culture, Freud‘s examination 
of the fort/da games played by children and D.W. Winnicott‘s theory of transitional 
objectivity become key here.  Indeed, to the degree that I am less concerned with the term 
―sublimation‖ or ―transitional objectivity‖ and more concerned with the general problem 
of understanding the relation between primitivity, violence, their persistence, and the 
development of human culture which takes place in and despite violence and its 
persistence, I also turn to Tzvetan Todorov‘s impressive cultural and historical analyses 
in Conquest of America.  Through analyses of Freud‘s, Winnicott‘s, Žižek‘s, and 
Todorov‘s ideas concerning culture, we can more deeply understand the idea of 
developmental health which Kant and Marx introduce.   
 Human culture, I want to suggest, develops out of (what we might generally call) 
―nature,‖ although not merely naturally of course, in, say, two general steps.  In the first 
step, before and as culture appears, before and as it is objectified, a break or split is 
suffered within what we must later presuppose and take merely as ―nature.‖  The latter 
splits (and is split off from itself) into ―nature‖ on the one hand and what we might call 
―proto-humanity‖ on the other.  This proto-humanity, then, is natural and animal to some 
degree, but it‘s now, given the split, also partially meta-natural, something even contra-
natural; in any case, as humans, we develop and exhibit what many philosophers have 
called a ―second nature,‖ which brings me to the second step.  Culture arises and 
develops, I suggest, as the symbolic mediation of our splitting off from (what, again, can 
and must then be presupposed as if it was ―sheer‖) nature.  Or we could say that culture 
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appears in and as the ―symptom‖ of this splitting, this violence, this primitive destruction, 
which is only then felt and understood later, by deferred action and by means of the 
meaning the symbol is and contains, as loss.  Indeed, the difference between an object 
and a symptom pivots on how this loss is exhibited.   
So, while elephants, gorillas, and other mammals may shed tears in response to 
pain, and while various animals use what we now call simple tools, and while a number 
of animal species build dwellings to live in, and while almost all animals can be said to 
communicate with various interests in mind in more or less simple ways, especially 
within their species, and while human birth births babies with cultural potential to the 
degree that this process is a dividing-off from mothers, I want to suggest that we build 
culture, the distinctly human world, to the degree that we need to make some sense of, 
and yet also distance ourselves from the immediacy of, the death and/or loss of our most 
needed loved-ones and most ―natural‖ needs.  As far as I can tell, non-human animals 
don‘t build arts and religions even if this or that animal has become a sacrificial or 
totemic object for our forgetful remembrances, in religious and magical rituals, of 
animal-things ―past.‖  In this respect culture is both a partial dividing-off from and an 
ability to make developmental use of this separation (in developmental forms of 
appearance) from the rest of the animal kingdom.  Children love their stuffed animals in 
and as they distance themselves from the oral voracity and fierceness which many of 
these animals present.  The voracity goes elsewhere—into (or “in and as,” as I will often 
say) the objects and antagonisms of culture and value.  Following upon our heritage in 
cannibalism, there is already, behind and within each of our particular losses of loved-
ones, the more general, persistent, culturally-structuring loss of our more or less 
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immediate immersion in, well, for lack of a better word, nature.  Here, then, I end up 
suggesting that culture in the widest sense of the term is the symbolic work and play of 
the developmental process of mourning — even if this mourning is culturally disguised 
as this or that specific form of ―high‖ or ―low‖ culture — of the process of ―coping‖ with 
our being persistently and destructively divorced from what we (then) take to be ―pure‖ 
nature. 
Third, and as a framework to guide future research, I ask larger questions about 
the relation between individual and historical development.  Does individual 
development (ontogeny) recapitulate historical development (phylogeny), and vice versa?  
I suggest that they do—that culture is located and objectified between individual 
development in one generation (since the enculturation of an individual is a pedagogical 
process facilitated through symbolizations taking place between two or more generations) 
and historical development across and through many (nonetheless punctuated and 
individuated) generations.  But I don‘t want to suggest that ontogeny and phylogeny 
―parallel‖ each other.  More strongly, I want to say that cultural objectification between 
generations is the very means (not just of signifying development) but also of making 
development and culture transmissible, indeed, of making and moving development 
forward (say ―progress‖) and backward (―regress‖) at once in an activity of forgetting and 
remembrance.  Indeed, we often forget this — in the abstractions of alphabetic script, for 
instance — but as humans we don‘t just write history using the conceptual language of 
alphabetic narrative.  Before we are capable of this, we ―read‖ the world through objects, 
indeed, through objects which first of all ―present‖ our parents and family even as they 
also ―represent‖ them and their disappearance, their image and non-image, for instance.  
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Indeed, we don‘t just ―read‖ the world in this way but make it, ―write‖ it in this way.  We 
create the world by carving and reworking objects out of mother earth.  All objectivity is 
a detachment (in connection), or say, an externalization.  A typical infantile ―pacifier‖ is 
in the shape of a nipple.  Thus, babies first image and incorporate body-parts, which 
means that these are on the way to being personified through loss, just as our earliest 
relations with others cannot develop outside such pacifying objective mediations.  
History and development, then, aren‘t simply ―represented‖ but move through, are 
―presented‖ in, objectifications which are never merely external to human relations.   
As an extension of infantile desire and its frustrations, and as the individual 
reanimation of the springing of logos from mythos, adult conceptual thinking is a 
developmental achievement.  Abstract, cognitive symbolizations such as alphabetic 
writing, for instance, are individual elaborations of part-objects and pacifiers.  I note and 
examine in this regard the uncannily intimate relationship between the development of 
alphabets, the development of money, and the transformation of culture from magical to 
scientific thinking and praxes.  Is it merely a coincidence that when a child moves from 
picture-book ―reading‖ to reading using alphabets and abstract, general concepts, for 
instance, this movement largely coincides with his or her ability to understand the 
representational use of money and prices?
1
  History, then, comes in stages, whether it is 
of an individual, a culture, or set of cultures.  First, as the unbroken seed of history, there 
is potential in the undifferentiated unity of what we might, for lack of a better word, call 
―nature.‖  I tend to, but don‘t feel I have to, place plants and animals here.  With the 
violent splitting of this seed, however, human prehistory arises as the realm of 
somatization and war.  The original proto-human tribe becomes a number of tribes.  But 
                                                   
1
 See the Marxian epigram to this dissertation‘s Part Two, below. 
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there is very little conceptual ―recording‖ of these events, although there is plenty of 
blood and dirt.  Eventually, magic arises as a form of wish-fulfillment.  Magic links and 
divides us by giving human power to things.  These things are the first symbols.  And 
eventually symbolization comes to reflect back on itself when, after losing track of each 
other, these tribes meet, or rather meet again, only eventually to recognize that the magic 
of the world is both illusory and as good as real.  This, then, entails a general principle of 
history:  History is communicated (like a beneficent disease) between generations 
through symbols of value and significance that join and distance these generations in 
their violent splits and intimate conflations, in their archaic losses and reconnections, and, 
through the (dis)illusions arising out of these, in and as the historical dialectic which we 
call development.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART ONE THE CULTURE OF HEALTH: KANT‘S ARCHAEOLOGY OF 
OBJECTIVITY 
 
 1 
CHAPTER I 
 
HYPOCHONDRIACAL DISPOSITIONS 
 
For fear of obstructing the circulation of the blood … 
[Kant] never would wear garters; yet, as he found it 
difficult to keep up his stockings without them, he had 
invented for himself a most elaborate substitute….  In a 
little pocket, somewhat smaller than a watch pocket, but 
occupying pretty nearly the same situation as a watch 
pocket on each thigh, there was placed a small box, 
something like a watch case, but smaller.  Into this box was 
introduced a watch spring in a wheel, round about which 
wheel was wound an elastic cord, for regulating the force 
of which there was a separate contrivance.  To the two ends 
of this cord were attached hooks, which hooks were carried 
through a small aperture in the pockets, and so, passing 
down the inner and outer side of the thigh, caught hold of 
two loops which were fixed on the off side and the near 
side of each stocking.  As might be expected, so complex 
an apparatus was liable, like the Ptolemaic system of the 
heavens, to occasional derangements.  
 
   —Thomas De Quincy,  
   The Last Days of Immanuel Kant 
 
 
I anticipate that when my stomach comes to do its duty, my 
fingers will do so as well. 
 
    —Kant, 1771 
 
 Although many theorists in our academic universe know of Kant‘s persistent and 
anxious concern for his health, and although Kant biographers occasionally lap 
voyeuristically at the pool of quirky habits which made up his health regimen, only a few 
critics have ever investigated, let alone sought to develop, Kant‘s philosophy of health.2  
                                                   
2
 See Shell, especially the chapter on ―Kant‘s Hypochondria.‖  
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It is especially the formalists in and among us who have tended to see Kant‘s theoretical 
objectivity as existing outside this supposedly Ptolemaic and deranged aspect of his 
subjectivity.  After all, what could a complex system of strings and pulleys meant to hold 
up Kant‘s socks, for instance, have to do with pure reason‘s deduction of synthetic a 
priori judgments, or of duty‘s freedom from the sensuous inclinations of the stomach?   
 For the few who have sought answers to these and similar questions, there is a 
basic and, again, a somewhat biographically famous response.  Supposedly Kant‘s 
philosophical formalism so subsumed his personal heteronomies that the latter eventually 
became mind-numbingly predictable and boring—except or perhaps precisely insofar as 
he revolutionized philosophy.  The irony runs deep here.  Indeed, what especially stands 
out for the typical inquirer is the famous joke which places Kant himself at the center of a 
Ptolemaic worldview.  So rigidly punctual was his daily afternoon walk, the jibe goes, 
that his fellow citizens set their watches not so much by heeding the path of the arms of 
the town clock around its face as by tracking Kant‟s orbit around his miniature universe, 
his quiet tree-lined neighborhood.  As Heine puts it: 
 
The history of Kant‘s life is difficult to describe, for he neither had a life nor a 
history.  He lived a mechanically ordered, almost abstract, bachelor life in a quiet out-
of-the-way lane in Konigsberg….  I do not believe that the great clock of the 
cathedral there completed its task with less passion and less regularity than its fellow 
citizen Immanuel Kant.  Rising in the morning, drinking coffee, writing, giving 
lectures, eating, taking a walk, everything had its set time, and the neighbors knew 
precisely that the time was half past three o‘clock when Kant stepped outside his door 
in his grey, tight-fitting coat, Spanish reed in hand, and walked toward the small 
linden avenue….  Strange contrast between the outer life of this man and his 
destructive, world-crushing thoughts!  To be sure, had the citizens of Konigsberg had 
the least presentiment of the full significance of his ideas, they would have felt a far 
more awful dread in the presence of this man than at the sight of an executioner, who 
can but kill the body.
3
 
                                                   
3
 See Heine, 108-9. Arsenij Gulyga (p. xi) similarly quips that Kant ―has no biography other than the 
history of his thought.‖   
 3 
 
 But as his biographers tell us, Kant‘s regimen and health idiosyncrasies included 
much more than his daily ―constitutional‖ (as he called his walk).  For instance, we hear 
that he was so averse to perspiring that he would stop in the middle of whatever he was 
doing to step into a cool shadow, hold steady, refresh, and prevent himself from sweating.  
Only then would he again take up the task at hand.  Or, as he grew old he developed a 
number of rituals which were performed as if to stave off death:  He was supposedly 
afraid of mentioning the recently dead and he even kept in touch with Konigsberg‘s 
police chief to monitor the area‘s mortality rates and speculate upon his own life-
expectancy.  He disliked receiving gifts and would immediately ―re-gift‖ a present, to use 
our contemporary term, if possible.  In his last year he needed and performed the same 
elaborate bedtime ritual night after night, evenly and exactly placing his watch between 
the barometer and thermometer he kept near his bedside—all three items put there as 
metrics for the surveillance of the time, the weather, and, in the end, his health.  
Similarly, his daily dinner conversation with friends and guests just had to include talk 
about the weather.  According to his official biographer and intimate Jachmann, Kant 
spoke of nothing with greater interest than health, diet, hygiene, and prolonging life:  
―Perhaps no man who ever lived paid a more exact attention to his body and everything 
that affected it.‖4   
 This exacting self-attention to his body, however, made for some paradoxically 
somatic, if not contradictory, mental self-assessments.  While admitting to Marcus Herz, 
a physician and philosophical friend, that he was ―never actually sick‖ (10:231), for 
example, and while boasting when he was quite old that ―there was never anyone so 
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 See Stuckenberg, 173, 435-45, Scharfstein, 218-21, and Shell for all of these anecdotes and more.   
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healthy as myself,‖ Kant was nonetheless invariably touched if not always simply nagged 
by symptoms which, if not illnesses or diseases ―in themselves,‖ betrayed a certain and 
continuous susceptibility to illness and disease.  He had ―sensitive nerves,‖ he told his 
intimates many times.  It is guessed in this regard that although Kant commonly and 
intensely read medical texts and occasionally published critiques of these or included 
discussions of them (among other places) in his anthropological works, he may have 
visited the doctor — above and beyond his friend Herz — but once his entire adult life.  
This is the case, moreover, even though it‘s clear from his letters that he suffered deeply 
from ―winds‖ and constipation, especially during the so-called (and in this regard 
ironically named) ―silent decade‖ of 1770-1781.  Kant was sick in various obscure ways, 
in other words, during the period in which he invariably imagined that he would finish 
and publish his work in progress (what became the Critique of Pure Reason) in but a few 
more months—again and again, year upon year, imagining, wishing, and workingly 
enacting this same thing.
5
 
 It is only in 1798, however, a year often regarded as just past the beginning of his 
decline toward senility and death, that Kant publicly admits of his own health troubles.  
In his ―On the Power of the Mind to Master its Morbid Feelings by Sheer Resolution,‖ he 
tells us that this essay‘s thesis conforms directly to its title, or a version of it:   
 
Morally practical philosophy…provides a panacea which, though it is certainly not 
the complete answer to every [health] problem, must still be an ingredient in every 
prescription.  This panacea, however, is only a regimen to be adopted…. But an art of 
this sort presupposes, as its necessary condition, an ability that only philosophy, or 
the spirit of philosophy, can give.  The supreme task of the art of formulating a 
regimen, which refers to this spirit, is contained in the following thesis:   
 
                                                   
5
 The second epigraph above indicates that this event was underway as early as 1771.  See ―Letter to Herz,‖ 
June 7, 1771, (10:124). 
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On the Power of the Human Mind  
to Master its Morbid Feelings Merely by a Firm Resolution 
 
My examples confirming the possibility of this proposition cannot be drawn from 
other people‘s experiences, but, in the first instance, only from what I have 
experienced in myself; for they come from introspection…. To want to entertain 
others with the inner history of the play of my thoughts, which has subjective 
importance (for me) but no objective importance (valid for everyone), would be 
presumptuous, and I could justly be blamed for it.  But if this sort of introspection and 
what I found by it is something rather uncommon, which it is worthwhile for 
everyone to try though it must be pointed out to them, the nuisance of telling others 
about my private feelings can at least be excused. (7:98=313-14)
6
  
 
 The goal of this chapter is to develop a Kantian philosophy of health by 
extending, analyzing, and making use of the puzzle which Kant introduces here.  What is 
this puzzle?  Note on the one hand that in his thesis Kant names the power of resolution 
of the human mind, ―an ability that only philosophy, or the spirit of philosophy, can 
give,‖ as a ―moral‖ and ―objective‖ ingredient in all health, an ingredient transcendentally 
valid, in other words, for everyone without exception.  This health thesis corresponds 
generally, if certainly imperfectly, to the thesis of the second Critique, then, since in both 
cases the suggestion is that we ought to ascend to a vigorous kind of objectivity:  Much as 
the moral person ought not exclude herself, despite her inclination for self-exclusion, 
from the maxims, rules, and obligations reason suggests everyone as self and other-
respecting persons ought to live by, so similarly ought the ill person, in and despite the 
morbidities of her illness, not exclude herself from reason‘s obligation to live 
salubriously.  And yet on the other hand Kant immediately tells us that he has come to 
recognize this objective component of health through a ―subjective,‖ indeed, a ―private,‖ 
introspection concerning his feelings, his ―inclinations‖ (to use his terminology).  The 
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 Kant (1996), 311-327. This essay can be found in volume 7 of the Akademie edition (1902), Kants 
Gesammelte Schriften, Berlin: Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften.  I will call the essay 
the ―Sheer Resolution‖ essay for short.  
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puzzle this chapter will concern itself with, then, is just the puzzle that Kant himself 
subtly brings up here when he worries if he can construct an objective theory of health 
out of what ―in the first instance‖ is apparently a subjective and sensuous matter.  Indeed, 
this puzzle is the same as the ―conflict‖ which Kant mentions in the title of the section of 
his Conflict of the Faculties — ―The Conflict of the Philosophy Faculty with the Faculty 
of Medicine‖ — under which this ―Sheer Resolution‖ essay falls:  The conflict/puzzle 
concerns the status of health objectivity given the fancies and heteronomies of subjective 
experience.  What this objectivity is it will here be our job to discover, if possible. 
 Kant immediately deepens this puzzle, however, when he on the one hand admits 
to a lifelong effort to determine the causes of his personal health vicissitudes — since 
locating the ―causes‖ of health and illness would obviously be crucial for any regimented 
development of health — but on the other hand confesses to having a ―disposition‖ 
toward illness the very heart of which consists, in an almost philosophical fashion, in a 
putative inability to distinguish subjective from objective causes of health.  Now, this is a 
problem!  Indeed, we can imagine Kant secretly regulating the pulleys in his pockets, 
adjusting his socks, as he sat to confess the origins of his mature health habits in this, his 
non-hypochondriacal hypochondria:  
 
 The exact opposite of the mind‘s power to master its pathological feelings is 
hypochondria, the weakness of abandoning oneself despondently to general morbid 
feelings that have no definite object (and so making no attempt to master them by 
reason).  Since this sort of melancholia, hypochondria vaga [Kant‘s footnote here:  as 
distinguished from localized hypochondria, hypochondria intestinalis], has no 
definite seat in the body and is a creature of the imagination, it could also be called 
fictitious disease, in which the patient finds in himself symptoms of every disease he 
reads about in books.  The opposite of the mind‘s self-mastery, in other words, is 
fainthearted brooding about the ills that could befall one, and that one would not be 
able to withstand should they come.  It is a kind of insanity; for though some sort of 
unhealthy condition (such as flatulence or constipation) may be the source of it, this 
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state is not felt immediately, as it effects the senses, but is misrepresented 
[vorgespielt] as impending illness by inventive imagination.  And then the self-
tormenter (heautontimorumenos), instead of pulling himself together, summons the 
doctor‘s help.  But this does no good, since only he himself, by disciplining the play 
of his thoughts, can put an end to these harassing notions that arise involuntary—
notions, indeed, of diseases that could not be prevented if they were really 
forthcoming.  As long as a man is afflicted with this sickness we cannot expect him to 
master his morbid feelings by sheer resolution; for if he could do this, he would not 
be hypochondriacal.  A reasonable human being does not permit himself any such 
hypochondria; if uneasiness comes over him and threatens to develop into 
melancholia — that is, self-devised illness — he asks himself whether his anxiety has 
an object.  If he finds nothing that could furnish a valid reason for his anxiety, or if he 
sees that, were there really such a reason, nothing could be done to prevent its effect, 
he goes on, despite this claim of his inner feeling, to his agenda for the day; in other 
words, he leaves this oppression (which is then merely local) in its proper place (as if 
it had nothing to do with him), and turns his attention to the business at hand. 
 I myself have a natural disposition to hypochondria because of my flat and narrow 
chest, which leaves little room for the movement of the heart and lungs; and in my 
earlier years this disposition made me almost weary of life.  But by reflecting that if 
the cause of this oppression of the heart [Herzbeklemmung] was purely mechanical 
[and] nothing could be done about it, I soon came to pay no attention to it.  The result 
was that, while I felt the oppression in my chest, a calm and cheerful state prevailed 
in my mind, which did not fail to communicate itself to society, not by intermittent 
whims (as is usual with hypochondriacs), but purposely and naturally.  And since our 
joie de vivre depends more on what we freely do with life than on what we enjoy as a 
gift from it, mental work can set another kind of heightened vital feeling against the 
limitations that affect the body alone.  The oppression has remained with me, for its 
cause lies in my physical constitution.  But I have mastered its influence on my 
thoughts and actions by diverting my attention from this feeling as if it had nothing to 
do with me. (7:103-04=318-19) 
 
 If we reflect upon the almost subjectivist world-constructing strategy of Kant‘s 
Copernican revolution, we have to wonder how deeply this confession speaks of another 
kind of  philosophical revolution, one concerning the relation between philosophy and 
health.  For although Kant suggests quite common sensibly, for instance, that discovering 
an illness‘s objective cause is the first step towards overcoming that illness, nonetheless, 
since he‘s here writing about hypochondria, he also puts into question the very possibility 
of discovering what common sense generally — and even what Kant the philosopher, late 
in the passage — would consider to constitute an objective cause of illness or health.  It‘s 
 8 
precisely the form of Kant‘s descriptions, however, which, if noticed in relation to their 
specified and local content, allows us to see that hypochondria is an illness which divides 
and conflates subjectivity and objectivity and which even slyly slips between this very 
division and conflation.  If looked at carefully, in other words, Kant‘s ―objective‖ 
descriptions in the first paragraph begin to admit of (and certainly fall into tension with) 
his proposed ―subjective‖ disposition to hypochondria in the second paragraph, and vice 
versa.    
 In the first paragraph alone, however, a hypochondriacally disposed textuality 
begins to present itself.  As the passage opens, Kant offers a basic and guiding distinction 
between hypochondria vaga, as the subjectively-devised form of hypochondria which 
―has no definite seat in the body,‖ and localized hypochondrias, the objective causes of 
which are apparently always somatic.  After offering this clear distinction, however, and 
indeed, right on top of it, he more or less identifies h. vaga and localized hypochondria.  
By the end of the paragraph we witness ―mind‖ slipping into textual semblance with 
―body‖ and ―cause‖ slipping textually into semblance with ―symptom‖ (or ―effect‖) to the 
point where the two variables within each of these binaries begin to conflate:   
 
A reasonable human being does not permit himself any such hypochondria; if 
uneasiness comes over him and threatens to develop into melancholia — that is, self-
devised illness — he asks himself whether his anxiety has an object.  If he finds 
nothing that could furnish a valid reason for his anxiety, or if he sees that, were there 
really such a reason, nothing could be done to prevent its effect, he goes on, despite 
this claim of his inner feeling, to his agenda for the day; in other words, he leaves this 
oppression (which is then merely local) in its proper place (as if it had nothing to do 
with him), and turns his attention to the business at hand. [my emphasis] 
 
 One of Kant‘s considerations in this passage, or at least in the first half of it, is 
what ―a reasonable human being‖ will do if, to the question concerning whether his 
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anxiety has an object, he ―finds nothing that could furnish a valid reason for his anxiety.‖  
Although this is putatively one of the considerations early on, however, we find by the 
end of the passage — rightly or wrongly but certainly curiously — that there has been a 
shift away from this problem at least as a problem.  In other words, the problem is 
denied, in the psychoanalytic sense:  Though Kant seems ready early on to consider both 
the possibility and the problem of a subjectively-devised hypochondria vaga, a 
melancholia, in the reasonable person — thus suggesting that enlightenment reason might 
self-contain correlative irrational elements, as it were — by the end of the passage this 
―vaga‖ consideration has already, and thus slyly, been determined.  The ―reasonable‖ 
hypochondriac‘s lived difficulty of not being able as yet to find an object ―that could 
furnish a valid reason for his anxiety‖ has been pleasantly if paradoxically resolved in 
and as a resolutely ignorable localized hypochondria:  This apparently self-sickening but 
also apparently reasonable person suddenly needs, I emphasize, only to ―leave this 
oppression (which is then merely local) in its proper place (as if it had nothing to do with 
him).‖  For Kant, in other words, the melancholia to be ―reasonably‖ explored in terms of 
its non-objective and/or non-objectifying anxiety has already and slyly been objectified 
and, to this degree, ―cured‖ of anxiety.  So what was apparently a subjective anxiety 
beyond self-control is now suddenly only objectively caused and so, suddenly, 
subjectively insignificant, as if the body weren‘t even a part of the self!   
 The second instance of this sly and mutual slippage between mind and body and 
cause and symptom — which again conflates and divides the two variables in each of 
these binaries, marking a simultaneous slippage between subjectivity and objectivity — 
mirrors this first instance.  When Kant confesses to having faced a kind of despair earlier 
 10 
in his life, it seems likely that this despair was of a ―self-caused,‖ and thus melancholic, 
form.  But since his judgment that his constricted heart was the objective cause of his 
disposition seems (as a judgment) to be that which enabled him to resolutely ignore this 
acute despair, a despair making him ―almost weary of life,‖ and thus since it seems 
unlikely that he would or even could have fallen into this inimical weariness if at that 
earlier point he had judged or discovered his anxiety to be caused by a somatic 
constriction of this sort, it remains possible and even likely that Kant himself has here, to 
borrow his word, ―misrepresented‖ (vorgespielt) a vaga hypochondriacal difficulty, the 
experience of which lacks an object, as an objectively localized hypochondriacal solution 
(h. intestinalis, h. pectoris, or those in sequence, as we shall eventually see).  For to 
objectify an objectless anxiety — especially an anxiety anxious about its own 
objectlessness — is here to provide sickness an objective (and to this degree somewhat 
therapeutic) cause, which means that Kant may have somatized this ―illness,‖ in and 
despite himself, as a ―therapy.‖  He may have wishfully created his sense of an 
―objective‖ heart constriction as if to secretly ―remedy‖ what is then forgotten to have 
been a ―subjective‖ illness beyond subjective control.  So what neither the self-conscious 
mind nor the body can salubriously manage, here some other part of the mind and body, 
as if together, secretly ―manage.‖ 
 Let‘s interpret a bit more, to clarify:  Textually speaking, what Kant casts as if 
objectively in the first paragraph as a slippage among hypochondriacs in general between 
mind and body and between cause and symptom, he here slyly casts, and even partially 
performs, as a subjective slippage, something personal.  Here then is the key:  In both 
cases, somatically localized hypochondriacal causes seem already to contain or to be a 
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―misrepresented‖ vaga hypochondriacal form just as the mental symptoms of h. vaga 
seem already to contain or to be the somatic causes of localized hypochondria.  So much, 
then, for unambiguous philosophical distinctions.  What we have instead is a divisive 
conflation of mind and body, cause and effect, and, most generally, subject and object.  
Mind and body are seemingly separated as if they are unambiguously distinct and even 
distant, and yet, the more they are explored in terms of Kant‘s self-relation to 
hypochondria, the more we, if perhaps not Kant, recognize that this attempted separation 
also deeply (con)fuses them. 
 This being the case, it is unclear in the end whether Kant is confessing in the 
―Sheer Resolution‖ essay to suffering or to having suffered — or even to never having 
suffered! — from either hypochondria vaga or from localized hypochondria, or even 
whether, as a sufferer of both of these hypochondriacal kinds (perhaps at once, perhaps in 
―reasonable‖ transition), he is somehow performing the mind-body and cause-symptom 
―conflicts‖ this disposition, objectively speaking from the viewpoint of philosophy, 
apparently subjectively devolves.  The borders within and between each of these 
dualisms are thrown into question, in other words, despite and in the attempted 
clarification and confession.  Indeed, since the confessional phrase ―disposition to 
hypochondria‖ sounds as much like an unactualized tendency to self-devised illness as an 
actualized tendency to self-devised illness, we can be sure neither about the lived status 
of Kant‘s possible hypochondria nor — given the common and supposedly objective 
portrayal of this illness as self-fulfilling sickness and disease — about his subjective and 
objective descriptions of it.  For, again, it is precisely subjectivity and objectivity which 
―hypochondria‖ conflates in terms of health and illness.   
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Despite this mess or apparent mess, however, the mess does have a structure, 
namely, as a disavowal of a divisive conflating — a mirroring or slippage, as it were, 
between the identity and splitting — of mind and body, cause and symptom, subject and 
object.
7
  Indeed, what this mirroring does show us — as critical philosophers, despite and 
in the disavowal — is that nearer the root of vaga hypochondria, of melancholia, there is 
yet another, deeper slippage, another ambivalence of splitting and identity, this time 
however between wishful thinking and actuality.8  When Kant writes of hypochondria 
that it is ―a kind of insanity‖ he has this last slippage somewhere ―in mind.‖9  The anxiety 
which Kant mentions is key here, then, and key precisely in relation to the ―objects‖ of 
sickness, therapy, and health (all of which interpenetrate and overlap like Greek 
pharmaka, as poison and cure).10  In short:  The hypochondriac has a basic anxiety that 
he‘s falsely making up or at least misrepresenting his illness-, remedial-, and health-
objects in a series of self-fulfilling prophecies, as this or that self-produced 
objectification.  He feels ill or at least feels on the verge of being ill but is not quite sure 
if he‘s ill or, rather, illness-disposed.  He worries about impending and felt illnesses but 
for all of his worry he can find no ―definite‖ reason for this.  The problem thus emerges 
as one steeped and rooted, or at least routed, in anxiety and in anxious thinking.  
Although his anxiety may at times feel somatic or somatically caused, for instance, he 
can‘t be sure whether it is somatic, somatically-based, or not.  Maybe his various 
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 I realize that this is a complicated way of putting this, but in my judgment it is accurate enough.  The 
paradox here, moreover, is not accidental but unnaturally ―natural‖ to the object of melancholia for which 
we are trying to account. 
8
 In Part Two of this dissertation, we will explore in Marx this same ambivalence between splitting and 
identity as another pre-Freudian precursor to the psychoanalytic idea that development and health hinge 
together on the necessity of primitive disavowal.   What again might seem to some here as Kant‘s 
―accidental‖ emphasis on wishing and wishful-thinking is not accidental in this regard. 
9
 In Part Two, we will also further explore the historicizing relation between the materiality and somatics of 
primitive writing and the use of inscriptive symbols as objects of developmental health. 
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 See for example Derrida (1978) and Girard. 
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symptoms, he worries, are ―fictitious‖ and therefore ―insanely‖ made-up.11  Since ―the 
hypochondriac‖ worries about this state of affairs persistently, almost constantly, 
moreover, the very content of his anxiety ends up being largely, if not always precisely, 
about this anxiety‘s objectivity.  Is this reasonable?  Of course not, since anxious 
worrying to the point of illness is never reasonable, and yet, to the degree that the anxiety 
is felt and worried about, it is precisely reasonable to wonder whence it comes and how 
to void or avoid it.  The problem, however, is that with h. vaga these two aspects of 
anxiety are conflated.  Indeed, it is in this sense — concerning the deep critical concern 
over and between thinking and objectivity — that hypochondria and philosophy, no 
doubt, may not always be in conflict or identity.
12
   
 The hypochondriac, then, does not simply ask ―himself whether his anxiety has an 
object.‖  Rather, since the anxiety seems to have no cause behind it — which is reason 
enough, he thinks, for his anxiety! — he doesn‘t simply ask or wonder about but wants an 
objective cause of it.  He desires such a cause, an objective cause, and not just of it, then, 
but for it as well.  Thus, when Kant shows us (in more ways than one) that the reasonable 
person who is faced with not being able to find a ―definite‖ objective cause of his anxiety 
suddenly and somehow can and does, since he‘s reasonable, leave this anxiety in a 
―proper,‖ ―local‖ place, he shows us exactly what the hypochondriac most desires in an 
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 Marx relates the production of cyclical crises in capitalist culture to the production of fictitious capital.  
This will perhaps be my next area of research.  See Harvey, chapters 10 and 11, especially.   
12
 By ―objectivity,‖ I — like Kant (and Marx as well, as we shall see) — will continue to mean a number of 
things which cannot be neatly isolated in experience even if they are philosophically codifiable.   
―Objectivity‖ is the noun, static form of the transformation of precognitive things into objects of cognition, 
much as Kant‘s ―things in themselves‖ (which we cannot directly cognize) are transformed into and root 
the ―objects of experience.‖  But by ―objectivity‖ I will also have in mind the epistemic and scientific 
concern to abstract from subjectivity and its biases to judge something with a sense of disinterest.  Indeed, 
it is my contention that for Kant this latter form of objectivity hinges developmentally on and is produced 
through the (―transcendental‖) production of the objects of the former form.  Objectivity of judgment 
hinges on and is bound to the use of things in the developmental distinguishing of subjective fantasy and 
objective resistance to fantasy, as we shall see. 
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as-if self-fulfilling way.  The latter‘s basic empirical wish is to locate the cause of his 
anxiety (i.e. the anxiety that this very anxiety is falsely made up) in an object beyond the 
scope of his wishing, since only then could he be sure, certain that this ―causal object‖ 
was not falsely produced by ―himself,‖ given the desperate strength of his desire for it, in 
and as a kind of hallucination.  The vicious circularity here is obvious, no doubt 
especially for the person vexed in this way:  Since his wish for an objective cause of his 
condition is, in fact, a wish for an object to appear beyond the reach of this very wishing 
for it, if such an object does at some point appear to have arrived, its localization as a 
definite causal object will necessarily point back to the possibility — if he remains 
melancholic — that he‘s produced it through an hallucinatory wishing, a ―sheer‖ if 
fictitious ―resolution‖ perhaps, which means that his wish to overcome his anxiety is a 
futile one, or at least apparently so.    
 So let‘s examine this wish in a little more detail.  The fact that the hypochondriac 
wants the cause of her anxious experience to appear objectively beyond her wishing for 
such a cause implies that what she needs is not so much (or just) this causal object (which 
apparently promises to soothe to the degree that it gives suffering a reason, making it 
reasonable); what she also needs before or together with the object‘s objectification is a 
disavowal or forgetting of her (at least melancholic) wishing for it, for only via such a 
disavowal, apparently, could this object appear as distinctly beyond her wishing and so, 
by her current melancholic standards, as what we might call an ―objectivist object,‖ 
something objective ―in-itself,‖ rather than as an object the objectification of which still 
largely or solely hinges on the power of her subjective wishing.  So here again we 
encounter the disavowal that Kant‘s himself was apparently faced with.  This structural 
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link between therapeutic objectivity and the need to disavow desire, however, should 
remind us not just of hypochondriacal experience but of a more common health 
phenomenon.  Where else do we find disavowal, if not quite so obviously the need for 
disavowal, in the coming to appearance of an objective cause of health?  Indeed, where 
else in what we today call healthcare do we witness what appear to be divisively 
conflational slippages between the subjective and the objective, the mental and the 
somatic, the symptomatic and the causal, and the wishful and the actual in the search for 
health‘s objective causality?  We find these slippages, of course — and indeed, to be 
more precise we see a kind of wishing beneath and within the appearance of health‘s 
causes — in what are called placebo effects.    
 Take the example of a woman who, believing she has taken medicines bioactively 
specific for treating her ailment, insists that she is recovering or has recovered despite the 
fact that she did not take bioactive remedies but instead ―blindly‖ took what are called 
―dummy‖ remedies, such as water-filled caplets, which (let us suggest) have been given 
to her on the sly.  There are plenty of interpretations about what has happened here worth 
considering.  For the moment, though, let‘s stick with two perspectives which we can 
understand as readily or typically conforming to those of our two characters, namely, to 
the patient and to the person or doctor who knowingly slipped her the dummy pills.  
According to the latter‘s perspective, the patient‘s ―recovery,‖ to put it mildly, is more 
subjectively than objectively caused.  Dummy pills are used as placebos in therapeutic 
trials, after all, precisely because they can and do serve as ―controls‖ against which to test 
―real‖ drugs for what might be called the latter‘s objectively causal therapeutic 
properties.  And biomechanically speaking, a water-caplet has no, or at least very little, 
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objectively causal or ―causally active‖ therapeutic properties, especially when compared 
(as here) to other chemical compounds.  Indeed, extending this logic to its limit, someone 
might conclude that our patient recovered solely from psychologically subjective causes, 
that is, precisely because she expected to recover or believed that her ―remedy‖ was a 
bioactive one.  The recent ―expectation theory‖ of placebo effects offered and defended 
by many biologists and psychologists alike, for example, directly and merely 
determinately links the actualizing powers of expectation to the patient‘s belief in the 
object‘s ―natural‖ therapeutic causality.  From the point of view steeped in our patient‘s 
experience, however, her recovery was not subjectively, and certainly not merely 
subjectively, caused.  If asked, she would minimally likely assert that a biomedical drug 
was causally active alongside or together with her mental expectations.  Maximally, 
however, since she took the ―drug‖ precisely to recover, she might disavow her desire for 
health altogether and assert that the ―drug‖ alone, the ―thingly‖ pill ―itself,‖ was causally 
and objectivistically responsible for her recovery. 
 This last possibility, then, resembles Kant‟s self-experience of recovery, or at 
least on a critical reading of the ―Sheer Resolution‖ essay it does.  Kant tells us that he 
was melancholically anxious and ill to the point of wearying of life; but then later he 
seems to have found that his Herzbeklemmung was alone causally responsible for this 
anxiety; which meant in turn, he says, that he could now finally ignore this anxiety.  His 
anxiety dissipated, he suggests, when he later found it to have an earlier cause, and so an 
objectivistic cause.  But from our perspective this tension between what is taken later to 
have already been at work earlier cannot be so easily smoothed over.  Similarly, Kant‘s 
―subjective‖ description of his experience is interesting precisely to the degree that it 
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matches the ―objective‖ description he had just given of the ―reasonable person‖ faced 
with melancholic anxieties and wishes.  And certainly there is a kind of ―reasonableness‖ 
here even if it‘s steeped — indeed, precisely insofar as it invariably remains possibly 
steeped — in this disavowal that we will continue to investigate:  For Kant does 
pleasantly if paradoxically ―resolve‖ the hypochondriacal difficulty of not being able to 
find an object beyond his wishes ―that could furnish a valid reason for his anxiety‖; he 
does this precisely by ―finding‖ this object as if it had arrived from beyond the reach of 
his wishes.  Since we, however, have noticed a structural convergence and perhaps even a 
structural identity between the hypochondriacal need for disavowing desire and the 
disavowing ―as if‖ judgment hidden within the experience of a placebo effect — where 
the subject [mis]takes his object to be an objectivistic one — we should here go where 
Kant himself seems to have been unable or unwilling to go.  We must ask whether his 
solution could itself be a ―placeboic‖ disavowal of desire, a cognitive self-blinding 
undergone in the name of and need for ―recovery.‖  Indeed, if Kant is right to suggest, 
however vaguely, that health for the hypochondriac can appear when his or her 
melancholia ―objectively‖ disappears, we will have to investigate whether there is some 
secret relation between health and its apparent obvert, hypochondria. 
 If we understand Kant‘s descriptions as flatly as possible, and indeed, if we 
compare one of his basic suggestions about the relation between mind and body to the 
essay‘s title, we can suggest that Kant is not self-blinding himself:  When he suggests that 
―mental work can set another kind of heightened vital feeling against the limitations that 
affect the body alone,‖ the ―sheer‖ of the essay‘s title converges upon this ―alone‖ to 
advocate a kind of ―mind over matter‖ health psychologism.  If this psychologism is 
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acceptable or accepted, then it‘s not too difficult to accept how Kant brings his discussion 
of hypochondria to an end, namely, once again, by suggesting that he himself had 
mastered his erstwhile illness by subjectively ignoring its objective cause.  Flatly and 
uncritically understood, in other words, Kant‘s health ducks appear to be in an 
unproblematic psycho-causal row.  Sheer mental resolution, as the essay‘s title indicates, 
can master the illnesses and limitations which stem from the body alone.   
 On this idealist reading, however, especially if the ―resolution‖ belonging to 
―sheer resolution‖ is itself thought too purely, too ―sheerly,‖ Kant‘s analyses of 
hypochondria as an illness which is at least partly psychic become incoherent.  Regarding 
his own case, for example, does it not remain possible, especially given his prior 
admissions, that his judgment that his Herzbeklemmung was the cause of his 
hypochondriacal disposition is, as a judgment, both anxiously motivated and so 
hypochondriacally determined, at least in part?  We uncovered this possibility above in a 
variety of ways:  If someone wants an ―objective cause‖ to appear so as to ―resolve‖ a 
subjective anxiety about this anxiety‘s apparent causelessness, its apparent idiopathy, 
then if this cause appears as if objectively the ―as if‖ here cannot easily or simply be 
dismissed, disregarded, or dissolved.  For one could never know if one‘s wishes played a 
part or role in the appearance of the object.  Thus, more particularly, if someone later 
comes to judge a local area of the physical body ―alone‖ as the objective cause of a 
hypochondriacal anxiety which pre-existed this judgment, then this newly discovered 
objective cause, like a placebo, may very well both disavow and localize — here, it may 
very well be a somatization of — the anxious desire to make objective what was 
experienced as a desperate kind of objectlessness.  From a philosophical and, yes, a 
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Kantian point of view, an objective cause of health is not and could never be an object 
―in-itself,‖ an objectivistic object:  To the degree that when we‘re ill we wish for health, 
any object that stands out as a health object or cause will have to be recognized at least as 
bearing traces of a psychic, wishful event.  A health object, in other words, is always 
psychically objectified at least in part.  As a trace or as something bearing traces, 
however, it is also not a psychic or, more specifically, a cognitive event pure and simple, 
as the ―expectation‖ theorists believe is possible and often actual.  An object cannot be a 
mere hallucination even though hallucinations appear to be objective to the hallucinating 
subject.
13
  From a philosophical point of view, in other words, an object is never merely 
objective or merely subjective, never merely psychic or merely, say, nonpsychic or 
physical.  Rather, when some thing is an object — and this is consistent with Kant‘s 
terminology — it is already a managed and mediated relation of and between the psychic 
and the nonpsychic or material.   
 This brings us, or in fact returns us, to the one unambiguous if all too brief 
statement in the ―Sheer Resolution‖ essay where Kant directly addresses the problem of 
relating subject to object and mind to body without divisively conflating these binaries.  
He declares early on, we recall, that as a lived and determinate practice a regimen 
nonetheless somehow refers to its ―necessary condition,‖ the ―spirit of philosophy.‖  How 
does a regimen refer a mentally sheer philosophical spirit to our bodily experience of 
objects and vice versa?  How does it balance the ―panacea‖ of moral objectivity with the 
subjective heteronomy of ―feeling‖?  Kant does not elaborate here — and, in fact, right 
                                                   
13
 When a hallucinator sees a ―a monster‖ moving across the room, for example, his eyes objectively move 
as if they were following this mental object through the air.  So, more properly understood, the apparently 
―sheer‖ subjectivity of the hallucination is a kind of ―objective subjectivity,‖ if we may call it that—at least 
to the degree that the eyes are objects which can be studied in their somatic relation to the brain.  To deny 
this type of concern would be to deny that drugs, for instance, can help the so-called ―mentally‖ ill. 
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where he seems ready to investigate this ―necessary condition,‖ he slips into an 
investigation of the objective causes of health and illness — but at least he provides us 
with an explicit clue:  A health regimen, he twice indicates, can produce health as an 
effect neither through mental resolution alone (this despite his apparent thesis) nor 
through somatic corrigibility alone (this despite the apparent causal ―heart‖ of his illness) 
but precisely insofar as a regimen‘s practice as an art refers, and so relates, philosophy‘s 
resolute spirit to whatever else remains, beyond and resistant to this spirit, in this practice 
nonetheless.  He names the ill person‘s ―supreme task,‖ in fact, not simply the following 
of a regimen, as if adherence or conformity to imperatives were health incarnate, but the 
―art of formulating a regimen, which refers to this spirit,‖ as if health has something to do 
with creating health and, in particular, with creating (reflectively determinate yet) 
meaningful objects.  Indeed, since a regimen as an artistic practice can be said to mediate 
the difference between its necessary philosophical condition and the experience of 
objectivity, we can say that health appears through regimens neither purely 
psychologically, cognitively, naturally, nor somatically, but insofar as psyche, cognition, 
nature, and the body ―cross‖ or ―overlap‖ to create placeboic health objects which the 
subject can meaningfully if half-naively use.   
We have thus created a tripartite hypothesis, namely, (a) that health and illness, 
despite first appearances, are aesthetic categories, (b) that a disciplined artistic practice 
somehow mediates the difference between its necessary condition and the experience of 
objectivity, and (c) that this objectivity (which remains our broadest category of 
philosophical investigation and critique) can be best understood as a distinct — what will 
turn out to be a critically Kantian — sort of ―placebo effect.‖   
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 There must be a different relation in health and illness, then, between subject and 
object, psyche and soma, cause and symptom, and especially between wish and actuality 
than we see in the hypochondriacal disavowal which enables Kant to offer his sheer 
resolution thesis.  And to understand that different relation we need to take seriously his 
comments about regimen, practice, and especially artistic creation.  For there are 
apparently various unseen details taking place within artistic regimens which enable 
health‘s appearance but which hypochondriacal disavowal covers over.  How, then, might 
we examine aesthetic practice?  Rather than steep ourselves in yet another of Kant‘s 
medico-theoretical texts and rather than relying on his precritical Observations on the 
Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, let‘s turn to his third and culminating Critique.  For 
this text, of course, is critically concerned with the issue of aesthetic objectification. 
 In the Critique of Judgment, Kant transcendentally isolates and variously 
examines the divisive conflations, slippages, and movements which we have here been 
joining to call disavowal.  He calls this process ―subreption.‖  Like what Marx will call 
―fetishization‖ and like what a wing of psychoanalysis will call ―sublimation‖ (as we 
shall discover in Part Two), subreption is a culturally productive form of disavowal.  By 
necessarily disavowing the conditions for the possibility of experience, this form of 
judgmental praxis produces objects of culture and valuation, and so of development and 
health to boot.  In the rest of Part One, then, we shall investigate how Kant isolates and 
examines subreption and how he relates the conflations and slippages it bears to the 
movements and relation of development and health.  While his analysis is subtle — as if 
he was learning about subreption while undergoing it in and through the processes of 
learning and of writing about it — we shall eventually discover that subreption is a not-
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merely-mechanistic developmental mechanism.  Indeed, it is the reflective seed not just 
of judgment but of judgment‘s continuous growth, a growth which exhibits itself 
performatively in and as a series of forms (or even stages) of developmental 
objectification.  Before we examine these forms of objectification which subreptively 
exhibit subreptive movement, however, we will first turn to a couple of moments where 
Kant isolates what turns out to be the pre-subreptive ―ground‖ of subreption.  Kant calls 
this ground transcendental desire, but through further analysis we will end up calling it 
fantastic objectification to the degree that desire‘s power of fantasy, its power of wishing, 
turns out to be the noumenal source of the making of culture, growth, and health.  For 
Kant, in other words, the noumenal ―ground‖ of salubrious development is idealized 
wish-fulfillment, the power of wishing in general to condition the appearance of the 
world of objects in general.
14
  In any case, subreption‘s work first appears, 
developmentally speaking, in and through the failure of fantastic objectification.  
Subreption is this failure, but it is also this failure automatically covered over, in 
disavowal, in and as the worldly appearances we call subjects and objects.   
I therefore next examine the developmental trajectory of subreptive development.  
As it turns out, subreption first appears, on the back of the failure of pure fantasy, as a 
kind of somatization, an objectification which will remind us immediately of Kant‘s 
Herzbeklemmung but which transcendentally refers us to the process of the origination of 
the distinction between mind and body in every human being.
15
  Through further 
subreptive slippage, this somatization takes on the appearance of what I end up calling 
magical ritualization.  For it turns out that when mind and body are first distinguished, it 
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 Though we will not emphasize this, this phenomenon is eventually recognized and conceptualized by 
psychoanalysis as the pleasure principle‘s ability to condition the appearance of the reality principle.   
15
 The thumb- and fist-sucking of infants exhibits this process well, that is, once we are prepared to see it. 
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is not cognitive or moral understanding which immediately emerges but rather the 
fantasy-based production and use of magical and religious ritual.  The failure of fantastic 
objectification produces both new objects and new needs, in other words, and these end 
up taking the form, developmentally speaking, of magical thinking in and through 
practices and objects.  At this point, I follow Kant in trying to provide an overall 
conceptualization of this developmental process in the notion of symbolization.   For 
Kant, symbols do not simply represent morality, as is explicitly specified, for instance, 
late in the third Critique.  Moreso, they embody the subreptive movement from 
sensuousness toward morality and from desire toward the self-reflective cognition of 
experience.  Thus, as we shall see, for Kant development does not take place merely as a 
linear process of continuous growth.  Rather, to the degree that cultural objects of value 
symbolize both the persistence of perfect archaic wishing and the persistence of its 
failures, development is always self-challenged, ―as if‖ hypochondriacally.  I thus return 
in the end to what I call Kant‘s placeboic conception of the relation between development 
and health.   
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Chapter II 
 
PLACEBOIC STRUCTURE, AESTHETIC NEED 
 
Subreption 
 A careful reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment in the Critique of 
Judgment confirms that there is, minimally, a structural identity between the problem of 
health as cast by Kant in the ―Sheer Resolution‖ essay and the problem of taste.  Pluhar‘s 
introduction to his translation of the third Critique contains a passage which nicely 
summarizes the latter problem:   
 
The problem with these judgments [i.e. judgments of taste or beauty] is roughly the 
following:  When we call something ‗beautiful‘ we seem to do so on the basis of a 
certain liking, a certain feeling of pleasure; and pleasure is something very subjective.  
And yet it seems that in such a judgment we say more than ‗I like the thing.‘  For in 
using the adjective ‗beautiful‘ we talk as if beauty were some sort of property of the 
thing, and hence we imply that other people, too, should see that ‗property‘ and hence 
should agree with our judgment.
16
 
 
 What Pluhar here calls an ―as if‖ relation obviously resembles what we have been 
calling a relation of slippage or, more particularly, a placeboic relation.  In a judgment of 
taste regarding an object, there is a pleasure or displeasure which the subject feels and 
judges to be caused by the object and its properties, at least to some degree, but which 
from outside this perspective seems to be brought to or projected upon the object by the 
subject with her inclinations, expectations, interests, etc.   
                                                   
16
 Kant, 1987, xxiv.  Pluhar‘s introduction precedes Kant‘s own (second) Introduction. All citations of the 
Critique of Judgment will here begin with the Hackett edition‘s page numbers followed by the equivalent 
Akademie edition‘s page numbers. 
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 Although many third Critique critics take notice of this problem (as Pluhar has 
cast it here, for instance), rarely do they suggest that what we have been calling a 
slippage between subject and object might be crucial for understanding the text in its 
entirety or, indeed, for understanding the holistic whole of Kantian critique.  And 
actually, given the dearth of Kant‘s own explicit analysis on this idea of slippage, this is 
to be expected.  Instead, we are expected to learn about the slippage, including the 
divisive conflation of subject and object, by paying attention to other concerns, even 
though in the meantime a relation between subject and object is being painted, as it were.  
Indeed, I stand to be corrected here, but so far as I can tell, only in the Critique of 
Judgment‘s first Introduction (410=222‘), on the one hand, and when Kant turns from the 
Analytic of the Beautiful to the Analytic of the Sublime, on the other hand, does he track 
and analyze this slippage explicitly, naming it ―subreption‖ in but a single sentence of 
section twenty-seven, to which we will turn in a moment.   
 Mentioned in the third Critique but twice, it nonetheless turns out that Kant had 
introduced the idea of ―subreption‖ some twenty years earlier in his Inaugural 
Dissertation of 1770.
17
  Dividing subreption into ―logical‖ and ―metaphysical‖ types and 
developing from these types three kinds of subreptive axioms, he there describes the 
―fallacy of subreption‖ as the ―intellect‘s trick‖ of ―[passing] off what is sensitive as if it 
necessarily belonged to a concept of the understanding.‖  Consistent with this but more 
precisely relevant to our purposes here are Kant‘s first and third subreptive axioms.  His 
first axiom (§27) marks as a ―prejudice,‖ as a definitively empiricist bias, the assertion 
that ―whatever is, is somewhere and somewhen‖ while his third axiom critiques 
assertions which impart to objects the ―conditions which are peculiar to subjects‖ (§29).   
                                                   
17
 Kant, 1992, 373-416.  For a different translation, see Kant, 1929, 74-85.   
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 How and why, then, does Kant reintroduce subreption in the third Critique?  The 
need for subreption opens up, or rather opens up as a need to be explicitly addressed, 
when Kant‘s investigations of the sublime lead him astray of the realm of objects and 
objective experience as if to something sheer and objectless.  According to Kant‘s précis 
of sublimity in section 25, for example, ―…nothing that can be an object of the senses is 
to be called sublime.  What happens is that our imagination strives to progress toward 
infinity, while our reason demands absolute totality as a real idea, and so the imagination, 
our power of estimating the magnitude of things in the world of sense, is inadequate to 
that idea.  Yet this inadequacy itself is the arousal in us of the feeling that we have within 
us a supersensible power‖ (106=250).  
 And yet, while here and throughout the entire Analytic of the Sublime Kant 
emphasizes that ―the sublime‖ is not an objective thing and that properly speaking 
sublimity is merely intelligible and not sensible, nonetheless we also find him describing 
what external sublime objects, and what the experiences of those objects, are or would 
have to be like.  Indeed, despite his consistent guarded emphasis that the sublime is 
merely the supersensible (and so ―sheer‖) power of the human mind to elevate itself 
towards and grasp the moral ideas of reason, which are in-themselves (since beyond the 
understanding‘s concepts) objectless, Kant both (a) occasionally offers examples of what 
he himself calls ―sublime objects‖ and (b) mentions at various points that the feeling of 
sublimity is not just intelligibly caused but is caused by an object insofar as the latter 
serves as the site where a complex empirical mix of displeasure and pleasure is initiated 
in and for the subject.  Kant mentions St. Peter‘s Basilica in Rome, for example:  Anyone 
who walks into this edifice, he says, ―has the feeling that his imagination is inadequate 
 27 
for exhibiting the idea of a whole, a feeling in which imagination reaches its maximum, 
and as it strives to expand that maximum, it sinks back into itself, but consequently 
comes to feel a liking that amounts to an emotion‖ (109=252).  The object here seems to 
be the ―source,‖ or at least the trigger or catalyst, of awe if not of the awe itself.  Indeed, 
the awe is seemingly the ―consequence‖ of the object and its forces producing a feeling in 
the imagination. 
 Indeed, Kant offers plenty of descriptions which render sublimity objectless and 
yet somehow at the same time, despite his more obvious and guarded emphases, as 
objectively cast, a trigger of what is only then seen to be ―objectless‖ or a ―true‖ 
sublimity.  Thus, the paradox of an objectless objectivity which haunted both 
hypochondriacal experience and Kant‟s ambiguous analysis of hypochondria  is at work 
here, more than latently, in sublime experience.  Take the following example.  ―True 
sublimity,‖ says Kant, ―must be sought only in the mind of the judging person, not in the 
natural object the judging of which prompts this mental attunement‖ (111=254).  On a 
first approach, this statement might seem simple and unidirectional.  Since psychic 
subjectivity and natural objectivity are apparently separated off from each other and the 
subject‘s feeling is said to consist in a relation located in the former but ―not‖ in the 
latter, not in the natural object, the structure of sublimity looks just like the structure of 
melancholic hypochondria.  ―Properly speaking,‖ they are both ―vaga‖ conditions, 
objectless.  And yet, at the same time, Kant also indicates that the natural object, or at 
least the occasion of judging it, ―prompts‖ sublimity, so it‘s clear that sublimity would 
not even arise were it not for this ―object,‖ minimally, as prompt.  Indeed, it‘s as if only 
certain natural and artificial objects, with particular awe-inspiring characteristics or 
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properties, could be sublime enough to serve as the occasion for, for catalyzing or 
prompting, sublimity in the human subject.  And so suddenly the structure of sublime 
experience looks like the structure not of h. vaga but of localized hypochondria—as a 
―reasonable person‖ would see sublimity!  Indeed, why are many of us, like Kant, 
inclined to call St. Peter‘s Basilica sublime but not the simple house which sits around the 
corner from it?  Indeed, why does he suggest that we consider sublime not this pebble or 
that cloud or this little hill or this light breeze but, instead, ―bold, overhanging and, as it 
were, threatening rocks, thunderclouds piling up in the sky and moving about 
accompanied by lightning and thunderclaps, volcanoes with all their destructive power, 
hurricanes…‖ (120=261)?  His reasoning partly suggests, against the highlighting of 
sublimity‘s objectlessness, that the feeling of the sublime has, at least at some level, an 
―objective‖ cause:  ―[W]e like to call these objects sublime,‖ he continues, ―because they 
raise the soul‘s fortitude above its usual middle range and allow us to discover in 
ourselves an ability to resist which is of quite a different kind, and which gives us the 
courage to believe that we could be a match for nature‘s seeming omnipotence‖ 
(120=261, my emphases).
18
  These examples and others like them to be found in these 
sections are admittedly subtle and, again, if they‘re compared to Kant‘s regular and 
explicit defense of the sublime as the mind‘s supersensibility, these passages might be 
interpreted as mistakes, as instances of Kant briefly losing track of his analysis and 
objectifying noumenal objectlessness. 
 If this were the case, however, then his reintroduction of the notion of subreption 
soon after giving these examples would stand out as an incoherent codicil.  He would not 
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 This reference to omnipotence is not accidental, as we will see when we examine the notion of fantasy in 
its relation to primitive wishing in both Marx and a branch of psychoanalysis.   
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need to or even be able to name this slippage from objectlessness to objectivity if he 
weren‘t aware of it as something like ―slippage,‖ and if he weren‘t also aware of it as a 
problem.  Rather than mostly disparaging subreption as a fallacy or mistake in need of 
correction as he did twenty years before, however, Kant here presents subreption more 
positively.  He indicates that without subreption — even if it is fallacious, mistaken, or a 
kind of self-trickery — we could not possibly have an experience of the sublime.  
―Experience‖ in the Kantian rubric, after all, is comprised of subjects in phenomenal 
relation to objects.  As Kant had put this in the Critique of Pure Reason, ―…the 
conditions of the possibility of experience in general are likewise conditions of the 
possibility of the objects of experience and…for this reason they [i.e. the conditions] 
have objective validity‖ (A 158=B 197, my emphasis).  This is a crucial and basic 
Kantian insight, perhaps the basic insight.  Notice, too, the double sense of ―objectivity.‖  
On the one hand objectivity refers to the ―things,‖ or rather, the objects of experience, the 
this and that which we encounter, like the small house or sublime basilica, in experience.  
But on the other hand objectivity also points to understanding the world not just privately 
but more widely, more understandingly and even scientifically, and so more objectively.  
The question, then, is how a subject can have an objective experience of something which 
is in itself and properly speaking, as Kant repeatedly insists, objectless and 
supersensible.  How, for Kant, does sublime experience ―take place‖?  The answer which 
he gives — which is not merely a cognitive or psychologistic response but a critical one 
— is that sublime experience takes place exactly through the deceiving and mistaken but 
necessary objectification, the objective disavowal or (mis)presentation, of nonobjective 
conditions.  Here then is Kant‘s brief statement on subreption: 
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[T]he feeling of the sublime in nature is respect for our own vocation.  But by a 
certain subreption (in which respect for the object is substituted for respect for the 
idea of humanity within ourselves as subjects) this respect is accorded an object of 
nature that, as it were, makes intuitable for us the superiority of the rational vocation 
of our cognitive powers over the greatest power of sensibility. (114=257, my 
emphases) 
 
 This, then, is why the first and third of Kant‘s pre-critical subreptive axioms 
remain relevant to this elegant objectifying — which critically is to say transcendental — 
trick:  If we are to intuit or experience the sublime, this experience, if not its vaga 
condition per se, must have a ―somewhere and somewhen,‖ which is to say that our 
(falsely) attributing to a particular object of nature or art the ―conditions which are 
peculiar to subjects‖ is simply how these as a priori or supersensible conditions are made 
intuitable and available for experience.  The experience of a sublime object such as St. 
Peter‘s Basilica, in other words, is the (mis)experience of the intelligible conditions of 
this experience.
19
  Indeed, this (mis)attribution has cognitive relevance in terms of our 
(secretively placeboic) experience of causality.  The sublime object appears as the cause 
of a mix of pleasure and displeasure in the subject, but critically speaking there are also 
supersensible conditions, conditions which cannot be directly intuited, which lie (as I will 
here put it) behind and within (or ―in and as‖) the sensible experience of this cause.  
―Cause and effect,‖ as categories of experience and understanding, are thus secretly 
framed by a secret power of ―causality.‖ 
 In fact, if we now turn from the sublime back to beauty we find that despite the 
fact that Kant makes no explicit mention of subreption in his sections on taste and art and 
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 I put the ―mis‖ in parentheses to show that the mistake belongs, albeit largely invisibly or ―under 
erasure,‖ to this experience.  The mistake is a necessary though little-acknowledged part or aspect of the 
process of objectification. 
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despite his efforts to otherwise distinguish the beautiful and the sublime, beauty also 
―takes place‖ through subreptive slippage.  Kant only builds up to this, however.  He 
creatively develops it.20  As soon as the third Critique opens we don‘t see him officially 
marking out a slippery and puzzling relationship between the pleasure-causing status of 
subjectivity in relation to objectivity, as Pluhar‘s summary of the problem of taste 
suggests he should, so much as we see him emphasizing that judgments of taste, as he 
soon seemingly emphasizes concerning judgments of the sublime, are strictly and 
basically subjective.  Recalling that for Kant a cognitive judgment is one in which 
imagination combines a manifold of intuition which the understanding‘s unifying 
categories objectively and schematically subsume, Kant begins the third Critique as 
follows:   
 
If we wish to decide if something is beautiful or not, we do not use understanding to 
refer the presentation to the object so as to give rise to cognition; rather, we use 
imagination (perhaps in connection with understanding) to refer the presentation to 
the subject and his feeling of pleasure or displeasure.  Hence, a judgment of taste is 
not a cognitive judgment and so is not a logical judgment but an aesthetic one, by 
which we mean a judgment whose determining basis cannot be other than subjective. 
(44=203) 
 
 This is a relatively clear and emphatic beginning.  Judgments of taste are to be 
distinguished from logical or cognitive judgments, Kant says, because instead of referring 
―the presentation‖ (Vorstellung) to the object by subsuming it beneath the 
understanding‘s categories (such as that of cause and effect), this presentation is referred 
to the subject‘s imagination and understanding in a more general way, and indeed, as he 
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 It‘s as if he‘s secretly concerned with health in and through the ritualized act of creative objectification. 
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later specifies, to the harmonious play between them.21  Beyond the question of what 
Kant might mean here by ―presentation‖ — in part because it can apparently be either 
subjective or objective — there is as yet no other question.22  Judgments of taste are 
subjective.   
 By section three, however, we begin to see hints, resembling those we uncovered 
within the Analytic of the Sublime, that the ―subjectivity‖ of taste, including especially 
its ―determining basis,‖ are neither merely subjective nor private.  So here we have the 
beginning of a subreptive relation, a substitution which criticism can notice but which the 
pre-reflective subject, insofar as she experiences the object as pleasure-causing, cannot: 
 
When something determines the feeling of pleasure or displeasure and this 
determination of that feeling is called sensation, this term means something quite 
different from what it means when I apply it to the presentation of a thing (through 
the senses, a receptivity that belongs to the cognitive power).  For in the second case 
the presentation is referred to the object, but in the first it is referred solely to the 
subject and is not used for cognition at all, not even for that by which the subject 
cognizes himself. (47=206) 
 
 Although Kant here clearly wants to discern and even protect the aesthetic status 
of judgments of taste from possible conflation with cognitive judgments which, as we 
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 As we shall see, the relation between play, objectification, and development is taken up and examined 
critically by Freud and then especially by Winnicott.  But Kant is clearly the first.  His analysis is critical to 
the degree that the objectifications of work and play reflect the development and content of experience into 
the conditions of experience. 
22
 As we shall continue to see, Kant‘s analysis attempts to show both how and why experience 
(mis)objectifies its conditions, producing taste as a secretly-conflicted experience, which means that 
representation, which is a cognitive category, hinges secretly on presentation, which we and Kant 
understand as a pre-cognitive condition of conceptual thinking and experience.  Thus, I understand 
presentation to refer to the form of appearance or making appear that Freud, for instance, will end up 
calling ―primary process.‖  Representation is thus a derivative form of appearance or making appear that, 
while secretly containing primary process, is the stuff of secondary process and, at least to some degree, of 
cognitively filtered experience.  Pluhar is right then that Kant‘s aesthetics is non-representational, or as we 
shall specify it, pre-representational even when it appears to be representational.  The forms and stages of 
representation are more mature achievements which ―take place‖ in and through the aesthetic development 
of objectivity, the development, specifically, of more primitive forms of symbolization, generally 
understood. 
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learned in the first Critique, are determinative and subsumptive judgments about objects, 
and so although he again emphasizes that the presentation of beauty‘s pleasure ―is 
referred solely to the subject,‖ there is a definite hint here that this referring is somehow 
also beyond subjectivity in some as yet undetermined and indeterminate way.  Instead of 
saying that the subject actively refers the presentation of his feeling to himself, Kant uses 
the passive voice—―it is referred.‖  Behind or within, but certainly beyond, the subject 
―proper,‖ there is something else, something non- or pre-subjective in the subject‘s 
―determining basis,‖ which refers this presentation solely to the subject.  There is a blind-
spot, then, not just in sublimity but in taste too, and indeed, as the condition of the 
experience of beauty this blind-spot cannot be experienced directly or in-itself.  Further, 
when Kant compares the sensation of cognitive understanding to the sensation of 
aesthetic judgment and calls the former a receptivity, he implies that aesthetic sensation, 
by contrast, is a kind of activity—say, an impressing or projecting of feelings of pleasure 
or displeasure upon an ―object,‖ as if the latter caused them but not the reverse, where the 
object‘s properties either sensibly determine the perception of gratification or pain in the 
subject or serve as the intuitive particularities for the subject‘s conceptual subsumption.  
If aesthetic judgment is an ―activity,‖ then, it is not simply located in the subject‘s self-
activity.  It is a non- or pre-subjective activity somehow beyond self-awareness, a foreign 
inner realm (if not an inner territory or place) the processes of which do not — and as we 
shall see, cannot — directly show themselves.  This, then, is why Kant must indicate that 
in judgments of taste the subject does not ―cognize himself‖ in this aesthetic process 
despite the fact that his pleasure or displeasure is referred to himself.  For the subject is 
simply not doing the referring.
23
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 The subject is an extension (in the sense both of being a res extensa and a development) of the meaning-
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 If Kant has begun to modify the apparent subjectivist slant of his initial account, 
however, this of course does not mean that he means to characterize judgments of taste as 
objectivistic judgments, that is, either as judgments which mark, as determinative 
judgments mark, a characteristic which properly belongs to the object, or as judgments 
which simply command, as moral reason properly commands, universal and necessary 
assent.  Indeed, in sections six and seven of the Analytic of the Beautiful, Kant places 
judgments of taste precisely between the objectivity of ordinary cognitive understanding, 
on the one hand, as described and analyzed in the first Critique, and the necessity and 
universality of moral legislation, on the other hand, as described and analyzed in the 
second Critique—and yet he does this without asserting that judgments of taste are in-
themselves objectivistic, objectively universal.  Avowals of beauty‘s pleasure are claims, 
rather, to ―subjective universality‖—―universal‖ because the subject has no personal 
interest in finding the thing pleasing and yet she does,
 24
 and ―subjective‖ because this 
universality does not arise from the objectifying subsumption of understanding which 
(subreptively) takes place nonetheless (54=212).  The experience is (mis)experienced 
subjectively, we could say. 
 The combination of pleasure before the object and lack of subjective interest in it 
means that the judge cannot help but to expect others and even demand of others that they 
experience in the object what she experiences, what she experiences, that is, as if by 
objective determination.  Pluhar‘s hint had pointed in this direction generally but, as a 
summary, did not specify beauty‘s subreptive activity:  In an aesthetic experience of an 
                                                                                                                                                       
making process; it is not the latter‘s source. 
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 See 212=339:  ―[T]here can be no doubt that in a judgment of taste the presentation of the object (and at 
the same time of the subject as well) is referred more broadly, i.e. beyond ourselves, and this broader 
reference is our basis for extending such judgments and treating them as necessary for everyone.‖ 
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object, and especially when experiencing beauty, the object necessarily appears as if it 
were the determinate and determining cause of the subject‘s feeling since the subject, 
again especially in beauty, does not ―cognize himself‖ in this process.  As Kant puts this 
in sections six and seven: 
  
If someone likes something and is conscious that he himself does so without any 
interest, then he cannot help judging that it must contain a basis for being liked [that 
holds] for everyone…. Hence he will talk about the beautiful as if beauty were a 
characteristic of the object and the judgment were logical (namely, a cognition of the 
object through concepts of it), even though in fact the judgment is only aesthetic and 
refers the object‘s presentation merely to the subject.  He will talk in this way because 
the judgment does resemble a logical judgment inasmuch as we may presuppose it to 
be valid for everyone.  On the other hand, this universality cannot arise from 
concepts.  For from concepts there is no transition to the feeling of pleasure or 
displeasure (except in pure practical laws; but these carry an interest with them, while 
none is connected with pure judgments of taste)…. (54=211)25 
  
If he proclaims something to be beautiful, then he requires the same liking from 
others; he then judges not just for himself but for everyone, and speaks of beauty as if 
it were a property of things.  That is why he says:  The thing is beautiful…. (55=212) 
 
 In three steps, then, Kant shows us that aesthetic judgments on the whole are 
subreptive slippages, deflections in which an indeterminate psychic condition ―takes 
place,‖ as it were, as if objectively:  Since (a) the subject‘s experience of an object arrives 
with a pleasure which is referred to him from beyond his private proclivities and 
interests, he cannot help but think, indeed he finds it ―reasonable‖ to think, both (b) that 
the object contains a set of properties which, added up, determine his pleasure from 
outside and thus (c) that since this pleasure is apparently not subjectively but objectively 
caused, it should be referred to anyone and everyone who properly perceives and 
conceptualizes the object. 
                                                   
25
 When Kant here says ―no transition,‖ he doesn‘t mean, as we shall see, that a secretly transitional 
process, to be located in the object as a transitional object, is not possible.  On the contrary. 
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 Fantastic Objectification: Of Sense and Supersensibility 
 If Kant has shown that aesthetic judgment proceeds by way of an ―activity‖ which 
is not simply located in the subject‘s self-activity, and that in fact the pleasure and 
displeasure of judgment are actively referred to the subject from beyond herself such that 
she can only experience her pleasure and displeasure as if these were cognitively 
determined, then what can be said about this other- or more-than-subjective activity?  
What, in other words, does subreption point to as lying ―behind‖ experience and our 
experience of objects?  
 In my judgment, Kant‘s best response to these questions appears in his second 
(and his preferred) Introduction to the Critique of Judgment.  After having finished the 
Critique per se, he wrote this Introduction to synthesize his critical project as a whole, to 
bridge the gap between his first and second Critiques, as he puts it.26  One could thus say 
that the concept and actuality of subreption point to fact that this philosophical gap is not 
merely philosophical and not merely a gap.  There is a gap but subreption provides what 
might be called the ―transitional material‖ with which to plug or bridge that gap.  This, 
then, is why Kant tells us here that the third Critique‘s basic worry stems from the fact 
that human experience is both made possible and perpetually put at risk since it exists 
within a divide between nature (the cognition of which the first Critique specified) and 
freedom (the ideal reality of which the second Critique theorized as beyond nature in its 
                                                   
26
 Kant produced two Introductions to the third Critique.  He wrote the second Introduction in 1790 — on 
the heels of the first and just prior to the Critique of Judgment‘s first publication — since he found the first 
to be too long and peripheral.  While the second Introduction has been the standard and better introduction, 
then, the first was eventually published in 1914, such that both are available today in the Pluhar/Hackett 
edition.    
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purity).  This divide is where the problem of beauty and health begins.  As he puts this in 
section II of the (second) Introduction:     
 
[U]nderstanding and reason have two different legislations on one and the same 
territory of experience.  Yet neither of these legislations is to interfere with the other.  
For just as the concept of nature has no influence on the legislation through the 
concept of freedom, so the latter does not interfere with the legislation of nature… 
Why do these two domains not form one domain?  This is because the concept of 
nature does indeed allow us to present its objects in intuition, but as appearances 
rather than as things in themselves, whereas the concept of freedom does indeed 
allow us to present its object as a thing in itself, but not in intuition… Hence, an 
immense gulf is fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, the sensible, and 
the domain of the concept of freedom, the supersensible, so that no transition 
[Übergang] from the sensible to the supersensible (and hence by means of the 
theoretical use of reason) is possible, just as if they were two different worlds…. (13-
14=175) 
 
 After building and wrestling with this issue throughout the Introduction, Kant 
brings it to a head in the ninth and last section: 
 
The understanding legislates a priori for nature, as object of sense, in order to give 
rise to theoretical cognition of nature in a possible experience.  Reason legislates a 
priori for freedom and for freedom‘s own causality — in other words, for the 
supersensible in the subject — in order to give rise to unconditioned practical 
cognition.  The great gulf that separates the supersensible from appearances 
completely cuts off the domain of the concept of nature under the one legislation, and 
the domain of the concept of freedom under the other legislation, from any influence 
that each (according to its own basic laws) might have had on the other.  The concept 
of freedom determines nothing with regard to our theoretical cognition of nature, just 
as the concept of nature determines nothing with regard to the practical laws of 
freedom; and to this extent it is not possible to throw a bridge from one domain to the 
other.  And yet, even though the bases that determine the causality governed by the 
concept of freedom (and by the practical rule contained in this concept) do not lie in 
nature, and even though the sensible cannot determine the supersensible in the 
subject, yet the reverse is possible (not, indeed, with regard to our cognition of nature, 
but still with regard to the consequences that the concept of freedom has in nature); 
and this possibility is contained in the very concept of a causality through freedom, 
whose effect is to be brought about in the world [but] in conformity with the laws of 
freedom.  It is true that when we use the word cause with regard to the supersensible, 
we mean only the basis that determines natural things to exercise their causality to 
produce an effect in conformity with the natural laws proper to that causality, yet in 
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accordance with the formal principle of the laws of reason as well.  Though we have 
no insight into how this is possible, the objection that alleges a contradiction in it can 
be refuted adequately. (35-6 = 5:195) 
   
 Instead of suggesting that supersensibility simply and directly causes effects in 
the sensible world, which would make it a cause among other natural causes — and 
which by bringing freedom and nature into immediate connection in the same ―domain‖ 
would be the easy way of declaring both that we have free will and that aesthetic 
judgment is guided not purposively but by means of determinate purposes — Kant here 
indicates that freedom‘s causal power produces effects which, as appearances, are not 
connected to but rather merely ―in conformity with‖ or ―in accordance with‖ freedom, 
which cannot of itself appear.  Freedom‘s phenomenal effects are disconnectedly 
connected to their noumenal condition.  This, then, is a version of what has come to be 
known as Kant‘s compatibilism, his view that supersensibility and sensibility, or the a 
priori and the a posteriori, are divided off from each other but compatibly accordant.  
They are ―accordant‖ since the causal springs of supersensibility are reflected in the 
sensible effects which we live in and as experience.  They are merely ―compatible‖ and 
not of the same domain, however, since these supersensible springs can never be directly 
intuited in or by sensibility, given the gulf between them, just as one cannot kill a pure 
idea by means of a bullet, supposedly, given the gulf between them. To the degree that 
the subject has a free will that can act reasonably and dutifully, however, the effect of the 
will appears in nature.  The subject can resist natural desires, then, if the will is what 
moves him, even if when moving he is a natural body too.  Thus, whereas 
supersensibility — like the condition of hypochondria vaga or of sublimity‘s or beauty‘s 
causality — is properly objectless, sensibility senses objects.  This means in turn, 
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however, that Kant‘s desire ―to throw a bridge‖ over the ―great gulf‖ which separates 
sense and supersensibility is, or at least could be, a bit misleading.  One cannot literally 
build a bridge — which, as an object, is always somewhere — from somewhere (in 
sensation) to nowhere (beyond sensation), from objects to objectlessness, or the reverse.
27
   
 If, however, we speak both metaphorically and literally at the same time — and 
we always so speak this way, despite emphases, as we shall emphasize in Part Two on 
Marx — we can say that supersensibility can nonetheless be subreptively presented, 
(mis)presented sensibly.  Objectlessness can always be presented as if objectively, thus 
―bridging,‖ making a ―transition‖ between, or making compatible and accordant, these 
realms which remain divided nonetheless.  Kant does not explicitly mention subreption 
here, just as he did not offer an explicitly subreptive analysis in the analytic of beauty.  
Still, just as subreption nonetheless subtextually structures the analytic of beauty, so it 
structurally appears here, and in fact with more understated specificity.  Subreption is sly, 
after all.
28
  For here Kant claims that the reverse of a sensible determination of the 
supersensible in the subject is possible; but this ―determination‖ is a subreptive one.  It 
marks a secret aesthetic reflection of a priori conditions in and as the subjective 
experience of objects.  This supersensible determination does not, indeed cannot, 
determine the objectivity of objects in the cognitive, which is to say subsumptive, sense 
of ―determine‖ (for here concepts aren‘t already provided); and yet, it does condition 
objects such that nature as appearance and freedom‘s consequences, as appearances, 
                                                   
27
 As Kant presents this idea in his analysis of the sublime: ―If we speak literally and consider the matter 
logically, ideas cannot be exhibited‖ (127=268).  Let us say ―sic‖ to the degree that Kant is here, of course, 
like myself, exhibiting ideas on paper. 
28
 Understatement and subtextuality are meant here not simply metaphorically or analogically but literally 
as well.  Indeed, critically speaking, this is so insofar as subreption is the secretive form of the formation of 
symbolization, a process that takes place ―between the lines‖ or, better, ―within and beneath the surface‖ of 
cognitive judgment. 
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affect (and then seemingly effect) each other in experience.  The objects of our 
experience are (but) distorted reflections of their supersensible causality, of a primary or 
noumenal process in and behind secondary phenomena.  As Kant puts this in a footnote 
to the last sentence of the above quote: 
 
One of the various supposed contradictions in this complete distinction of natural 
causality from the causality through freedom is given in the following objection to it.  
It is held that when I talk about nature putting obstacles in the way of the causality 
governed by the laws of freedom (moral laws), or about nature furthering it, I do after 
all grant that nature influences freedom.  But this is a misinterpretation, which is 
easily avoided merely by understanding what I have said [sic].  The resistance or 
furtherance is not between nature and freedom, but between nature as appearance and 
the effects of freedom as appearances in the world of sense….  It is this causality‘s 
determination whose basis is contained, in a way not otherwise explicable, in the 
intelligible that is thought of when we think freedom. 
 
  Now, despite Kant‘s guarded claim that this supersensible causality‘s 
determination is ―not otherwise explicable‖ beyond its being contained in intelligibility, 
and indeed, despite his similar cautioning in the main passage that ―we have no insight 
into how this‖ compatibilist ―determination‖ ―is possible,‖ if we look to yet another 
footnote (this one in section III of the Introduction), we see that although it may not be 
possible to merely cognitively explicate ―how‖ this determination is possible, we can still 
explicate it further transcendentally, which is to say, critically.  Kant offers a theoretical 
self-warning against merely cognitive theorizations of objectivity, in other words, but at 
the same time he nonetheless makes room for the possibility of subtextual and 
subcognitive critique.  ―Critique,‖ then, investigates that which lies beneath experience as 
its condition or conditions, which makes subreption the key ―concept‖ for understanding 
the strange relation and movement between the conditions of experience and the 
(mis)experience of (secretly conditioned) objects.  We shall investigate this footnoted 
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material from section III in detail, then, on the presumption that subreption implies a 
subtextual relation to textuality, and to meaning-making more generally, just as 
subtextuality implies the secretive work of subreption.  Footnotes stand out as text (and 
not merely beneath the text) in this regard.  Indeed, as if he were doing this to perform 
this presumption and as if to avoid overcognizing how subreption works, Kant here 
adjusts the lens through which the causal determination of supersensibility is said to be 
directed:  Instead of casting judgment, a seemingly only intellectual exercise, as the 
connecting disconnection between reason and understanding, and instead of naming 
freedom as judgment‘s regulative ideal, he here casts the feeling of pleasure and 
displeasure as the connecting disconnection between the cognitive power and desire.   
 This is, well, significant, indeed, the making of significance.  By displacing an 
intelligible category (freedom) with this isomorphic but more primitive category (the 
power of desire), Kant doesn‘t so much cognize the subreption of objectivity as he begins 
to perform it critically, subcognitively, and subtextually, on the way to ―symbolically.‖  
Just as subreption points to a power beneath cognition, in other words, so does desire 
point to something beneath Kant‘s usual praise for freedom.  Indeed, as we read this 
footnote below we should recall that one of Kant‘s crucial problems in the ―Sheer 
Resolution‖ essay concerns the hypochondriac‘s understanding of his desire as a power 
causally (if ambiguously) productive of objects:  The hypochondriac wants the cause of 
his anxious experience to appear beyond his wishing, his desire, for such a cause — he 
wants an objectivistic determination of his illness in the name of health — but at the same 
time he worries and even expects that the appearance of any objective cause will not be 
―objective‖ so much as wishfully produced in and as an at least partial hallucination.  
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He‘s worried that his fantasy will invariably color the ―reality‖ he experiences, thus 
anxiously problematizing the real.  His disease, then, he thinks, consists in his cognitive 
inability to distinguish the subjectively wishful from the objectively non-wishful causes 
of health.  But this also means that he thinks that objects can appear disconnected from 
wishes, that there is such a thing as wishless objectivity, or ―reality.‖  But here, as 
opposed to much of his analysis in the ―Sheer Resolution‖ essay, Kant critically 
explicates the causal power of desire, of wishing, precisely as an, perhaps the, 
objectifying power:    
 
If concepts are used as empirical principles and there is cause to suppose that there is 
a kinship between them and the pure a priori cognitive power, then it is useful to 
attempt, on account of that relation, to give a transcendental definition of them….  
This procedure follows the example of the mathematician, who leaves the empirical 
data in his problem undetermined and only brings the relation they have in their pure 
synthesis under the concepts of pure arithmetic, thereby universalizing his solution to 
the problem.  I have been reproached for following a similar procedure (Preface to the 
Kritik der practischen Vernuft), namely, for defining the power of desire as the power 
of being the cause, through one‟s presentations [Vorstellungen], of the actuality of the 
objects of these presentations.  The criticism was that, after all, mere wishes are 
desires too, and yet we all know that they alone do not enable us to produce their 
object.  That, however, proves nothing more than that some of man‘s desires involve 
him in self-contradiction, inasmuch as he uses the presentation by itself to strive to 
produce the object, while yet he cannot expect success from it.  Such is the case 
because he is aware that his mechanical forces (if I may call the nonpsychological 
ones that), which would have to be determined by that presentation in order to bring 
the object about (hence to be the means for it) are either insufficient or perhaps even 
directed to something impossible, such as to undo what is done (O mihi praeteritos, 
etc.), or as being able, as one is waiting impatiently for some wished-for moment, to 
destroy the time which remains.  In such fanciful desires we are indeed aware that our 
presentations are insufficient (or even unfit) to be the cause of their objects.  Still, 
their causal relation, and hence the thought of their causality, is contained in every 
wish and is especially noticeable when that wish is an affect, namely, longing.  For 
since these desires alternately expand the heart and make it languid, thus exhausting 
its forces, they prove that these forces are repeatedly tensed by presentations, but that 
they allow the mind each time to relapse into weariness as it considers again the 
impossibility. Even prayers that ask for the deflection of some great and, as far as we 
can see, unavoidable evil, and also various superstitious means aimed at achieving 
purposes unattainable through nature prove the causal relation of these presentations 
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to their objects; and this relation is such that even an awareness [[i.e. in cognition or 
consciousness]] of its insufficiency for producing the effect cannot keep it from 
striving for the effect.  But why our nature was given a propensity toward desires of 
whose futility we are aware is an anthropological-teleological question.  It seems that 
if we had to assure ourselves that we can in fact produce the object, before we could 
be determined by the presentation to apply our forces, then our forces would remain 
largely unused.  For usually we do not come to know what forces we have in the first 
place except by trying them out.  Hence the deception contained in vain wishes is 
only the result of a beneficent arrangement in our nature. (17=178) 
 
 It might seem that what Kant here calls the ―deception‖ of vain wishes refers to 
the fact that they are empirically futile, that their lived fulfillment is impossible.  Vain 
wishes ―deceive‖ because they cannot be actualized ―objectively,‖ which is to say, 
beyond the status of a ―mere wish.‖  This, at any rate, is what Kant‘s critics insist, critics, 
one would have to guess, who don‘t consider themselves hypochondriacal.  Since a wish, 
they suggest, is but a mental and subjective presentation, a merely internal psychological 
thing, wishes on their own can never actualize or present their object, which is (it seems) 
external.  Mere wishes are causally inert or impotent.29  If a wish is not to be deceptive, 
then, it will require means and mediations—certain ―mechanical‖ and 
―nonpsychological‖ forces, such as somatic causes, for instance.   
 Kant agrees with this common sense empirical claim up to a point, the point 
where the empirical shows that its funding actually rests in meta-empirical conditions.  In 
addition to the empirical point of view adopted by these critics, then, there is another 
―point of view,‖ namely, that of the supersensible (thus primary or noumenal) relation of 
desire to its objects.  This, then, is the critical framework which is missing in the ―Sheer 
Resolution‖ essay, or rather, if this framework is there it is regarded only ambiguously 
and anxiously:  Whereas empirically speaking, mere wishing is causally powerless to 
                                                   
29
 Contemporary empirical biopsychiatry still bases its entire sense of ―science‖ on thoughts such as this 
one. 
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produce its object, transcendentally speaking, as the formal power of desire, this wishing 
is a causal superpower.  Desire, says Kant, is ―the power of being the cause, through 
one‘s presentations, of the actuality of the objects of these presentations.‖  By 
transcendental definition, in other words, to wish or desire is to ―objectify‖ the world 
immediately and directly, ―prior to‖ or ―behind‖ the specification of nonpsychological or 
mechanical means.  The fact that we can have impossible longings which tense the heart 
and empirical mind (making them anxious, for instance) despite the futility of the longing 
thus ―proves‖ that there is a kind if wishful power beneath this or that empirically framed 
or motivated wish.  For even if cognition is ―aware‖ that the wish is futile, the wish 
persists, proving that there is something driving our actions, as it were, despite our 
otherwise reasonable intentions and wishes.  Anxiety is thus proof, in a critical sense, of 
the a priori. 
 This, however, seems to rub up against and perhaps contradict one of Kant‘s 
staple formulations—that, namely, of the imaginative formation of objects.  When Kant 
elsewhere defines the imagination‘s relation to its world, after all, he doesn‘t suggest that 
imaginative fantasy presents its objects in their actuality.  Imagination, he says, can be 
original and productive, on the one hand, or recollective and reproductive, on the other 
hand; in either case, however, the productive capacity of imagination is not one which 
can, alone, produce its objects in actuality merely by presenting them.  Rather, since the 
play of imagination is fictive or fictitious, the imagistic and representational world it 
creates is only psychically but not objectively real.  As Kant had put this in the 
Anthropology:  ―The imagination, insofar as it produces imaginings involuntarily… is 
called fantasy…. The imagination either engages in fiction (i.e. it is productive), or in 
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recall (i.e. it is reproductive).  But this does not mean that the productive imagination is 
creative, i.e. capable of producing a presentation of sense that was never before given to 
our power of sense; rather, we can always show from where the imagination took its 
material‖ (VII, 167-68).  The power of desire to which he is pointing, then, is much more 
radical.  It is at and of the root of humanization.  It is not just productive or recollective 
of images but creative of what we might call worldliness.  It is thus also the unseen, the 
buried root of imaginative capacity.  Indeed, since the latter produces or reproduces 
images, it is a part of or at least partially cognition, the cognition of nature as 
appearance.  A priori desire, on the other hand, causally actualizes its objects without 
imaging them beforehand.  It is the conditioning source of cognitive images and 
imaginings.  If the power of desire can be said to ―image‖ an object, then from a non-
cognitive ―point of view‖ this ―image‖ is actually not an image at all but rather, in a 
dreamlike fashion, the actuality of the object.  And this insight has tremendous 
significance, especially when seen in ―reverse‖:  From the ―point of view‖ of the 
supersensible power of desire, a perspective prior to the development of perspective, 
whatever appears is not an appearance but just is, and indeed, it is caused simply and 
immediately by wishing it so.  The appearance of any object, then, transcendentally 
implies — as if through a screen of the developmental forgetfulness of the power of 
noumenal desire — its unmediated wishful localization, a merely desirous objectification 
from out of an objectless plenum, in and despite the fact that the emergent subject can‘t 
directly experience, and is not usually aware of, this wishful happening.
30
   
                                                   
30
 As Žižek puts it, it‘s like subjective experience ―itself‖ gets in the way of experiencing this power as 
condition. 
 46 
 But if this is so, what might Kant mean when he claims that there is deception 
contained in vain wishes?  We seem to have two contradictory accounts.  From the point 
of view of Kant‘s critics and of ordinary common sense, vain wishes are deceptive since 
they constantly propose their actualization (this is why they are wishes, empirically 
speaking) and yet, given the ―mechanical‖ impossibility of actualizing them, they also 
invariably remain unactualized (this is why they are vain, empirically speaking).  
According to Kant‘s transcendental figuration, on the other hand, vain wishes are never 
merely vain since a wish, a presentation, is causally identical to its actualization.  Identity 
with its object is the transcendental meaning of desire as a causal power.31  But, again, if 
―futile‖ wishes unfailingly and unmediatedly produce their object in and despite the lived 
experience of their futility, and so if they are anything but futile from the supersensible 
―point of view,‖ and indeed are quite the opposite of futile, what does Kant mean here by 
―deception‖?   
 My suggestion is that the deception contained in mere wishes is the subreption 
which nonetheless takes place objectively (placing the thing-itself into objectivity as it 
were), between supersensibility and sensible experience, or, as Kant hints half-way 
through this crucial footnote, between causality and empirical causes.  We have already 
seen in the passage defending Kant‘s compatibilism that in and despite the divide 
between these ―domains,‖ they remain subreptively accordant.  A ―great gulf‖ separates 
supersensibility from sensibility, which means that we cannot directly understand or 
cognize the wishful causality from which our experience of objective causes, as an effect, 
dawns.  And yet, a causal indirection based on the sub- or pre-empirical identity of 
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 This, then, is why I described desire as belonging to a ―plenum‖ above.  For if subject and object are yet 
to be distinguished, the preworldly world is like one great ―place‖ without places, without borders and gaps 
for instance. 
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supersensible causality and sensible object remains consistent both with this great gulf 
and with the effect we call our experience of objects:  Though it remains invisible to us in 
itself, supersensible desire can be said to have simultaneous effects (in the world of 
sense) which, as appearances, mix with the mechanistic and nonpsychological aspects of 
nature cognized as appearance.  It is thus possible to think, indeed to critically notice, that 
our power of wishing is an objectifying super-power — that there is no such thing as a 
―mere wish‖ — despite the fact that the origin of all objects can be explained without 
including the element of human wishing.  That is, speaking pre- or un-critically, objects 
can be said to appear simply (a) in merely physical or natural fashion, in terms of 
mechanical forces (Newtonian, quantum, or otherwise), and/or (b) in cognitive fashion, in 
terms of the subsumption of particulars beneath the understanding‘s schematizing sieve 
of categories and concepts.
32
  Indeed, in (b) here, we would have to include ordinary 
psychological and/or behavioral forms of causality, those which typically don‘t 
understand or conceive of the transcendental difference between noumena and 
phenomena, for instance.) 
 And this brings us to our point about deception:  The deception belonging to so-
called vain wishes is not only their vainness, their actual and supposed unactualizability, 
but also the fact that despite and in — ―contained in‖ — their empirical vainness there is 
nonetheless a causally ―fanciful‖ actualization, a fantastic objectification (as I will call 
it).  What in experience seems to be a mere fantasy or wish, in other words, is nonetheless 
actualized at the level of transcendental desire to the degree that it is even thought, 
pictured, imaged, expected, hoped for, etc.  Our supersensible power of instantaneous 
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 If, like Kant, one sometimes includes moral categories such as goodness or duty within the range of the 
term ―objectivity,‖ if not within the range of ―objective appearance,‖ then one can add a third explication 
here, namely, (c) that moral objectivity can be practically intelligibilized as a meta-cognitive idea of reason.  
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wishful causality, then, is subrepted into and as our normal, cognitive experience of 
objects and objective causes.  Insofar as objects appear at all, they point to their secret 
wishful condition.  We pointed to this earlier when we suggested that the persistence of 
the wish despite its cognitively registered futility proves that there is a form of desire 
driving our actions, as it were, despite our otherwise reasonable intentions and wishes.   
 Kant does not leave this paradox of a noncausal causality hanging in merely 
theoretical suspension, however.  Rather, he also offers us a couple of subtly clarifying 
examples.  Indeed, it is these examples which, if critically interpreted, return us to our 
tripartite hypothesis that health and illness are aesthetic practices, that as an aesthetic 
practice a regimen mediates the difference between its necessary condition and the 
experience of objectivity, and that this objectivity is best conceived as a transcendental 
sort of placebo effect.  The objectification of the world of objects arrives not without its 
pleasures and displeasures.  Indeed, we can now say that the mediation an aesthetic 
regimen introduces is a specifically subreptive mediation and that the placebogenesis of 
health must be understood along critical lines as a subreptive placebogenesis.   
 How does this ―fantastic footnote‖ reveal all of this?  Let us suggest that it does so 
by subtly, somewhat secretly, introducing four aspects of desire‘s activity — 
somatization, magical ritualization, symbolic enculturation, and cognition — which 
together manufacture and cumulatively comprise Kant‘s developmental theory of health.  
Since Kant introduces the movement from somatization to magical ritualization to 
symbolic enculturation to cognition more or less subtextually, however, we would be 
incorrect to suggest that he examines health and illness merely cognitively or empirically.  
Just as his critique of aesthetic representation is not merely representational or about 
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representation, so his articulation of the process of enculturation is not just cognitively 
advanced and is not just about cognition.  Similarly, while cognition may be the first 
―obvious‖ stage of desire‘s actualization of health, this doesn‘t mean that the 
development of cognition is healthiest when merely cognitively understood.  Indeed, to 
understand only the experience of health objectivity without understanding the latter‘s 
subreptive conditions would, from this critical perspective, be to be less than objective, 
less than scientific.  Further, as if he had these last thoughts somewhere in mind in the 
text, Kant here presents his analysis of health somewhat performatively.33  And this 
implies a lesson about health:  It‘s as if cognition were healthiest when it examines and 
represents not just its history but when it subreptively-aesthetically references and 
presents its prehistory.  Kant‘s methodology, then, whether he exactly intended this or 
not, is a performatively subreptive production of healthy cognition.  And this insight, in 
turn, informs both our object and methodology:  To the degree that Kant‘s object is not 
simply cognition and culture but the secretive objectification of cognition and culture, we 
too must dig beneath cognition and culture to understand their roots.  Following Kant, 
then, we shall here present and analyze what we might call an archaeology of cognition 
and culture through the aesthetic objectification of beauty.  The fantastic footnote will 
mark and symbolize this process, this development:  For, again, it performs how the 
illusory prehistory of aesthetics is forgotten in and as cognition, but by cognitively 
tracking and performatively showing this forgetting, it also produces an analysis that is 
self-critical if not always perfect, logically correct, or moral.  Cognition develops, and 
develops not as sickness or disease but as health, then, along a path we‘ll here track and 
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analyze:  It develops when supersensible and non-cognitive conditions are subrepted into 
a somatic and pre-cognitive background, subreptively complementing a symbolic 
ritualization, which, where favorable conditions prevail, is subreptively developed into 
cognitively self-critical, and so scientific, forms of enculturation.   
 
Somatization 
 Kant‘s suggestion that longing indicates that vain wishing nonetheless causes the 
actuality of its object is on first sight, of course, a ridiculous suggestion.  Since we 
typically long when, wish as we might, we cannot satisfy this wish, longing of the most 
intense kind appears to be an experience which precisely cannot exemplify the claim that 
vain wishes nonetheless actualize their object.  Kant calls these ―futile wishes,‖ after all, 
and even wishes, he says, which are ―directed to something impossible.‖  Indeed, a 
description of intense longing, and of the impossibility of actualizing all-too-ideal wishes, 
sounds more than just a little like the account Kant gives of hypochondria vaga in his 
―medical‖ texts, especially insofar as he contrasts h. vaga to localized hypochondria:  In 
the ―Sheer Resolution‖ essay, h. vaga is described as a condition where wishes are 
causally powerless to produce their desired object, so much so, in fact, that the sufferer‘s 
experience begins to anxiously cycle within this supposed powerlessness and 
objectlessness.  Felt anxiety and depression are the effects.  So dominated is the vaga 
sufferer by what she takes to be her impossible wishing that she finds nothing of interest 
in the world of actual and sensible objects.  Her pure wishing even feels to her like a kind 
of wishlessness, or at least eventually so.  Her despair piles upon longing to build a 
despair virtually beyond longing.  Talk about melancholia.  This is hopelessness. 
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 We must recall, however, that although Kant offers this account of melancholia, 
and although he distinguishes h. vaga from localized hypochondria — naming the former 
an objectless longing and the latter a disturbed wishing which has a somatic cause — our 
own critical analysis of Kant‘s account revealed a double set of slippages.  His 
descriptions of hypochondria vaga slipped, we recall, both objectively and subjectively, 
and probably unintentionally, into descriptions of localized hypochondria.  In fact, in the 
―Sheer Resolution‖ essay, Kant takes his heart as the merely physical cause of a tendency 
toward morbid wishing, a wishing, he says, which once made him almost weary of life, 
and thus of wishing.  Given the textual slippages between h. vaga and localized 
hypochondria, however, we came to suspect that Kant had not discovered his 
Herzbeklemmung to be the cause of his anxiety so much as he had somatized this ailment, 
conflating a kind of cause and its effect as if to make this anxiety sensible, thereby 
making sense of it by (mis)giving it an object, an objective cause.  Indeed, we will recall 
that Kant indicated that the ―reasonable human being‖ does something like this — that 
reasonable people make objectifying mistakes of judgment — when faced with an 
incessant anxiety, an anxiety, no less, about the apparently merely wishful source of this 
anxiety! 
 In providing a subtle theory of the relation of subreption to somatization, on the 
other hand, the fantastic footnote critiques this particular ambiguity.  The note does not 
merely consist in Kant commenting philosophically on the objectifying power of desire, 
as may first appear.  Mentioning the heart — and by thus suggesting indirectly that there 
has been a displacement of the stomach disturbances of his so-called ―silent decade‖ — 
Kant also points, both in and despite his own awareness, to his own ―hidden‖ desire and 
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its objectification in terms of health and illness.
34
  This, then, is the point:  Since the 
appearance of any objective cause implies a causally identical wish for this object‘s 
actualization, the appearance of a languid or oppressed heart implies that its condition as 
an object is the objectifying power of desire.    
 At first this may appear strange, but upon reflection the reference makes good 
sense.  After all, ―since these desires alternately expand the heart and make it languid, 
thus exhausting its forces,‖ these futile desires are not ―effect-less,‖ which means that 
they are never completely futile or empty.  Rather, the exhaustion of the heart itself, and 
so all the anxiety that this process entails and is, comes together with the supposed 
―futility.‖  Thus, even what must seem to a ―rational‖ mind to be a completely futile wish 
— to reverse time so as to overcome loss and replace it with non-loss, for instance — 
proves that there is a fantasy of causality built into wishing.  But more than this, Kant‘s 
more subtle and radical point is that this fantasy is not mere fantastic, imaginary, or 
fictional but is, rather, a very force, the very force, of producing worldly ―effects.‖  
Wishing against loss, longing, proves that behind our empirical experience of desire and 
its limits there is a form of desire that cannot be limited even if its effects appear to be.   
 Let‘s approach this puzzle with the notion of health up front.  On the one hand, 
the point is that empirical objectlessness — the experience of loss, temporary mourning, 
or especially lasting melancholia — transcendentally implies an objectified fantasy of and 
for objectlessness.  The melancholiac will always produce overlooked objects of anxious 
reification — what we now call symptoms — despite his or her experience of 
objectlessness.  On the other hand, however, the point is that melancholia sits beneath 
                                                   
34
 So while the text may be ―about‖ something (i.e. representationally), it also is a world-creation (i.e. a 
presentation).  
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and within any somatic illness.  The implications of this idea are, well, fantastic.  To say 
that the languid heart has been ―tensed by presentations‖ is to say, consistent with the 
analysis, that this object has been wishfully produced.  And since this example 
exemplifies a wider rule, indeed, a transcendental power, it suggests a lesson about health 
and illness in the manner of a subreption:  Transcendentally understood, the ―discovery‖ 
of any somatic illness object implies this object‘s wished-for creation.  That is, somatic 
illness objects always implicate themselves as melancholic, as what Kant calls ―self-
devised illness.‖  Since these objects, these symptoms, indicate a desire for their 
actuality, the discovery of any somatic cause of illness necessarily implies a wish to make 
ourselves ill.
35
   
 And yet, none of us wishes ourselves ill, do we?  Isn‘t this an ―insane‖ thought?  
But Kant is not saying that the healthy person, perhaps as opposed to the melancholiac, 
empirically wishes herself or himself ill.  Although the appearance of an object of 
experience implies that this object was produced by a wishful causality, this causality, 
since supersensible and so divided off from sensible causes, is an activity, we must again 
recall, which is not properly located in the subject‘s self-activity and self-experience.  We 
can become critically and thus indirectly aware of the symptomatic effects of this wishing 
but we can‘t see, experience, or manipulate the wishing directly since it is a form of 
desire, the formless form, beyond our particular empirical desires.  Critically speaking, 
then, the pleasure or displeasure involved in the somatized production of an oppressed 
stomach or heart is a pleasure or displeasure referred to the subject from a wishful 
causality (in and) beyond himself.  This is why the object looks merely naturally 
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produced and why the mode of its presentation seems cognitive or merely external, not 
aesthetic. 
 Entailed in this analysis is a paradoxical concept on which we should now focus, 
namely, that of causal simultaneity.  The somatic illness object is not just the delayed 
consequence or effect of this or that mechanical cause, although empirically speaking this 
is exactly and perhaps only how things appear.  Transcendentally speaking as well, 
however, this object is the simultaneous effect of a persistent supersensibility.  Since 
supersensibility is divided off from appearances, ―it‖ does not directly appear in terms of 
the inner forms of intuition—time and space.36  And yet, its power distortedly comes 
along together with, indeed, in and as spatiotemporal, and so mechanistic, appearances 
and intuitions.  This is subreption‘s trick of making the merely intelligible or 
supersensible intuitable.  As Kant had put this general idea in the first Critique:  ―[I]f the 
conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions,…a series which is therefore itself 
unconditioned, is likewise given, that is, contained in the object and its connection‖ 
(A307-8/B364).  As what we might call a ―simultaneous background‖ causality, then, 
supersensibility (mis)appears precisely in and as cognized object, which means that the 
subject will experience this object as if it had nothing to do with wishing.  The reason 
Kant‘s insight into our wishful morbidification of illness doesn‘t mesh with our everyday 
experience of falling prey to illness, in that case, is that our creative transcendental wish 
for illness cannot reach our awareness precisely insofar as we subreptively and 
creatively “find” and “discover” empirical causes of illness.  Indeed, if we are judging 
these causes cognitively, we cannot help but experience some of them objectivistically, as 
it they came to us merely from the outside. 
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 And as we‘ve seen, this seems to be what happens to Kant himself in his overtly 
medico-confessional analysis, at least from the point of view of the fantastic footnote.  
Since he describes the experience of his tendency to self-devised illness without the aid 
of the notion of subreption, his very analysis emits a symptom, namely, the textual 
slippages not between the critical notions of aesthetic-sensibility and super-sensibility but 
between the cognitive notions of subject and object, mind and body, and cause and effect.  
These symptomatic slippages perform a placeboic and precritical disavowal:  Even as he 
describes melancholia as ―self-devised,‖ Kant comes to understand his illness object — 
once his stomach and now his heart — as if it were produced merely naturally and 
mechanistically.  Critically and subreptively understood, however, this object is identical 
to a nonobjective desire for it.  This then is why despite Kant‘s attempts to fully 
distinguish h. vaga from localized hypochondria the former necessarily slips, both 
textually and empirically, into appearances of the latter. One simply cannot be directly 
aware of the supersensible (or what we might now call the unconscious).  Critically 
speaking, the divisions and conflations between subject and object, mind and body, and 
cause and effect are symptoms of the causal simultaneity of supersensibility‘s subreption 
into and as our experience.  Here, then, is the strange, almost scary point:  Although we 
actively seek out and often discover the empirical causes of our illnesses in an effort to 
remedy them, and although we are right to do this, we have also desired ourselves ill, 
behind our backs and melancholically, as it were, every time we find ourselves ill in 
terms of subject and object, mind and body, and cause and effect.  And so, for Kant 
illness is not merely cognitive, bio-naturalistic, empirical, behavioral, or psychological, 
and not even primarily a combination of these, as many interdisciplinary health theorists 
 56 
would now suggest.
37
  Rather, for him, illness, and health too, are first of all relations of 
our supersensible desire to our sense of objectivity. 
 Although the first part of Kant‘s response to his critics is easy to overlook, it 
defends and details this point.  When he suggests that vain wishing indicates 
transcendentally not (so much) that these wishes are futile but ―that some of man‘s 
desires involve him in self-contradiction, inasmuch as he uses the presentation by itself to 
strive to produce the object, while yet he cannot expect success from it,‖ he indicates that 
it‘s our melancholically not being able to ―expect success‖ regarding our wish‘s 
actualization (in what is called ―the real world‖) which produces conflict with this wish.  
But to say that in such cases we desire self-contradictorily is to say that we have not just 
one but two or more incompatible wishes.  This is a crucial insight.  Transcendentally 
speaking, in futile wishing one wish arrives as a desire to produce an object merely by 
wishing this object‘s existence, as if the ―presentation by itself‖ were enough.38  The 
other wish, on the other hand, arrives as the supersensible form of purposiveness, as a 
form of desire which empirically looks like a reasonable expectation that the first wish 
shall not be actualized, especially insofar as it is too ideal.39  One wish is too optimistic 
and ideal while the other is too pessimistic and even destructive.  But this conflict in 
wishes, or the simultaneous empirical “result” of their supersensible conflict, proves 
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 See the work, for instance, of George Engel and Arthur Kleinman.  These theorists are pluralistic, 
showing us how health and illness are combinations of various empirical legislations of nature, psychology, 
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as if it were a causal superpower beyond the experience of its causal powerlessness.  This, it seems to me, 
is Kant‘s point. 
39
 And indeed, technically it is incorrect to call one wish ―first‖ and the other ―second‖ since Kant‘s point 
here is that they are in mutual and simultaneous conflict. 
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symptomatically that there must be a subreptive relation between the supersensible 
causality of wishing, on the one hand, and our experience and expectations of the limits 
of wishing, on the other.  Although one wish causally desires the immediate actualization 
of a (vain) object and the other causally wishes against the actualization of this object — 
which may be to say that it wishes for objectlessness, even for lack — the objective 
symptom which is produced nonetheless is a sign that the determinative incompatibility 
of these wishes in-themselves is reflectively compatible.40  The somatic illness object thus 
(mis)actualizes the incompatibility between a futile wish and perfect desire by presenting 
these in and as a sensible object of longing.  The only way to ―prove‖ this, however, is to 
read the symptom backward towards its ―source‖ in transcendental desire.  Does not the 
heart skip or feel a constriction in deep, partly-conscious longing?  In any case, 
transcendentally speaking, the longing and somatic symptoms, including the futility to 
which they point, simultaneously ―exemplify‖ that they were wished-for.  This will 
become clearer as we proceed. 
 
Magical Ritualization 
 After Kant names the languid heart as critical and objective proof of desire‘s 
noncausal power of causality, he repeats this ―proof‖ but with an exteriorizing difference.  
The object at hand is now (it now appears) outside the body, as an obvious social ritual, 
rather than being merely a somatization:  ―Even prayers that ask for the deflection of 
some great and, as far as we can see, unavoidable evil, and also various superstitious 
means aimed at achieving purposes unattainable through nature prove the causal relation 
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of these presentations to their objects; and this relation is such that even an awareness of 
its insufficiency for producing the effect cannot keep it from striving for the effect.‖  
Why would Kant turn to superstitious and religious objects as another critical proof of 
desire‘s transcendental power?   
 His final remarks in the footnote round off the idea that human longing always 
produces a developmental fallout.  The key point, however, concerns the secret 
persistence of origins.  To say that ―we do not come to know what forces we have in the 
first place except by trying them out‖ is to suggest that in the first place, that is, when we 
are youngest, and perhaps even before and when we are born, we don‘t know anything 
about ourselves and our forces in relation to a world.  This is readily imaginable though 
no one can directly remember it.  We have no subjectivity or objectivity as yet, and so no 
sense of worldliness.  Indeed, to say that we ―come to know‖ what forces we have — 
where technically for Kant ―forces‖ are to be distinguished from a priori ―power‖ — is to 
say that we develop our subjective forces and relations to objects from an initial non-
cognitive but indirectly analyzable power, that of transcendental desire, in the direction of 
cognition and knowledge.  
 Kant‘s reference to this ―first place,‖ then, should be taken in a number of senses, 
including that which highlights Kant‘s references to primitive superstition.  Indeed, what 
he seems to have in mind here is primitive human life in general, and perhaps especially 
that belonging to individual development.
41
  Think for instance of a mother‘s doting care 
                                                   
41
 As we shall see, I do not by ―primitive‖ mean to disparage any group or individual, as was done for 
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developed social formations.  This is paradoxical or paralogical, of course, but as such it generates  —  as 
Kant and Winnicott know well, for instance — an impulse toward understanding. 
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and a baby whose desire is met by this mother (almost) instantly, as soon as or even 
before the baby‘s desire expresses itself.  Indeed, let‘s look at this relationship from two 
basic points of view.  From outside the baby‘s perspective, we see a causally active and 
beneficent mother doing everything she can to care for a helpless newborn babe.
42
  
Indeed, when we call the latter ―helpless,‖ we mean that he is, well, incapable as yet in 
the world.  He cannot talk, he cannot use his body, he cannot do anything, it seems, but 
fumble around, mouth, and leave us stinky presents.
43
  From this perspective, the baby is 
more or less ―powerless,‖ so to speak, to be the cause of worldly objects; he must 
somehow come to develop his forces, as Kant says, but in the meantime is completely 
dependent upon the mother.  Given his mother‘s constant and meticulous doting, in fact, 
it is not he but almost entirely she who does everything for him, she who presents the 
―objects‖ he comes into contact with.  It is not he but she who gratifies and actualizes his 
wishes so quickly that he cannot as yet develop a firm awareness of them as subjective 
things distinct from the objects of their actualization.   
 But this last bit already hints at what the baby‘s ―perspective‖ must be like.  Since 
all he ―experiences‖ near the beginning of life is something tending toward an 
instantaneous actualization of his wishes, it is not or not just powerlessness and 
helplessness which he lives.  On the contrary, what is lived is something on the order of 
or approximating a ―godlike‖ capacity for fantastic actualization.  From the baby‘s 
earliest nonperspectival perspective, in other words, wishing and actualization arrive so 
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 Kant‘s suggestion in the ―Sheer Resolution‖ essay that ―some sort of unhealthy condition (such as 
flatulence or constipation) may be the source of [melancholia]‖ derives its weight here, that is, when we 
realize the give and take of the earliest objectivities. 
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intimately undifferentiated that neither stands out, subjectively for the first, objectively 
for the second.  This baby is about to sense his desire or need, for instance, and 
something which seems to fulfill it arrives simultaneously, or virtually so.  Thus, to say 
that newborns are powerless is not, transcendentally speaking, to say that they are 
ineffective, or indeed, that they lack an a priori desire whose power is manifestation, 
phenomenalization, objectification.  On the contrary, a baby‘s so-called powerlessness is 
fully compatible with a formally causal superpower of wishing, where causality and its 
effects are or would be simultaneous.  Do we all not begin this way?  Of course, on the 
other hand, and again from an outside, socialized perspective, since no mother is faultless 
enough to meet a baby‘s wishes perfectly — and who knows what is first wanted? — 
even if this presupposed power of desire were something we could think of as being there 
at the ―ground zero‖ of birth, so to speak, it is also something which will have to be given 
up, or rather, as we shall see, developmentally subrepted so as to appear that it has been 
given up or even never actually was.  
 Before this developmental forgetfulness of perfect wish actualization dawns 
cognitively, indeed as cognition, however, there is a mediate, in fact a magically 
mediating, step.
44
  How so?  Let us remember that in the baby‘s eyes — as the seed of  
hallucination and dreaming — the mother doesn‘t just seem to be but is, as his only 
worldly ―object,‖ and indeed as his whole ―world,‖ all-important, fully significant.  The 
mother and what she brings, we could say, are not just representationally but, prior to and 
with this, presentationally sacred.  This sacredness, however, is a developmental first 
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generations in the destruction and building of the (natural but humanly distorted) world. 
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step, a movement of sacralization which is intimately tied up with an alternately 
necessary desacralization.  The mother is, after all, imperfect and cannot — and 
developmentally speaking, she should not — be there to fulfill her child‘s every wish.  
Why?  Growth requires both obstacles and routines mutually developed to meet these 
obstacles.  At first, these routines develop primitively:  As the baby comes to find that his 
gratifying ―object‖ is not under perfect wishful control, he develops the thought of an 
―outside/inside‖ distinction, one, however, which arrives in a surprisingly conflated or 
alternately divided form.   Indeed, my suggestion here is that the object becomes sacred 
precisely to the degree that primitive desire, fantastic objectification, becomes 
subreptively and empirically crossed-up, simultaneously divided and conflated, in and 
between an ―inside‖ and ―outside,‖ the one reflecting the other in the presence and 
absence of this all-important thing:
45
  If the baby‘s wish is not immediately met, he is 
prompted — indeed, sublimely prompted if we recall Kant‘s introduction of the notion of 
subreption — to develop rituals and discovers forces (a power in himself, which in the 
baby is exhibited as screaming and crying, for instance) which can be used to maintain, 
strengthen, or diminish what also then appear as various desired effects.   But again, 
from the emergent perspective of the baby, inside and outside are not that distinct or, 
alternately, they‘re are all too separate, at least at first.   
 Thus, following upon, maintaining, and subrepted from out of the conditioning 
illusion of transcendental desire (the causal identification of ―wish‖ and ―actualization‖) 
comes the experience of magic.  Magic appears in the ritual crossing of wishing with the 
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form.  See Bettelheim, 1972, especially the chapter on Laurie. 
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relative indistinction or seemingly total separation of inside and outside.
46
  It pivots on 
the objective force of subjects to the degree that some thing, in signifying a sacred 
intimacy, can be used to influence a now-distinct subject, for better or worse.  Birth 
exposes the need for magic.  Take the breast in early feeding:  At first the baby cannot be 
said to know if, let alone when, it will return.  Thus, if it is sensed to have disappeared, to 
be gone for good for instance, the wish and movement which conjures it forth will be 
seen as magical to the degree that a sacred relation is reborn with these.  This influence 
over that which seems to have disappeared, then, is ―magic.‖  Indeed, once the thing has 
been brought forward for satisfaction, it can be wished away through yet another ritual.  
We thus have a full cycle, one routinized, regimented, ritualized soon enough:  The baby 
longingly wishes for the thing, and behold, together with some fanciful ceremonials, it 
soon appears; when he wishes that it go away and performs yet another rite, the thing 
moves away, destroyed or at least magically warded-off yet again.  The thing is conjured 
forth and away in turn, in other words, through cycles of wish-infused objective ritual.   
 But let me add a point of clarification:  The baby doesn‘t perform these rituals 
thinking that it is the screaming and crying and not really her ―mere wish‖ which 
conjures her ―sacred object‖ forth or away.  On the contrary, in the ealiest infancy there is 
no such thing as a mere wish.  For the appearance or disappearance of any object will 
have been, even if only retrospectively, wishfully infused.  This is ―because‖ the baby‘s 
desire is not yet clearly differentiated from ―objects,‖ or alternately is all too surprisingly 
differentiated.  Nonetheless, a developmental aspect emerges in the comings and goings 
of satisfaction:  Whereas we must presuppose that there was once a complete 
identification of inside and outside, and wish and object, it‘s now more that the baby 
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thinks her wish is this noise (this screaming and crying, for instance) which is almost, or 
related to, or connected to, the forth- or away-conjured sacred thing.
47
  In short, then, the 
subreption of fantastic objectification corresponds developmentally to the losing and 
finding by the primitive human of an ability to more or less instantly actualize a wish in 
the form of a deeply significant object, which means that the developmental fallout of our 
most needy and primitive longings retains the formal rule of fantastic objectification, in 
the form of ritualized magic and magical thinking, if not exactly fantastic 
objectification‘s perfectly undifferentiated content and its perfectly conflated personage.  
Magic appears experientially and experience must appear as magic when wish is in the 
process of being distinguished from object but that process remains pupal to the point 
where “mere wishes” can still be identified  with practices so as to generate — or from 
the point of view of fully developed cognition, so as to seem to generate — some 
empirical influence over what appears.  This influence, as we shall see, is symbolic, the 
work of symbolization. 
 Notice in this regard that prior to his more cognitive referencing of superstition 
and prayer in the fantastic footnote, Kant first refers, symbolically as it were, to what we 
might call a superstitious moment in Vergil‘s Aeneid.  As Pluhar‘s footnote indicates, ―O 
mihi praeteritos, etc‖ refers to the Aeneid passage at viii, 560, ―O mihi praeteritos referat 
si Iuppiter annos,‖ which in English can be translated ―if Jupiter would only restore to me 
those bygone years.‖   What is the significance of this reference?  The main 
transcendental point is that, given our ―propensity toward desires of whose futility we are 
aware,‖ superstitious and religious rituals — which Kant here identifies — fulfill for us a 
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wish to have our vain and failing desires ―actualized‖ nonetheless, both insofar as we 
have, and despite, a growing awareness of their empirical impossibility.   
 Kant‘s admission that this is an anthropological-teleological question, and thus a 
developmental one, is correct in this respect.  Despite his personal and critical support of 
Pietism specifically and Christian rationalism more generally, he is not offering a 
theological analysis here but, on the contrary, a philosophical archaeology of magico-
religious thinking and practice.  This archaeology will include what Kant calls 
symbolization and cognition in developmental turn.  Given the development of the 
passage as a whole, the point of the reference to Jupiter is that since magical practices 
grow out of the fact that as wishers we wish beyond our worldly means and in doing so 
create rituals to mediate this overextension which somehow ―gratify‖ our wishes 
nonetheless — say, as consolation — Jupiter, as the supposed ruler of gods and worlds, 
archaeologically (mis)reflects our own transcendental power of fantastic objectification.  
The ―gods‖ arise for us developmentally and historically, in other words, on the back of 
our own impossible-to-cognitively-remember capacity to wishfully create the world.  The 
―gods‖ meet our need, which is also to say our wish, to immediately fulfill unfulfillable 
wishes.
48
  
 ―We moderns‖ have come to call certain beliefs or practices ―superstitious,‖ after 
all, whenever they grant not a cognitive, mechanical, or natural but a supposedly 
animistic, magical, or supernatural causation of this or that object.  In a similar way, Kant 
here uses the word ―superstition‖ (Superstition) to remind us of the magical feel, the 
aesthetic sense, of the falling-out of primitive ―supersensibility‖ (Übersinnlichkeit) into 
and toward objectivity, even into and toward the objectivity of science:  To stand-over 
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something in awe, as ―superstition‖ etymologically denotes, is to be awe-struck by a 
power which apparently lies both in and beyond this object‘s obviously natural and 
cognitive properties — the magic is said to be the object‘s ―aura,‖ ―mana,‖ ―qi,‖ 
―energy,‖ etc —  just as, according to Kant, a beautiful object, which is always sensible, 
refers us subreptively to a supersensible pre-objectivity as its hidden condition.  
Similarly, ―ob-ject‖ etymologically signifies a being thrown-out, as into sensibility. 
 Thus, magical and religious objects and practices are subrepted externalizations.49  
They are wishes and contain wishes, true, but to the degree that they‘re an extension of a 
radical power of actualization, they‘re never mere or vain wishes.  Rather, as both 
symptoms and forms of consolation, they are effective to some degree even when they 
seemingly fail.   This, then, is Kant‘s basic archaeological point:  Since we produce 
superstitious rituals as if to satisfy certain vain desires despite the otherwise apparent 
impossibility of satisfaction, this means, critically speaking, that magic and religion 
actually reflect human dependencies and idealizations.  Gods and idols, in other words, 
are anthropomorphisms unrecognized up to the point of a critical self-examination of our 
development, an examination which shows them to be productions stemming from the 
context of primitive need, desire, and desire‘s wishful failure to fulfill need immediately.  
For even in failing, gods and idols symptomatically prove desire‘s secret work of our 
wanting to be godlike, to escape loss and its travails.  Indeed, from another, more 
primitive, but nonetheless Kantian perspective, we wishfully develop such rituals and, 
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behold, the divinities who would fulfill our wishes become the actual objects of these 
rituals.
50
  
    
Symbolic Enculturation 
 In the last sections of the critique of aesthetic judgment, Kant expands and 
clarifies this process of magical experience by articulating two developmental structures 
the first of which, symbolization, extends the ritualization of longing we have been 
examining and the second of which, cognition, marks the symbolically transformative 
forgetting of primitive symbolization.  At stake in both symbolization and cognition, 
then, as section fifty-nine ―On Beauty as the Symbol of Morality‖ perhaps best 
exemplifies, is the objectification of a sensible object from out of something formal: 
 
All hypotyposis (exhibition…) consists in making a concept sensible, and is either 
schematic or symbolic.  In schematic hypotyposis there is a concept that the 
understanding has formed, and the intuition corresponding to it is given a priori.  In 
symbolic hypotyposis there is a concept which only reason can think and to which no 
sensible intuition can be adequate, and this concept is supplied with an intuition that 
judgment treats in a way merely analogous to the procedure it follows in 
schematizing; i.e. the treatment agrees with this procedure merely in the rule followed 
rather than in terms of the intuition itself, and hence merely in terms of the form of 
reflection rather than its content. (226=351) 
 
 When Kant suggests that symbolizing or symbolization agrees with the procedure 
of schematizing or  schematization ―merely in the rule followed rather than in terms of 
the intuition itself,‖ he is referring immediately backwards to his suggestion that 
concerning ideas of reason, which are supersensible, ―no sensible intuition can be 
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adequate.‖  To say that these two kinds of judgment are analogous, then, is to say that 
while the procedures agree in terms of the ―rule followed‖ or the ―form of reflection‖ 
since they both supply form with intuition, only in schematization is the given intuition 
sufficient, indeed, already sufficient in terms of this form.  Indeed, this material refers 
back to Kant‘s guiding problem in the Introduction.  Since there is no ―great gulf‖ 
between understanding and imagination preventing such direct correspondence, an 
intuition can be said to ―correspond‖ a priori to a concept of understanding.  And since 
understanding and imagination are faculties of cognition and are part of the same domain, 
they can and do play harmoniously in claims of taste concerning beautiful objects.  
Correspondence and play before this same object of taste cannot be said to exist, 
however, between an idea of reason, as supersensible, and the sensible intuition which the 
imagination gives to ―exhibit‖ this idea.   
 When two paragraphs later Kant provides an example of symbolic objectification, 
however, something strange happens, or has already happened, as if by textual slippage.  
He has just defined symbolization and analogy not as the making differently sensible of 
some already sensible and schematized object but as the making sensible in the first place 
of an idea of reason which, as supersensible, is in itself unfit for sensibility or 
schematizing; and yet the example he gives to explain his definition takes two already 
sensible objects (a constitutional monarchy and an absolute monarchy) and symbolizes 
these with yet two other sensible objects (an animate body and a mere machine), 
respectively:   
 
Symbolic exhibition uses an analogy (for which we use empirical intuition as well), in 
which judgment performs a double function:  it applies the concept to the object of a 
sensible intuition; and then it applies the mere rule by which it reflects on that 
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intuition to an entirely different object, of which the former object is only the symbol.  
Thus a monarchy ruled according to its own constitutional laws would be presented 
as an animate body, but a monarchy ruled by an individual absolute will would be 
presented as a mere machine (such as a handmill); but in either case the presentation 
is only symbolic.  For though there is no similarity between a despotic state and a 
handmill [for instance], there certainly is one between the rules by which we reflect 
on the two and on how they operate [in terms of] causality. (227=352)   
 
 Thus, it‘s as if a critical gap had slyly opened up in the text.  What was just two 
paragraphs before a transcendental analysis of the symbolic objectification of a 
supersensible and nonobjective condition is now suddenly what seems to be a merely 
empirical exemplification where one empirical object symbolizes another object.  Why 
might Kant have done this? In his fine reading of Kant‘s third Critique, Henry Allison 
notices this discrepancy which most other Kant commenters fail to notice.
51
  According 
to Allison, Kant‘s analysis here is ―cryptic.‖  There is, he says, 
 
…an important question with which Kant does not deal explicitly, namely, how can 
the mere reflection on a sensible intuition, which ex hypothesi is not governed by a 
determinate concept, be viewed as formally analogous to the explicitly rule-governed 
reflection on the corresponding intellectual object?  This question does not arise in 
the case of Kant‘s examples, since they each involve a reflection based on 
determinate concepts (of a handmill and an organism), whereas this is precisely what 
is supposedly lacking in the mere reflection of taste. (256) 
 
 Allison is right — at least in a sense — that by reflecting determinate concepts 
and empirical objects against each other, Kant‘s symbolization examples fail to reflect 
the indeterminacy of supersensibility and as such misexemplify his initial definition of 
symbolization where what is symbolized, and indeed, what requires not schematization 
but symbolization insofar as there can be no adequate or corresponding intuition of it, is 
supersensibility in itself.  Finding this a bit cryptic and inexplicit, Allison turns away 
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from any immanent critique of this discrepancy and endeavors to justify the link between 
taste and morality by tracking what he suggests is an ―isomorphism‖ of form between 
aesthetic ideas and rationally moral ideas.  This is a legitimate move.  Indeed, his 
suggestion, following Kant, that aesthetic ideas prompt indeterminate thoughts and 
thereby enable the judge of taste to consider aspects of the object which transport her 
beyond her initial concerns in the gratifying allure of the object‘s charms toward 
something indeterminately supersensible is helpful.    
 We, on the other hand, shall here suggest that there is something secretly but 
developmentally significant about this discrepancy.  Although Allison is right that Kant‘s 
examples misexemplify his initial definition of symbolization, we shall suggest that these 
examples are also performatively correct insofar as their very failure to explicitly reflect 
the supersensible symbolizes the development towards cognition that is here at stake.  
What Allison sees as a simple mistake in Kant‘s analysis, in other words, we shall 
examine for its subtextually symbolic and performative precision as a slip, as a 
performative symptom.  Allison‘s description of Kant‘s text as ―cryptic,‖ in this regard, is 
more telling than one would think.  Indeed, my suggestion is that Kant‘s writing is 
subreptive here of the symbolization which is at stake.  Kant‘s writing is a 
―cryptography,‖ in other words, to the degree that it does not just tell us but also 
performatively shows us, through the non-recognition of its mistakes, how symbolic code 
develops.  We need to express loss and disillusion in a meaningful way, don‘t we?  How, 
then, do we begin to do this, and why?  Kant‘s idea includes the fact that our experience 
and memory only give us part of the story, and that stories develop as life is challenged.  
Indeed, since what is at stake in symbolization is precisely a non-recognition or 
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disavowal of its own indeterminate (although not indeterminable) supersensible 
condition, Kant‘s examples perform this developmental process of disavowal.  As such, 
his archeology of cognition is only understandable in its widest sense if one reads it 
subreptively, tracking fantastic objectification, by means of a code of magic and 
superstition — a fetishistic hieroglyphics as Marx will articulate it — into the realm of 
symbolic disavowal.   
 It is no accident on my reading, for instance, that in the many places in his work 
where Kant tackles the process of symbolization, he almost invariably uses as his 
example an analogy between ―God‖ (or this being‘s supposed power) and ―humanity‖ (or 
one of our forces).
52
  A page after offering his analogy (in the third Critique) between 
types of monarchy and types of causality, for instance, and after commenting briefly on 
the symbolism involved in basic philosophical language — thus symbolically articulating 
his self-awareness of his own writing and capacity to write in a distant connection to 
longing — Kant makes the following suggestion:  ―If a mere way of presenting 
something may ever be called cognition (which I think is permissible if this cognition is a 
principle not for determining the object theoretically, as to what it is in itself, but for 
determining it practically, as to what the idea of the object ought to become for us and for 
our purposive employment of it), then all our cognition of God is merely symbolic‖ 
(228=353).
53
  Similarly, discussing symbolization in the Prolegomena, Kant 
distinguishes between dogmatic anthropomorphism, which he rejects since it attributes 
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human predicates to God as he would be in himself, and symbolic anthropomorphism 
which ―concerns language only and not the object itself.‖54    
 It is in two footnotes from this section of the Prolegomena, in fact, where Kant 
offers what are perhaps his most telling — subtextually telling — suggestions concerning 
symbolization.  Seen in combination, these notes reveal the transcendental cryptography 
be-longing to empirical symbolization.  By secretly exhibiting our power to fantastically 
fulfill wishes, indeed longings, symbols point to and bear (the forces of) human 
development.  According to Kant:  
 
By means of … analogy I can obtain a notion of the relation of things which 
absolutely are unknown to me. For instance, as the promotion of the welfare of 
children (= a) is to the love of parents (= b), so the welfare of the human species (= c) 
is to that unknown character in God (= x), which we call love; not as if it had the least 
similarity to any human inclination, but because we can suppose its relation to the 
world to be similar to that which things of the world bear one another.  
 
and  
 
I may say that the causality of the Supreme Cause holds the same place with regard to 
the world that human reason does with regard to its works of art….55  
 
 When Kant suggests in section fifty-nine that symbolic judgment ―performs a 
double function,‖ the analogy he offers between an absolute monarchy and a machine on 
the one hand and a constitutional monarchy and an animate body on the other hand, as 
we‘ve seen, omits the symbolic procedure his definition had made explicit, namely, the 
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falsely making sensible and intuitable in the first place of a supersensible condition.  In 
this first footnote from the Prolegomena, however, Kant doesn‘t obscure judgment‘s 
double function as much as he does by means of the third Critique‘s examples.  He 
combines judgment‘s first or a priori function of objectifying supersensibility and its 
second function of applying the ―mere rule‖ of this first function to an ―entirely different 
object‖:  He first casts the causality of transcendental desire as if it belonged to the object 
here named ―God‖ and then ―God‖ is again symbolized (in ―language only‖) by casting 
his supposed relation to the human species (in terms of love, which is eros, which is the 
power of desire) as if it were like the empirical relation between two sensible objects, 
namely, parents and children.  We thus see how the critical slip which Allison rightly 
finds ―cryptic,‖ and which most scholars don‘t acknowledge, actually secretly works 
archeologically and performatively:  Any empirical symbolization of one object or pair of 
objects by another object or object-pair always also secretly symbolizes the magical 
objectification in the first place of the condition of supersensible desire.  By 
concentrating on the causality of autonomous versus heteronomous governance, Kant‘s 
examples in section fifty-nine do not explicitly reference the supersensible in itself, true.  
This, however, is the point.  Symbolization (reveals as it) hides supersensibility in and as 
sensible objects.  Indeed, it develops precisely out of our failing desire to be godlike or 
perfect in our wishing.  All symbolization in this regard is a process of longing and, 
indeed, of mourning primitive loss. 
 Indeed, this same point is ―revealed‖ in the second footnote from the 
Prolegomena.  When Kant says ―that the causality of the Supreme Cause holds the same 
place with regard to the world that human reason does with regard to its works of art ,‖ he 
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can be understood in a religious and idealistic sense as naming ―God‖ as the creative 
cause of the human world.  The cryptic phrase ―causality of the Supreme Cause‖ would 
thus mark a power of world creation which belongs to ―God‖ as his primary attribute.  
All ―God‖ has to do is wishfully desire the world or any of its objects and without delay 
or mediation the world and it objects are fantastically actualized.  Or at least so goes the 
theological account of omnipotence.  If we remember, however, that in the fantastic 
footnote Kant both (a) distinguishes ―causality‖ from ―cause‖ as a transcendental 
condition is developmentally distinguished from its empirical appearance and (b) casts 
religious and superstitious practices in general as developmental substitutions of our own 
transcendental power of fantastic objectification, then we can critically understand the 
phrase ―causality of the Supreme Cause‖ as designating not what belongs to a putative 
divinity but rather to ourselves, to the cryptic within us, as artistic creators of a world 
developmentally populated with absconding magical beings and sacred objects.  
Subreptively understood, in other words, what determines the ―Supreme Cause‖ is not an 
objective cause, supreme or otherwise, but the transcendental causality which religious 
and superstitious rituals developmentally harness and symbolize.  Indeed, we would do 
better to suggest that these rituals (mis)symbolize this causality insofar as all objective 
symbolization necessary presents, and so simultaneously mispresents, its non- or pre-
objective pre-history.  A symbol is thus a metaphorical representation of supersensible 
desire which is simultaneously a secret literal presentation of this desire.  Whereas 
representation re-presents something with and through another thing, showing the second 
thing to be ―about‖ the first thing, presentation is this first thing.  Representation has been 
mediated whereas presentation as yet is not.  But re-presentation contains presentation in 
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the way that for Freud, for instance, the secondary processes will secretly contain primary 
processes, as if beneath the surface.  Presentation is thus the subtext of representation. 
 This refers us back again to the first footnote.  Kant‘s suggestion that the 
promotion of the welfare of children is to the love of parents as the welfare of the human 
species is to that unknown character in God which we call eros is not, critically speaking, 
a suggestion that the empirical parent-child relationship symbolizes a more primary or 
primitive erotic relationship between ―God‖ and the human world.  Rather, it is the 
reverse of this.  The supersensible and primary relation here is not the god-human 
relation but the desirous parent-child relation before it has been made ―understandable‖ 
by and for the child by means which begin in ritualized codes of objective superstition.  
And this refers us back yet again to the second footnote.  The suggestion that the relation 
between human reason and artworks is like the creative relation between God and the 
world critically indicates that the relation between human reason and artworks is actually 
and most deeply like the relationship between parental reason (and repressed desire) and 
childish desire (and inchoate reason), namely, an aesthetically developmental and 
subreptively educative relationship.   
 How does the symbolization we call art enable development?  Let‘s work toward 
an answer by suggesting first of all that Kant offers us a clue early in the Critique when 
he declares that hunger is not the best sauce, that is, that we don‘t aesthetically appreciate 
an object if crudely sensuous desire is merely what drives our liking (52=210).  Allison, 
too, provides a clue for answering this question, but he does not himself pursue the lesson 
this clue offers.  He reminds us that in one of Kant‘s notebooks Kant links what we are 
calling the ritualization of longing to the relationship we find between mothers and 
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babies.  This, then, is why we felt justified earlier in performing this analysis from a 
Kantian perspective.  In this apparently innocuous remark, in fact, Kant brings together 
all of the elements of our analysis.  He subreptively links and divides a priori 
objectification to and from the externalizations we call longing, somatization, magical 
ritualization, and symbolization.  Indeed, his claim firmly places the aesthetic link 
between sense and supersensibility within the developmental vicissitudes of desire:  
―Beautiful objects and beautiful representations of objects,‖ he states, and I emphasize, 
―wean the mind from the mere satisfaction of enjoyment and bring it closer to 
morality.‖56   
 What does a primitive human being — what do we all — want?  According to 
Kant, the objects we most archaically desire we like sensuously, at least for the most part.  
We like them because they are ―agreeable,‖ because they ―gratify.‖  This is not to say, 
however, that the primitive person lacks taste for these objects or, more broadly, that 
aesthetic judgment doesn‘t rest upon gratification.  Taste, however, isn‘t reducible to 
gratification.  On the contrary, and as Kant slowly but eventually makes clear over the 
course of the Critique, taste is something which must be developed in subreptive remove 
from mere sensuousness and mere gratification.  When the experience of beauty dawns, 
he says in section fifty-nine, ―…the mind is also conscious of being ennobled … above a 
mere receptivity for pleasure derived from sense impressions‖ (228=353).  Or, as the 
final sentence of this section puts it:  ―Taste enables us, as it were, to make the transition 
from sensible charm to habitual moral interest without making too violent a leap; for taste 
presents the imagination as admitting, even in its freedom, of determination that is 
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purposive for the understanding, and it teaches us to like even objects of sense freely, 
even apart from sensible charm‖ (230=354).   
 Given the ―great gulf‖ which always threatens to turn abysmal between sense and 
supersensibility, however, what is it about symbolization which makes this transition 
possible?  Kant‘s entire analysis in the third Critique of the intersubjectivity belonging to 
sensus communis could be said to address the issue of broadening judgment and, in 
developing a broader, more cosmopolitan perspective, (mis)bridging this gulf.  Sensus 
communis is what enables us to establish and hold ourselves accountable to norms for the 
communication — like the communication of a beneficent disease — of the pleasure of 
judging.  To judge by sensus communis is to abstract to some degree from the limitations 
and biases of one‘s own sensuous proclivities and needs to judge an object as all others 
would judge under a presumed similar, developmental abstraction.  As Kant puts it in his 
section on sensus communis:   ―We must here take sensus communis to mean the idea of a 
sense shared by all of us [gemeinshaftlichen], i.e. a power to judge that in reflecting takes 
account (a priori), in our thought, of everyone else‘s way of presenting…‖ (160=293).  If 
we abstract from our private and empirical interest in a given object, however, what we 
are left with is our most primitive way of presenting, namely, our shared power of 
objectifying objects whatsoever from out of a non-objective plenum through 
transcendental symbolization.  Symbolization, then, is what stands between 
supersensibility and sense and what enables a transition between these poles precisely by 
reflecting one in and as the other, in and despite the great gulf.  Sense can thus appear as 
more than mere sensuousness, as a partially developed maturity.  Or we could say that the 
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supersensibility of morality can (mis)appear in feelings of pleasure, the pleasure of 
sharing human (a)social life. 
 Kant‘s clearest statement on this issue appears not in his sections concerning 
sensus communis, however, but in his final statement on symbolization in the critique of 
aesthetic judgment in section sixty, an ―appendix‖:   
 
It seems that for all fine art, insofar as we aim at its highest degree of perfection, the 
propaedeutic does not consist in following precepts but in cultivating our mental 
powers by exposing ourselves beforehand to what we call humaniora, the humanities; 
they are called that presumably because Humanitat means both the universal feeling 
of sympathy, and the ability to engage universally in very intimate communication.  
When these two qualities are combined, they constitute the sociability that befits our 
humanity and distinguishes it from the limitations characteristic of animals.  There 
were peoples during one age whose strong urge to have sociability under laws, 
through which a people becomes a lasting commonwealth, wrestled with the great 
problems that surround the difficult task of combining freedom (and hence also 
equality) with some constraint (a constraint based more on respect and on submission 
from duty than on fear).  A people in such an age had to begin by discovering the art 
of reciprocal communication of ideas between its most educated and its cruder 
elements, and by discovering how to make the improvement and refinement of the 
first harmonize with the natural simplicity and originality of the second, finding in 
this way that mean between higher culture and an undemanding nature constituting 
the right standard, unstatable in any universal rules, even for taste, which is the 
universal human sense. (231=355) 
 
 What is communicated in beautiful art and in the experience of beauty?  The idea 
that the refinement of the more-educated can be made to harmonize with the originality 
of the less-educated by means of ―the art of reciprocal communication of ideas‖ is 
suggestive of what we just uncovered in Kant‘s phrase gemeinshaftlichen, which Pluhar 
translates as ―a sense shared by all‖ and which Meredith translates as ―public.‖57  Both 
translations are useful to the degree that Kant definitely wants to indicate not just a 
common capacity to judge but also a sense of what is materially shared, and indeed, of 
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what is shareable in and by means of objects, and so by means of objectivity.  Notice, 
then, that in both of these phrases — ―the art of reciprocal communication of ideas‖ and 
―the idea of a sense shared by all‖ — the supersensible, as an indeterminate ideal, is 
balanced by reference to something crudely non-ideal.  What is communicated in art like 
a beneficent disease is neither solely sensuous nor solely ideal but a (mis)presentation of 
both of these such that the crude (babies, for instance) and the more-reasoned (many 
adults, for example) come to be able to relate to each other developmentally by means of 
the symbolizations a shared, educative art of pleasing offers.58  Since the crude develop 
from out of the mere charm of sensuousness through the symbolic introduction to ideas 
and since the refined have become so enamored of ideas but still must materialize ideas 
to a more or less obvious degree if they are to communicate socially and intimately — 
there is no such thing as a telepathic exchange of ideas, despite the claims of the childish 
adult — what serves to mediate these groups and enable a mutually developmental 
interaction are pleasing aesthetic objects together with the art of communication.  To the 
degree that it tends toward the creation of sympathy and intimacy (together), art becomes 
the transmissive and cultivative means of individual and historical development.  
Philosophy remains an art, for instance, to the degree that it cultivates and communicates 
an intimate feeling of sympathy between oneself and others. 
 This means that beautiful objects enable development by subreptively 
(mis)presenting gratification as a pleasing resistance to mere gratification on the one 
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hand and by subreptively (mis)presenting pure reason as a sensible anticipation of 
morality‟s non-sensuousness on the other hand.  Identity with nature or, alternately, with 
reason is transformed here at least to some small degree into a relationship between 
developing subjects, a sensus communis.  In order for this process to take place, however, 
pure ideas need an objective place to be ―taken.‖  What is needed is not pure gratification 
nor absolute categorical demand but a claim of sympathy — for the old were and remain 
somewhere young, do they not? — a pleasing object between the crude and the refined 
concerning the loss and gain each must suffer or has suffered in growing up.  
Symbolizing both the loss of merely sensuous intimacy and the maintenance of mutual 
subjectivization, the beautiful object helps to manage the insult of discontinued 
gratification and the guilt-inspiring ideality of merely moral command.  When culture is 
historically able to communicate individuality by means of art, it lives at least one more 
generation.  For it is aesthetic experience which helps us manage what otherwise wearies 
us of life. 
 This, then, and again, is why Kant can round off the fantastic footnote with the 
seemingly absurd claim that the deception of futile and impossible wishes is the result of 
a beneficent arrangement in our nature.  Too much immediate wish-fulfillment, like too 
much moral guilt, inhibits development.  Indeed, if desire did not at some level and in the 
first place fail, and if rather than deceiving us desire was always already and perfectly 
―met‖ in nature, our objectivity — in the aesthetic, theoretical, and practical senses, in 
this logical if not temporal order — could not develop at all.  Objectivity begins and 
grows, and continues to grow toward science and morality, in other words, when 
primitive desire causally presents some thing not just perfectly, as by fantastic 
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objectification, but imperfectly, in aesthetic objectification.  The growth of such 
objectivity, in turn, is and encourages the growth of culture.  As Kant says in section 
forty-one, ―we judge someone as refined if he has the inclination and the skill to 
communicate his pleasure to others, and if he is not satisfied with an object unless he can 
feel his liking for it in community with others‖ (164=297, my emphasis).  The emphasis 
on community here is crucial.  Taste just is the building of mutually likeable community, 
in and despite our sensuous interests and moral demands, in the course of being educated.   
  
Cognition 
 The link Kant makes between magic and symbolization as conditions for the 
cultivation of objectivity apparently cuts against the progressivist and certainly the 
triumphalist Enlightenment tendency to cast ―objectivity‖ as the complete overcoming of 
fantasy and illusion.  In the triumphalist tradition, for instance, the experience of magic is 
not said to be an ingredient in but the opposite of objectivity.  Magic is ―heathen‖ or 
―backward,‖ like so much polytheism.  Talk about guilt!  Indeed, at times, or at least 
according to certain interpretations, Kant himself seems to fall into a merely progressivist 
(anti-regression) camp.  In What is Enlightenment, for example, he famously tells us from 
the start that ―[e]nlightenment is man‘s release from his self-incurred tutelage‖ (8:35)—
as if enlightenment were liberation from passive obedience to external imperatives and 
norms.
59
  And yet, of course, as the essay proceeds Kant argues that pure liberty and the 
sheer overcoming of superstition are precisely not what he has in mind.  Public citizens 
can develop a cosmopolitanly objective perspective not when freedom is extended 
universally to everyone but by limiting freedom in order to maintain and develop it.  Just 
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like everyone else but moreso, for example, state or government workers must adhere to 
many behavioral rules in their domestic or civil roles:  ―Many affairs which are 
conducted in the interest of the community require a certain mechanism through which 
some members of the community must passively conduct themselves with an artificial 
unanimity so that the government may direct them to public ends or at least to prevent 
them from destroying those ends‖ (8:37).  Indeed, ―here is shown a strange and 
unexpected trend in human affairs in which almost everything, looked at in the large, is 
paradoxical.  A greater degree of civil freedom appears advantageous to the freedom of 
mind of the people, and yet it places inescapable limitations upon it; a lower degree of 
civil freedom, on the contrary, provides the mind with room for each man to extend 
himself to his full capacity‖ (8:41).  Enlightenment and enlightened cognition, then, are 
not so much the result of freedom as they are achievements of reasonably guided 
educational constraints.  
 We find a similar argument at work concerning the development of cognition in 
the third Critique, especially in sections V and VI of the Introduction and as defended by 
Kant‘s solution to the antinomy of taste.  What‘s at stake is not exactly the above 
paradox, that political cognition develops by means of restricted freedoms, but still, a 
similar, indeed a wider, paradox is at play.  Kant‘s point here is that objective cognition 
in general develops out of non-cognitive conditions and pre-cognitive means.  To 
understand both nature and human nature objectively, he says, we must presuppose in the 
first place not a distinct purpose of judgment, since in this case judgment would 
teleologically belie the subreptive relationship between the conditions of experience and 
experience, but rather an as-yet unspecified purposiveness which experience comes to 
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mark derivatively and determinately with purposes and concepts.  According to Kant, 
―the principle of the purposiveness of nature (in the diversity of its empirical laws) is a 
transcendental principle.  For the concept of objects, insofar as they are thought as 
subject to this principle, is only the pure concept of objects of possible empirical 
cognition in general‖ (21=181).   
 Kant was apparently deeply worried — even anxious — about this particular 
problem!  No fewer than seven times in the Introduction‘s small section V does he 
highlight the deep human need, a wish for sociability, which the a priori supposition of 
purposiveness fulfills.  Given that our experience, and especially primitive experience, is 
faced with ―a diversity of empirical laws‖ which we would not otherwise be able to 
organize to form ―cognition in general,‖ we must suppose this purposiveness as an 
organizing principle of experience and cognition.  Purposiveness, in other words, is the 
principle through which our world, the social and human world included, can come to 
make sense, any sense.  It is the condition of possibly having a world which at least partly 
coheres.  As Kant puts this: 
 
Now this transcendental concept of purposiveness of nature is neither a concept of 
nature nor a concept of freedom, since it attributes nothing whatsoever to the object 
(nature), but through [it] we only think of the one and only way in which we must 
proceed when reflecting on the objects of nature with the aim of having thoroughly 
coherent experience….  A principle like this is expressed in the following 
propositions…, [for example,] that, while initially it seems to our understanding 
unavoidable to assume as many different kinds of causality as there are specific 
differences among natural effects, they may nevertheless fall under a small number of 
principles which it is our task to discover….  For it is quite conceivable that, 
regardless of all the uniformity of natural things in terms of the universal laws [of a 
priori understanding], without which the form of an empirical cognition in general 
would not occur at all, the specific differences in the empirical laws of nature, along 
with their effects, might still be so great that it would be impossible for our 
understanding to discover in nature an order it could grasp—i.e. impossible for it to 
divide nature‘s products into genera and species so as to use the principles by which 
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we explain and understand one product in order to explain and grasp another as well, 
thereby making coherent experience out of material that to us is so full of 
confusion….  This law could be called the law of the specification of nature…. (23-
5=184-6, my emphasis on ―initially‖).   
 
 Kant‘s anxious insight in this section, then, is that while the formal understanding 
provides a categorical sieve for the subsumption of empirical particulars, no possible 
human sense could be made of the particulars — they could not be cognized objectively 
— were we not to presuppose their purposiveness.  We could perceive them and manage 
them through instinct and inclination in the animalistic sense, but we could make no 
culturally useful sense of them.  Developmentally speaking, then, cognitive objectivity 
doesn‘t just depend on the formal mechanics of subsumption Kant had examined in the 
first Critique but also and more importantly, as he now realizes in his old age, on the 
supposition that our initial pre-objective confusion, our lived conflational split between 
morality and nature,
60
 can be ordered into coherent experience where purposes are 
possible, where subjects are distinguishable from objects, and where wish and actuality 
are not alternately torn and miraculously healed but are more or less predictably related, 
mediated well-enough.  My emphasis on ―initially‖ has this idea of developmental 
mediation in mind.  Indeed, Kant ends section V by noting explicitly that cognition is a 
later development which arises out of aesthetic judgment.  ―Only to the extent that this 
principle [i.e. purposiveness] has application,‖ he says, ―can we make any headway in 
using our understanding in experience and arrive at cognition‖ (26=186, my emphasis).  
Cognition, consciousness, and the scientific knowledge which arises out of the growth of 
                                                   
60
 ―Confusion‖ here should also be taken in the sense of indicating a ―fusion‖ of subjectivity and objectivity 
which can‘t be objectively or subjectively understood. 
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these, are achievements, historical developments from and out of a prior symbolic 
prehistory. 
 Indeed, in section VI Kant extends and recasts the paradox that cognition 
develops out of non-cognitive conditions and pre-cognitive means to suggest that 
cognition cannot be aware, outside of critical crises and despite being the faculty of 
awareness, of its fragmented symbolic beginnings.  ―It is true that we no longer feel any 
noticeable pleasure resulting from our being able to grasp nature and the unity of its 
division into genera and species that alone makes possible the empirical concepts by 
means of which we cognize nature in terms of its particular laws.  But this pleasure was 
no doubt there at one time, and it is only because even the commonest experience would 
be impossible without it that we have gradually come to mix it in with mere cognition 
and no longer take any special notice of it‖ (27=187).  The key element in this phrase is 
―that we no longer feel any noticeable pleasure‖ in ―mere cognition,‖ as if the aesthetic 
pleasures which are means to cognition — think of rewards in a pedagogical system, for 
instance — nonetheless persist despite our non-awareness of them in and as cognition.  
Our experience is a testament to this aesthetic persistence and its developmental 
disavowal. 
 Kant has this same idea in mind when he tracks what he calls ―aesthetic illusion‖ 
in his solution to the antinomy of taste.  The antinomy of taste, we recall, consists in the 
fact that judgments of taste seem subjective and objective at once.  Thetically, they are 
―subjective‖ since they are not based on concepts of the understanding and therefore 
cannot be decided by means of objectivistic proofs.  Antithetically, they are ―objective‖ 
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since otherwise one could not legitimately lay claim to another person‘s assent, which 
means that they must be based on concepts (211=339).  Now, according to Kant, 
 
What is needed to solve an antinomy is only the possibility that two seemingly 
conflicting propositions are in fact not contradictory but are consistent, even though it 
would surpass our cognitive power to explain how the concept involved is possible.  
Showing this consistency will also allow us to grasp the fact that and the reason why 
this illusion is natural and unavoidable for human reason, and why this illusion 
remains so even though it ceases to deceive us once we have resolved the seeming 
contradiction. (213=340)   
 
 Kant‘s well-known solution, of course, is that it is the concept of purposiveness 
which allows us to hold taste‘s contrasting propositions as mutually consistent, as a 
paradox, then, but not as a contradiction.
61
  We need only to specify the type of concept at 
hand in the thesis and antithesis.  Purposiveness is indeterminate, not teleological, which 
satisfies the subjective requirement that taste be disinterested; and yet purposiveness is an 
indeterminate concept of reason, which satisfies the requirement that taste be objectively 
determinable if not already determinate.  Though the antinomy is ―solved‖ by this move, 
however, there is something else at stake.  Kant‘s deeper developmental point is that 
aesthetic illusion remains an illusion and therefore remains aesthetic even when we have 
come to understand the object cognitively and are no longer mislead by it.  Philosophy 
remains an art, for instance, even when and after it supersedes what is usually understood 
as art.  So again, illusion persists in the development of subjectivity in and by means of 
objectivity, and vice versa.  And again, by objectivity we here have in mind the cognitive 
ability to analyze as well as the things of culture and taste. 
 Thus, even when we parcel out our subjectivity from our objectivity quite 
distinctly, and so even when we judge an object apparently non-aesthetically — 
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 Looked at in the large and in terms of the contours of objectivity almost everything is paradoxical. 
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scientifically naming it, logically analyzing it, philosophically explaining it, or morally 
esteeming it, for example — there remains in our judgment a kind of subjective 
objectivity, an illusion.  This illusion can be maintain in and as pleasure.  This means that 
just as aesthetic symbolization is the subreptive distortion of fantastic objectification so 
cognition is the subreptive distortion of aesthetic symbolization.  Cognition works with 
symbols, whether it avows this or not, and symbolizes insofar as it works, even though 
this symbolism works through illusion and even if this illusionism is discovered to be 
illusory and effective by critical analysis.  Cognition is the empirical (mis)presentation of 
supersensibility further organized and further objectified than in symbolization alone.  
We could say that it is symbolization developed to the point of abstraction.  Although 
cognition, or at least a certain precritical form of cognition, takes itself to be an 
overcoming of the illusions of superstition, magic, and fantasy, this cognitive archaeology 
of cognition reveals that it is also the subreptively continued presentation of superstition, 
magic, and fantasy.  As Kant says, the term enlightenment indicates not that cognition is 
already enlightened but that it has become critical and that critique does not escape and 
nullify its creative and illusional roots.  Science is not scientific on this view, then, unless 
it is creative of a more mutually developmental community by means of an art of 
communication. 
 This reflects on the passive kind of judgment which Kant famously calls 
―tutelage.‖  Although tutelage is in some respects self-incurred by fear and laziness, as he 
says, such that superstition and magic appear as the necessary but abandonable 
preconditions of cognition, it is just as important here, indeed more important, to stretch 
Kant‘s terminology to include what his theory strategically and objectively implies, 
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namely, that tutelage is not just self-incurred but self-incurring, self-developmental when 
pedagogically guided by the subjective universality of taste.  Since taste is reflective of 
both reason and sense, ―self-incurring‖ implies that the self develops, indeed, can only 
develop, by taking up an embodied, thoughtful, and self-critical perspective concerning 
its own illusional development.  This doesn‘t make taste merely cognitive, moral, and 
incapable of mistakes but, on the contrary, cognitive of the fact that self-development as 
self-incurrence of tutelage is an intersubjective practice of growing out of a primitively 
structured state of things, namely, the conflational splits of and between subject and 
object, sense and supersensibility, wish and fulfillment. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
PLACEBOIC HEALTH  
 
 When Kant says that in our initial fragmented ―experience‖ of the world there are 
―as many different kinds of causality as there are specific differences among natural 
effects‖ and says further that this is an incoherent state, at least according to our 
understanding and current experience, he makes a link, knowingly or otherwise, between 
this proto-developmental state and the manner in which it would persist 
―developmentally‖ were it not ordered and unified purposively and transcendentally.  
Recall that according to Kant‘s characterization of causality in the fantastic footnote this 
―endless diversity‖ of empirical laws is secretly structured in terms of the transcendental 
principle of supersensible desire, which means that what understanding initially takes as 
causal incoherence desire simultaneously takes as causal perfection, the identity of 
―wish‖ and its ―effect.‖  But this again sounds like the ambivalence of hypochondria as 
either a nonobjective or locally objectified ―condition‖ or ―disposition.‖  (Indeed, if Kant 
is right, it is not by accident that we encounter hypochondria as a kind of secret 
background of taste, the ability to judge beauty.)  Since hypochondria is a disturbance 
which both conflates and splits the subreptive relation between the causality of desire and 
the causes of understanding, Kant‘s analysis of a link between causal wishing and the 
multiplication of empirical causal laws, in and despite the gap between these, sounds like 
a program for the manufacture of health and illness which includes acknowledgment of 
the links and breaks between childhood and adulthood.  While illness is a displeasing 
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subreptive mediation of and between the position of perfect desirous causality and the 
position of multiplying causes and effects, what health seems to require is a pleasing 
subreptive mediation of and between these positions. 
 But this, we have learned, just is symbolization.  Since symbols (mis)present 
supersensible causality (the fantastic causal power of wishing) in and as causes, pleasing 
symbols indicate that the emergent subject is digesting, in and as the appearance of 
culture, the conflation of and split between too much wishful causality (where every 
―object‖ seems to arrive as by perfect actualization) and too little wishful causality 
(where what is felt is lack of a power of coherent world objectification).  In other words, 
since we both transcendentally assume that desire is ―the power of being the cause, 
through one‘s presentations, of the actuality of the objects of these presentations‖ and 
empirically ―assume [that there are] as many different kinds of causality as there are 
specific differences among natural effects,‖ the aesthetic fallout of transcendental 
causality into an experience of symbolic and magical causes enables us to begin to 
recognize, albeit minimally, stutteringly, and pre-cognitively, that some of these causes 
are ―inside‖ us and some ―outside‖ us, that some are wishful ―self‖ causes while some are 
causes ―external‖ to wishing, and indeed, that some are causes somatically ―attached‖ and 
some somatically ―detached.‖  Our initial state of confused dependency is to this degree 
purposively enabled to live with purposes.  Here we begin to arrive at selfhood, egohood.  
Indeed, if what enables this transition is (a) supersensible desire, (b) nature‘s failure to 
instantly meet this primitive want, and (c) the objectification of an object which is taken 
to be the cause of a pleasure the emergent subject feels, then what she needs in order to 
develop is not just direct access to gratifying objects, nor unrelenting loss or reminders of 
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loss only, but a regimen of symbols which enables her to digest both object presentation 
and object loss, both an apparently wishful power and the apparent loss of this power. 
 So here again we can turn to the fantastic footnote.  When Kant suggests that 
prayer and other superstitious rituals exemplify the causal relation of transcendental 
desire to its objects, he isn‘t just focusing on the fact that magic can and must 
(effectively) work or seem to work (causally); he is also suggesting that rituals are 
rudimentary regimens which enable emergent subjects to manage the conflation of and 
gap between supersensible causality and so many sensible causes.  When rituals work, 
they work not because they supernaturally do what nature cannot do but because they 
constitute an organized rhythm and intersubjective balance between pure desire (say, an 
immediate ―being‖ with nature) and the natural objectification of the loss of ―pure‖ 
nature.  They are communal and artistic.  They undertake an intimate communication 
with what is most important, but they also ―present‖ this communication in and as the 
objects around which they pivot.  These objects are both the means of communication 
and the communication in and despite the fact that some partly unfathomable thing, what 
we call ―nature,‖ is in fact lost.  The symbolic objectification of beauty, then, is a 
ritualistic conjuring of pleasant, partially coherent intersubjective effects, effects distinct 
and transitionally developed from the scramble and myopia of instant gratification in 
relation to mother nature.  Taste, a pleasing sense of practicing and sharing the task of 
growing up, thus enables our constant confrontation with nature to dawn objectively, 
eventually cognitively, as if beyond hypochondriacal disorder, and on the way to 
morality.  This, in short, is a developmental and cultural experience. 
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 The fact that enculturation requires a creative regimen of beautiful symbolization, 
moreover, helps return us to support what might be the most provocative aspect of our 
thesis, namely, that since our experience of beauty‘s pleasure seems objectivistically 
determined but is actually first made possible through the disavowal of the persistent 
causal illusion which Kant calls ―subreption,‖ we can say that health dawns not simply as 
an effect mechanically, efficiently, directly, or teleologically produced from these or 
those causes but as an effect of a transcendental placebogenesis which makes those 
causes possible.  Indeed, our experience of time enters here, in the judgment of the object 
as containing beauty, and so being the ―cause‖ of the pleasing ―effect.‖  And this in turn 
hinges on subreption.  For subreption means that while an object of beauty is 
transcendentally identical to desire as a causal power such that the ―object‖ is 
indistinguishable from the ―subject‘s‖ desire for it, this same object will dawn 
experientially and cognitively not as an immediate effect of desire but rather, again, as 
the cause of the pleasure the subject feels before it.  Placebos and culture are thus linked 
in the experience of magic.  While the roots of the object are wishfully ―magical,‖ these 
roots are transformed above ground, in and as the field of more or less coherent 
subjective experience, into the flowering of objects the magic of which, in the light of the 
moral sun alone, can‘t be seen.  The roots remain buried, and yet their extension is the 
stuff of our experience.  So what seems like a simple cause of health or illness is actually, 
critically speaking, a placeboic cause of health or a noceboic cause of illness, a pleasure 
or pain steeped in secretive illusion.  The causal object of health is not ―always already‖ 
but prehistorically already an aesthetic, developmental placebo.  
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 When a medical doctor gives a modern patient medicine, for example, whether 
this object is biomechanically causal of specific somatic effects or not, the patient 
invariably stands before the doctor and his objects as someone both dependent (say, like a 
child) and desirous of a certain outcome.  Whether the patient is aware of this or not, 
then, the ―objects‖ the doctor prescribes invariably (mis)present certain illusions, hopes, 
and fantasies which the patient brings to the communication.  We will have to wait until 
we analyze Marx‘s and Winnicott‘s theory of development to further investigate this 
situation.  I can suggest in anticipation, however, that the relation the modern patient has 
to both the medical doctor and his prescriptive objects is subreptively linked to the 
relation a ―traditional‖ or ―tribal‖ patient has to both his witchdoctor and to the fetishistic 
objects this doctor prescribes.  In both the ―modern‖ and the ―pre-modern‖ cases, I 
suggest, the object is most primitively an aesthetic object even if it is not recognized in 
this way.  Economics, for instance, appears with the supposed disappearance of cultures 
of the fetish. 
 In fact, to conclude, let me present a tripartite example, an object that for me 
remains wondrous:  A sick tribal man contacts a witchdoctor who, in turn, performs 
dances, invokes the patient‘s ancestors (the gods) in song, and in an exchange with these 
gods and upon departure, gives the patient a magical amulet.  A sick modern man 
contacts his doctor who, in turn, checks the patient‘s vital characteristics, asks the patient 
a series of questions, and in exchange for payment and upon departure, issues some pills 
to be taken at home.  In the first case we are presented with a ―magical‖ social ritual, 
some words, and a charm.  In the second we are presented with what we could in Kantian 
terms call a cognitive social ritual, some words, and, say, a prescription.  Let us ask 
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ourselves not just how the ―magical‖ objectivity of the ―premodern‖ health situation 
developmentally relates to the ―cognitive‖ objectivity of the modern health situation—
although let‘s not forget to ask this either.  But let us also ask how each of these cases 
developmentally relate to the following:  A sick baby cries for her mother who, in turn, 
feeds, holds, and pampers her, plays a simple game with her, and in exchange and upon 
departure, gives her baby a reflective object which the latter finds puzzlingly beautiful.  
What is the significance of the object here in terms of what has been lost and gained?  
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PART TWO MARX, VALUE, AND THE PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION 
OF DEVELOPMENT 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE FURTIVE FETISH 
 
Choose safe, age-appropriate toys. Many toys come 
equipped with choke tubes to test whether the toy is safe 
for your child to use…. As a general rule:  Don't let your 
child play with marbles, coins, balls or other items smaller 
than 1 3/4 inches in diameter. 
 
   —Mayo Foundation  
       Infant Health Notice, 2004   
 
 
[The] money-form of commodities is, like their form of 
value generally, quite distinct from their palpable and real 
bodily form….  Although invisible, the value of iron, linen, 
and corn exists in these very articles: it is signified through 
their equality with gold, even though this relation with gold 
exists only in their heads, so to speak.  The guardian of 
commodities must therefore lend them his tongue, or hang 
a ticket on them, in order to communicate their prices to the 
outside world. (Savages and semi-savages use the tongue 
differently. Captain Parry says of the inhabitants of the 
west coast of Baffin‘s bay: ―In this case they licked the 
thing represented to them twice to their tongues after which 
they seemed to consider the bargain satisfactorily 
concluded.‖)  
 
   —Marx, Capital, 1867 
  
 
 In chapter one of volume one of Capital, Marx titles the famous subchapter on 
fetishism not simply ―The Fetishism of the Commodity‖ but more specifically ―The 
Fetishism of the Commodity and its Secret.‖62  So what is fetishism, especially 
concerning this so-called secret?  On a standard reading, Marx‘s analysis dovetails with 
                                                   
62
 Marx, 1977, my emphasis.  Volume I of Capital was originally published in German in 1867; volume III 
in 1894 (as edited by Engels after Marx‘s death in 1883).  I will specify which volume we are referring to 
per occasion, but generally we will work with volume I.  
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the ―labor theory of value,‖ at least to the degree that he starts with the classical political 
economic premise that labor creates and informs value.  From about 1857 onward, he 
regularly suggests both that labor is the ―content,‖ ―measure,‖ ―substance,‖ and ―source‖ 
of value and that value ―is determined by‖ labor.  He occasionally mentions that nature 
gives the thingly substrate, what most of us call the ―raw material,‖ upon which socially 
organized labor works, but for the most part his focus is on labor.  So while it‘s true that 
in Capital he distinguishes between abstract labor and concrete labors, between labor 
power and particular useful labors, and between socially necessary labor time and 
heterogeneous labor intensities (albeit infrequently and sometimes in footnotes), he 
nonetheless often refers to ―labor‖ in a generic (and so abstract) way when these 
distinctions apparently aren‘t necessary for a particular argument or reference.63  Take the 
famous ―third thing‖ argument from the opening pages of Capital I.  This passage is often 
cited as if to ground Marx‘s value theory precisely in the labor theory of value.  When 
Marx asks himself ―what does the equation‖ of two or more commodities in exchange 
―signify?,‖ he responds with the following reasoning, a calculative kind of logic: 
 
It signifies that a common element of identical magnitude exists in two different 
things, [for example] in 1 quarter of corn and x cwt of iron.  Both are therefore equal 
to a third thing, which is itself neither the one nor the other…. This common element 
cannot be a geometrical, physical, chemical, or other natural property of 
commodities.  Such properties come into consideration only to the extent that they 
make the commodities useful, i.e. turn them into use-values.  But clearly the 
exchange of commodities is characterized precisely by its abstraction from their use-
values…. If then we disregard the use-values of commodities, only one property 
remains, that of being products of labor. (127) 
 
                                                   
63
 See Marx, 1977, 137, footnote 16, for example.  In a technical sense, if Marx uses the term ―labor‖ while 
discussing capital or capitalism, he need not refer to concrete labors or particular kinds of labor but will 
always mean abstract labor, labor power, to the degree that this is precisely how labor is treated, 
objectified, and thought of in an everyday or bourgeois sense under capitalism. 
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 While Marx thus agrees with Smith and Ricardo that labor creates and informs 
value, however, we should stress that it‘s Marx who emphasizes that value doesn‘t just 
instantiate and express but also conceals this labor, together with labor‘s sociality, its 
relations, in the ―form of appearance‖ of commodities and money.  Circulation and 
consumption are thus interwoven with production to the degree that each is social.  
Society is the commingling of these arenas to the degree that they have been 
developmentally distinguished, though never completely separated both between 
themselves and from what Marx calls ―nature‖ or ―natural production.‖  Value, however, 
―conceals‖ the sociality of labor, the realm of production in general.  Describing the 
―simple‖ or ―elementary‖ form of exchange early in Capital, for instance, Marx suggests 
that ―the relative value-form of a commodity, linen for example, expresses its value-
existence as something wholly different from its [physical] substance and properties, as 
the quality of being comparable with a coat, for example; this expression [of 
commensurability or equivalence of ―value,‖ despite differences] itself therefore indicates 
that it conceals a social relation‖ (149).64  Or, as we read a bit later, in a footnote:  ―When 
Galiani said [that] value is a relation between persons…, he ought to have added: a 
relation concealed beneath a material shell‖ (167).  Or, in a passage just a couple of pages 
beyond this, to which we‘ll return later, we hear that  
 
it was solely the analysis of the prices of commodities which lead to the 
determination of the magnitude of value, and solely the common expression of all 
commodities in money which led to the establishment of their character as values.  It 
is however precisely this finished form of the world of commodities — the money 
form — which conceals the social character of private labor and the social relations 
between the individual workers, by making those relations appear as relations 
between material objects, instead of revealing them plainly. (168-9) 
                                                   
64
 Trade implies a developed difference between need and production as well as distance between 
―community‖ members.  Trade implies non-communal community. 
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 On our standard reading, then, and especially given the suggestion here that the 
social relations of commodity trade can or could be revealed ―plainly,‖ it would appear 
that money, as the finished commodity form of value, simply conceals labor and its 
sociality.   Indeed, from this perspective, this is supposedly where the notion of fetishism 
dovetails with the labor theory of value:  We fetishize commodities and money to the 
degree that prices, profits, the satisfactions of consumption, and especially exchange-
value and money blind us to the labor and labor relations which together produce 
commodities in the first place.    
 If we scan Marx‘s mature texts we find that he constructs three general categories 
for this concealment; or rather, he shows us that the concealment of labor and labor 
relations by commodity consumption and exchange takes one or more of three basic 
forms in popular and scholarly understanding and practice:  We fetishize commodities to 
the degree that we ―see value‖ inhering (a) in the commodity itself (as the vulgar political 
economists believe, especially of ―precious‖ substances like diamonds or gold), (b) in the 
commodity‘s exchange relation to other commodities (as the physiocrats believe of land 
and as nearly all political economists hold with regard to money, such that ―price‖ is said 
to measure value), and/or (c) in the commodity‘s use-value (prioritizing individual 
judgment, consumption, and technological satisfaction, as many mainstream and all 
neoclassical economists suggest).
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  ―Mainstream‖ usefully refers to a standard, more or less empirical-positivist range of explanation which 
combines the microeconomic insights of neoclassical and rational-expectation economic theory with an 
additional (sometimes Keynesian) emphasis on macroscopic (state) regulatory mechanisms.  It strives to 
show how the management of ―demand‖ by government and/or a central bank can improve the efficiency 
of supply in competitive and fluctuating markets.  The presumption, of course, is that only an efficient 
market which grows quantitatively is a healthy one.  Mainstream can be contrasted to ―heterodox‖ 
economics.   
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 Marx thus finds himself in the fetishism subchapter in a position to link this 
concealment belonging to the commodity form with fetishism‘s secret.  As he puts it in 
an important passage to which we will continue to return: 
 
Men do not bring the products of their labor into relation with each other as values 
because they see these objects merely as the material integuments of homogeneous 
human labor.  The reverse is true: by equating their different products with each other 
as values, they equate their different kinds of labor as human labor.  They do this 
without being aware of it.  Value, therefore, does not have its description branded on 
its forehead; it rather transforms every product of labor into a social hieroglyphic.  
Later on, men try to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of their own 
social product: for the characteristic which products of utility have of being values is 
as much men‘s social product as is their language.  The belated scientific discovery 
that the products of labor, insofar as they are values, are merely the material 
expressions of the human labor expended to produce them, marks an epoch in the 
history of mankind‘s development, but by no means banishes the semblance of 
objectivity possessed by the social characteristics of labor. (166-7, my emphasis) 
 
 Fetishism thus includes a distinct element of non-awareness:  ―by equating [our] 
different products with each other as values, [we] equate [our] different kinds of labor as 
human labor.  [We] do this without being aware of it.‖   This non-awareness marks a 
fetishization to the degree it implies a ―conversion,‖ ―substitution,‖ ―reflection,‖ etc, 
between things and persons.  Fetishism is thus an objectification and (false) 
naturalization:  We treat money as if it ―naturally‖ measured ―value,‖ or we even treat 
―value‖ as naturally consisting in this or that thing.  As Marx puts it, ―the mysterious 
character of the commodity-form consists…simply in the fact that the commodity reflects 
the social characteristics of men‘s own labor as objective characteristics of the products 
of labor themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things.  Hence it also reflects 
the social relation of the producers to the sum total of labor as a social relation between 
objects, a relation which exists apart from and outside the producers.  Through this 
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substitution, the products of labor become commodities…‖ (164-5).  In sum, to the 
degree that we are captivated by the ―sociality‖ of the things and objects of circulation 
and consumption, we tend to disavow, to make secret both the labor and sociality 
belonging to persons.   
 On a standard progressivist reading, this secrecy implies a ―falsity‖ which is often 
highlighted to criticize the capitalist valuation of ―profits over people.‖  The progressivist 
goal, of course, is to reverse this valuation, to value ―people over profits.‖  But for many 
on the left, fetishism is reifying and regressive to the degree that a presumed qualitative 
and intersubjective sociality of production is expressed, or rather, mis-expressed, reduced 
and covered over, in our enthrallment to both quantitative abstractions and a semblant, 
and so merely false, sociality.   One of the basic implications of this critique, then, is that 
commodity and money fetishism are only deemed bad, socially regressive.   
 Lukács and Geras, for instance, have suggested that by ―fetishism‖ Marx means 
something on the order of the false-representation of a purely human and intersubjective 
sociality.
66
  According to Lukács, when fetishism predominates in both the center and 
periphery of a society, that society has become capitalistic and stultifying:   ―The essence 
of commodity-structure…is that a relation between people takes on the character of a 
thing and thus acquires a ‗phantom objectivity‘, an autonomy that seems so strictly 
rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature:  the 
relation between people‖ (83).  Every trace? Hmmm.  Further, ―this rational 
objectification conceals above all the immediate — qualitative and material — character 
of things as things; when use-values appear universally as commodities they acquire a 
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 See Geras, 1971, 69-85 and Lukács, 1971, 83-89 (especially at 86-7), for instance.  This idea largely 
corresponds to Engels‘s emphasis that ideology is false consciousness. 
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new objectivity, a new substantiality which they did not possess in an age of episodic 
exchange and which destroys their original and authentic substantiality‖ (92).  Similarly, 
for Geras the wage-form is ―pure appearance‖ (80) and since ―pure,‖ it tends to hide a 
―reality‖ or ―essence‖ which lies detached ―behind‖ it (70). The strength of these readings 
is not just their clarity but also their highlighting of the rationalization and abstraction 
processes at stake in modernization.  And yet, since social relations between persons are 
cast as ―fundamental,‖ ―original,‖ or ―authentic‖ while social relations between things are 
occasionally cast as a ―pure appearance‖ which can even ―destroy‖ this fundament, 
Lukács and Geras also thereby deem fetishism anti-developmental.  Subjectivity and 
objectivity are or should be clear and distinct from the start, they suggest, but have since 
been fetishistically corrupted, as if from some fall.  Contemporary writers on money such 
as James Buchan have extended this idea to the point of declaring that human society can 
only redeem itself if it does away with money and its fetishization—as if money and not 
capital were the menacing object of danger and destruction.
67
  On my reading, these 
sometimes classical, usually progressivist, labor-theoretical interpretations constitute a 
first step in understanding fetishism, but they typically don‘t sense or indicate that Marx 
had already developed a more sophisticated, critical account (an account forming the first 
steps in the Kantian subreptive tradition).   
 This, then, shall be our task, namely, to motivate and explore Marx‘s casting of 
fetishism not simply as a negative or regressive social process within which the 
―concealment‖ of labor by money and commodities produces this or that false 
naturalization of value but, in a much more complex way, to cast fetishism as a grand 
historical process, a movement of historicization, indeed, as world-historical 
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 See Buchan, 1997, especially the final chapter. 
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enculturation.  For again, while it‘s true that Marx often focuses on labor or on 
production in general as the ―source‖ (etc) of value, there‘s nonetheless both more to 
labor and more to the seeing of the eye which perceives labor giving birth to value than 
meets the focused eye.  There‘s not just a perspectivism to be uncovered and understood 
beyond this focus on production; rather, both the focus and even the perspectives beyond 
it can be shown to be conditioned by a necessary developmental scotomization, one 
enabling historicization and human enculturation.   
 But let‘s start small, with some particulars and a roadmap.  First, take the 
sentence, indeed the clause, which ends our key passage above.  The suggestion is that 
even when the classical political economists, and by implication even when we ourselves, 
have finally become aware that value doesn‘t consist naturally in ―precious‖ substances, 
relationally in exchange-value, or instrumentally in the marginal utility of use-values but, 
more deeply, that it consists in the productivity and sociality of the labor necessary in 
their making, this cognition and insight cannot abolish the ―semblance of objectivity,‖ 
the fetishism, possessed by labor and its sociality.
68
  One would think that such insight, 
which Marx elsewhere and here calls scientific, would dissolve or at least enable us to 
begin to dissolve the fetishistic appearance, this semblance of objectivity, to reveal the 
essence behind the appearance, the objectivity behind the semblance—but it doesn‘t.  The 
secret of this objectification persists, is necessary, both in and despite this legitimate, 
even scientific, understanding; and it persists at least in part in and as this ―semblance.‖   
 Žižek‘s essay ―How Did Marx Invent the Symptom‖ is keen and helpful in this 
regard:  ―The unmasking of the secret,‖ he says, ―is not sufficient…. Classical economy 
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 As we‘ll see, in and behind labor there is always this problematic of ―possession‖, in the many senses of 
this term, indeed, as these many senses primitively overlap and develop. 
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is interested only in contents concealed behind the commodity-form, which is why it 
cannot explain the true secret, not the secret behind the form but the secret of this form 
itself‖ (15).69  According to Žižek, although Freud was to discover the relation between 
the latent content and the dream-work of dreams in the 1890s, Marx had already 
discovered this relation (as the unconscious structural effectivity between the labor 
content of the commodity and the formation of its form) in the 1860s.  He therefore 
points to a schematic ―homology,‖ as he calls it, between Marx and Freud:  
 
Freud proceeds here in two stages:   
 
- First, we must break the appearance according to which a dream is nothing but a 
simple and meaningless confusion, a disorder caused by physiological processes 
and as such having nothing whatsoever to do with signification.  In other words, we 
must accomplish a crucial step toward a hermeneutical approach and conceive the 
dream as a meaningful phenomenon, as something transmitting a repressed 
message which has to be discovered by interpretive procedure;   
- Then we must get rid of the fascination in this kernel of signification, in the 
‗hidden meaning‘ of the dream — that is to say, in the content concealed behind 
the form of a dream — and center our attention on this form itself, on the dream-
work to which the ‗latent dream-thoughts‘ were submitted. 
 
The crucial thing to note here is that we find exactly the same articulation in two 
stages with Marx, in his analysis of the ‗secret of the commodity-form‘:  
 
- First, we must break the appearance according to which the value of a commodity 
depends on pure hazard—on an accidental interplay between supply and demand, 
for example.  We must accomplish the crucial step of conceiving the hidden 
‗meaning‘ behind the commodity-form…; we must penetrate the ‗secret‘ of the 
value of commodities….  
- But as Marx points out, there is a certain ‗yet‘:  the unmasking of the secret is not 
sufficient…. Classical bourgeois political economy…is not able to disengage itself 
from this fascination in the secret hidden behind the commodity-form, [and so] its 
attention is captivated by labor as the true source of wealth…. In spite of its quite 
correct explanation of the ‗secret of the magnitude‘ of value‘, the commodity 
remains for classical political economy a mysterious, enigmatic thing—it is the 
same with the dream: even after we have explained its hidden meaning, its latent 
thought, the dream remains an enigmatic phenomenon; what remains unexplained 
is simply its form, the process by means of which the hidden meaning disguised 
itself in such a form. 
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 Žižek, 1989, chapter one.     
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We must, then, accomplish another crucial step and analyze the genesis of the 
commodity-form itself. (14-15, Žižek‘s emphasis) 
 
 Now, as we‘ll see in more detail later, although Žižek‘s own analysis of the 
―genesis of the commodity form‖ is largely structural (that is, it‘s not a developmental 
theory so much as a theory of the unconscious pivoting on the Lacanian structures of the 
real, the symbolic, and the imaginary), and so while his analysis is also sometimes 
hermeneutical in the way he describes and criticizes here, his insight, following 
Althusser,
70
 that fetishistic secrecy is symptomatic is both insightful and helpful.  One of 
our goals here then will be to expand and develop this idea into wider developmental 
theory:  We will focus not simply on ―the symptomatic,‖ nor simply on symptoms as 
forms of illness, but on the process of symptomization as illness and health together, 
indeed, of the developmental health and illness belonging to the formation and procession 
of culture.
71
  This approach is novel and outstrips the Lacanian-Žižekian procedure, then, 
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 Admittedly, it may be difficult to see that Marx offers us a theory of health.  Whereas historical 
materialism is often recognized as one of his broadest objects and inheritances, issues of health and illness 
tend to appear in his work — both explicitly and for the most part — only in piecemeal, empirical, and 
descriptive fashion.  When he uses the term ―health‖ in Capital, for instance, he‘s usually referring us to 
what we might understand today, in a rather uncomplicated way, as physiological well-being.  He also 
typically paints the opposite of health not so much as ―illness‖ but as ―disease‖ or ―injury‖.  We therefore 
observe in various descriptions from parts three and four of Capital I what Engels had already largely 
identified and published in 1844 in The Condition of the Working Class in England:  Industrial production 
regularly exposes a wide variety of workers to this or that toxic pollutant, to physical exhaustion and 
―torpor‖, to noxious fumes or particles, to various contagious diseases, and/or to mutilation or even death 
by heavy machinery.  In this era of the birth of statistics, moreover, Marx quotes reports and data compiled 
by doctors and factory inspectors regarding the diseases, mutilations, and rates of death ―circulating‖ in the 
partially hidden abode of factory and mill production.  We learn about the physical degeneration of whole 
worker populations, as among the potters of North Staffordshire, for instance.  Marx quotes a doctor here:  
―The potters as a class, both men and women, represent a degenerated population….  They are, as a rule, 
stunted in growth, ill-shaped, and frequently ill-formed in the chest; they become prematurely old…; they 
are phlegmatic and bloodless, and exhibit their debility of constitution by obstinate attacks of dyspepsia, 
disorders of the liver and kidneys, and by rheumatism.  But of all diseases, they are especially prone to 
chest disease, to pneumonia, phthisis, bronchitis, and asthma….That the ‗degenerescence‘ of the population 
of this district is not even greater than it is, is due to the constant recruiting from the adjacent country‖ 
(355).  We will address this last bit about ―recruiting‖ as we proceed.  For ―recruiting‖ here is a kind of 
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to the degree that we shall attempt to link the psychoanalytic insights ―invented‖ 
(articulated through and discovered) by Marx to the meaning of the development of 
history and culture.  
But Žižek‘s analysis sets up this possibility.  Ordinary ―hermeneutical‖ analyses 
can ―get behind‖ Marx‘s most obvious texts and claims to exhibit their concealed 
meanings and contents.  Behind, on top of, and developmentally through such 
interpretivist readings, however, a richer and more valuable interpretation, a symptomatic 
reading — where concealment shows itself to be closer to and dependent upon primary 
repressions — can be teased out and then, once teased, found to be already, albeit 
secretly, at work in Marx‘s wider historical project.  Our basic idea in this regard is that 
Marx tackles the object of fetishism precisely insofar as he‘s slowly discovering that the 
problem of value which the political economists treated and continue to treat as a 
quantitative and technical problem, or rather as a useful disavowal of history and its 
meaning, is much more deeply a problem of the significance of the developmental 
vicissitudes of desire in the production and destruction, in the making and loss of human 
culture and cultures. 
 Take the passage on the ―money form‖ which we analyzed above, but this time in 
wider context:  Money is a great social and labor-relational concealor, to be sure, but 
there is also something to be said about the fact that we only discover this, scientifically 
unveiling the modern labor theory of value for example, well after the object which we 
                                                                                                                                                       
―accumulation‖; and for Marx it is on the vicissitudes of accumulation that development and social health 
hinge. 
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call ―money‖ has been generalized, indeed globalized, to appear as ―universal 
equivalent.‖72  As Marx puts it: 
  
Reflection on the forms of human life, hence also scientific analysis of those forms, 
takes a course directly opposite to their real development.  Reflection begins post 
festum, and therefore with the results of the process of development 
[Entwicklungprozesses] ready to hand.  The forms which stamp products as 
commodities and which are therefore the preliminary requirements for the circulation 
of commodities, already possess the fixed quality of natural forms of social life before 
man seeks to give an account, not of their historical character, for in his eyes they are 
immutable, but of their content and meaning.  Consequently, it was solely the analysis 
of the prices of commodities which lead to the determination of the magnitude of 
value, and solely the common expression of all commodities in money which led to 
the establishment of their character as values.  It is however precisely this finished 
form of the world of commodities — the money form — which conceals the social 
character of private labor and the social relations between the individual workers, by 
making those relations appear as relations between material objects, instead of 
revealing them plainly. (168-9) 
  
 If we analyze this passage with care, we see that once labor and its social relations 
are obscured by money, value appears to be something which names and measures 
―magnitudes,‖ something which is therefore objectively quantifiable (like prices), 
something which therefore takes on the fixed (and therefore countable, measurable) 
quality of a natural form of social life, and so something which appears to be more or less 
universal (to the degree that seemingly everything has its price).  This is fetishism as 
naturalization, indeed, as dehistoricization to boot:  With the generalization of money, not 
only is labor concealed, but so also is history, the processes and movements through 
which commodities and money are formed and arrive at a form of appearance, to become 
a normalized and normative part of social life.  Notice again, however, that money 
doesn‘t simply conceal.  It must be fully developed, a ―finished form‖ of the world of 
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 To recognize that ideologies in general and fetishism in particular are historically conditioned in material 
processes is one thing, but to recognize that development hinges on something like fetishism, with its 
fantasy content, is quite another, as we‘ll see. 
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commodities, a third thing facilitating trade between this product and that product, before 
reflection upon it, upon its concealing aspects, and upon its history as a mechanism of 
historical concealment, becomes not so much possible but actualizable.  In other words, it 
is precisely despite but also in and through its character as a mechanism of concealment 
that money becomes not just a fetter but also a kind of ―secret agent‖ facilitating 
reflection, even of scientific reflections like this one.  Today money seemingly represents 
gain, or at least its possibility, for instance, such that the more money one has the more 
one stands to gain, such that money is seen as ―naturally‖ valuable.  But money marks 
gain, as we shall reveal in our analysis of fetishism, by means of repressed (and so 
secretive) primitive losses, almost unfathomable losses which provoke the need for 
culture, for developing a significant human world.  We can put this abstractly for the 
moment and return to it later:  Losing mother nature is difficult, to say the least, and 
culture is the presentation of that primitive loss and difficulty in symbolic and sublimated 
form.  Thus, the historical movement to be critiqued here (which Marx takes up as an 
analysis of money and monetization in chapters two and three of Capital I) is no simple 
process within which the events of history follow each other merely sequentially and 
linearly.  Rather, at stake is the movement of an almost natural prehistory in and beneath 
the surface of the modern and modernizing cultures which disavow it.  Characterizing 
fetishism as a form of disavowal which produces history and development in and as 
objects of value, Marx himself secretly inherits Kant‘s notion of developmental 
subreption.   
 This being so, and supplementing and digging beneath Marxian historical 
materialism, my goal here is to develop what might be called a developmental theory of 
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the persistence of prehistorical materialism.  My basic idea concerning the relation 
between fetishism, its secret, and these developmental processes, in other words, can be 
said to pivot on how the disavowal and even the repression of prehistorical loss 
necessarily appears — distortedly — in and as objects of historical meaning and, as Marx 
emphasizes concerning the birth of modernity, of value in general.  Indeed, more broadly, 
I want to suggest that human development takes place as progress and secret regress 
bound together, bound precisely in the objects and values of exchange, especially and 
most visibly in cross-cultural exchanges between speakers of different languages, that is, 
between persons from what will at first appear as wholly different cultures.  For in such 
cross-cultural exchange value is more fluid and less ossified than it is within this or that 
single culture, and as such the objects which apparently bear value communicate as much 
about past, indeed archaic, development as they do about the present exchange. 
One of our passages above provides what we shall take as our guiding and 
principal clue in this regard.  We shall return to this idea repeatedly:  ―Value,‖ says Marx, 
―transforms every product of labor into a social hieroglyphic.  Later on, men try to 
decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of their own social product:  for the 
characteristic which products of utility have of being values is as much men‘s social 
product as is their language.‖  Now, we have already detailed one of the ways in which 
this process of disavowal works, that is, the process in which history arises, eventually 
coming to historical self-consciousness, through the disavowal objectified in value.  
Recall that revealing the secret of fetishism doesn‘t simply consist in discovering the 
hidden quantitative and labor-relational content of value.  We can now specify more 
carefully why this is so, at least as a hypothesis:  This secret remains secretive despite our 
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uncovering of its latent content, we shall suggest following Marx‘s ―hieroglyphic‖ hint, 
to the degree that our products don‘t just represent an economic, more or less modern 
language of ―labor,‖ ―labor power,‖ ―use,‖ and ―exchange‖.  Rather, more deeply, 
fetishism remains a secret to the degree that these products, as commodities, are and 
remain, despite appearances, prehistorical ciphers, hieroglyphs which are not reducible, 
as Žižek rightly points out, to their hidden content.   They are inscriptions, as we shall 
discover, of an archaic form of marking, a division of the human social body into class 
formations.  Our job, then, is twofold.  We aim to decipher, to make sense of Marx‘s 
claim that value is hieroglyphic and we also aim to relate this sense to his grand theory of 
historical materialism. 
Žižek doesn‘t note or comment upon Marx‘s notion of the hieroglyph, but he‘s 
nonetheless right to cast Marx‘s notion of fetishism as anticipating the psychoanalytic 
notion of the symptom.  After all, although it is doubtful he knew that he was following 
Marx in this regard, Freud calls dreams the ―hieroglyphics‖ of the ego.73  The choice of 
term here is no accident.  Dreams are the ego‘s basic symptom and they‘re hieroglyphic 
to the degree that they ―speak‖ not just imagistically or representationally of a persistent 
conflictual primitivity but also presentationally and inscriptively as this primitivity in 
action.  Through primitive eyes and understanding, in other words, a hieroglyph doesn‘t 
just represent some non-present idea.  Moreso, it also is that ―idea‖ in material, effectual 
form.  So while Žižek doesn‘t really offer a developmental account, he nonetheless 
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  In ―The Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest‖ of 1913, Freud suggests that in psychoanalysis 
―‗speech‘ must be understood not merely to mean the expression of thought in words but to include the 
speech of gesture and every other method, such as writing. . . . It is even more appropriate to compare 
dreams with a system of writing than with a language.  In fact, the interpretation of dreams is completely 
analogous to the decipherment of an ancient pictographic script such as Egyptian hieroglyphs‖ (see Freud, 
SE Vol. XIII, 176-7).     
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provides us with a helpful structural formula for researching the ―source,‖ ―genesis,‖ or 
―origins‖ of fetishism in its cultural productions and vicissitudes.  His suggestion, one 
that we will follow but expand developmentally, is that the critical analysis of dreams 
and symptoms, and of ideology in general, must proceed not on two but on three levels 
the most primitive plane of which, since constitutively repressed, is never directly 
accessible to conscious knowledge.  Žižek thus draws a ―parallel‖ or ―homology,‖ as 
we‘ve seen, between this and the Freudian analysis of dreams.  Here, then, is part of his 
articulation: 
 
If we seek the ‗secret of the dream‘ in the latent content hidden by the manifest text, 
we are doomed to disappointment: all we find is some ‗entirely‘ normal — albeit 
usually unpleasant — thought, the nature of which is mostly non-sexual and 
definitely not ‗unconscious.‘  This ‗normal‘ conscious/preconscious thought is not 
drawn towards the unconscious, repressed simply because of its ‗disagreeable‘ 
character for the conscious, but because it achieves a kind of ‗short circuit‘ between it 
and another desire which is already repressed, located in the unconscious, a desire 
which has nothing whatsoever to do with the „latent dream-thought‟….  It is this 
unconscious/sexual desire which cannot be reduced to a ‗normal train of thought‘ 
because it is, from the very beginning, constitutively repressed (Freud‘s 
Urverdrangung)—because it has no ‗original‘ in the ‗normal‘ language of everyday 
communication, in the syntax of the conscious/preconscious;  its only place is in the 
mechanisms of the ‗primary process.‘  This is why we should not reduce the 
interpretation of dreams, or symptoms in general, to the retranslation of the ‗latent 
dream-thought‘ into the ‗normal‘, everyday common language of intersubjective 
communication (Habermas‘s formula). The structure is always triple; there are always 
three elements at work:  the manifest dream-text, the latent dream-content or thought, 
and the unconscious desire articulated in a dream. (12-13, emphases in original) 
   
 The desire which animates a dream is not so much the dream‘s preconscious 
thought, the hidden or latent particular wishes which are translated into and found within 
the dream‘s manifest imagery; rather, most basically, the desire is the unconscious action 
of the dream-work, the process whereby a primitive power of wishing takes imagistic 
form as if the dream‘s particular wishes were constituted simply in the relation between 
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two kinds of content (manifest and latent).  Thus, while the ―work‖ of the dream-work 
consists in part in erasing its own laboring, this ―erasing‖ also consists in the work of 
invisibly piggy-backing unconscious primitive wishing onto and as a relation between 
particular preconscious and conscious wishes.  Thus, while the meaning of a dream may 
seem only to be about one‘s current activities, enjoyments, struggles, and worries — 
some obvious (conscious), some more distant (preconscious) — the dream form of these 
wishes, the significance of their being limned and dreamed at all, both embodies and is 
the activation of an unconscious, infantile, and specifically pre-verbal wishing, even 
while words and other verbal and syntactical arrangements might otherwise appear in the 
dream in spoken or alphabetic form.  These higher symbolic forms need ―deciphering,‖ to 
use Marx‘s term.  The point, in fact, is that the pre-verbal is developmentally distorted — 
through what Freud specifies in the Interpretation of Dreams as condensation, 
displacement, symbolism, ―representation,‖ and secondary revision — into verbal 
significance, at least upon waking and interpretation.  Because this is so, however, we can 
come to partially understand the historical development of the dreamer if we properly 
engage in dream interpretation.  We must start, then, with the relation between manifest 
and latent content, working our way backward by reading (i.e. ―unwriting,‖ de-ciphering) 
the work of symbolic distortion employed by the dreamwork.  Indeed, the manifest and 
latent verbal significances will invariably bear traces of pre-verbal impulses stemming 
―originarily‖ from what we will discover to be the lost unity of the dreamer‘s primitive 
identification with his or her mother, a lost unity that correlates in Marx‘s developmental 
scheme, as we‘ll see later, to his conception of the loss of our immediacy with mother 
nature.   
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 Where and how, then, does Marx think ―unconscious desire‖?  In short, and to 
anticipate our results, he frames this desire both as our archaic immediacy with nature 
and as the persistence of its dissolution and loss.  Indeed, it is precisely the loss of this 
immediacy that prompts the rise of culture in a first moment of development, in the form, 
the mode of production, of primitive communism.  But to the degree that primitive 
communism remains susceptible to archaic dissolution in turn, it also necessarily 
undergoes dissolution and so takes on a new form of development; indeed, it is both this 
communism and its dissolution which continue to haunt and, as I interpret it, to motor 
history (like a specter haunting Europe).
74
  For Marx, then, unconscious desire is the 
primitive and persistent tension between our archaic drives toward community-building 
and community-destruction, a pair of drives developmentally distorted into distinct 
prehistorical and then historical modes of production which undergo dissolution and 
transformation when the forces of production (which are forces of destruction distorted 
by forces of community, appearing as forms of society) are outstripped by forces hidden 
in symbolic relations of production (which are forces of community mixed with 
destructive elements), enabling social crises and recovery, although recovery is never 
guaranteed.   
Agreeing with and expanding Žižek‘s tripartite structural formula, then, my idea 
is that we can frame Capital‘s analysis of capitalism developmentally in the following 
way:  To the degree that the commodity‘s value, manifested especially in and as modern 
money, conceals the labor and labor-power lying latent in and behind it, the relation 
between manifest value and latent content obscures and yet strangely embodies a deeper 
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 In addition to Marx‘s Communist Manifesto (in Marx, 1978), see Derrida, 1994.  Derrida, however, has 
very little to say about primitive communism and so, despite his interesting analysis, fails to specify, even 
if he partially comprehends, the communal and agonistic sources of this spectral haunting. 
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primitivity yet, one which Marx names not just as the secret of fetishism but, relatedly, as 
the secret of primitive accumulation.  Primitive accumulation is the unconscious 
destructive force of historicization and so of development.  This, then, is my thesis, an 
idea we will set up in the next two chapters and then carry through in the remaining 
chapters of Part Two:  Primitive accumulation, I will suggest, is the repressed and 
repressing unconscious motor of history, the secret mechanism of historicization, but 
only insofar as it nonetheless, despite and in its power of repression (and here of 
community), appears (as in Kantian subreption) in the form of objects of value which 
both disavow it and yet at the same time distortedly and so developmentally preserve it.  
Žižek is not correct in this last respect to suggest that the manifest and latent content of 
symptoms have ―nothing whatsoever to do‖ with the conflictual desire that short-circuits 
behind them.  For this desire is not just behind them but in them too—just as Kant‘s 
fantastic objectification, the power of transcendental desire, is not just behind but also 
subreptively active in aesthetic value.   
 But these insights and hypotheses also motivate how we‘ll organize our 
investigations.  In large part, and especially at first, we shall follow Marx, road-mapping 
our argument by the development of his in Capital.  Marx‘s argument, however, has not 
gone uncriticized.  Critics and scholars including Althusser, Žižek, and David Harvey, for 
instance, have noted, often with more than a hint of exasperation, that Marx wrote 
volume one of Capital ―backward,‖ at least in a sense.  For rather than beginning with the 
material on so-called primitive accumulation, where capitalism can be seen to derive its 
force of origination (no matter how one reads this material), Marx ends the volume with 
this material and its analysis.  And rather than ending volume one with an investigation 
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into how money as value-incarnate is shaped as if through circulation and exchange to 
manufacture capital, Marx begins his examination here—in the territory of fetishism and 
appearances.  Based on what we have discovered already, however, there are good 
reasons for this.  It‘s certainly possible that Marx himself only came to understand the 
importance of primitive accumulation (especially as primitive accumulation prompts and 
can developmentally demand fetishization) long after he had studied money, exchange, 
and the capitalization of money in the field of political economy.  And in fact this seems 
to be Marx‘s argument for a kind of phenomenological start, as the very opening sentence 
of volume one of Capital names:  We cannot arrive at a greater scientific and historical 
understanding of capitalism until we have critically worked our way through how it first 
presents itself to us, manifestly and ideologically, and so fetishistically, both in society 
and in the science of political economy.
75
  In fact, I am in large part drawing this lesson 
from Marx‘s claims above:  ―Reflection on the forms of human life, hence also scientific 
analysis of those forms, takes a course directly opposite to their real development.  
Reflection begins post festum, and therefore with the results of the process of 
development ready to hand.‖  Similarly, value ―does not have its description branded on 
its forehead; it rather transforms every product of labor into a social hieroglyphic.  Later 
on, men try to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of their own social 
product: for the characteristic which products of utility have of being values is as much 
men‘s social product as is their language.‖  We, like Marx, then, must start with 
symptoms, with hieroglyphs, working carefully in a first step to analyze their manifest 
and latent content; for only then will we be ready to make the second step towards an 
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 Žižek tackles this problem in For They Know Not What They Do (1991, 209-222), but his analysis is both 
complex and overstated.   
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analysis of the formation of the form of these contents in a more-than-hermeneutic 
critical analysis aiming to uncover and make use of the archaic, or what Marx and I will 
call the primitive, forces which have been disguised in and as objects of ―value‖ the 
content of which seems to regulate social power. 
 This, then, is how we shall proceed:  I will first analyze the manifestly economic 
status of modern money to show that it is the symptom, indeed the primitively literal 
trace, of earlier, archaic, extra-economic forces.  Under analysis, we shall discover that 
money‘s roots are ―magical.‖  Indeed, this explains why Marx uses the term fetishism to 
investigate and name our modern relation to value and why too he casts value as hiero-
glyphic:  The hieros of value is a kind of sacredness which premodern cultures of various 
sorts access through objects revered as magical.  Fetishes serve various purposes in 
premodern cultures, of course, but they can broadly be construed as magical to the degree 
that they serve as sites for the embodiment and distribution of social and individual 
power and health.  With a socially sanctioned ―fetish,‖ I can heal the injured or ill, or I 
can damage the otherwise healthy.  Or, in any case, one can make others do things they 
would not necessarily otherwise do.  Thus, with the term fetishism, Marx is simply noting 
that and how this ―power‖ is retained in commodities and especially in modern money, 
an object secretly, which is here to say unconsciously, ―revered‖ for its apparent wish-
fulfilling properties.   
 But if ―fetishes‖ can do their social and individual ―work‖ only within cultural 
norms situating and framing them as ―powerful,‖ doesn‘t this mean that specific 
―fetishisms‖ are culturally relative, that is, relative to the norms — and nothing else — of 
individuated, distinct cultural histories?  This is the question I take up in chapter six to 
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begin to show that while Marx‘s account takes this cultural relativism seriously, it goes 
deeper by not jettisoning the moment and necessity of material objectivity.  As in our 
Kant chapters, ―objectivity‖ here designates both a thingly and instrumentalist concern to 
the degree that it references things, in and after a process of objectification, as objects.  
But as in our Kant chapters as well, objectivity also implies the widening, and so the 
development, of a subjective, intersubjective, and epistemic purview, a movement toward 
the cognitive and scientific understanding of the object world, albeit through illusions, 
fantasy, myth, and their partial failure.  In the present context, for instance, we will 
analyze gold for its ―magical‖ qualities.  For despite initial appearances, gold isn‘t just 
valued in European culture but, at least to some degree, in all human cultures, at least 
now.  But despite modern appearances, this is not simply because it‘s metallically soft, 
uniform, and incorruptible, and therefore useful economically as a medium of exchange.  
Marx thus demands that we examine the social scene and movement of globalization — 
though of course he doesn‘t yet use this term — to investigate what happens and is 
exchanged between cultures, in their ―interstices,‖ to better understand just in what this 
―objectivity‖ consists.  To do this, I cull material from Tzvetan Todorov‘s  dynamic 
examination of the initial contacts and exchanges between the native Americans and 
Columbus and his crew.  And later we turn to Cortés and his crew‘s encounter with 
Montezuma and the Aztecs.  What we notice first of all, then, is that while Columbus and 
the ―Indians‖ cannot communicate verbally, they make what appears at least to the 
Indians to be a series of magical, almost sacred exchanges.  So at this point I fine-tune 
my hypothesis to suggest that whatever else Marx means by relating development to 
fetishism, the latter‘s ―objectivity‖ secretly embodies the exchange of what I call pre-
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dialectically communicative forms of development, the development, for instance, from 
magical thinking and practices toward modern, cognitive understanding and economic 
practices.  But we cannot, as yet, understand why gold plays the developmental role that it 
does, since for this we need to tackle what makes this secretive symbolic development 
possible.  We need to analyze, albeit through its symptoms, the primal scene of human 
development. 
 I therefore then examine what Marx means, both explicitly and implicitly, both 
obviously (in chapter seven) and more ―secretly‖ (in chapter eight), when he suggests that 
capitalism begins with ―primitive accumulation‖ and its ―secret.‖  It‘s as if the making of 
capitalism depended necessarily on the making-secret of its sources.  Chapter seven 
should be fairly straightforward for most Marxian scholars in this regard.  Since 
capitalism hinges on the wage-relation between more or less propertyless workers, on the 
one hand, and owners of the means of production, on the other hand, the formation of 
capitalism requires that all prior property-relations — where peasants, plebes, 
journeymen, vassals, and even serfs have had limited continuous access to and use of 
various means of production — be dissolved, destroyed in this or that way.  The now-
generalized ―worker‖ must be, is, made ―free‖ in the famous ―double sense‖ of the term:  
free as an individual with rights of non-interference and the like, but also ―free‖ of 
owning most forms of property, and especially free of having what Marx will sometimes 
call ―possessive‖ — which is to say premodern, pre-contractual, but symbolically and 
customarily guaranteed familial, clan, or common — use of means of production.  So 
here I highlight the fact that ―primitive accumulation‖ is Adam Smith‘s term, a 
euphemism covering over the fact that much of the history of the formation of capitalism 
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is a violent, horrible, bloody, expropriative, colonizing, imperialistic, militaristic, 
murderous, sad disaster.  ―Appropriating‖ peasants and other ―common‖ workers of their 
customary resources and (especially their) lands has been the pivotal move in the 
invariably partly forgotten history of primitive accumulation, whether this has been 
accomplished through brute force or through so-called ―fair exchange.‖  
 Chapter eight thus critically analyzes the idea that this invariably significant 
forgetting of the violence of primitive accumulation ends up both representing and 
presenting ―itself,‖ referencing and embodying ―itself,‖ in and as objects of capitalist 
private property, such that fetishistic objectivity marks a disavowal ―taking place‖ in the 
birth of ―universal‖ and ―ideal‖ objects of value like money and especially capitalized 
money.  Here a giant social melancholia is ―forgetfully‖ transformed into mania for 
value, to be sure,
76
 but what interests me in particular is the manner that the expropriation 
of the premodern worker‘s access to means of production and the common lands is 
―remembered,‖ and so largely mis-remembered, as in Smith‘s account and in bourgeois 
society in general, as a more or less positive appropriation.  The wage-relation stands out 
in bourgeois circles, for example, as economically and functionally feasible, as if it were 
a merely positive leap beyond the violences of serfdom and slavery:  Since the free 
worker isn‘t bound to the soil, both tribute and payments in kind are obviously less 
appropriate, useful, and fair than using money as a wage in the contracted, and so 
apparently mutually agreeable, relation between owner and worker.  What is disavowed 
and yet ―shown‖ in the value of modern money, then, is class historical domination.  But 
this means in turn that the violence of primitive accumulation is not simply covered over 
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 We can note here that this follows the same developmental structure of objectification named in Kantian 
subreption:  An apparent ―objectlessness‖ is transformed subreptively into a form of useful value.  Here, 
however, the placebo is just as often a nocebo. 
 119 
by money; rather, the object ―itself,‖ as a fetish, both subreptively represents and 
presents, both secretly refers us to and embodies, primitive violences.  In short, as 
(pre)historical repression, primitive accumulation injures and uproots, but in doing so it 
also makes another repression, in the sense of a historically productive forgetting of 
prehistory and its persistence, in the form of the effective illusion of objective value, both 
possible and actual.   
 This insight demands in turn that we take a critical look at the development of the 
various prehistorical and historical modes of production together with their respective 
forms and objects of symbolization and fetishization.  What is the relation between 
violence, primitivity, symbolism, development, and class power?  Accomplishing much 
of the historical work to tackle this broad question in chapter eight, I return to the 
example of ―gold‖ in chapter nine, but now armed with insights into the repressive and 
repressively productive power of primitive accumulation.  We are thus prepared to see 
not just how but to some degree even why value, both in and despite cross-cultural 
exchange, can be both useful in the modern economic sense and yet also primitively 
violent and, at least at times, objectively developmental.  Why, for instance, would the 
Lenape Indians of what is now Manhattan Island trade the entire island for a chest of 
beads, bangles, coins, and other variously ―reflective‖ materials?  The complex and 
difficult key to our analysis here is to recognize that, in and through primitive ―eyes,‖ 
symbolization divisively conflates the literal and the metaphorical by aesthetically 
reflecting subjectivity and objectivity against and upon each other through what might be 
thought of as ―mirrors of value.‖  Because this insight is complex, however, we again 
analyze and borrow insights from Todorov‘s cross-cultural investigations and then turn to 
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Freud‘s and especially Winnicott‘s theories of the relation between enculturation, 
objectification, splitting, and reflection.  With our deepened understanding of the brutal 
and symbolic, the destructive and productive, aspects of the repression of primitive 
accumulation now at hand, however, we can make a lot more of our earlier questions and 
insights (from chapters five and six, for instance) concerning the relation between value, 
objectivity, and development.  In fact, we can usefully and finally return to Marx‘s idea 
that value is hieroglyphic.  What we discover with all these tools at hand is that modern 
value is the persistent distorting of an originary dividing up of nature and ―individual‖ 
pregnant mothers, which is then to say ―historically‖ in and as epochs and ―individually‖ 
in and as stages, respectively, but as both of these processes imbricate and identify as a 
symbolizations marking and embodying the growth of the ―human family.‖  Our belly 
buttons nicely express this, and then the symbolization moves to clothes and jewelry, to 
various kinds of more and then eventually less magical objects of trade, and then 
eventually to kinds of commodity, as if this magic were now gone in some larger 
secularization process called ―economics.‖  What ―traditional‖ cultures seem largely, 
mythically and illusionally, to recognize, then, is that localized value is embodied human 
historical meaning.  And yet we only know and can know the traces of the sources of this 
meaning and history.  Marx is right in a number of ways to call value hieroglyphic in this 
regard.  Indeed, what are we remembering and forgetting in money and capital?  And 
what would we remember with the elimination not of the first but of the second?  My 
suggestion is that something like socialism becomes possible only when we can make use 
of value as a memorial, a cenotaph, a memento the total meaning of which cannot be 
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finally determined but which certainly has to do with human love and hate, and family, 
community, and development.   
 And wouldn‘t development require that hate be eliminated, or at least sublimated 
or transformed into more gentle and perhaps even enjoyable forms, such that it wouldn‘t 
be felt as hate but say, a power to paint, to play a sport, to share a funny story—any 
number of forms of aesthetic practice and judgment?  This is where objectivity as a 
concern of and for health meets objectivity as a concern of and for symbolism.  Here then 
are the principal concerns of my argument:  Somewhat as I did with Kant, I examine the 
relationship between Marx‘s health, his personal finances, and his writing.  My concern is 
with inscriptive development.  With the help of Todorov and Derrida, I suggest that 
commodities arise historically not just with money but, generally speaking, with 
alphabets.  What does alphabetization have to do with the development of (and 
developments perhaps beyond) capital?  To the degree that alphabets are the legacy of 
iconography, I would want to write, they develop aesthetically as forms of 
communication, a communication however not just of meaning but of wishing.  For 
alphabets develop out of and secretly embody the magical influence of prior glyphic 
forms.  As a form of presentation, for instance, glyphs prove that iconographies bear 
power.  For glyphs, as scars, are signs.  Indeed, in what ends up being my final inquiry 
into the relation between human developmental health and objectivity, I suggest that 
development is born and borne in a glyphics of cultural meaning the goal of which we 
can create in terms of social and communal health.  And for this we need to talk about 
justice and happiness as ideas and ideals.   
 122 
CHAPTER V 
 
DAZZLING VALUE TRACES 
 
 So, why does Marx suggest that ―the characteristic which products of utility have 
of being values is as much men‘s social product as is their language‖?  Why language?  
The first thing to notice is that he both draws and draws upon this suggestion on a 
number of occasions.  Take the following helpful passage:    
 
The value of the commodity linen is expressed by the bodily form of the commodity 
coat, the value of one by the use-value of the other.  As a use-value, the linen is 
something palpably different from the coat; as value, it is the same as the coat, and 
now has the appearance of a coat.  Thus, the linen acquires a value-form different 
from its physical form…. We see, then, that everything our analysis of the value of 
commodities has already told us, is told by the linen itself, as soon as it comes into 
communication with another commodity, the coat.  Only it betrays its thoughts in that 
language with which alone it is familiar, the language of commodities.  In order to tell 
us that its own value is created by labor in its abstract character of human labor, it 
says that the coat, in so far as it is worth as much as the linen, and therefore is value, 
consists of the same labor as the linen.  In order to inform us that its sublime reality as 
value is not the same as its buckram body, it says that value has the appearance of a 
coat, and consequently that so far as the linen is value, it and the coat are as like as 
two peas.‖77 
 
 Clearly Marx wants to create a kind of ―analogy‖ here between commodity 
exchange and language, at least to the degree that we can understand and show them both 
to be, as we might put it today, ―social constructions.‖  Indeed, we can read this passage 
as if Marx were speaking ―tongue in cheek,‖ that is, as if he were creating an analogy by 
holding back the merely literal tongue in the name of sheer realism:  While commodities 
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 See Marx, 1978, 317.  I have chosen to quote the Marx-Engels Reader translation since the references to 
commodity ―communication‖ are more obvious here than in Fowkes‘ translation.  Indeed, here, in Tucker‘s 
translation, you get what you pay for when you name two things as peas in a pod, encouraging regression.   
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cannot and could never literally ―speak,‖ they‘re nonetheless like language to the degree 
that they‘re ―social products,‖ as Marx specifies in our hieroglyphic passage.  This logic 
is extendable a la Lukács:  It‘s ―we humans,‖ ―we persons,‖ after all, who exchange these 
―things‖ and not the reverse, nor even partially the reverse, at least to the degree that we 
humans are really alive, active, and social while these things are really dead, passive, and 
asocial.  What could be more ―obvious‖ than this?78  The idea here, in other words, is not 
that commodities and money ―really‖ do speak but that, were they capable of this, they 
would declare their value as the value of and belonging to exchange-value:  ―If 
commodities could speak, they would say this:  our use-value may interest men, but it 
does not belong to us as objects.  What does belong to us as objects, however, is our 
value.  Our own intercourse as commodities proves it.  We relate to each other merely as 
exchange-values‖ (177).  This ―if‖ can thus be said — humanly, of course — to remain 
merely hypothetical; for it indicates and signifies metaphorically:  again, since 
commodities don‘t ―really‖ speak, Marx must be speaking ―tongue in cheek.‖   
 And yet, on the other hand, while the hypothetical ―if‖ leads the way, the point is 
also,  if also taken literally, more or less than hypothetical, and more or less than 
metaphorical too:  If commodities could speak, their value would not just be spoken of 
beyond exchange (by ―we humans‖) but spoken in and as their exchange.  It would be 
―proven‖ in and as the ―object intercourse‖ we now call sales and purchases.  We thus 
stumble upon a Dr. Seussian type of problematic:  What ventriloquizes who and/or who 
                                                   
78
 Marx (1977) introduces the fetishism subchapter in just this way:  ―A commodity appears at first sight‖, 
he says, ―an extremely obvious, trivial thing.  But its analysis brings out that it is a very strange thing, 
abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties‖ (163).  Again, we will return to the ―sacred‖ 
(and so ―metaphysical‖ and ―theological‖) aspect of commodities later.  And yet, we should also say here 
that it‘s not that ―the hieratic‖ and ―the glyphic‖ are separate; indeed, primitively speaking, they are 
intimate beyond distinction — writing is a ―relief‖, yes? — though here for the moment we shall treat them 
distinctly. 
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ventriloquizes what here?  And why should ―who‖ and ―what‖ be so distinct and/or alike?  
The fetishistic conversion, it seems, runs in both directions at once, in and between who 
and what. 
 This difficulty, in turn, helps us understand why Marx ends the fetishism 
subchapter with a reference to Shakespeare.  Here he reminds us of a ―vulgar‖ economic 
belief.  The ―vulgar‖ economic theorists believe both that value inheres in commodities, 
indeed, in naturally ―precious‖ substances themselves (such as gold, pearls, and 
diamonds) and that commodity utility belongs to human culture.  What‘s interesting, 
however, says Marx, is that these theorists believe this even though they occasionally 
also admit that ―the use-value of a thing is realized without exchange, i.e. in the direct 
relation between thing and man, while, inversely, its value is realized only in exchange, 
i.e. in a social process.‖  Marx therefore follows this (apparent?) contradiction with a 
question, a reference from Shakespeare‘s Much Ado about Nothing:  ―Who would not call 
to mind at this point the advice given by the good Dogberry to the night-watchman 
Seacoal? ‗To be a well-favoured man is the gift of fortune; but reading and writing comes 
by nature‘‖ (177).79  Now, how should we understand this reference?   
 One interpretation stands out quickly.  When Dogberry informs Seacoal that 
reading and writing devolve ―by nature,‖ clearly he‘s doing the same thing in comic 
fashion that the vulgar fetishists do in all seriousness concerning modern value:  He‘s 
reifying a social relation as if this relation were given merely by nature.  So clearly Marx 
here means to critique the dual fetishistic belief that ―value‖ is natural while ―utility‖ is 
social or cultural.  Indeed, for Marxist critics who are constantly concerned with false-
naturalizations and desocializations, this critique should be obvious. 
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 See Shakespeare‘s (1959) comedy Much Ado About Nothing, Act 3, Scene 3. 
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 But what about this reference to reading and writing, spoken by Dogberry and 
written by Shakespeare and Marx?  Let‘s note first of all that Dogberry belongs to the 
lower classes.  He‘s likely a laborer or yeoman.80  In fact, over the course of Much Ado, it 
becomes clear not only that Dogberry cannot read and write but that he has an 
exaggerated reverence — a fetishistic anxiety signified in and through his grandiose 
speeches and minor malapropisms — for those who can. So this is likely why he has 
sought out Seacoal to serve as part of the town Watch:  As various scholars have noted, 
the name ―Seacoal‖ refers to the coal which is brought to market by ship, which means 
that while Dogberry belongs to the laboring class and is illiterate, Seacoal is a commodity 
merchant and in all probability educated.  He‘s associated with money, profit, and 
commodities and — ―at the same time‖ — he‘s able to read and write, to make ―notes‖ or 
―noting‖ out of ―nothing‖ as the title of the play indicates.81  Why, then, does 
Shakespeare so clearly and yet secretly associate class with the problem of literacy?  And 
how and why does Marx follow him here?
82
   
 Following from our critique in the prior chapter, I want to suggest that the object 
we have come to call ―money‖ plays an important role here.  Indeed, let‘s look at a 
summary, from the end of chapter two of Capital I, concerning the formation of money 
out of what is typically called ―barter.‖  Regarding money‘s formation, says Marx, 
 
what appears to happen is not that a particular commodity becomes money because 
all other commodities express their values in it, but, on the contrary, that all other 
commodities universally express their values in a particular commodity because it is 
[already] money.  The movement through which this process has been mediated 
vanishes in its own result, leaving no trace behind.  Without any initiative on their 
part, the commodities find their own value-configuration ready to hand, in the form of 
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 English yeoman, not Czech. 
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 See Shakespeare, 1959, 96.  
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 Marx often spent time with his family, his daughters especially, playing with and reading Shakespeare. 
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a physical commodity existing outside but also alongside them.  This physical object, 
gold or silver in its crude state, becomes, immediately on its emergence from the 
bowels of the earth, the direct incarnation of all human labor.  Hence the magic of 
money.  Men are henceforth related to each other in a purely atomistic way.  Their 
own relations of production therefore assume a material shape which is independent 
of their control and their conscious individual action.  This situation is manifested 
first by the fact that the products of men‘s labor universally take on the form of 
commodities.  The riddle of the money fetish is therefore the riddle of the commodity 
fetish, now become visible and dazzling to our eyes. (187)  
 
When Marx claims here that the historical movement through which monetization 
has been mediated ―vanishes in its own result, leaving no trace behind,‖ he could be read 
— non-archaeologically, non-hieroglyphically — as declaring that this process is over, 
end of story.  To disappear and leave no trace behind is to completely disappear.  Indeed, 
by most people‘s lights, it is precisely barter which disappears without a trace with the 
appearance of money.  In a pecuniary economy, after all, exchange doesn‘t take place by 
swapping commodities in a single transaction (C-C, in Marx‘s shorthand).  Rather, we 
―buy‖ and ―sell‖ commodities in distinct transactions precisely by means of the object 
which money is (C-M-C).  Since we don‘t trade commodities ―directly‖ but purchase and 
vend them ―indirectly‖ through money, money is a means, nay, it‘s now more or less the 
means of exchange.  It is money as ―means‖ or ―medium of exchange,‖ in fact, which 
takes precedence in economic and political economic explanations of its historical 
emergence.  In his otherwise non-historical Theory of Money, for instance, Walter 
Newlyn tells us from the start that ―the essential function, the performance of which 
enables us to identify money, is very simple: it is that of acting as a medium of exchange.  
The necessity of having something to perform this exchange function lies in the fact that, 
in the absence of such a medium, exchange requires a double coincidence of wants.‖83   
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What is this ―double coincidence of wants‖?  The theory is that for two persons to 
barter they must each want what the other both has and is ready to part with.  Required 
first of all, then, is commodity superfluity or surplus.  To make an exchange, each person 
must have in hand some commodity or other in excess of her own needs.  But of course 
there‘s a second condition (to which the term ―double coincidence‖ actually refers):  
When you and I meet as traders, as barterers, you not only have to have what I want 
(when I want it) but also have to want what I have (when I happen to have it in excess of 
my needs).  If this double coincidence isn‘t met, if one of us doesn‘t want what the other 
is trading just when this other is ready to trade it, then trade between us 
becomes…difficult.  The economic historian Arthur Monroe suggests that it was the 
second century Roman jurist Paulus who first articulated this ―double coincidence‖ 
difficulty.  According to Paulus, ―since occasions where two persons can justly satisfy 
each other‘s desires are rarely met, a material was chosen to serve as a general medium of 
exchange.‖84  It was Adam Smith, however, who first began to develop a monetization 
theory, one involving the ―division of labor,‖ based on this concept.  As he puts it in the 
Wealth of Nations:  
 
When the division of labor first began to take place, this power of exchanging must 
frequently have been very much clogged and embarrassed in its operations.  One 
man, we shall suppose, has more of a certain commodity than he himself has occasion 
for, while another has less.  The former consequently would be glad to dispose of, and 
the latter to purchase, a part of this superfluity.  But if this latter should chance to 
have nothing that the former stands in need of, no exchange can be made between 
them….  In order to avoid the inconveniency of such situations, every prudent man in 
every period of society, after the first establishment of the division of labor, must 
naturally have endeavored to manage his affairs in such a manner as to have at all 
times by him, besides the peculiar produce of his own industry, a certain quantity of 
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 This is somewhat profound, of course, but not necessarily, or at least not as deeply, under the 
presumption of barter.  See Monroe, 1966, 10.   
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some one commodity or other, such as he imagined few people would be likely to 
refuse in exchange for the produce of their industry. (I.4.2)
85
  
 
While it‘s usually suggested that classical theory locates value in production and 
labor whereas neoclassical, marginalist, and most mainstream economic theory locates 
value in circulation, consumption, and utility, and so while these two basic forms or 
epochs of analysis are almost invariably contrasted, we see here that by casting money as 
an object which rationally facilitates the efficiency of exchange, even Smith is already 
utility-marginalist in orientation, at least in regard to money.  So this is why Marx 
suggests that we ―find that economists who are entirely agreed that labor time is the 
measure of the magnitude of value have the strangest and most contradictory ideas about 
money, that is, about the universal equivalent in its finished form‖ (174, footnote 34).  
Marx doesn‘t specify this contradiction but we can.  In Smith the contradiction pivots on 
the fact that while he seeks to reduce value to labor, he nonetheless represents money as 
deriving not from production (or even from that which lies behind the need to produce) 
but from a need located in circulation and consumption, indeed, from a rational need to 
maximize utility and “profit” through exchange.86   
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  With this in mind, both Smith and Jean-Baptiste Say (who largely inherits Smith‘s account) end up 
proposing scenarios like the following:  A village butcher needs bread and so wants to trade with the baker.  
But what if the baker doesn‘t need any meat?  Since this is barter, the butcher is simply out of luck, at least 
temporarily.  Indeed, this situation of non-coincidence can run further still.  For the baker, needing sheets 
for his bed, wants to barter his bread for the linens produced by the weaver.  But the weaver doesn‘t 
currently want bread, which means that the baker too is out of luck, and so on. While Menger and 
especially Jevons fine-tuned this account in the late nineteenth century, little has been written on the 
double-coincidence theory since.  This is not, however, because scholars aren‘t interested in it.  Rather, it‘s 
because few think the theory is problematic.  According to the historical purview of Milton Friedman and 
monetarism, for instance, the double coincidence idea remains a presupposition.  See Jevons, 1875 and 
Menger, 1892, 239-55.  For recent accounts, see especially Wallace, 1997, 2–20; Kiyotaki, and Wright, 
1989, 927–54; and Mishkin, 1986, 22.  For this idea in monetarism, see Friedman, 1962, 14. 
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  The link between monetary functionalism and monetary utility begins in Aristotle.  When Schumpeter 
says that Aristotle‘s theory of money ―prevailed substantially until the end of the nineteenth century and 
even beyond‖, he‘s referring to Aristotle‘s basic idea (Politics, I 8-10, and Nicomachean Ethics, V 6) that 
money‘s adequacy and convenience for trade inheres in its ability to make unequal products or works 
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Like the political economists, and as we noted earlier, Marx highlights money‘s 
suitability for facilitating exchange and the natural appropriateness of silver and 
especially gold for becoming the first substances of modern ―world‖ money.  Like them, 
he suggests that money is a tool, a means of modernization, especially with regard to 
labor and its pay.  Note the following passages: 
 
Only a material whose every sample possesses the same uniform quality can be an 
adequate form of appearance of value, that is, a material embodiment of abstract and 
therefore equal human labor.  On the other hand, since the difference between the 
magnitudes of value is purely quantitative, the money commodity must be capable of 
purely quantitative differentiation, it must therefore be divisible at will, and it must 
also be possible to assemble it again from its component parts.  Gold and silver 
possess these properties by nature. (183) 
 
Money necessarily crystallizes out of the process of exchange in which different 
products of labor are in fact equated with each other, and thus converted into 
commodities.  The historical broadening and deepening of the phenomenon of 
exchange develops the opposition between use-value and value which is latent in the 
nature of the commodity.  The need to give an external expression to this opposition 
for the purposes of commercial intercourse produces the drive towards an 
independent form of value, which finds neither rest nor peace until an independent 
form has been achieved by the differentiation of commodities into commodities and 
money.  At the same time, then, as the transformation of the products of labor into 
commodities is accomplished, one particular commodity is transformed into money. 
(181)  
  
The need for [the money] form first develops with the increase in the number and 
variety of the commodities entering into the process of exchange.  The problem and 
the means for its solution arise simultaneously.  Commercial intercourse, in which the 
owners of commodities exchange and compare their own articles with various other 
articles, never takes place unless different kinds of commodities belonging to 
different owners are exchanged for, and equated as values with, one single further 
kind of commodity…. The universal equivalent form comes and goes with the 
momentary social contacts which call it into existence.  It is transiently attached to 
this or that commodity in alternation.  But with the development of exchange it fixes 
itself firmly and exclusively onto particular kinds of commodity, i.e. it crystallizes out 
into the money-form.  (182-3) 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
commensurable.  For justice can only spring from and exist in such commensurability.  This 
commensurability, in turn, hinges on what Aristotle describes, although without our modern terminology, 
as money‘s role as medium, measure, and store.  See Schumpeter, 62.  
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 So, like the (other?) political economists, Marx informs us that gold and silver 
possess certain chemical and physical properties which make them more trade-functional 
(as ―equivalents‖) than other natural substances.  There are always differences of quality 
within any given ―primitive money‖ or ―general equivalent,‖ for instance, but notice that 
this is not the case with these ―precious metals,‖ the first global moneys.  Some cows are 
fatter than others, some feathers more colorful, some teeth sharper, some shells stronger, 
etc.  Once gold and silver are mined and isolated, however, they are always sheer and 
everywhere chemically identical.  Since they are each isolatable and homogenous, 
qualitatively speaking, as well as highly divisible, quantitatively speaking, they are 
―ideal‖ substances, as it were, for the abstraction which modernization both is and 
requires.
87
  Moreover, gold is typically found in nature unmixed with other metals and 
minerals; it is therefore relatively easy to isolate and purify; it is also often directly 
siftable from rivers in a pure state; it does not oxidize in air; and it‘s insoluble in acids 
other than aqua regia.88  Although silver is often mixed in nature with other metals and 
minerals and is generally more difficult and dangerous to mine, it‘s nonetheless much 
more plentiful than gold and can typically be found in larger deposits.  Both gold and 
silver, however, are readily transformed from coin, from raw material, or from their use 
                                                   
87
  As Marx puts it in Capital I, ―the truth of the statement that ‗although gold and silver are not by nature 
money, money is by nature gold and silver‘ is shown by the appropriateness of their natural properties for 
the function of money‖ (185).  Further, ―because universal labor-time itself can only display quantitative 
differences, the object to be recognized as its specific embodiment must be able to express purely 
quantitative differences, thus presupposing identical, homogenous quality‖ (Contribution, 153).  Marx thus 
favorably quotes Galiani‘s suggestion that ―a peculiar feature of metals is that in them alone all relations 
are reduced to a single one, that is, their quantity, for by nature they are not distinguished by differences in 
quality either in their internal composition or in their external form and structure‖ (ibid).   
88
 The earth‘s gold was first created, today‘s physicists tell us, in the collisions and explosive deaths of 
neutron star pairs.  Only in these collisions which form black holes are neutron-rich heavy metals such as 
gold and platinum both created and then released into space to cool into solid form.  Gold is an element 
born of the death and objectification of light, as we shall see.  Indeed, it is ―reborn‖, as it were, when it 
extrudes from, or is extracted from beneath, mother earth‘s surface.  See 
http://apod.nasa.gov/apod/ap050515.html.  
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in ornaments, into bullion and back again. Further, silver and (especially) gold are soft in 
comparison to bronze, iron, and most steels and alloys.  Gold is the softest solid pure 
metal and silver is highly malleable too.  This last fact is crucial, for it tells us that these 
metals are largely superfluous in consumption and especially in production and to that 
extent are more ―ideal,‖ as it were, for playing a specifically circulatory or economic role.  
As Marx says of gold and silver in the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy 
of 1859, ―any quantity of them can thus be placed at will within the social process of 
circulation without impairing production and consumption as such.  Their individual use-
value does not [much] conflict with their economic function‖ (154).89  Our overall point 
here, then, is that neither Marx nor the political economists in general ignore the 
―material shell‖ of value when analyzing why gold and silver became the first substances 
of modern money.  Far from it:  Insofar as the value which they are and signify is 
abstract, the substances of money will have to exhibit qualitative uniformity together with 
quantitative divisibility and recombinability.  Only in this way and with these substances 
is trade first centralized, made more efficient, and globalized.   
Marx‟s account of gold and silver‘s historical rise as money, however, does not 
reduce to their functional, technological, and utilitarian ability to facilitate trade.  Indeed, 
he‘s careful not to describe money‘s role in commerce in etiological and/or teleological 
terms.  He doesn‘t use the word ―because‖ at crucial moments in the second and third 
passage above, for instance, but the word ―with.‖   He does not say that ―the universal 
equivalent form comes and goes because of the momentary social contacts which call it 
into existence‖ but rather that ―the universal equivalent form comes and goes with the 
                                                   
89
 In Capital, Marx refers us to the Contribution repeatedly for his more detailed analysis of money.  See 
Marx, 1970. 
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momentary social contacts which call it into existence.‖  And he does not say that ―the 
need for this form [of value] first develops because of the increase in the number and 
variety of the commodities entering into the process of exchange‖  but rather, and 
significantly, that ―the need for this form first develops with the increase in the number 
and variety of the commodities entering into the process of exchange.‖  So while Adam 
Smith and so many other theorists of marginal utility indicate that the problems of barter 
precede and announce the need for money such that money is nothing but the solution for 
those problems, here we have at least a negative indication of what Marx means when he 
says that ―the problem and the means for its solution arise simultaneously‖:  Concerning 
the origins of money, he is not attributing primary or monocausal force to the rational-
economic interest that trade be made to function efficiently, in instrumentalist fashion, 
amidst a growing multiplicity of products.   
 Let‘s return to our ―dazzling‖ passage (above) in this regard.  If we read this 
passage with care, we begin to see that although Marx could be, or even is, saying that 
money is functional, utilitarian, and efficient for trade, he‘s nonetheless also offering a 
more subtle account.  So let‘s look again:  The fact that bourgeois economics portrays 
―what appears to happen‖ as happening in money‘s movement does not mean that this 
appearance fully conceals some completely-lost process.  The lost process, the movement 
prior to monetization, does not altogether vanish.  Rather, it vanishes, as we‘ve already 
begun to see, as Marx says here, and as we shall stress, in its own result, namely, in and 
as the object which ―money‖ has become.  This may seem to be but a sly sort of 
difference, but in fact, as sly, as subreptive, as secretive, it makes all the difference.  On a 
merely ―economic‖ and so typically ―modern‖ reading, the conditions for money‘s 
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existence disappear without a trace when money as rational measure and facilitator 
overcomes and replaces these ―irrational‖ and ―inefficient‖ conditions.  What‘s left 
behind, as if the past were merely or simply past, is something which everyone thinks of 
as being a market economy of commodity exchange before money.  They call it ―barter‖:  
I produce this object in isolation; you produce another object in isolation; and when we 
meet we can trade these products if our needs are doubly coincidental.  As Marx phrases 
the problem here, however, money is not just a rational object of value invented for 
exchange but is also an indication of its own movement‘s apparently ―leaving no trace 
behind.‖  Again, the conditions for commodity and money exchange don‘t simply vanish 
but vanish, Marx says, in their own result.  Money is thus a trace.  But of what?   
 Marx brings a clue to the surface in this same passage.  Money is an objective 
trace of magic, indeed, as we shall see, it‘s a riddling and dazzling trace — a rebus as 
cipher — of its own lost conditions in primitive magic.  Take here the central concept of 
―fetishism.‖  Marx borrows the term from European ethnology, which of course is 
emerging as a science in the 19
th
 century.  And for the ethnologists, fetishism is a 
principal aspect of the so-called ―primitive religions‖ which belong to so-called ―tribal 
cultures.‖90  It is through an almost religious form of fetishism, then, that the glyphics of 
money and commodities speak also of their hieros, a sacredness, of which magic is an 
elaboration.  But magic is the practical enterprise of religion and historically precedes 
religion if by the latter we have in mind the various monotheisms.  Magic roots — it is a 
central root of — commodity value. 
 These relations will become clearer as we go.  This is why we find Marx 
―riddling‖ various early passages in Capital with strange references to the animistic or 
                                                   
90
 See Pietz. 
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mysterious power ―in‖ or ―of‖ commodities and money.  Chapter two on ―The Process of 
Exchange‖ opens, for instance, with a reminder that commodities aren‘t alive and social:  
―Commodities cannot themselves go to market and perform exchanges in their own right.  
We must, therefore, have recourse to their guardians, who are the possessors of 
commodities.  Commodities are things, and therefore lack the power to resist man‖ (178).  
Not only is this reminder strange to the degree that it‘s a ―reminder‖ — for who would 
think otherwise, right? — but as soon as Marx has seemingly clarified that commodities 
are asocial and thingly and therefore lack the power to resist man, he virtually, 
mysteriously backtracks.  In the next sentence we read that ―if they [commodities] are 
unwilling, he [the guardian] can use force; in other words he can take possession of 
them.‖  So again, while the hypothetical ―if‖ leads the way, and despite apparently being 
mere things with no cultural, social, or subjective power, commodities might still ―will‖ a 
form of social resistance to human will.   
 Did Marx say ―possession‖?  On the next page, we read the following:  ―A born 
leveler and cynic, [a commodity] is always ready to exchange not only soul but body with 
each and every other commodity, be it more repulsive than Maritornes herself‖ (179).  
Indeed, some pages later this object has become money, gold in particular.  And as gold, 
money is more attractive, more dazzling we might say, and yet more stubborn and 
difficult, too:  ―We see then that commodities are in love with money, but that ‗the course 
of true love never did run smooth‘‖ (202).  Thus, ―in order…that a commodity may in 
practice operate effectively as exchange-value, it must divest itself of its natural physical 
body and become transformed from merely imaginary into real gold, although this act of 
transubstantiation may be more ‗troublesome‘ for it than the transition from necessity to 
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freedom for the Hegelian ‗concept‘, the casting of his shell for a lobster, or the putting-
off of the old Adam for Saint Jerome‖ (197).91  We will return later to this idea that value 
has difficulty in shedding its shell, or more precisely its ―skin,‖ to become really 
embodied in gold as exchange-value.  We can point cryptically to the difficulty, however, 
if in and behind the metaphor of value‘s desirous need to shed its skin there lies 
something literal, something, then, which verges upon and enacts a transubstantiation 
identifying body and soul in a sacred act of exchange.  For as we‘ll see when we analyze 
the Aztec ritual of the ―smoking mirror,‖ what‘s at stake isn‘t just modern possession (i.e. 
the form of modern ownership) but possession of a prior sort.  When gold becomes 
money and money becomes gold, both become the ―trace‖ of this priority.  
 But we can take a less cryptic approach, too:  When I pay a taxi driver twenty 
dollars after he‘s taken me to my specified destination, money has apparently ―done,‖ or 
at least has enabled me to do, what I could not have done without it.  As with any 
―charm,‖ with money my ―natural‖ somatic powers are further socially extended, 
elaborated.  I have temporary practical ―control‖ over both the driver and the vehicle, for 
instance, whereas otherwise, without money, I would not usually have this ―control,‖ this 
ability to ―possess‖ other persons and things.  Of course, this can be looked at and 
understood positively or negatively—a difference in orientation made possible in part 
through money‘s historical emergence, or rather, through the money-relation of credit 
and debt.  In any case, we can see here precisely why Marx motivates the notion of the 
fetish to examine money‘s magical properties:   While an ethnological ―primitive fetish‖ 
is any object which, whether crafted, found, or exchanged, has a preternatural, as if 
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 The current (early 2009) aliquidity in the world market exemplifies the difficulty of this attraction, for 
instance, to the degree that we can do little about it.  It‘s as if the market were working ―behind our backs‖ 
despite the fact that value seems to agree with price on our ―foreheads.‖     
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supersensible, ability to protect, aid, or harm its possessor or recipient — or so this object 
practically appears and ―works‖ from the cultural ―inside‖ — this is how ―we moderns‖ 
treat and use money.  We treat it like ―its‖ powers inhered in it animistically. 
 But while Marx structurally links the fetishism of trade to the fetishism of 
religion, he also notes the developmental trajectory of this structure‘s coming to be.  In 
bourgeois society, religion exists in two general forms:    
 
For a society of commodity producers whose general social relation of production 
consists in the fact that they treat their products as commodities, hence as values, and 
in this thingly form bring their individual, private labors into relation with each other 
as homogeneous human labor, Christianity with its religious cult of man in the 
abstract — more particularly in its bourgeois development in Protestantism, Deism, 
etc — is the most fitting form of religion.  In the ancient Asiatic, Classical-antique, 
and other such modes of production, the transformation of the product into a 
commodity, and therefore men‘s existence as producers of commodities, plays a 
subordinate role, which however increases in importance as these communities 
approach nearer and nearer to the stage of their dissolution. (172, my emphasis)   
 
 Foreshadowing Weber‘s detailed analysis in the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, Marx‘s point is clearly and correctly that Protestantism‘s social 
individualism, its idea of an absconding monotheistic God, and its universalistic 
abstraction of ―man in general‖ make it the ―ideal‖ religious form for the abstraction of 
value and history which appears with global commodification.  But notice, too, how the 
transformation of precapitalist forms of trade into generalized commodity trade marks 
and is simultaneously marked by the transformation from pre-Christian into Christian 
religion.  The ideology of religious thought is inseparable, in this regard, from the praxis 
of economic objectification, here the making of the form of money.  Indeed, this latter 
praxis, since more obviously material, will disavow its universality precisely in and as 
particular objectifications.   While gold announces itself as universal or world money in 
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its generalization and production during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, for instance, 
we also encounter here a repression of the magical notion that gold is divine (and 
specifically divine shit for some religions).  In any case, with the ―dissolution‖ of various 
―ancient‖ modes of production, we also find the dissolution of primitive religion and the 
rise of Christian universalism.  Recall Marx‘ claim in this regard that, although political 
economy has discovered that labor hides behind and within commodities as values, the 
political economists have not been able to understand, nor even to ask, why labor takes 
the shape, specifically, of commodities:   
 
Political economy has indeed analyzed value and its magnitude, however 
incompletely, and has uncovered the [labor] content concealed within these forms.  
But it has never once asked the question why this content has assumed that particular 
form, that is to say, why labor is expressed in value, and why the measurement of 
labor by its duration is expressed in the magnitude of the value of the product.  These 
formulas, which bear the unmistakable stamp of belonging to a social formation in 
which the process of production has master over man, instead of the opposite, appear 
to the political economists‘ bourgeois consciousness to be as much a self-evident and 
nature-imposed necessity as productive labor itself.  Hence the pre-bourgeois forms 
of the social organization of production are treated by political economy in much the 
same way as the Fathers of the Church treated pre-Christian religions. (174-5) 
 
 In the footnote attached to the end of this passage Marx reminds us that the 
Christian church fathers he has in mind resemble the political economists of his critique 
to the degree that both groups hold that there are ―only two kinds of institutions, artificial 
and natural…. [The church fathers believe that] every religion which is not theirs is an 
invention of men, while their own is an emanation of God.  Thus there has been history, 
but there is no longer any‖ (175).   Marx thereby links fetishistic abstraction not simply to 
Christianity but also to what he specifies as ―tribal religion‖—although ―religion‖ may be 
a bit misleading here to the degree that it‘s magic which is at stake in and beneath 
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religion, polytheism in and beneath monotheism.  In any case, commodity fetishism‘s 
deepest roots are ―reflected‖ in the primitively magical, as we‘ll continue to see:   
 
Trading nations, properly so called, exist only in the interstices of the ancient world, 
like the gods of Epicurus in the intermundia, or Jews in the pores of Polish society…. 
They are conditioned by a low stage of development of the productive powers of 
labor and correspondingly limited relations between men within the process of 
creating and reproducing their material life, hence also limited relations between man 
and nature.  These real limitations are reflected in the ancient worship of nature, and 
in other elements of tribal religions. (173) 
 
 The above-mentioned ―dissolution‖ of these ―ancient communities‖ and ―modes 
of production‖ hinges, then, on how these ―interstices‖ are reflected, magnified, and 
reduced in the objects of sacred value borne and exchanged between trading nations and 
communities of the ancient world.  Trade spreads culture, in other words, and in definite, 
if general, ways.  More specifically, commodity trade has an abstracting affect on 
polytheism, magic, and eventually even on monotheism, although this isn‘t to say that the 
sacred is totally effaced.  As Marx puts it in chapter two on ―The Process of Exchange‖:  
 
things are in themselves external to man, and therefore alienable.  In order that this 
alienation may be reciprocal, it is only necessary for men to agree tacitly to treat each 
other as the private owners of those alienable things, and, precisely for that reason, as 
persons who are independent of each other.  But this relationship of reciprocal 
isolation and foreignness does not exist for the members of a primitive community of 
natural origin, whether it takes the form of a patriarchal family, an ancient Indian 
commune, or an Incan state.  The exchange of commodities begins where 
communities have their boundaries, at their points of contact with other communities, 
or with members of the latter.  However, as soon as products have become 
commodities in the external relations of a community, they also, by reaction, become 
commodities in the internal life of a community.  Their quantitative exchange relation 
is at first determined purely by chance.  They become exchangeable through the 
mutual desire of their owners to alienate them.  In the meantime, the need for others‘ 
objects of utility gradually establishes itself.  The constant repetition of exchange 
makes it a normal social process.  In the course of time, therefore, at least some part 
of the products must be produced intentionally for the purpose of exchange.  From 
that moment the distinction between the usefulness of things for direct consumption 
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and their usefulness in exchange becomes firmly established.  Their use-value has 
become distinguished from their exchange-value. (182) 
 
 While this passage is quite straightforward and helpful, and indeed, while it 
describes the formation of what Marx calls the ―normal social process‖ of commodity 
exchange, it presents us nonetheless with a couple of question sets.  First, what does it 
mean to say that ―as soon as products have become commodities in the external relations 
of a community, they also, by reaction, become commodities in the internal life of a 
community‖?  What is this ―reaction‖?  And whence does its apparent necessity arise?  
Second, and relatedly, we can imagine all sorts of scenarios where things are exchanged 
between individuals or groups where there is already ―tacit agreement to treat each other 
as the private owners of those alienable things.‖  ―We‖ do this all the time, for this is our 
practice—we imagine a more or less individualistic trade of more or less private 
properties whenever we trade in any market society.  But what happens, and what is 
happening, when this ―tacit agreement‖ doesn‟t yet exist, has not yet appeared, or is only 
in the process of appearing?  Indeed, what does it mean to say that ―this relationship of 
reciprocal isolation and foreignness does not exist for the members of a primitive 
community of natural origin‖?92    
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 Although Marx (and myself, too) sometimes refers to ―nature‖ as if it were some thing which could stand 
out intelligibly for us as an object ―in itself,‖ since fetishism is our object, any idea of ―nature‖ we might 
have has already been historically and practically situated by our modern, capitalist mode of production.  
But this doesn‘t mean that referring to ―nature‖ somewhat plainly cannot be useful.  After all, part of 
Marx‘s argument is that fetishism makes historically situated objects, like nature, appear merely natural.  
So long as we know this, then, we needn‘t be anxious about using the term in an ordinary and useful way. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
PRIMITIVE ENCOUNTER I: OBJECTIVE INTERCOURSE 
 
 To help us answer these prior questions, let‘s examine some ―primitive‖ cultural 
encounters as offered, for instance, by Tzvetan Todorov in his excellent Conquest of 
America.93  Indeed, since it is precisely in the ―long sixteenth century‖ confrontation 
between Europeans and native Americans that the process of modernization may be said 
to coincide with the actuality and practicality of globalization, we can investigate this 
encounter as a privileged site for studying the birth of capitalism and ―the market.‖  Or, 
as Todorov puts it,  
 
the discovery of America, or of the Americans, is certainly the most astonishing 
encounter of our history.  We do not have the same sense of radical difference in the 
‗discovery‘ of other continents and of other peoples:  Europeans have never been 
altogether ignorant of the existence of Africa, India, or China; some memory of these 
places was always there already—from the beginning....  At the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, the Indians of America are certainly present, but nothing is known 
about them, even if, as we might expect, certain images and ideas concerning other 
remote populations were projected upon these newly discovered beings.  The 
encounter will never again achieve such an intensity, if indeed that is the word to use:  
the sixteenth century perpetrated the greatest genocide in human history. (4-5) 
 
  This passage bears a number of assumptions that we will want to clear up—
concerning ancestral and cultural memory, and concerning the understandably 
controversial and to a certain degree offensive idea of the European ―discovery‖ of 
America, including the idea that this encounter is ―our‖ encounter, for instance.  For now, 
however, I simply want to take up the line of inquiry which Todorov himself first takes 
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 Todorov, 1984.   
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up, a line concentrating on the so-called ―beginning‖ of this encounter, that is, when the 
world, like a skin, was first broke open into what are still sometimes called ―Old‖ and 
―New.‖  The question this ―example‖ highlights, then, is on the one hand the question of 
modernization, a process coincident with a literal historical globalization; but on the other 
hand it‘s also a question of all entrances into ―history‖ from ―prehistory.‖94  Indeed, a 
crucial caveat of this opening of and to history is that the age of scientific, and so 
―objective,‖ understanding is also the age that births capital.  This should be familiar 
territory for any critical theory of modern culture:  Capitalization and enlightenment arise 
together, and necessarily so, at least at first.  For while reflection dawns post festum, it 
also seems to require the feast, a primitive accumulation, even as it dawns. 
So, what happens between the Europeans and the Amerindians when Columbus 
and his crew spot and then land on a small island in the Bahamas on October 11
th
 and 
12
th, 1492?  Let‘s note first of all that because the Taíno or Arawak Indians who 
Columbus and his crew first meet don‘t have an ―obvious‖ system of writing beyond a 
few petroglyphs, and reciprocally, because the Europeans bring with them a system of 
phonetic-syllabic or alphabetic writing, a lot of what ―we‖ now ―know‖ about these ―first 
contacts‖  — that is, a lot of what we are cognizant of — stems from Spanish records 
such as Columbus‘s journals.95  Indeed, as Todorov notes, it turns out that the first thing 
Columbus does when he approaches the island is to get his paperwork in order:  
Disembarking into a small boat with the royal banner at hand and with a royal notary 
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 As we‘ll see, an epoch or culture can be understood as ―historical‖ to the degree that it produces and 
marks its development self-reflectively and self-consciously using abstract, alphabetically materialized 
concepts, whereas an epoch or culture remains ―prehistorical‖ to the degree that it communicates and 
understands its development pictographically.  This will become materially clear later.   
95
  Actually, Columbus‘s journals were eventually lost but not before much of their content was quoted, 
transcribed, and/or summarized by Las Casas, the famous priest who, in his history of the Americas, 
eventually and vigorously defends the rights of the Indians against conquest and mistreatment.  See, for 
example, Columbus, 1969.   
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armed with an inkwell, Columbus demands that a deed of possession be drawn up.  
Standing before the Indians who continue to hail him from the shore, he formally 
―appropriates‖ the island for the Spanish Crown in the name of Christ.96  He concretizes 
this formality in an act of inscription.
97
      
 When Columbus and his crew actually meet this first Amerindian group moments 
later, however, this is what happens:  Noticing to some degree that they cannot 
understand each other verbally, the two groups supplement their respective chatter with 
physical gesturing and, more importantly, at least for the Indians, they begin to exchange 
various small objects.  They begin to communicate ―tacitly,‖ in other words, if not yet 
under the agreement of reciprocal relations of private property.  In Maussian terms, they 
exchange, they present each other with gifts.  As Columbus puts it: ―As I saw that they 
were very friendly to us…I presented them with some red caps, and strings of beads to 
wear upon their necks, and many other trifles of small value, whereupon they were much 
delighted, and became wonderfully attached to us. Afterwards they came swimming to 
the boats, bringing parrots, balls of cotton thread, javelins, and many other things which 
they exchanged for articles we gave them, such as glass beads and hawk's bells; which 
trade was carried on with the utmost good will.‖ (Oct 12, 1492, Cohen p55).98  Indeed, 
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  Similarly, although Columbus soon learns that the Indians call this particular island ―Guanahani‖, he 
―officially‖ dubs it ―San Salvador‖.  
97
  Further, Columbus and his crew are astonished, as they continue to be with each such early encounter, at 
the Indians‘ lack of clothing.  According to Las Casas (in Columbus, 1969), the first contact starts with this 
observation:  ―Presently they saw naked people‖ (Oct 11, 1492).  And this continues with each new 
encounter:  ―They all go naked, men and women, as the day they were born‖ (Nov 6, 1492).  ―This king 
and all his people went naked as their mothers bore them, and their women the same, without any shame‖ 
(Dec 12, 1492). Etc.  It‘s thus as if writing and clothing are linked, as cultural objects of a development 
beyond ―mere nature.‖  We should note, however, that, excepting children, the Indians rarely went around 
purely naked.  They sometimes wore loin-cloths and almost always wore certain ―charms‖ and 
―adornments‖ of a ―magical‖ sort.  Despite the observations of the Europeans, then, it‘s as if the rudiments 
of clothing performed the same function as the earliest form of writing, as we shall see. 
98
 Also see ―Christopher Columbus: Extracts from His Journal, 1492,‖ online at 
http://www.vlib.us/amdocs/acolon.html.  
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encountering different groups of Indians in the next days, weeks, and months, this rather 
beatific scene tends to repeat itself in a general way, at least for some time — before a 
certain horrific disenchantment takes place — whenever the Europeans meet a new 
Indian group on a different island.  On Oct 22
nd, for instance, Columbus writes that ―they 
carried spears and some of them brought balls of cotton thread.  These they exchanged 
with some of the sailors for bits of glass from broken bowls and fragments of earthen-
ware.  Some of them wore pieces of gold hanging from their noses, which they happily 
exchanged for bells of the kind made for the feet of a sparrow-hawk and for glass beads, 
but the amount was a mere trifle.  Indeed, however small the things we gave them, they 
still consider our coming a great marvel‖ (72).  Or, on Oct 16th, he writes that ―they 
brought us water and something of all they had.  I ordered presents to be given to all of 
them, that is to say, strings of ten or a dozen small glass beads and some glass 
clappers…and some leather tags, all of which they value very highly‖ (63).  Indeed, as 
Todorov points out, Columbus is surprised and even astounded, especially on the first 
voyage, by the generosity of the Indians:  On Oct 13
th
, Columbus writes for instance that 
―all that they have they give for any trifle we offer them, so that they take in exchange 
pieces of crockery and fragments of glass goblets.‖  Or on Dec 13th:  ―For anything at all 
we give them, without ever saying it is too little, they immediately give whatever they 
possess‖ (Todorov, 38).  
 What, then, is happening here and what are some of the lessons to be culled from 
these scenes of ―the gift‖?  Focusing on Columbus‘s general ―medievalist‖ and ―finalist‖ 
mentality, as he calls it, Todorov initially suggests that these exchanges point to the 
social relativity of value,  or more accurately, the social relativity of valuation between 
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vastly dissimilar cultures.  Recall Todorov‘s assumption that ―nothing is known‖ — by 
whom, and in what lineage? — ―about [the Indians], even if, as we might expect, certain 
images and ideas concerning other remote populations were projected upon these newly 
discovered beings.‖  Although he will eventually withdraw it, or rather, emend it 
developmentally, then, Todorov‘s initial interpretation pivots almost exclusively on 
cultural difference:  ―Columbus unceasingly praises the generosity of the Indians, who 
give everything for nothing; it sometimes borders, he decides, on stupidity:  why do they 
value a piece of glass quite as much as a coin, and a worthless piece of change as much as 
a gold piece?‖  Indeed, from this, he draws a lesson, a thesis about value and about 
Columbus‘s failure to understand value normativity:  ―No more than in the case of 
languages does Columbus understand that values are conventional, that gold is not more 
precious than glass ‗in-itself‘, but only in the European system of exchange.  Hence…, 
we have the impression that…a different system of exchange is for him equivalent to the 
absence of system, from which he infers the bestial character of the Indians‖ (38, my 
emphasis).   
 I tend to agree with the sympathies of this assessment, of course, for who now 
wouldn‘t recognize that Columbus, like so many of his followers, was constantly failing 
to understand Amerindian cultural norms.  We must always insist in this regard that 
colonialism and imperialism stem from this general inability to recognize others in their 
difference and differences.  This inability is exaggerated with Columbus, to say the least.  
In the very first encounter with the Indians on October 11
th
 and 12
th
, for instance, 
Columbus cannot even be sure that the Indians are speaking, even though he himself 
speaks at least four different European languages!  He writes in his journal that ―at the 
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moment of my departure I shall take from this place six of them to Your Highness, so that 
they may learn to speak‖; but various translators of this passage have been so shocked or 
confused by it that they ―correct‖ it as if Columbus had said ―so that they may learn to 
speak our language,‖ which is in fact not what Columbus said (30).  And yet, by 
concentrating only on Columbus‘s general inability to recognize the Indians in their 
difference, Todorov doesn‘t reach a deeper insight, as yet; he can only put forward a few 
brief ideas focusing on cultural normativity.  But nonetheless this already brings us to the 
heart of things:  One of the specific details he offers is that there is nothing objective 
about the values being traded between these groups.  What we see is simply value 
relativism (at least until Todorov widens his thesis developmentally much later in the 
book).  Gold for instance, as we‘ve seen, ―is not more precious than glass ‗in-itself‘, but 
only in the European system of exchange.‖   
 Marx‘s emphasis, on the other hand, is not simply on the difference and relativity 
of cultural valuation — such that feathers, bark, beads, quartz, copper, gold, bronze, and 
iron will be valued ―differently‖ in distinct cultures, for example — but also on the 
objective development of valuation and value.99  One can‘t have cultural growth, in other 
words, without the simultaneous and linked development of objectivity.  Indeed, we can 
now better link this with Marx‘s suggestion that the ―characteristic which products of 
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 To better discern where I am going with this, one could ask both (a) why the stone age precedes the age 
of metals and (b) why so-called ―proto-writing‖ and the earliest forms of pictography emerge in the 
Neolithic age while logogrammatical, ideographic, and hieroglyphic ―true-writing‖ emerge in the Bronze 
(including also the Copper [Chalcolithic] and Gold [Chrysolithic]) age, while alphabetic-phonetic writing 
emerges more or less only in the Iron age.  As we shall see, this is not simply an issue of technological 
progress but a question of the symbolic development of humankind, in both progress and regress together, 
coincident with technological discovery such that techne cannot be dissociated from magic; and magic may 
even precede the age of technology as we understand the concept of ―technology‖ today.  If humanization 
and enculturation is our concern, the study of development must concentrate upon reflective technologies 
(mirrors of the necessity of human conflict) which express their birth when mythos is repressively 
sublimated into logos through ―immemorial‖ primitive accumulations.  
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utility have of being values is as much men‘s social product as is their language‖:   When 
we treat value as if it inhered in certain objects, we make a partial secret, true, since we 
thereby hide human labor behind these objects as discrete ―values.‖  The more secretive 
point, however, is that even while labor is being transformed into a secret (in the form of 
objectified value), and so even while ―value‖ apparently doesn‘t communicate this secret, 
it nonetheless communicates something like linguistic significance.  This ―like,‖ on the 
other hand, doesn‘t simply indicate ―communicability.‖   Marx employs the language of 
―secrecy,‖ after all, since in and through commodity exchange something is also bound 
— above and beyond the fact that value conceals labor — not to be communicated in 
them.  Before children communicate verbally, for instance, they communicate through 
gesture and object-exchange.   
 What, then, is being exchanged in the ―first contact‖ between the so-called 
―Europeans‖ and the so-called ―native‖ populations of America from the sixteenth 
century through the present?  My thesis is contained in the following answer, namely, 
that here objective forms of development and anti-development are being exchanged in a 
subdialectics of primitivity embodied in hieroglyphic traces of prehistorical accumulative 
redistributions.  What do I mean by this complex statement?  First of all, by ―objective 
forms of development‖ I largely have in mind what Marx means by ―modes of 
production.‖  A mode of production is the relationship between an culture‘s 
spatiotemporal productive forces (including human labor and such means of production 
as equipment, tools, buildings and technologies, natural resources, and improved land) 
and its distinct social and technical relations of production (including the property, 
power, and control relations, often codified into norms, customs, or laws, governing this 
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society‘s productive assets, the cooperative work relations and forms of association, the 
relations between people and the objects of their work, and the relations between social 
classes).  I emphasize that the modes of production which meet and are exchanged here, 
however, are ―objective‖ to the degree that the relations of production are always 
embodied and symbolized in fetishized objects of value, some of which are certainly 
more technically powerful than others.  And since these objects are symbols and fetishes 
of power, and since power is a relation borne through exchange, the exchange of objects 
of ―value‖ between quite distinct cultures is never neutral.  Rather, a given object of 
exchange will be reinscribed with new meanings and forces.  Indeed, to the degree that 
valued objects secretly refer to what is ―primitive‖ in a given culture, the exchange of 
values also secretly entails an exchange of forms of development and regression.  A 
culture‘s ability to adapt to disillusion or to the persistence of illusion, for example, will 
here, in exchange, be put to the test.  When a relatively isolated culture meets an ―other‖ 
culture which for thousands of years has been much less isolated, as is the case here, for 
instance, their mutual contact and exchange can be developmentally ―shocking,‖ 
especially for the former group.  
 Indeed, to the degree that two cultures meet without a common verbal language, 
their communication will consist in ―preverbal‖ forms of interchange embodied in objects 
of ―value.‖  This, then, is why such exchanges are and should be labeled ―predialectical,‖ 
on my view; for if the exchanges are not yet made at a mutually intelligible level of 
abstraction, where the cultures understand how each both represents and presents its 
highest values, what secretly gets exchanged in and through the preverbal objects of 
significance at hand are some primitive assumptions and forces regarding cultural 
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―others.‖  While the Amerindians often sacralized their European visitors such that the 
latter were taken to (and so placeboically did) have power over the former, for instance, 
the Europeans falsely supposed in turn that the Amerindians lacked culture and also that 
the latter‘s magic was altogether different from their ―own‖ monotheistic religious forces.   
 The war that breaks out between these groups and the conquest that befalls the 
Amerindians, then, is not something merely or purely ―new.‖  Rather, this tragedy recalls 
and to some degree repeats various long-forgotten (and so prehistorical) tragedies which 
had split apart and mutually isolated these two cultures, thus making them distinct 
cultures, in the first place.  The human family began long, long ago in Africa, after all, 
such that what when we refer to distinct or even isolated ―cultures,‖ we already imply 
that there had once been a split between them in our buried, mutual pasts.  And as we 
shall see, this is precisely what Marx means by the term ―primitive accumulation.‖  
Primitive accumulations are the latent suspicions, hatreds, and intimacies of and towards 
―others‖ which rest upon forgotten prior unions, splits, and wars, which means that when 
two relatively ―isolated‖ cultures meet as if for the first time, the exchange of objects 
between them secretly revivifies their capacity for suspicion, hatred, and intimacy with 
the ―other.‖  Modern money, for instance, retains premodern ―magical‖ forces even 
though it appears to be a merely secular ―economic‖ object, as we shall continue to see.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION I: VIOLENT EXPROPRIATION 
  
 Early in Capital, Marx frames capitalist history almost economically, in an 
economic ―form,‖ indeed, in the formula for surplus-value.  Surplus-value, in turn, can be 
traced to the formation of value, which of course can be traced to fetishism and, well, its 
secret.  Thus, in part one, Marx points to the secret of the value fetish, as we‘ve seen, in 
part by suffusing his apparently simply political economic analysis with strange and 
subtle references to primitivism and magic.  Indeed, linking primitive magic to money, he 
suggests that money plays a significant role in the process of capitalization, as we‘ll 
continue to see.  In part two, he then locates capitalization, at least formulaically, in the 
transformation of money, understood as value ―incarnate,‖ into surplus-value:  This 
―surplus‖ is a ―valorized‖ or increased amount of money, represented by the apostrophe 
or prime in the formula M-C-M'.  Money purchases a commodity which is then sold, in 
turn, for the original amount of money plus a surplus.  Surplus-value, and therefore 
capital, thus appears to arise solely in and through exchange, as discussed and theorized 
in much bourgeois political economy.   
Indeed, according to most political economists, surplus-value is formed by selling 
something at a price higher than its value (where the latter is understood in terms of what 
are called ―costs of production,‖ costs which include labor, which has a price).100  Capital 
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 There has thus arisen a debate between Marxist and non-Marxist economist over the identity and 
difference, the relation and possible transformation, between price and value.  Part of this debate is thus 
called the ―transformation problem‖.  The basic economistic (non-Marxian) theoretical reference for the 
―transformation problem‖, which comes with a large survey of sources, is Samuelson, 1971.   
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is thus the accumulation of profit, it is said.  This, however, is not Marx‘s view, at least to 
the degree that he wants to distinguish ―profit‖ from ―surplus-value‖ by linking the 
former simply to circulation while tracking the latter back to production and beyond.   
Indeed, for Marx, unregulated market exchange, whether capitalist or not, is fair and 
equivalent at the level of circulation to the extent that to make an exchange is to signify, 
to represent by the very act of exchange embodied in its objects, the equal value of these 
traded objects.  As he puts it, in exchange ―each enters into relation with the other, as 
with a simple owner of commodities, and they exchange equivalent for equivalent‖ (280).  
That is definitional, although merely so at the level of circulation.  In this circulatory 
situation ―if equivalents are exchanged, no surplus-value results,‖ and so no capital 
results (266).   
The free market logic behind this should not be hard to follow.  Indeed, this logic 
is, it has become, more or less ―obvious‖ in market societies to the degree that 
commodities and their movement embody the logic as a form of appearance of things 
past but forgotten:  If one enters a market with a sum of money, for instance, one can 
choose to buy or not to buy any of the products one can afford.  One finds this or that 
commodity ready for purchase or ready to leave behind.  Indeed, this is where most 
capitalists and the economists smile brightly.  And like I said, Marx does not disagree 
with them if we worry only about this point, or this aspect of the point:  Since purchases 
and sales tend to exemplify fair-exchange at the level of circulation, thus exhibiting 
mutual consent, equity, and choice (even freedom of choice), it is only cheating which 
can make commodity exchange morally, legally, or formally unfair; it is only something 
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on the order of robbery, a dispossession, which interrupts or destroys the possibility of 
what, hypothetically and merely formally speaking, would truly be ―fair exchange.‖   
 What, then, distinguishes ―profit,‖ which is the general term for increases in 
money that result from sales, from ―surplus-value‖?  While Marx sometimes conflates the 
two terms even in Capital,  as we‘ll see below,101 the latter hinges on and specifies the 
exploitation of labor by capital through wage-relations, especially through subsistence 
wages.  In general, ―profits‖ are made and gained through opportunistic salesmanship.  
They depend on calculative and sometimes ―lucky‖ acts of buying cheap and selling dear, 
but by strict Marxian definition they don‟t hinge on exploitation.  Indeed, this is why 
Marx motivates the term and idea of surplus-value.  He doesn‘t want the notion of 
exploitation to be confused with profit through exchange.  Of course, in a complex 
market it is often, in fact almost invariably, difficult to tell the difference since so many 
products, large and small, simple or complex, hinge at bottom on exploitation.  If I‘m 
trading stocks, for instance, the ―stock‖ isn‘t directly produced by a wage-laborer.  And 
yet, several removes away, the corporate power which the stock financially represents 
typically does hire and use wage-labor, a form of labor, that is, the owner of which 
doesn‘t own means of production but is paid a wage for working those means (which are 
owned and controlled by a capitalist) into values, and indeed, by creating amounts of 
value greater than his or her wage reflects.  Thus, looked at from the point of view of the 
whole of society, profits cancel each other out even while the total value (and money) in 
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 Many of these terms were only being more or less scientifically specified between the writing of the 
Grundrisse (in 1857) and Capital (published in 1867) and beyond, which means that although Marx is 
developing scientific categories and structures, these are often partially unclear or conflated. 
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the whole of society (and of all societies combined) continues to increase.
102
  So on the 
one hand there is equilibrium of profit and loss, and yet, on the other hand, capital 
continues to grow.  As Marx puts this, although here at first misleadingly calling ―profit‖ 
by the name of ―surplus-value‖:   
 
In this case [e.g. where an object of, say, $100 in value is sold at $110] the seller 
pockets a surplus-value [i.e., more properly, a profit] of 10.  But after he has sold he 
becomes a buyer.  A third owner of commodities now comes to him as a seller, and 
he too, for his part, enjoys the privilege of selling his commodities 10 percent too 
dear. Our friend gained 10 percent as a seller only to lose it again as a buyer.  In fact, 
the net result is that all owners of commodities sell their goods to each other [say, on 
average] at 10 percent above their value, which is exactly the same as if they sold 
them at their true value…. The formation of surplus-value [here properly termed], and 
therefore the transformation of money into capital, can consequently be explained 
neither by assuming that commodities are sold above their value, nor by assuming 
that they are bought at less than their value. (263) 
 
Marx specifies this further in the following footnote which ends chapter five, a 
footnote, as we‘ll see, which also illustrates how the famous ―value controversy‖ debates 
of the twentieth century, especially those concerning the ―transformation problem‖ 
between ―values‖ and ―prices,‖ are largely, if not completely, red-herrings.  Once we 
look at market society as a whole, and/or over a long period of time, prices and value 
tend to look a lot alike:  
 
The formation of capital must be possible even though the price and the value of a 
commodity be the same, for it cannot be explained by referring to any divergence 
between price and value…. The manufacturer knows that if a long period of time is 
considered, commodities are sold neither over nor under, but at, their average price.  
If, therefore, he were at all interested in disinterested thinking, he would formulate the 
problem of the formation of capital as follows:  How can we account for the origin of 
capital on the assumption that prices are regulated by the average price, i.e. ultimately 
by the value of the commodities?  I say ‗ultimately‘ because average prices do not 
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 See This American Life: ―Episode 355: The Giant Pool of Money‖ (May 9, 2008), radio program: 
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/Radio_Episode.aspx?sched=1242.  
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directly coincide with the values of commodities, as Adam Smith, Ricardo, and others 
believe. (269) 
 
Perhaps the clearest articulation of this problem, however, comes from Engels.  
As he puts it in part II, chapter 7 of his Anti-Dühring of 1877:  
 
Whence comes this surplus-value? It cannot come either from the buyer buying the 
commodities under their value, or from the seller selling them above their value. For 
in both cases the gains and the losses of each individual cancel each other, as each 
individual is in turn buyer and seller. Nor can it come from cheating, for though 
cheating can enrich one person at the expense of another, it cannot increase the total 
sum possessed by both, and therefore cannot augment the sum of the values in 
circulation.... This problem must be solved…: how is it possible constantly to sell 
dearer than one has bought, even on the hypothesis that equal values are always 
exchanged for equal values?
103
 
 
As Marx occasionally reminds us, if we disregard differences of risk, market 
power, localized technological innovation, trade restrictions, and so on, we see that prices 
differ from their values here, there, and almost everywhere in modern market economies 
because of fluctuations in the relations between production, on the one hand, and supply 
and demand, on the other.
104
  So while prices and value rarely exactly converge, they do, 
or rather, they would tend to converge where market exchange and production are 
allowed to grow and expand in a more or less unimpeded way.  That is, if a commodity is 
produced and traded in what, hypothetically, would be open and free competition, it‘s this 
competition which generates what Marx calls an average price, which means that the 
product‘s costs of production eventually tend, on average, to converge just below its 
                                                   
103
 See http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch19.htm.  
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 Marx thus does not ignore supply and demand, as is often said.  He tells us in ―Value, Price and Profit‖ 
(Marx, 1969), for example, that ―it suffices to say that if supply and demand equilibrate each other, the 
market prices of commodities will correspond with their natural prices, that is to say, with their values as 
determined by the respective quantities of labor required for their production‖ (chapter vi, paragraph 14).  
See http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1865/value-price-profit/ch02.htm#c6.   
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average price.  Products are sold at prices higher than the costs of production to make 
profits, of course, but prices and costs of production both have averages.  Thus, when 
someone is temporarily making more money from sales, someone else would be making 
less.  Further, since on this understanding prices are subtended by average labor-time and 
by average costs of production, the convergence between average labor-time and average 
price becomes more and more common the more products are mass produced and mass 
distributed.  As Marx puts it in the fetishism subchapter, ―in the midst of the accidental 
and ever-fluctuating exchange relations between the products, the labor time socially 
necessary to produce them asserts itself as a regulative law of nature‖ (168).  Because the 
labor time socially necessary to produce commodities asserts itself in market societies as 
a regulative law of nature, value understood in terms of average labor (and what else does 
a wage measure?) eventually converges with and so transforms quite normally into 
average commodity price.  This is especially the case, again, when labor and price are 
functionalized and proportioned ―on average,‖ ―in the long run,‖ and ―on the social 
whole.‖  What really matters for Marx, then, as opposed to these ―economic‖ debates, is 
not whether and how values and prices can be transformed into each other.
105
  What 
matters, as we just saw him put it above, is the formation of surplus-value, ―the 
transformation of money into capital‖ (263, my emphasis), capital being the historical 
class relation of a particular form of domination and subordination.    
So, where does Marx most explicitly do this?  As it turns out, this is quite a secret 
in Marxian studies.  Only in part eight, chapter twenty-six, some 700 pages beyond his 
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 Thus, the famous so-called ―transformation problem‖ between value and price which occupies so much 
debate in twentieth century analytic Marxist literature is already based on a fetishistic understanding of 
value—even though Marx himself tangles himself up in this derivative and misleading web of discussion in 
chapters eight to ten of Capital III!  It‘s as if he had forgotten something.   
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introduction to fetishism, do we find Marx tracking circulation not simply back to 
production but to something even prior to production.  As chapter twenty-six opens, in 
fact, we find him taking stock of the analytic situation he has developed by noting how 
his investigation, even after hundreds of pages, still portrays capital‘s start in a causal or 
apparently causeless circularity.  Even after surplus-value is traced back from circulation 
to production and found to reside not simply in the buying and selling of commodities but 
in the specific buying and exploitative use of the worker‘s capacity to create both value 
and surplus, Marx admits that capital‘s origins remain unexplained as yet in their 
fetishistic totality:   
 
We have seen how money is transformed into capital; how surplus-value is made 
through capital, and how more capital is made from surplus-value.  But the 
accumulation of capital presupposes surplus-value; surplus-value presupposes 
capitalist production; capitalist production presupposes the availability of 
considerable masses of capital and labor-power in the hands of commodity producers.  
The whole movement, therefore, seems to turn around in a never-ending circle, which 
we can only get out of by assuming a primitive accumulation (the ‗previous 
accumulation‘ of Adam Smith) which precedes capitalist accumulation; an 
accumulation which is not the result of the capitalist mode of production but its point 
of departure. (873)  
 
 This is an astonishing admission, and one rarely acknowledged by critics.  Only 
after twenty-five chapters of analysis has Marx traced the formation of capital back to 
something which apparently lies outside the realms of capitalist circulation and 
production.  The patient reader is thus rewarded with a second start, so to speak, in the 
textual end.  Indeed, noticing this, Althusser suggests in his Lenin and Philosophy that all 
but the most experienced of critics should read Capital in more or less reverse chapter 
order.  Or rather, for Althusser, it‘s because Marx‘s early examination of fetishism is so 
dangerously ―Hegelian‖ that it should be read not first but last; and indeed, as Althusser 
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puts it, it should be ―read with infinite caution.‖106  Whether Althusser is right about this 
―Hegelian‖ danger or not, however, clearly one of Marx‘s goals in Capital is to draw the 
political economists into the discussion early on so as to provide an immanent, almost 
subreptive, critique of their presuppositions.  And this is done best, of course, by 
borrowing from and partially speaking ―their language‖ even while pointing to the 
fetishism which that language and those presuppositions necessarily entails but does not 
cognitively notice.  Thus, following Althusser but partially reversing his pessimism, our 
idea is that Marx presents the beginning and end of volume one of Capital as mirroring 
— if imperfect and distorted — ―bookends.‖  This brings us to our point:  The secret of 
fetishism which initially belongs to commodity trade, and which includes its objectively 
semblant persistence beyond the political economic discovery that labor informs value, is 
simultaneously and also another secret, namely, as the title of chapter twenty-six has it, 
―The Secret of Primitive Accumulation.‖  What, then, is the secret of primitive 
accumulation?  According to Marx, and at length: 
  
Primitive accumulation plays approximately the same role in political economy as 
original sin does in theology.  Adam bit the apple, and thereupon sin fell on the 
human race.  Its origin is supposed to be explained when it is told as an anecdote 
about the past.  Long, long ago there were two sorts of people: one, the diligent, 
intelligent and above all frugal elite; the other, lazy rascals, spending their substance, 
and more, in riotous living.  The legend of theological original sin tells us certainly 
how man came to be condemned to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow; but the 
history of economic original sin reveals to us that there are people to whom this is by 
no means essential.  Never mind!  Thus it came to pass that the former sort 
accumulated wealth, and the latter sort finally had nothing to sell except their own 
skins.  And from this original sin dates the poverty of the great majority who, despite 
all their labor, have up to now nothing to sell but themselves. (874) 
 
[A]s soon as the question of property is at stake, it becomes a sacred duty to proclaim 
the standpoint of the nursery tale as the one thing fit for all age-groups and all stages 
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of development.  In actual history, it is a notorious fact that conquest, enslavement, 
robbery, murder, in short, force, plays the greatest part. (875)  
 
In themselves, money and commodities are no more capital than the means of 
production and subsistence are.  They need to be transformed into capital.  But this 
transformation can itself only take place under particular circumstances, which meet 
together at this point: the confrontation of, and the contact between, two very 
different kinds of commodity owners; on the one hand, the owners of money, means 
of production, means of subsistence, who are eager to valorize the sum of values they 
have appropriated by buying the labor-power of others; on the other hand, free 
workers, the sellers of their own labor power, and therefore the sellers of labor…. The 
process, therefore, which creates the capital-relation can be nothing other than the 
process which divorces the worker from the ownership of the conditions of his own 
labor; it is a process which operates two transformations, whereby the social means of 
subsistence and production are turned into capital, and the immediate producers are 
turned into wage-laborers.  So-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing 
else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of 
production.  It appears as ‗primitive‘ because it forms the prehistory of capital, and of 
the mode of production corresponding to capital….Hence, the historical movement 
which changes the producers into wage laborers appears, on the one hand, as their 
emancipation from serfdom and from the fetters of the guilds, and it is this aspect of 
the movement which alone exists for our bourgeois historians. But on the other hand 
these newly freed men became sellers of themselves only after they had been robbed 
of all their own means of production, and of all the guarantees of existence afforded 
by the old feudal arrangements. And this history, the history of their expropriation, is 
written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire. (875) 
 
The starting-point of the development that gave rise both to the wage-laborer and to 
the capitalist was the enslavement of the worker.  The advance made consisted in a 
change in the form of this servitude, in the transformation of feudal exploitation into 
capitalist exploitation…. In the history of primitive accumulation, all revolutions are 
epoch-making that act as levers for the capitalist class in the course of its formation; 
but this is true above all for those moments when great masses of men are suddenly 
and forcibly torn from their means of subsistence and hurled onto the labor-market as 
free, unprotected, and rightless proletarians.  The expropriation of the agricultural 
producer, of the peasant from the soil, is the basis of the whole process.  The history 
of this expropriation assumes different aspects in different orders of succession, and 
at different historical epochs. (875-6)  
  
As if to annihilate Smith‘s belief in an ―invisible hand‖ of economic 
accumulation, Marx here translates and transforms the latter‘s term ―previous‖ into 
ursprüngliche — more on this later — and declares that ―so-called primitive 
accumulation‖ is steeped not in the parsimony of the hard-working but in the brutal 
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violence levied upon premodern workers of various sorts, especially the common peasant 
and former serf.  The ―so-called‖ thus draws attention to the fact that ―accumulation,‖ 
which covers both the possession and increased appropriation of private property, hinges 
upon an expropriation, a dispossession, a deprivation, and so a destruction.   
Whereas former serfs, peasants, and guild-workers had produced many of their 
use-values or goods by means of their tools and through direct, feudally tenured access to 
arable or otherwise useful land, and whereas they once exchanged some of their own 
goods ―in-kind‖ with other producers to meet other needs (and so did not typically 
require much money, even if money existed in the pores of society like gods in the 
intermundia), groups of emergent capitalists in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
largely confiscated these lands and tools, forcibly evicting the prior tenants.  These latter 
populations were thus proletarianized and compelled to take up what — then and there, 
in massive farms and urban industries — first emerged as wage-labor and labor-power.  
As opposed to parsimony, then, this is more like a feast, a festum.107   
 Marx first describes the ―enclosure acts‖ or, to avoid the euphemism, the forcible 
confiscation and eventual privatization (through a new but growing network of 
contractual law) of the English feudal common lands (where mother nature is held and 
used in common) by proto-capitalists and sundry former lords.
108
  In a footnote at the 
beginning of chapter twenty-seven, for example, we are reminded that ―we must never 
forget that even the serf was not only the owner of the piece of land attached to his house, 
although admittedly he was merely a tribute-paying owner, but also a co-proprietor of the 
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 We will turn to the forgetfulness and legacy of the after-feast momentarily. 
108
 What happens in Western Europe at this time, however, doesn‘t happen in Eastern Europe until the 
nineteenth and even twentieth centuries, at least for the most part.  Indeed, it‘s now (again) happening, 
albeit through monetary means, in Russia.  See, for instance, Kramer, 2008: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/31/business/worldbusiness/31food.html.  
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common land‖ (877).   Thus, even the serf owned various (albeit usually meager) means 
of production and reproduction — and in particular the land to which he or she was ―tied‖ 
or ―bound‖ — through a hereditary feudal tenure steeped in the quasi-religious rituals of 
tribute.
109
  Further, in the main passage to which this footnote is attached, we are 
reminded that ―in England, serfdom had disappeared in practice by the last part of the 
fourteenth century.  The immense majority of the populations consisted then, and to a still 
larger extent in the fifteenth century, of free peasant proprietors, however much the 
feudal trappings might disguise their absolute ownership‖ (877).   Thus, in either case — 
as a serf or, after various peasant revolts and the dissolution of feudal orthodoxies, as a 
free peasant — the agricultural producer possessed both land and other means of 
production and, further, s/he had additional useful access to the common lands, the lands 
possessed by none and all.
110
   
 So, what happened?  The short version of the story, for England at least, is that a 
great many peasant tenements, whole small villages in some cases, were razed in the 
creation of giant sheep walks and pastures.  Marx quotes an official Act of Henry VII in 
1489 (one later renewed by Henry VIII), for example, which laments among other things 
the fact that ―many farms and large flocks of cattle, especially of sheep, are concentrated 
in the hands of a few men, whereby the rent of land has much risen, and tillage has fallen 
off, churches and houses have been pulled down, and marvelous numbers of people have 
been deprived of the means wherewith to maintain themselves and their families‖ (880, 
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 Of course, as indicated above, this ―ownership‖ was not bound in legal contract.  It was bound in the 
symbols of allegiance and the obligations of paying objective ―tribute‖ with goods in kind.  The goods thus 
(re)presented, indeed, communicated the (gradually less sacred) relation between serf…and lord.  What is 
tribute?  Today it is (mis)objectified in the exchange of labor power for cash.  
110
 See Hilton, 1973; Thompson, 1991; and Dobb, 1963, especially chapter VI. 
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my emphasis).  Marx here also cites Harrison‘s documenting of ―of townes pulled downe 
for sheepe-walks, and no more but the lordships now standing in them‖ (879).  
 Besides ―enclosure,‖ however, there were other, similar forms of deprivation and 
dispossession.  First and foremost was the concurrent ―spoliation of church property,‖ 
that is, the privatization of Catholic domains.  ―The process of forcible expropriation of 
the people received a new and terrible impulse in the sixteenth century from the 
Reformation‖ (881).  The Church domains were largely ―given away [both] to rapacious 
royal favorites‖ and to speculating farmers when Protestant reform dissolved many 
Catholic monasteries in the sixteenth century.  Linked with church ―spoliation‖ and 
common land ―enclosure,‖ there was also the ―clearing of estates,‖ the ―thefts of state 
lands which had hitherto been managed more modestly.  These estates were given away, 
sold at ridiculous prices, or even annexed to private estates by direct seizure‖ (884).  In 
short and in all, ―the spoliation of the Church‘s property, the fraudulent alienation of the 
state domains, the theft of the common lands, the usurpation of feudal and clan property 
and its transformation into modern private property under circumstances of ruthless 
terrorism, all these things were just so many idyllic methods of primitive accumulation.  
They conquered the field for capitalist agriculture, incorporated the soil into capital, and 
created for the urban industries the necessary supplies of free and rightless proletarians‖ 
(895).
111
 
 The secret of capital, of surplus-value, of wage labor, and of commodity fetishism 
to boot, then, here rests on what Marx calls ―brutal‖ or ―forcible‖ dispossession, a 
―ruthless terrorism‖ centered on the ―direct seizure,‖ the ―theft,‖ of land and other means 
of production and subsistence.  Indeed, there is no need to mix words here, at least in this 
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 Notice here that mother earth is ―directly‖ incorporated into capital.  
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first interpretation of the story.  This was violent, physical expropriation.  ―If money, 
according to Augier, ‗comes into the world with a congenital blood-stain on one cheek‘, 
capital comes dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt‖ (926). 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION II: THE SECRET OF EXCHANGE 
 
 But what, on a hieroglyphic reading, are blood and dirt?  Indeed, what are 
commodities and money in relation to this blood and dirt?  Our idea, which we will 
pursue to the end, is that money and commodities are the traces of bloody primitive 
destructions which took place ―long, long ago‖ at the dawn of humanization — say, in 
Africa — destructions which in turn, since prehistorical, are necessarily lost and 
forgotten, as if vanishing completely, only to ―reappear‖ in their results, that is, in both 
(a) the epochal revolutions transforming one mode of production into other, more 
developed and abstract modes and (b) the (economic) objects of appropriation and 
domination which circulate as (gradually more secretive) memorials of these bloody 
revolutions.  
In themselves, of course, this blood and dirt could never prove developmental.  In 
themselves, they are significant only in a negative sense, as mere effects of a simply 
forceful destruction; but as symptoms, they are significant and meaningful.  Why?  A 
symptom relates, tells, in some way communicates a ―story‖; it ―speaks‖ in and as an 
objective precognitive code; and so it has more than merely natural worth; it has and 
signifies the problematics and developmental obstacles of cultural value.  Symptoms here 
are mythic.  They enact and are a ―sacred duty‖ to tell a ―nursery tale‖ about the 
communal possessions and especially about the destructive expropriations of early human 
life, about the identifications and divorces of and from (mother) nature.  We need these 
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stories to ―cope,‖ to manage loss, to move, to (partially) forget, to develop, as a baby, for 
instance, must leave the womb and begin to fantasize and forget about the utopias and 
disasters of having been literally and metaphorically one with and then divorced from 
mother (nature).   
Observe in this regard that when Marx speaks of accumulation in Part Eight, he 
rarely reminds us that he ―really‖ means so-called ―accumulation,‖ that is, expropriation, 
deprivation, or dispossession.  Of course, we could easily chalk this up — externalizing 
the idea on paper, for instance — to the fact that once he has pointed to the insufficiency 
of Adam Smith‘s term ―previous accumulation,‖ he would not want to or have to 
repeatedly make this ―so-called‖ explicit.  As soon as he has specified the brutal evictions 
in the transitional period out of feudalism, in other words, it would be understood that 
whenever he says ―accumulation‖ in the context of the primitive he actually means 
―expropriation.‖  But even if this is true, we still have to wonder why Marx keeps and 
occasionally uses the term ―accumulation‖ and why he doesn‘t rather abandon it 
completely as misguided and Smithian, replacing it with ―expropriation,‖ 
―dispossession,‖ etc.  Why call expropriation ―accumulation‖?  Why mix words?112  
Notice, for instance, how Marx uses the term ―force‖ in a passage from chapter thirty-
one: 
 
These methods [of primitive accumulation] depend in part on brute force, for 
instance, [on] the colonial system.  But they all employ the power of the state, the 
concentrated and organized force of society, to hasten, as in a hothouse, the process 
of the transformation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode, and to 
shorten the transition.  Force is the midwife of every old society which is pregnant 
with a new one.  It is itself an economic power. (915) 
                                                   
112
 What form of language unifies the antagonism of opposing notions into the same word?  Who speaks of 
night and day or life and death with the same term, for instance?  It turns out that ―archaic‖ cultures do:  
See Freud, ―The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words,‖ SE, Vol. XI, 153-162.  
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  ―Force‖ here is first equated with ―brute force,‖ and so presumably indicates 
physical power, a physical or brutal violence, for instance, that can spill blood or kill.  
But by the end of the paragraph this same ―force‖ is equated with ―economic power.‖  
The ―itself‖ in the last sentence, especially, then, gives the impression that Marx is not so 
much distinguishing socioeconomic influence from physical brutality — and thereby 
adding a fiscal part to a forcible part to account for capital‘s origins — but that he‘s 
identifying socio-economic influence with physical force despite and even within prior 
claims.  What is the significance of this?  Why might these two ―forces‖ be identified or 
identifiable even when for us they are so obviously distinct?  The idea that we will 
continue to exhibit and analyze is that, primitively speaking (where speaking primitively 
necessarily involves a force of inscription), these forces, like body and mind for the 
preverbal baby, are not (yet, cognitively) distinguishable; further, and just as importantly, 
it is from this primitive identification of physical force and symbolic influence — where 
things “speak” and where symbols physically “act,” for instance — that Marx both 
develops the notion and points to the immemorial source of capital‘s modern power, its 
hegemony. 
 When Marx suggests in chapter twenty-seven that ―we leave on one side here the 
purely economic driving forces behind the agricultural revolution; we deal only with the 
violent means employed,‖ clearly this claim is consistent with part eight‘s emphasis on 
expropriation and, indeed, on the brutality of the force and the physical force of the 
brutality which dispossessed the (Western) European peasantry in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries.  And yet, a few pages before this he indicates that the impulse which 
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kicks off this kicking of the yeomanry off the land was, as he puts it, a ―direct‖ economic 
impulse, namely, a rise in the price of wool.  Higher prices, and thus the allure of money 
— where money previously didn‘t seem to have this strong an allure, to be in this much 
demand, since feudal goods were mostly traded ―in kind,‖ such that money played an 
only occasional role — here suddenly ―inspires‖ the English proto-capitalists to undersell 
the wool-producers on the continental mainland and to ―make a killing,‖ as it were.  As 
Marx says,  
 
Although the royal power, itself a product of bourgeois development, forcibly 
hastened the dissolution of these bands of [serf] retainers in its striving for absolute 
sovereignty, it was by no means the sole cause of it.  It was rather that the great feudal 
lords, in their defiant opposition to the king and Parliament, created an incomparably 
larger proletariat by forcibly driving the peasantry from the land, to which the latter 
had the same feudal title as the lords themselves, and by usurpation of the common 
lands.  The rapid expansion of wool manufacture in Flanders and the corresponding 
rise in the price of wool in England provided the direct impulse for these evictions. 
(878) 
  
 Thus, while in part eight Marx obviously wants to suggest that precapitalist brutal 
expropriation conditions specifically capitalist economics as well as the bourgeois 
conceptual justifications which would deny the ―notorious facts‖ of ―conquest, 
enslavement, robbery, [and] murder,‖ his subtler indication — one that begins to show 
how this denial is made possible and which must seriously consider Marx‘s continued use 
of the term ―primitive accumulation‖ together with his signifying of ―force‖ as brutality 
and economy together — is that violence and trade, assault and exchange, in short, 
expropriation and appropriation are and remain intimately linked, difficult to untangle, 
and are even reflectively identified, as we shall see in the next sections, in a primitive yet 
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potentially developmental way.  Money, moreover, plays an ideal material role in this 
regard.   
There are hints, or more than hints, of this early in Capital, as in chapter five, 
where Marx is both clear and ambivalent at once about the link and/or relation between 
the origins of capital and circulation:    
 
We have shown that surplus-value cannot arise from circulation, and therefore that, 
for it to be formed, something must take place in the background which is not visible 
in circulation itself… Capital cannot therefore arise from circulation, and it is equally 
impossible for it to arise apart from circulation.  It must have its origin both in 
circulation and not in circulation.  We therefore have a double result…. The money-
owner, who is as yet only a capitalist in larval form, must buy his commodities at 
their value, sell them at their value, and yet at the end of the process withdraw more 
value from circulation than he threw into it at the beginning [thus the formula M-C-
M‘].  His emergence as a butterfly must, and yet must not, take place in the sphere of 
circulation.  These are the conditions of the problem.  Hic Rhodus, hic salta!  (268) 
 
Indeed, let‘s jump now, exploring this ―double result‖ with its problematic 
―conditions.‖  The fact that capital cannot arise ―from circulation‖ should now be clear:  
Understood cognitively, partially disavowing their primitive identification, expropriation 
is not circulation — whew! — but rather the interruption or destruction of exchange by 
violence:  by robbery, by theft, by military invasion, even by murder.  This violence is 
brutal, physical, or, as Marx often terms it, ―forcible.‖  But notice that Marx also says 
here that ―it is equally impossible for [capital] to arise apart from circulation.‖  Indeed, 
most strangely and significantly, he suggests that capital ―must have its origin both in 
circulation and not in circulation.‖  Not just the capitalistic results, then, but even the 
origin of capital, its Ursprüng, is doubled in its primitivity, in its ursprünglichkeit.  
Take, further, a passage from chapter three.  Here Marx suggests that ―with the 
development of circulation, conditions arise under which the alienation of the commodity 
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becomes separated by an interval of time from the realization of its price‖ (232).   Given 
the greater geographical (and especially latitudinal and altitudinal) distances over which 
trade is accomplished over time, for instance, ―one commodity-owner may therefore step 
forth as a seller before the other is ready to buy,‖ such that  
 
the role of creditor or of debtor results here from the simple circulation of 
commodities.  The change in its form impresses this new stamp on seller and buyer.  
At first, therefore, these new roles are just as transient as those of seller and buyer, 
and are played alternately by the same actors.  Nevertheless, this opposition now 
looks less pleasant from the very outset, and it is capable of a more rigid 
crystallization.  However, the same characteristics can emerge independently of the 
circulation of commodities.  The class struggle in the ancient world, for instance, took 
the form mainly of a contest between debtors and creditors, and ended in Rome with 
the ruin of the plebeian debtors, who were replaced by slaves.  In the Middle Ages the 
contest ended with the ruin of the feudal debtors, who lost their political power 
together with its economic basis.  Here, indeed, the money form — and the relation 
between creditor and debtor does have the form of a money-relation — was only the 
reflection of an antagonism which lay deeper, at the level of the economic conditions 
of existence. (232) 
   
Notice the ambivalence here.  Historically speaking, debt, and the subordination 
that debt is and signifies, can arise in fierce class struggle or in regular trade over 
temporal and spatial distances, in commodity ―generalization‖ as Žižek calls it.  These 
seem like alternatives.  We can imagine a situation where a farmer‘s experience with 
drought, for instance, forces him into a debt relation with someone else.  Or perhaps, not 
understanding the practice and concepts of exclusivist ownership, he makes what 
retrospectively turns out to be a rash trade.
113
  Or we can discover through certain texts 
how the plebes, to use Marx‘s example, resisted the Roman patricians through secessio 
plebis, but only to have the patricians, with their army, revolt violently, that is, with 
physical violence in turn.  In any of these cases, however, the transformation of what 
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 This is the situation we will analyze in the following sections.   
 168 
Marx calls ―elementary‖ exchange, where money is not yet present or only incipiently 
developing, into a monetary-debt relation, where money has become a ―means of 
payment‖ and ―store of value‖ and so an object of debt and credit, is also apparently 
dependent — and this is the key here — not simply on money as a means of exchange 
but, as Marx specifies, on ―an antagonism which lay deeper‖ than elementary exchange.  
It lies ―at the level of the economic conditions of existence.‖  Indeed, notice that trade 
between debtor and creditor is here described as being not even as economic as this 
antagonism is!
114
  Or even if trade is economic, as is now obvious in modernity, it is so, 
perhaps, in virtue of this specifically primitive antagonism.   
 Of crucial importance here, then, are the possible meanings of ursprünglich and, 
more specifically, the meanings that are set in motion when Marx uses ursprünglich in 
ways which problematize its most obvious meaning as ―original.‖  As we‘ve mentioned, 
Marx motivates ursprünglich not so much to translate Smith‘s ―previous‖ but to dislocate 
the suggested singularity of temporal antecedence implied in ―previous.‖  Primitive 
accumulation ―appears as ‗primitive‘,‖ we recall, ―because it forms the prehistory of 
capital and of the mode of production corresponding to capital.‖  But ―prehistory‖ is not 
necessarily, and certainly not only, the series of historical modes of production which are 
previous to and culminate in capital.  It must also be a mode which is more literally, 
albeit persistently, prehistorical, a mode prior to the cognitive ―record‖ and ―recording‖ 
of history, but also, then, latent (and largely irrecuperable) within that recording.  
And this brings with it a powerful lesson.  Despite and even in the records of 
bourgeois economics (despite and in the generalization of credit-money, for instance), 
capitalism doesn't even have its own proper origin.  Indeed, for Marx this remains the 
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 This is not chapter 13 of Capital for Marx, but we get the point. 
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case even if we can locate an apparently ―original‖ violence, an apparently distinct origin, 
in the brutally expropriative processes of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.  The 
problem is that the origins of capital are split and so doubled, but also that the origins, 
since split, persist not just as that which originates but also as that which splits or puts 
into crisis as antagonism.  This has its practical implications for science, the history of 
science, and for scientific method:  Even as bourgeois historians try to tell the story of 
capitalism‘s beginning, they reproduce myths, or what Winnicott and Kant would call 
illusions, about capitalism‘s ―essential‖ difference from earlier forms of violence.  The 
history of fetishism thus births the history of the differences and conflations of and 
between science and ideology.  The bourgeois historians suggest that capitalism frees the 
worker from slavery, from the social paternalism of the guilds, from the domination of 
the serf by his lord, for instance.  Capital becomes the reward of the virtuous, the hard-
working, the parsimonious.  Partially but not fully against this, then, we want to suggest 
that the differences between capitalist violence and earlier forms of violence are not 
essential but developmental.  The unities and violences belonging to prehistorical 
community condition the formation and development of historical society and, indeed, 
they continue to condition it such that global community, in the form of a mature 
communism, always remains possible.  More than original, then, ursprünglich means 
originary — the directly-inaccessible prehistorical condition of history which continues 
to inspire epochal formations and revolutions together with the traces, symptoms, and 
objects of value — although the term ―primitive‖ may suffice if we remember that with 
this term Marx is referring not just to tribal, aboriginal, clan, or so-called preliterate 
cultures but also to ancient, feudal, and capitalist cultures (so far).  Let us recall with new 
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emphasis in this regard that for Marx ―in the history of primitive accumulation, all 
revolutions are epoch-making that act as levers for the capitalist class in the course of its 
formation; but this is true above all for those moments when great masses of men are 
suddenly and forcibly torn from their means of subsistence and hurled onto the labor-
market as free, unprotected, and rightless proletarians.  The expropriation of the 
agricultural producer, of the peasant from the soil, is the basis of the whole process.  The 
history of this expropriation assumes different aspects in different orders of succession, 
and at different historical epochs‖ (876).  Capital‘s origins are many, in other words, and 
point retrospectively to an originary but (im)memorial violence against and within 
primitive community. 
 In the background of all of this, then, lies Marx and Engels‘s full historical 
materialist project, including their theory of the ―making‖ and development of the various 
epochal modes of production which have together — in an overlapping way, as Frederic 
Jameson has noted — ended up producing the possibilities of socialism and communism.  
Marx first develops historical materialism, we recall, after 1844.   By 1846 he is less 
concerned with the internal alienation structure of the worker‘s relation to capital — 
which doesn‘t mean that he later drops the notion of alienation, as Althusser suggests — 
than he is with investigating the world-historical formation of class.115  In the German 
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 In the 1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx warns us against tracing capitalist production 
back to some ―primitive‖ origin, at least in the manner of certain political economists and uncritical 
philosophers.  He offers instead a philosophically-surmised ―economic fact‖, as he calls it, one which 
apparently explains capitalist ―alienation‖ in terms of circulation and production, on the one hand, and in 
terms of the structural relation between workers (as laborers) and capitalists (as owners of the means of 
production), on the other hand.  There is no investigation into the historical and especially prehistorical 
origins of capitalist production; the form of production is taken for granted; and similarly there is nothing 
about the worker‘s status as being necessarily related to a primitive injury:  ―Let‘s not go back to a fictitious 
primitive condition as the political economist does when he tries to explain.  Such a primitive condition 
explains nothing.  He merely pushes the question away into a grey nebulous distance.  He assumes in the 
form of fact, of an event, what he is supposed to deduce — namely, the necessary relationship between two 
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Ideology‘s first section, for example, he suggests that what he is calling a ―mode of 
production‖ corresponds by a different terminology to ―various stages of development in 
the division of labor.‖  These stages or modes are in turn ―just so many different forms of 
ownership, i.e. the existing stage in the division of labor also determines the relations of 
individuals to one another with reference to the material, instruments, and product of 
labor‖ (151).  History and prehistory together thus constitute, and can be understood as 
and within, the development of modes of property and property relations.  Indeed, 
conceptually speaking, what I‘m calling history begins with the emergence of fetishized 
private property to the degree that the latter both marks and is marked by the emergence 
of commodities.
116
   
 Marx therefore broadly outlines four forms of ownership which his and others‘ 
scholarship have been able to uncover and, to some degree, to differentiate, namely, (a) 
the ―tribal-communal ownership‖ of ―primitive‖ societies, (b) the ―slave‖ or ―ancient 
communal or state ownership,‖ as in Greek and Roman societies, (c) the ―feudal or estate 
property‖ characterized by systems of ―serf,‖ ―vassal,‖ or other kinds of ―retainer,‖ and 
(d) ―modern bourgeois‖ or ―capitalist‖ private property.  In other texts we learn that the 
―oriental‖ or ―Asiatic‖ mode of property is a first, partial development out of the ―tribal-
communal‖ mode.  Socialist property would be a fifth or sixth form, of course, one which 
finally dissolves the practice of property distributed and used on the basis of class and 
                                                                                                                                                       
things — between, for example, division of labor and exchange.  Theology in the same way explains the 
origin of evil by the fall of man; that is, it assumes as a fact, in historical form, what has to be explained.  
We proceed from an actual economic fact. The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, 
the more his production increases in power and range.  The worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity 
the more commodities he creates.  With the increasing value of the world of things proceeds in the direct 
proportion the devaluation of the world of men.  Labor produces not only commodities; it produces itself 
and the worker as a commodity—and does so in the proportion in which it produces commodities 
generally‖ (Marx, 1978, 71).  This last bit, of course, resembles Žižek‘s analysis. 
116
 We began to see this earlier, when we examined Columbus‘ and the Europeans‘ first contacts with the 
Amerindians.  Indeed, to specify this further, we will return to this example in the next sections. 
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domination.  Non-class social formations, communism in its prehistorical past and 
therefore potentially future forms, would thereby stand as ―bookends,‖ as it were, within 
a full singular cycle of human development the middle of which is filled out by class 
―history.‖  Important in this regard is the overlapping difference Marx spells out in and 
between divisions of class and divisions of labor.  But again, it is not the overlaps or the 
differences which are crucial so much as the developmental story these express.  Since 
divisions of labor are more primitive than divisions of class, we only get divisions of 
class when we mix prehistorical divisions of labor with primitive accumulation.   
 Marx‘s grand story thus goes something like this:  Tribal (or if you prefer, 
kinship, clan, or aboriginal) forms of property and sociality are communal, based on the 
unity of the common, a co-unity, to be sure, and yet they are also undoubtedly 
hierarchical and even divisive in terms of labor and authority to this or that developed 
degree.  In pre-class social organizations there are authorities and obedients;  there are 
matriarchs and/or patriarchs; there are military chiefs and ―intellectual‖ shamans or 
witchdoctors; and of course there are many ―manual‖ workers of this or that type.  All 
this is to say that within primitive communisms of this or that type there is a hierarchy the 
social and productive structures of which constitute a division of labor.  Does violence 
exist in this hierarchy?  Undoubtedly.  Primitive communism is no picnic with the gods, 
or even if it sometimes is — where strawberries might be served, for instance, as we‘ll 
see — ―the gods‖ are far from uniformly benevolent even if they are always giving.  Has 
there ever been a human group incapable of war, without war in its ―background 
conditions,‖ without being capable of going to war if injured or attacked?  Or, at a 
different level, why do tribal communities invariably perform the social rituals of 
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scarification, tattooing, and wounding, especially in developmental, indeed transitional, 
rites of passage?  Why is sacrifice in various forms a common element of primitive 
―religion‖?  Why exogamy?  What is exorcism?  Sorcery?  In any case, violences of 
various (particularly inscriptive, sacred, and therefore symbolic) kinds mark groups off 
from both outside ―spirits‖ and outside ―other‖ groups while also internally 
differentiating its individual members.  Violence is a mechanism of differentiation, 
indeed the basis of all differential forms, from and out of primitive unity.  But the 
important thing to notice here is that these violences do not divide archaic communities 
internally into two basic groups (and therefore a society) with one group owning property 
and means of production and the other working that property and those means in the 
production of a surplus accumulated by the elite group.  Indeed, for tribal communities, 
there is as yet no such thing, notion, or practice of what we would call private property.  
Marx occasionally recognizes this, although by no means consistently, by distinguishing 
in his work between ―possessions‖ (which, while ―owned‖ or at least fetishized by an 
individual or group to some greater or lesser degree, are not exclusively owned or 
fetishized) and ―private property‖ (within which ownership is clear and exclusive to the 
point where various non-owners are not allowed to share in that ownership).117  For now, 
then, we should stress that although there are clearly various forms and levels of ―rank‖ 
or ―status‖ in these primitive societies, these forms and levels have not yet been widely or 
firmly established through an exclusivist form of ownership of the properties, means, and 
symbols of production, which means that although forms of violence pervade the 
community, the social whole is not split through by violence.  Violence is here a 
                                                   
117
 See for example Marx, 1973, especially the notes on ―Forms which precede capitalist production‖, 471-
513. 
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mechanism of differentiation but not necessarily a mechanism of division, separation, 
permanent wounding, and domination.  Thus, in these communities there is less social 
abstraction, atomization, and, most crucially, there is also as yet no class rigidity.  That 
said, there are no doubt many cultures past and present which exhibit social structures 
fitting or seeming to fit somewhere between pre-class communities and class societies.  
And certainly both pre-class and class social forms vary greatly within these categories 
depending on geography, encounters with foreign ―others,‖ trade routes, etc.  With the 
determinate leap in globalization which takes place around 1492, for instance, and as 
we‘ll continue to see, individual ―communities,‖ ―cultures,‖ and ―societies‖ become 
harder to distinguish or individuate.
118
   
 Recall Marx‘s statement from part eight, above, that class societies typically 
begin as slave societies:  ―The starting-point of the development that gave rise both to the 
wage-laborer and to the capitalist was the enslavement of the worker‖ (875).  On the one 
hand, this means that capitalism will always be linked to its heritage and reflection in 
slavery, even and especially when slavery is ―forgotten,‖ when it‘s become a thing 
putatively only of ―the past.‖  As Marx points out explicitly, the bourgeois revolution was 
not limited to Europe but was also intimately tied up with the colonization of India, 
Africa, and the Americas: 
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 When, where, and under what social encounters and conditions, for instance, are caste systems class 
systems, and vice versa?  When today are socialist social forms not already partially compromised by 
capitalist influences?  Is the United States, for instance, with its great systems of public roads, parks, and 
libraries, more or less socialist than, say, Cuba, with its bifurcated dollar-convertible peso (CUC) and 
original peso (CUP) economies?  Are the latter class economies?  Why do a great many Cuban youths 
prefer to work in tourist hotels than in Cuban education?  Although I won‘t respond specifically to these 
questions, my wider point is that it is through the study of class and class division that we can see not only 
cultural difference and cultural identities in history but also how these differences and identities implicate, 
express, and demand historical development.  Is socialism or communism in all our lineages?  
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The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement, and 
entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent, the beginnings 
of conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the 
commercial hunting of blackskins, are all things which characterize the dawn of the 
era of capitalist production.  These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of 
primitive accumulation.  Hard on their heels follows the commercial war of the 
European nations, which has the globe as its battlefield. (915) 
 
But on the other hand the idea that the institution of slavery is an early stage, the 
―starting-point of the development‖ of capitalism, indicates just that, namely, that slavery 
is not just a regressive social form but also a form of development.    To say this is not to 
justify it retrospectively in the least.  On the contrary.  Slavery in this or that form is 
domination, by definition, an objectification of the other without a concomitant 
acknowledgment of subjectivity.  Thus, while slavery is obviously a kind of ―fall‖ from 
primitive communism, it is a ―fall‖ that should not be idealized.  Insofar as this or that 
―primitive accumulation‖ expropriates the primitively communal worker and transforms 
her into an object of private ownership, slavery as an institution ―falls out‖ of primitive 
community when violence rips that community apart.  As an owned object, the slave is 
then dominated and brutalized as in no other form of property or production; that is, she 
is typically subjected as nothing more than an object in the production of a surplus 
produce accumulated by the owners of the means of production, who at this very point 
become an elite class.119  Marx notes in this regard that ―men have often made man 
himself into the primitive material of money, in the shape of the slave…‖ (183).  Indeed, 
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 I think that a comparison of the ―historical‖ (phylogenetic) formation of ―archaic‖ forms of slavery with 
the ―individual‖ (ontogenetic) formation of what Melanie Klein has called the paranoid-schizoid position in 
infants would prove interesting and productive in this regard.  Klein‘s attention to the ―schizoid‖, and thus 
the necessary splitting of a primitive unity in and for development is precisely what I am finding at play in 
the history of human development.  Indeed, my idea is that the splits and violences between subject and 
object here are both phylogenetically and ontogenetically necessary and imbricated.  History is thus the 
uniting and dividing of generations through the transmission of the archaic in distorted forms of object 
production.  
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since the slave is a person now suddenly treated as a thing which speaks, she is the first 
class-fetishistic symptom, a communicative ―thing.‖  We‘ll have more to say about his 
momentarily when we turn to Žižek‘s structural analysis of two forms of fetishism.  
 But world-historical development is not always or just a fall, of course, though it 
invariably hinges, apparently, on the necessary dissolution of primitive communism.  
When slave societies of various types give way to (what Marx calls) feudal societies of 
various types, the slave is at least partially emancipated, if not from domination, then at 
least from being owned.  He or she becomes a ―retainer‖ of some sort, and is typically 
―bound‖ to the soil or to other means of production (to this or that part of mother nature), 
but he or she is no longer a ―pure‖ object of instrumental use or a ―purely‖ instrumental 
object; surplus extraction continues, but the worker is granted a partial independence; she 
or he has thus become, however incompletely, a subject, someone perhaps on the way to 
a more developed and secure form of subjectivity; this part-subject can even use 
communal means of self-production and own private means of self-provision to some 
degree.  And for Marx, as it should be for us as well, this is no merely superficial or 
superstructural gain.  Owning private property and means of production just is the 
representation and presentation of development to the degree that class relations are 
relations between the propertied and the dispossessed.  Thus, to redistribute property 
more widely and equitably is also to redistribute means of subjectivity, the means to a 
healthier, more just and equitable society.  This is not to say that redistribution would 
―solve‖ social asociality, the antagonisms of post-communal living.  Since culture is 
deeply at issue, it is not simply redistribution but also recognition, and more precisely 
education, which must play various significant roles in overturning relations of class 
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domination.  In any case, given the lost history of dispossession, the redistribution of 
property is important to the degree that it more or less directly addresses the archaic 
wounds which comprise the dissolution of community into society.   
 A great many anti-Marxists and Marxists have misunderstood this point, however.  
They think Marx simply wants to abolish private property, all of it, in the name of some 
pure or grandiose communal property, that he wants to destroy all forms of ―property‖ as 
if to return to primitive communism.  What these critics fail to see or remember, however, 
is that for Marx the development of the ―individual‖ (ontogenetically, as specific single 
persons) and the historical ―subject‖ (phylogenetically, as the abstract ―subject‖ arising 
principally in ―modernity‖), if I can put it this way, depends on the use and ownership of 
both communally shared and privately owned means of production and property.  In the 
last chapter of volume one, Marx points out that ―political economy confuses, on 
principle, two different kinds of private property, one of which rests on the labor of the 
producer himself, and the other on the exploitation of the labor of others‖ (931).   Marx 
deeply values the first kind.  Indeed, this form of property is developmental in practice 
even if development might eventually spring from laboring against the obstacle which the 
second kind is.  This means in turn, however, that the two are sometimes difficult to tell 
apart.  Take the issue of money in a family, for instance.  Why don‘t parents today 
typically charge their children for food?  And what is the history of this family relation?  
Why do we charge each other money for goods in society but not typically within a 
family?  How is the modern ―family‖ related to the ―tribe,‖ ―clan,‖ etc?  Was not the 
human species ―originally‖ a family, large or small?  Indeed, we should ask, further, in 
this regard:  Does the earth belong to anyone more than anyone else?  When we are born, 
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aren‘t we without property and individuality?  How, then, have forms of inheritance 
become so differentially and, in particular, class distributed?  (We should recall in this 
regard that for the Greeks, ―economy‖ is the place and work of the home, a place only 
later transformed into a larger social institution steeped in commodities and markets.)   
In any case, the object that property is ―interrelates‖ subjects in their associations 
and distinctions, and so in their development as ―independent‖ individuals.  Property 
becomes the site of both antagonism and protection.  Indeed, when something becomes 
exclusively mine for the first time, it can be used not simply to distinguish me from you 
in and through the exclusivity attached to it;  but this thing also represents the first 
opportunity to share that which is ―mine.‖  The subject comes to be, she develops, then, 
in using and producing the world through owned and jointly owned means of production.  
The artisan is more truly an artist when he both owns and jointly owns the tools and 
products of his and others‘ art, as opposed, for instance, to the case where he can only 
rent the use of those tools in exchange for a wage (a wage which arrives later).  
Moreover, if the latter case is a part of a typical capitalistic wage-relation, this worker 
produces objects which he cannot usually keep unless he buys them on the market like 
everyone else, such that, in working the means of production and buying on the market, 
he thereby augments the capital (the power of command and control) of his employer, 
rigidifying his position as mere worker, a non-owner.  But against this, as Marx says, ―the 
private property of the worker in his means of production is the foundation of small-scale 
industry, and small-scale industry is a necessary condition for the development of social 
production and of the free individuality of the worker himself‖ (927).  This is the Marx 
that almost everyone forgets.  Indeed, the emphasis should not be placed here on ―small-
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scale,‖ for Marx was supportive precisely of worker owned large-scale corporations and 
industry.  Everyone would be included, except, of course, those too young or violent to 
share in the production of culture, and these people would ―simply‖ have to be educated 
or re-educated. 
 Thus, we should not presume that when Marx demands the end of capitalism and 
the eventual birth of communism that he is demanding the abolition of just any kind of 
private property.  Since self-realizing private property is necessary together with 
communal (i.e. public) property in the production and maintenance of the health of self 
and society, Marx in fact wants private property reestablished, even widened.  But 
property should not be based on class or be used as a form of domination.  This is the 
key.  Rather, it should be generalized and distributed as fairly as possible — where the 
rules and norms of distribution take into account the utility of property in self and social 
development — together, of course, with a generalization of public forms of property.  
Too much property, or rather, too much exclusivist property, and we become spoiled, like 
spoiled children, to the degree that our property prevents us from understanding the value 
of sharing and community.   And yet, if we were to simply deprive the wealthy owners of 
their property and of the means of production they own, we would be doing the same 
thing, that is, we would be taking away their opportunity to understand the value of 
community and sharing.  Indeed, to deprive the wealthy of their property and means in 
the name of redistribution would be,  since a de-privation, but a repetition of primitive 
accumulation—for once deprived, the wealthy would be vengeful and without means to 
sublimate their very real pain.  It is thus by educating the poor and the wealthy alike — 
the current workers and owners of the means of production — that sharing is often 
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(although not always) better than excluding, and that sharing is and can be an enjoyable 
learning and growing experience, at least to the degree that the self is not overrun (even if 
challenged) with always having to share, that can prove developmental.   
Thus, even the capitalist form of private property which emerges as a distortion 
— or as we‘ll soon see Žižek characterize it, as a ―displacement‖ — of the feudal form of 
private property is not completely anti-developmental, as much as infantile Marxists 
would like to paint it — almost pictographically — this way.  So while this is something 
acknowledged by Marx with deep ambivalence and worry, we should acknowledge that 
he did recognize it:  When we turn from feudalism to capitalism, the worker is further 
freed in the sense that he or she is certainly not owned (like the slave) and is no longer 
even bound to the soil and retained (like the serf).  In fact, under the principles of 
democracy and enlightenment which emerge with the ―democratic‖ or ―bourgeois‖ 
revolutions, the worker, whether a CEO or manual laborer, gains rights.  This is 
significant.  While neither slave nor serf can simply quit his ―job‖ without great physical 
risk to limb and life, for instance, the wage-worker who seeks to move socially and 
economically ―upward,‖ or at least away from a bad job, can, and in fact has, the ability 
to quit a vocation.  And under capitalism this freedom, a new kind of ―independence‖ 
comes into existence, even if the freedom is won by socialistic effort.  Indeed, we earlier 
saw that Marx even calls this an ―advance,‖ albeit, again, a deeply ambivalent one:  
 
The immediate producer, the worker, could dispose of his own person only after he 
had ceased to be bound to the soil, and ceased to be the slave or serf of another 
person.  To become a free seller of labor-power, who carries his commodity wherever 
he can find a market for it, he must further have escaped from the regime of the 
guilds, their rules for apprentices and journeymen, and their restrictive labor 
regulations.  Hence, the historical movement which changes the producers into wage 
laborers appears, on the one hand, as their emancipation from serfdom and from the 
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fetters of the guilds, and it is this aspect of the movement which alone exists for our 
bourgeois historians….The starting-point of the development that gave rise both to 
the wage-laborer and to the capitalist was the enslavement of the worker.  The 
advance made consisted in a change in the form of this servitude, in the 
transformation of feudal exploitation into capitalist exploitation…. (875, my 
emphases) 
 
   Our point, then, is to recognize with Marx that while capitalism is in part 
regressive, it is also simultaneously in part progressive, at least in this regard.  Similarly, 
in chapter thirty-two, Marx suggests that the developmental potential of the feudal 
system, including the relations of property-tribute between lord and serf, is very limited, 
or at least became so after so much internal stasis:   
 
This [feudal] mode of production presupposes the fragmentation of holdings, and the 
dispersal of the other means of production.  As it excludes the concentration of these 
means of production, so it also excludes co-operation, division of labor within each 
separate process of production, the social control and regulation of the forces of 
nature, and the free development of the productive forces of society.  It is comparable 
only with a system of production and a society moving within narrow limits which 
are of natural origin.  To perpetuate it would be, as Pecqueur rightly says, ‗to decree 
universal mediocrity.‘  At a certain stage of development, it brings into the world the 
material means of its own destruction. (927-8) 
 
 Notice that Marx here gives capitalism the credit, as it were, it is due:  As 
compared to feudalism, capitalism concentrates work and industry, it organizes labor into 
co-operating levels and distinctions, it controls and regulates the forces of nature, and 
indeed, it enables the development of the productive forces, the technological means, of 
society, a development which outstrips the quasi-religious (serf and ―lord‖) and small-
scale (manorial, e.g.) relations of production.     
 We know very well, however, why and how this ―advance‖ is deeply 
compromised in the class relations born(e) with and through primitive accumulation:  
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While the worker is perhaps ―free‖ to seek this or that form of work, this freedom arrives 
in the famous double sense:  The worker is freed from the soil (in serfdom) and from the 
status of pure objecthood (in slavery), but to the degree that he suddenly (again) owns 
very few or perhaps even no means of production, he is also free only, and so only ―free,‖ 
as it were, to sell his labor power to others, to others who now happen, who are ―lucky 
enough,‖ to exclusively own as a class the great majority of the means of world- and self-
production.  The average, low-wage worker thus has little or no effective freedom.  He 
remains uneducated, and often uncultured, un-self-reflective to this or that degree, and 
steeped in the problems and dangers of just getting by.  Without means of self-production 
and self-provision, his self is emptied into the all too lost objectivities coincident with the 
pure subjectivity of labor-power.  This is capitalism as social melancholia.  And this 
insight brings with it a powerful lesson:  Under this developmentally troubled lens, world 
history is the progressive emancipation of forms of ―the worker‖ in terms of rights and 
subjectivity in and despite the regressive loss of the communal and (to some degree) 
private property which would make those rights, emancipation, and subjectivity more 
than only partially effective.   
 Žižek‘s ―Symptom‖ essay is helpful in this regard.  To understand how Marx 
―invented the symptom‖ we must, he says, investigate ―the way Marx conceived the 
passage from feudalism to capitalism‖ (23): 
 
What we have [between feudalist and capitalist society] is a parallel between two 
modes of fetishism, and the crucial question concerns the exact relationship between 
these two levels…; commodity fetishism occurs in capitalist societies, but in 
capitalism relations between men are definitely not ‗fetishized‘; what we have here 
are relations between ‗free‘ people…; two subjects meet, their relation is free of all 
the lumber of veneration [i.e. free of the fetishization] of the Master, of the Master‘s 
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patronage and care for his subjects; they meet as two persons whose activity is 
thoroughly determined by their egoistic interests…. 
 
The two forms of fetishism are thus incompatible:  in societies in which commodity 
fetishism reigns, the ‗relations between men‘ are totally defetishized, while in 
societies in which there is fetishism in ‗relations between men‘ — in pre-capitalist 
societies — commodity fetishism is not yet developed, because it is ‗natural‘ 
production, not production for the market which predominates.  This fetishism in 
relations between men has to be called by its proper name:  what we have here are, as 
Marx points out, ‗relations of domination and servitude‘—that is to say, precisely the 
relation of Lordship and Bondage in a Hegelian sense; and it is as if the retreat of the 
Master in capitalism was only a displacement: as if the de-fetishization in the 
‗relations between men‘ was paid for by the emergence of fetishism in the ‗relations 
between things‘…. 
 
This is why one has to look for the discovery of the symptom in the way Marx 
conceived the passage from feudalism to capitalism.  With the establishment of 
bourgeois society, the relations of domination and servitude are repressed;  formally, 
we are apparently concerned with free subjects whose interpersonal relations are 
discharged of all fetishism; the repressed truth — that of the persistence of 
domination and servitude — emerges in a symptom which subverts the ideological 
appearance of equality, freedom, and so on.… [quoting Marx:] ‗Instead of appearing 
at all events as their own mutual relations, the social relations between individuals are 
disguised under the shape of social relations between things‘—here we have a precise 
definition of the hysterical symptom, of the ‗hysteria of conversion‘ proper to 
capitalism. (25-26) 
 
 Here we have a ―latent‖ content hidden behind and in a ―manifest‖ object:  In 
already developed capitalist societies we are formally, which is to say ideologically or 
manifestly, ―concerned with free subjects whose interpersonal relations are discharged of 
all fetishism.‖  These subjects are ―equal‖ and can atomistically pursue their ―own‖ 
business, at least so long as this pursuit doesn‘t restrict the business, freedom, or rights of 
others to do the same.  Capitalist exchange thus pivots on the famous doctrine of negative 
liberty, rights of non-interference, the dictum and principle of liberalism.  For again, so 
long as each person in an exchange agrees or consents to make a trade, the act of 
exchange thereby manifests ―freedom‖ and ―equality.‖  It proves its content ―ideally‖ in 
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this practice.
120
  According to Žižek, however, as an ideal in practice, ―free exchange‖ 
short-circuits itself to conserve and perpetuate unfreedom at another level.  When it is the 
specific exchange between capitalist and laborer (of wages for abstract labor power, 
respectively), this specific kind of exchange, though ―free‖ and ―fair‖ according to both 
the norms and laws of market society, conceals and preserves — it slyly reproduces in 
another form — a domination and servitude which ―previously‖ belonged to feudal 
property relations.   
 And of course, Marx does articulate these two levels.  The circulatory process 
and all of the fetishism it is and contains enables a ―repression.‖  In hiding exploitation in 
and behind the use and dazzle of money, this repression also hides the persistence of 
―feudal‖ (and we should say it, since Žižek doesn‘t say it, all precapitalist forms of) 
domination.  Domination has a history of forms.  The interesting thing, however, is that 
these forms are forms of appearance, and that these appearances affect the very 
―psychology‖ of the individual.  Modern fetishism, for example, while a microscopic 
phenomenon hinging on the development of the money and banking systems at large, 
together with the reach of the ―world market,‖ nonetheless conditions the beliefs and 
structures of belief (in individuals).  Here, says Marx, we encounter the ―exclusive realm 
of Freedom, Equality, Property, and Bentham.‖  But it is only when ―we leave this sphere 
of simple circulation or the exchange of commodities, which provides the „free-trader 
vulgaris‟ with his views, his concepts, and the standard by which he judges the society of 
capital and wage-labor‖ that ―he who was previously the money-owner now strides out in 
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 But don‘t tell this to the Lenape Indians who traded away Manhattan Island, for instance. 
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front as a capitalist [while] the possessor of labor-power follows as his worker‖ (280, my 
emphasis).
121
   
This repression of dominance and servitude is thus exhibited through forms of 
forgetting, forgetting in and as the objects, or what Žižek calls symptoms, which arise 
alongside and are attached to these ―independent‖ subjects.  The symptomatic object both 
repeats and yet also hides primitive injury.  What ―happened‖ in the fifteenth century as a 
sudden and violent expropriation, for instance, soon becomes repeatable but in a 
mediated and less-obviously violent form, namely, in the form of capitalist legislation and 
trade.  Repressive state apparatuses are hidden behind ideological state apparatuses.  
Indeed, as if to ―remind us‖ of what lurks behind and in them, Marx calls the new 
privatization and trade laws of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a ―bloody 
legislation.‖  These laws are ―forcible.‖  Indeed, it is this new legal force, in the name of 
an exclusivist form of property, which allows us to forget prior bloody dispossessions 
while yet still enacting them:  ―Communal property…was an old Teutonic institution 
which lived on under the cover of feudalism. We have seen how its forcible usurpation, 
generally accompanied by the turning of arable into pasture land, begins at the end of the 
fifteenth and extends into the sixteenth century.  But at the same time the process was 
carried on by means of individual acts of violence against which legislation, for a 
hundred and fifty years, fought in vain.  The advance made by the eighteenth century 
shows itself in this, that the law itself now becomes the instrument by which the people‘s 
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 Marx adds here something of inscriptive significance, as if to indicate (in an almost Foucaultian sense) 
that the production of types of subjectivity hinges upon a destruction laid upon the body, upon an 
inscriptive subjection: ―The one smirks self-importantly and is intent on business; the other is timid and 
holds back, like someone who has brought his own hide to market and now has nothing else to expect 
but—a tanning‖.  We shall keep this notion of bringing one‘s own ―hide to market‖ in mind when we later 
examine the Aztec Xipe Totec ritual.  
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land is stolen‖ (885).122  Bloody dispossession by whip, brand, and sword (or by guns, 
germs, and steel, for instance) has become ―possession‖ by legal hegemony.  
What is it in the transition from feudalism to capitalism, then, that is, as it were, 
unconscious?  How does Marx think this transition?  What does he ―see‖ in it?  On a first 
reading, it looks as if what is here unconscious is actually what is here and only here 
made unconscious.  Forced into repression is not only feudal domination and feudal 
craftwork but also the bloody expropriations of both the feudal peasantry in their 
transformation into wage-laborers and the feudal commons.  According to Marx, ―by 
about 1750 the yeomanry had disappeared, and so by the last decade of the eighteenth 
century had the last trace of the common land of the agricultural laborer‖ (883).  Further, 
―by the nineteenth century, the very memory of the connection between the agricultural 
laborer and communal property had, of course, vanished‖ (889).  This reading is not 
incorrect.
123
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 And not just the laws of  ―free trade‖, but its ―theory‖.  According to Perelman‘s (2000) simple but 
useful extension of Marx, for instance, most eighteenth and nineteenth century bourgeois historians 
disavowed primitive expropriation not simply by misunderstanding it — that is, by failing to read the 
annals of fire and blood — but by manipulatively miscasting it, by actively denying and repressing it, only 
as ―accumulation‖.   
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 We now know, however, that for Marx the primitive doesn‘t vanish so much as it vanishes in its results. 
Communal property has not quite ―vanished,‖ then, but more accurately has been forced to appear 
symptomatically both in capital‘s ―freedoms‖ and its domination.  For example, when hurricane Katrina 
recently overwhelmed the U.S. gulf coast and flooded New Orleans, the great majority of those who had 
evacuated the city prior to the storm‘s arrival were residents who had private means to leave.  There was 
basically no communal or public evacuation plan.  What this means is that in times of crisis to have private 
means is to have the means to escape horror, trauma, and death.  ―Homeland Security‖ is in this respect 
security for the already at least moderately secured.  Note in this regard that on FEMA‘s webpage one of 
the first pieces of advice is, after a hurricane, to contact one‘s (needless to say private) insurer.  FEMA‘s 
own charge of helping the poor and at-risk is largely disavowed in this sentence alone. Further, among the 
poor and/or black who stayed behind in New Orleans and survived, some looted and occasionally became 
violent.  Responding to a reporter‘s questions in the middle of emptying some goods for himself out of an 
abandoned store, for instance, one looter shouted that the store‘s goods were ―everyone‘s property‖, but 
instead of staying and sharing this property with others, the man quickly absconded to wherever he could 
now hide away and privatize these supposedly social ―goods.‖  The president chimed in on the radio the 
next day to insist that everyone must work together in the moment of crisis and demanded that police bring 
all looters and price-gougers to justice.  The governor of Louisiana seemingly granted shoot to kill orders to 
prevent mass looting.  Meanwhile, one of the president‘s first steps after the disaster was to promise and 
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Regarding primitive accumulation, then, we might suggest that one of Marx‘s 
principal insights is that repression, in the sense of primitive uprooting and injury, makes 
another repression, in the sense of a historically productive forgetting of prehistory and 
its persistence — in the form of the objective illusion of value — possible and actual.  
Indeed, what is forgotten is not simply feudal domination and servitude, nor simply the 
exploitation of the worker, but the perpetuity of primitive violence and primitive 
community in their tension and overlap.  This, then, is our principal discovery in this 
chapter:  Primitive accumulation isn‘t simply the physically violent fifteenth and 
sixteenth century origin of capital which is then hidden behind the circulation of 
commodities, money, profits, laws, and institutions in capitalist society.  Rather, this 
bloody injury, this specific origin, points to an originary ―unconscious desire‖ of human 
community and human violence in their partial indiscernibility.  The fact that feudalism 
was already a class system which had absorbed prior and wider forms of common 
property, for instance, indicates that for Marx the violence of this specific primitive 
accumulation is a repetition, albeit with differences, of prior, more deeply unconscious 
violences.  Marx typically only ―indirectly‖ articulates this thought of repetition.  But if 
it‘s true that feudal violence and community are repressed in the transition to capitalism 
and also true that feudalism is itself a historically developed form of class society, then 
                                                                                                                                                       
extend low-interest loans to the gulf‘s oil corporations.  So on the one hand he simply equated all small 
scale ―looters,‖ whether these persons were gathering food and water or whether they were gathering less 
necessary goods, as criminals, and on the other hand he quickly moved to insure that capital would remain 
strong, and so that the class system would remain intact.  Even if capital moved around horizontally, then, 
it would not move vertically.  Thus, the more private means of production and provision you own, the more 
―public government‖ will protect you.   This has again happened with the giant savings and loan bailouts.  
At a distant level, then, there is some truth to what the looting-man was saying, at least ideally.  The earth 
belongs to everyone.  And yet to some more than others, at least in current practice.  So long as there is a 
difference between children and adults, this is how things have to stand.   Indeed, things are not always so 
easy:  Accumulation and expropriation are far from being easily differentiated, especially in times of crisis, 
given the fact that while the poor resent the rich, the rich are already paranoid about encountering the poor.  
We will more deeply investigate this idea in the next sections. The point for now, however, is that crisis 
reveals a sense of communal property that was formerly repressed, that is, in unconscious abeyance. 
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what‘s ―unconscious‖ in the transition from feudalism to capitalism cannot be said to be 
merely specific to that transition.  This unconsciousness must also derive from prior 
events and epochs, that is, from the history and prehistory of class-formation on the 
whole, beginning, say, if we limit ourselves to the advent of the human as homo sapiens, 
two to five hundred thousand years ago.   
Thus, for Marx there are not simply structures of trauma and symptom but, more 
accurately, structures of trauma and symptom in cultural development, in the localizable 
development of culture.  Culture is traumatological, but it is also developmental.  This 
brings us full circle, then, albeit beyond a simple hermeneutic circle.  Ursprünglich 
akkumulation is the prehistorical tendency, persisting as both violence and community in 
tension and overlap, which divides primitive communism and hierarchy, whatever the 
details of this communistic form, to produce and reproduce history as class history, 
which means that capitalist accumulation is the developmentally distorted repetition and 
development of this directly inaccessible primitive communism and hierarchy at the cusp 
of its necessary persistence and break-up.124   Thus, for ―definitional‖ purposes, we could 
say that history is the series of evolutionary transformations in the fetishism and 
ownership of means of production and property, both of which together bear and manage 
prehistorical community in and despite its revolutionary destructions.  Let‘s return once 
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 One of our methodological suppositions is that we can learn something about the development of ―world 
history‖ as a single object both by casting our distinctions flexibly and by nonetheless marking the 
transition from prehistory to history by means of the notion of class.  For ―class‖ characterizes social forms 
within which a subservient group systematically provides a separated-off dominant group with labors 
which end up in the dominant group‘s hands in the form of produce, value, and social distinction and which 
are used to thereby reproduce the social divide at hand.  If Marx didn‘t often reserve the term ―exploitation‖ 
for the specifically capitalist mode of extracting surplus-labor and surplus-value from the modern wage-
laborer, we could say that class societies consist most basically in a developing split between exploiters and 
exploited, at least by and large.  But we would also want to emphasize that these classes didn‘t ―choose‖ to 
end up where they did.  ―Choice‖ or ―freedom‖, as we‘ve seen, arrives only in modernity as the symptom 
of a violence lying both beneath and within its apparently nonviolent circulatory surface.   
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again to our sentence from chapter 26 in this regard:  If ―in the history of primitive 
accumulation, all revolutions are epoch-making that act as levers for the capitalist class in 
the course of its formation,‖ we should here take seriously Marx‘s combination of the 
concepts of ―all,‖ ―class,‖  and ―epoch-making.‖  We should include as primitively 
accumulative not just modern, feudal, or ancient revolutions but also those revolutions 
which make possible all transitions from pre-epochality to epochality, from prehistory to 
history, and from pre-class communities to class societies and beyond.   
 It is no accident in this regard that in his famous 1859 ―Preface to A Contribution 
to the Critique of Political Economy‖ Marx does not simply assume that history is what 
has been.  Rather, in the sense that development is the repetition and transformation of 
primitive injury which does not simply disappear when its symptoms appear but, on the 
contrary (and at first almost ―naturally‖) forces its way into (and as) such cultural 
phenomena as class-consciousness and identity politics, history is that which we finally 
have the opportunity to enter, to wake up to, as it were, as if from a dream, a dream 
embodied in our intersubjective exchange of objects as commodities:   
 
[M]ankind always sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer 
examination will always show that the task itself arises only when the material 
conditions for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation.  In 
broad outline, the Asiatic [primitive], ancient, feudal, and modern-bourgeois modes 
of production may be designated as progressive epochs in the economic development 
of society.  The bourgeois relation of production is the last antagonistic form of the 
social process of production—antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism 
but of antagonism that emanates from the individuals‘ social conditions of existence; 
at the same time the productive forces developing in the womb of bourgeois society 
create the material conditions for the solution of that antagonism.  This social 
formation brings, therefore, the prehistory of human society to a close. (5, my 
emphasis)   
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 In short, against the common interpretation that Marx locates the causes of both 
fetishism and capitalist domination in what is usually and simply called production, our 
analysis problematizes the sheerness and productive consistency of production.
125
  Marx 
is usually thought to understand ―production‖ as the realm of labor and assembly, as the 
gathering and manipulation of raw materials, as the employment of wage-labor (at least 
since the fifteenth century) in the making of various forms of value (including surplus-
value), that is, as all those uses of labor and labor-power which, when combined with 
natural materials, produce goods as commodities, the worker as a class-worker, the 
capitalist as structurally beholden to domination.  Production is usually thought to be the 
―background,‖ as we‘ve seen, ―which is not visible in circulation itself‖ (268) but which 
supplies circulation with its structural conditions.  It is the realm, then, where exploitation 
takes place, if under the cover of circulation and exchange.  And this interpretation is 
right—when we fetishize and trade commodities and money, we hide or veil production, 
and so the object of exploitation, to focus instead upon an objectified form of value.  We 
have seen here, however, that Marx also, albeit secretively, suggests that production is 
driven by primitive destruction, indeed, that forms of production require destruction as 
the constitutively repressed condition for their epochal or historical standing and 
development.  What fetishism points to, then, is not simply the productive labor and 
sociality behind circulation but more deeply and crucially the creative-destructive 
prehistory which ―comprises the world‘s history‖ including, of course, the world-
historical opportunity to develop a modern sense of community and sharing in and 
through communal and private property.  Perhaps historical materialism would be better 
understood as prehistorical materialism in this regard?  
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 Baudrillard (1981) offers a similar criticism in For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign. 
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CHAPTER IX 
 
PRIMITIVE ENCOUNTER II: REFLECTIVE MOURNING  
 
As we‘ve seen, in Capital Marx suggests that gold and silver are functional as 
―money‖ to the degree that they‘re qualitatively homogenous and quantitatively divisible.  
Since soft, these metals are ―negatively superfluous‖ in consumption and especially so in 
production.  One doesn‘t drive a steel nail with a golden hammer, for instance.  In the 
Contribution, however, Marx also explicitly links the ―value‖ of gold and silver to their 
aesthetic qualities.  Indeed, regarding exchange-value, superfluity of consumptive and 
productive function derives from a superfluity of wealth which is inseparable from what 
might be called wealth‘s developmental reflection.  But ―reflection‖ here, as we‘ll see, 
must be taken in at least a double sense—not just as a physical reflecting of light and 
visual images but also as a ―mental,‖ ―social,‖ or what we‘ll see Marx call a 
―suprasensible‖ mirroring, a making equivalent in relation to difference, or at least a 
relating by means of semblances.
126
  For over 2500 years humans have valued the 
recombinability and uniformity of gold and silver, as well as their relative scarcity, to 
perform what we recognize today as their ―economic‖ function; but this functional 
history is necessarily connected to and even coexistent with these substances‘ more or 
less forgotten aesthetic roots:  
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 This is an aspect of Marx‘s overall ―object‖, namely, the mirroring of the development of human 
community in objects of value which symbolize the persistence of both our social and asocial reactions to 
this community‘s primitive dissolution.   
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Gold and silver are not only negatively superfluous, i.e. dispensable objects [in 
modern production], but their aesthetic qualities make them the natural material for 
pomp, ornament, glamour, the requirements of festive occasions, in short, the positive 
expression of supra-abundance of wealth.  They appear, so to speak, as solidified light 
raised from a subterranean world, since all the rays of light in their original 
composition are reflected by silver, while red alone, the color of highest potency, is 
reflected by gold.  Sense of color, moreover, is the most popular form of aesthetic 
perception in general.  The etymological connection between the names of precious 
metals and references to color in various Indo-European languages has been 
demonstrated….  Nature no more produces money than it does bankers or a rate of 
exchange.  But since in bourgeois production wealth as a fetish must be crystallized 
in a particular substance, gold and silver are its appropriate embodiment. (154-5) 
  
 What is the significance here of light, color, and especially reflection?  And why 
does Marx link ―popular forms‖ of perception to the fact that the names of the precious 
metals can be traced not to their pecuniary-functional qualities but, more deeply, to their 
aesthetic qualities, to traits which are therefore more archaic to the degree that etymology 
is the logos of roots?
127
  This seems clear enough for now:  For Marx, aesthetic 
ornamentation is somehow and for some reason the midwife between the labor that digs 
gold and silver up from the ―bowels‖ of the earth and the authoritative power in 
hierarchical (including class) societies that would stand above a common identity.  We 
saw a glimmer of what is at stake here already, in fact, when Marx suggested earlier that 
―the riddle of the money fetish is…the riddle of the commodity fetish, now become 
visible and dazzling to our eyes.‖   
 Indeed, Capital‘s first chapters are simply filled with references to how a given 
commodity or money-object ―reflects‖ or ―mirrors‖ the value of other commodities.  In 
the description of the movement from the elementary to the expanded form of value, for 
instance, we read that ―the value of a commodity, linen for example, is now expressed in 
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 Soon enough we‘ll also ask why it is significant that gold and silver are light-reflecting substances 
which are also ―raised from a subterranean world‖ and connected to ―festive occasions‖.   
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terms of innumerable other members of the world of commodities.  Every other physical 
commodity now becomes a mirror of the linen‘s value‖ (155, my emphasis).  But this is 
already at stake in the elementary form:  ―By means of the value-relation, the natural 
form of commodity B becomes the value-form of commodity A; in other words, the 
physical body of commodity B becomes a mirror for the value of commodity A‖ (144, 
my emphases).   Marx uses this language repeatedly.   
 Let‘s examine what might be Marx‘s most famous description of fetishism in this 
regard.  For here the relation between fetishism and reflection is explicitly laid out in and 
as an ―analogy,‖ or at least as an analogy which becomes developmentally possible, in 
the link between visibility and fantasy, between image and imagination, we might say; 
and yet, even as he does this, Marx also ―literalizes‖ this ―analogy‖ while also drawing a 
similarly literalized ―analogy‖ between fetishism and religion.  None of these elements 
can be ignored.  The implication, on my reading, is that there is a kind of literal 
metaphorics in the connection between reflection and primitive religion which speaks, 
precisely, to what makes fetishism a developmental phenomenon.  For, the reflection of 
the literal in the metaphorical, and vice versa, is precisely that from which the first forms 
of communication are cut; or rather, this reflection arises with this cutting.  According to 
Marx,   
 
The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists therefore simply in the fact 
that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of men‘s own labor as objective 
characteristics of the products of labor themselves, as the socio-natural properties of 
these things.  Hence it also reflects the social relation of the producers to the sum total 
of labor as a social relation between objects, [as] a relation which exists apart from 
and outside the producers.  Through this substitution, the products of labor become 
commodities, sensuous things which are at the same time suprasensible or social.  In 
the same way, the impression made by a thing on the optic nerve is perceived not as a 
subjective excitation of that nerve but as the objective form of a thing outside the eye.  
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In the act of seeing, of course, light is really transmitted from one thing, the external 
object, to another thing, the eye.  It is a physical relation between physical things.  As 
against this, the commodity-form, and the value-relation of the products of labor 
within which it appears, have absolutely no connection with the physical nature of the 
commodity and the material [dinglich] relations arising out of this.  It is nothing but 
the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the 
fantastic form of a relation between things.  In order, therefore, to find an analogy we 
must take flight into the misty realm of religion.  There the products of the human 
brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter 
into relations both with each other and with the human race.  So it is in the world of 
commodities with the products of men‘s hands.  I call this the fetishism which 
attaches itself to the products of labor as soon as they are produced as commodities, 
and is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities. [165, my emphases] 
 
The term ―themselves‖ seems to indicate that there really does or could exist a 
sociality between human subjects or selves (where ―you‖ and ―I‖ would communicate 
with each other as, say, fellow humans) which is not or at least not yet mediated by 
things, by ―external‖ physical objects.  The ―sociality of objects‖ is therefore easily read 
as false or derivative to some degree, is it not?  For again, as we ―discovered‖ earlier, 
objects and things can‘t talk or communicate, and so aren‘t ―really‖ social, right?  
They‘re dead.  Right?  And yet, the indication here is also that human sociality cannot be 
separated from objects of exchange, and so from physical things.  The passage is doubled 
in this tension.  Note the idea for instance that in the process of commodification 
―sensuous things…are at the same time suprasensible or social.‖  The invisible (or 
supersensible) sits ―within‖ the visible (or sensible) just as the ―causality‖ of magic (or 
what Marx here calls religion more widely) sits within and even roots itself upon the 
technical-functional use of money as an economic instrument.  So this ―at the same time‖ 
deprioritizes what we might call the idea of a ―purely human sociality.‖  The social does 
not arise except through objective mediation, in other words, where subject and object are 
first set into distinguishable relation, and are no longer an identity, as we will see 
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especially when we turn to Winnicott.  For now, though, let‘s simply take the ―reflect‖ in 
the opening sentence.  The character of the commodity-form is mysterious since two 
forms of appearance — the social and the physical — exist in one and the same object 
which is itself a form of appearance, a commodity.  So where is the social, this sociality?  
It is reflected in a relation between the objects of exchange which to some degree 
disavow the labor that makes them:  ―The mysterious character of the commodity-form 
consists therefore simply in the fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics 
of men‘s own labor as objective characteristics of the products of labor themselves.‖  
Neither subject nor object ―comes first‖ here to the degree that the sociality, the 
intersubjectivity, of labor is already reflectively objectified in and as the commodity-form 
of value;
128
 indeed, in a practical way, the ―already‖ indicates that subjects ―work‖ or 
―labor‖ themselves and their sociality into existence precisely in creating an objective 
human world — a culture — which, in its objectivity, always partially (mis)expresses 
their deepest subjective needs and wishes.  The objects mediate intersubjectivity by 
misexpressing that which is left behind.   
But this ―at the same time‖ doesn‘t just act synchronously or, say, simply 
structurally.  For Marx here articulates a developmental structuring which pivots, as with 
Kant‘s critique of judgments of value, on the relation between value and enculturation.  
Indeed, as with Kant, the concern here articulates a line of development mediated by 
what both Kant and Marx, and soon enough by what Freud and the psychoanalytic 
tradition, call fantasy.  The key here is that fantasy is never purely inward, never merely 
fantastic.  There is no ―mind‘s eye‖ for Marx, for instance, without there also, at the same 
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 For Marx the term ―form‖ always indicates, is shorthand for, ―form of appearance‖; and an appearance 
is always something distinct; it is that which stands-out or exists, as a semblance of objectivity, from a 
―background‖ from which, we might say, it is distinguished.  This is the ―nature‖ of human relief.  
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time, being a somatization steeped in reflection, as with Kant:  Here we find an ―eye,‖ an 
―optic nerve,‖ for instance, which is an extension of the ―brain,‖ just where we might 
expect to see (or is it not to see?) a ―mind‖ or ―spirit.‖  For even mental activity and 
thoughtful work both are and are correlated with somatic, muscular, and neural pathways, 
though of course they are not only (correlated with) these.  The eye of someone who sees, 
a seer — a prophet, for instance — moves as if following the image or illusion she sees.  
This somatization hinges, in turn, upon a difficult and sometimes tortuous process of 
disillusion within which the primitive illusion of communal oneness, of primitive unity, 
both dies and survives, like a ghost.  We begin to see and wish together, in cultural ways, 
in other words, to the degree that a primitive division and illusion persists in the form of 
shareable objects which are saturated, elaborated, and distorted with compromise; which 
is here to say with conscious wishes and needs.
129
  
 Let‘s look at the ―objectivity‖ of objective illusion in this regard, but keeping in 
mind (and in brain, and so in the extension of the brain that is our eyes) that and how 
objectivity grows out of somatization.  Indeed, this somatization (coincident with the 
putative interiority of fantasy) is here extended, as it were, into an ―external‖ object of 
fantasy, a relative and incomplete differentiation of res cogitans and res extensa.  This 
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 Marx‘s written material (in Marx, 1978) on the history of the humanization of the senses in the 1844 
Manuscripts is apposite here, although we should recognize that he eventually and rightly overcame his 
naïve ―essentialism‖.  For here he describes the relation between development and aesthetic appreciation.  
And again, as with Kant, hunger is not the best sauce for understanding the world through a maturing 
human sense: ―The eye has become a human eye, just as its object has become a social, human object—an 
object emanating from man for man.  The senses have therefore become directly in their practice 
theoreticians.  They relate themselves to the thing for the sake of the thing, but the thing itself is an 
objective human relation to itself and to man…. The forming of the five senses is a labor of the entire 
history of the world down to the present.  The sense caught up in crude practical need has only a restricted 
sense.  For the starving man, it is not the human form of food that exists, but only its abstract being as food; 
it could just as well be there in its crudest form, and it would be impossible to say wherein this feeding-
activity differs from that of animals.  The care-burdened man in [too much] need has no sense for the finest 
play; the dealer in minerals sees only the mercantile value but not the beauty and the unique nature of the 
mineral: he has no mineralogical sense. Thus, the objectification of the human essence both in its 
theoretical and practical aspects is required to make man‘s sense human‖ (87, 89). 
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movement begins as a tremendous swinging back and forth, a divided conflation, 
between unity (or identity) and division.  As a presupposed unity finds itself within this 
divided conflation, the root of fantasy necessarily begins to take on somatic significance, 
one located in the route from mouth to stomach, as we‘ll see, in the case of the individual, 
or from natural production to primitive communal to various forms of asocially social 
production, in the case of cultural groups.  This is a process of externalization, then, but 
to be more accurate we should say that it‘s an externalization of the difference between 
internal and external.  The object reflects subjectivity in and as a social relation to and an 
exchange with others.  Thus, as the passage at hand proceeds, we see a movement from 
the brain and eyes to objects, to things which can be both touched and manipulated, 
dropped and returned or thrown away.  Freud‘s infant grandson would be proud, as we 
will soon see:  ―There [and here] the products of the human brain appear as autonomous 
figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter into relations both with each other 
and with the human race.  So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men‘s 
hands.‖  One doesn‘t produce the world only with thoughts, after all, or at least this is 
now the thought that dawns for Marx in the form of a magico-religious objectivity, a 
fetishism ―which attaches itself to the products of labor as soon as they are produced as 
commodities.‖  So while thinkers such as Habermas rightly point to the 
demythologization involved in this movement — where the evolution from primitive 
community and violence toward a more scientific knowledge of human development 
requires a long, difficult resistance to and critique of religion, to the degree that science is 
not merely myth and magic — we shouldn‘t forget that Marx also focuses on how and 
why myth and magic both partially constitute and persist in the rise of modern forms of 
 198 
knowledge and production, forms which are sedimented in the institutional frameworks 
of a society.
130
   
 Now, while probably not directly aware that Marx casts value as a hiero-glyphic 
process, Winnicott and Todorov can help us see, expand, explain, and justify these initial 
insights to the degree that they both explicitly and ingeniously link the hieratic to the 
inscriptive as the developmental working-through of primitive accumulative schism and 
its after-effects.  Before we turn to Winnicott, however, let‘s finish this thought about 
Freud‘s infant grandson.  As Winnicott mentioned at a couple of points in his career, his 
thoughts on transitional objectivity derive more or less directly, scholastically speaking, 
from Freud‘s famous analysis of the fort-da game in Beyond the Pleasure Principle.  
Observing the behavior of his infant grandson, Freud had noticed that this boy had 
developed, like all children do to some degree and in some way, a more or less serious 
kind of play.  The boy would take a yo-yo-like toy spool attached to a string and throw 
the spool away, out of sight, only to bring it from invisibility back to visibility by pulling 
on the string.  And in fact, from this artifact of play, Freud develops what I would not call 
a ―minor‖ theory of enculturation.  As he conceives it, the spool and string (together with 
the fantasy overlaying and undergirding them, in the constitution of the object‘s 
objectivity) represents the mother or father, on the one hand, as well as the loss of a 
certain ―ideal‖ relation with the mother and/or father, on the other hand.  Freud calls the 
boy‘s use of the toy a ―great cultural achievement‖ (15) in this regard and notes that his 
grandson created this common game precisely when and as he became able not to cry 
when his mother, or later, in a more elaborate version, when his father, went away.  His 
earlier somatic exteriorization of primitive loss as screaming and crying (where screams 
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 We‘ll examine a couple of important claims from Habermas below. 
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and tears signify that this activity belongs to a pre-playful anguish) gets sublimated here 
into the activity of playing, a playful fetishization of the thing as an object of value.  A 
prior attachment is cancelled, distorted, and yet preserved in the cultural use of the thing.  
The ―thing‖ is ―objectified‖ in this way, to transfer this idea into a common Lacanian 
vocabulary. 
 Winnicott‘s notion of transitional objectivity extends Freud‘s analysis, then, or at 
least supplements it, by highlighting the identity and difference between the 
developmental process of meaningful representation, on the one hand, and what, 
following the Kantian, Marxian, and Freudian (in)distinction between Darstellung and 
Vorstellung, might be called the presentation of meaning, on the other.  For Winnicott, 
when a baby is born, his or her inchoate experience is conditioned by a state of (nearly or 
as if) perfect wish-fulfillment, or, as he terms it, by something on the order of 
―omnipotence,‖ ―primitive identification,‖ or ―primary creativity.‖  Omnipotence implies 
the irony of ironies in this regard, for since we all seem to think that babies are simply 
―powerless‖ to get along in the world, especially as newborns, we pithily deem them 
―helpless.‖131  But looked at from the ―perspective‖ of the pre-subjective or pre-egoistic 
baby whose subjectivity or ego is yet to congeal in an organized way (and so, not looked 
at merely from the perspective of the forgetful adult, where forgetfulness is part of the 
transitional, which is to say developmental, process), newborns only need to wish for 
something on the order of fulfillment and, voilá, does not the pre-objective thing of that 
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 In what follows, I‘ll again conform to the convention of making the ―example‖ baby male to be able to 
more clearly distinguish ―him‖ from ―her‖, that is, from his mother—after all, I don‘t want to fall into the 
identification which each and every baby is born with!  ―God‖ forbid! 
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satisfaction appear as if by mere wishfulness?132  Omnipotence, in other words, suggests 
that the baby‘s wishing is met so immediately by the mother‘s capacities and availability 
that the baby cannot as yet discern a firm difference or even (theoretically) a distinction 
between his so-called ―interiority‖ and the world which you and I know, but which he 
does not yet know, to be provided by the mother‘s so-called ―external‖ activity.  In short, 
from the baby‘s incipient preconceptual ―perspective,‖ the behest of wishing is 
simultaneously what happens just as what happens is simultaneously the behest of 
wishing, which implies as well that need (or wishing) and what happens (or appearance) 
are one.  While Winnicott tends to puts this less succinctly and abstractly than I have 
done here, his analysis is typically helpful.  In the ―Transitional Objects‖ essay, for 
instance, he suggests that ―the mother, at the beginning, by an almost 100 percent 
adaptation, affords the infant the opportunity for the illusion that her breast is part of [and 
so indistinguishable from] the infant.  It is, as it were, under magical control‖ (TPP 238).  
 And yet, while instantaneous wish-fulfillment may sound enchanting and 
gratifying for some, the ―perfect‖ parenting that would be necessary for such fulfillment 
doesn‘t provide the baby with health so much as it establishes a problem of and for 
health, for developmental health and illness, namely, the task of ―giving up‖ the 
presumption of omnipotence for what I am here, following Winnicott, calling 
―objectivity.‖  I mean ―objectivity‖ in many, indeed in all its senses—as that significant 
appearance which has been distinguished, in a mutual reflection, from the appearance of 
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 Referring to our earlier sections, Kantians may here want to think of ―omnipotence‖ as the a priori 
conditions of experience, especially as these conditions are articulated in the Critique of Judgment.  By 
distorting and yet participating in those conditions, the object of taste is not just a vehicle for a subject‘s 
gratifications but, as Kant suggests, a developmental mediation between pure sensuousness and pure 
morality.  With a taste for objects of beauty, the subject grows in relation to the world in developmental 
remove from the pure gratifications of instantaneous consumption.  The ―best sauce‖ for a hungry baby‘s 
development may appear to be hunger and the edible object of satisfaction, but again, as Kant insists 
(52/210), this does not mean that aesthetic pleasure corresponds to the perfect fulfillment of need and wish.  
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the subject, as a widening perspective or ability to understand, and thereby as the more or 
less ―disinterested‖ foundation for science (even and especially for the science of 
development and culture), etc.
133
   In any case, development assumes the status of 
something objective, just as objectivity becomes developmental, precisely as children and 
then adults cope with their mothers‘, their parents‘, and then the widening social world‘s 
disillusioning failure to immediately meet their illusions, wishes, or needs.  Objectivity is 
borne of (dis)illusion, we might say or write, of wishes not perfectly met or completely 
unmet but wishes partially met, of a pleasing-enough admixture of illusion and 
disillusion.  So what does a ―good enough mother‖ do when she cannot be there, or 
knows she shouldn‘t be just there just yet, to satisfy her baby‘s wishes?  She presents this 
baby with an appropriately fetishistic third thing, as Marx would call it, a tasteful 
aesthetic object, as Kant might call it, or a sublimated externalization of the reality 
principle, as Freud might describe it.  In any case, this object is a failing gift; it‘s some 
thing which appears to us, on the ―outside,‖ to be simply ―thingly,‖ a mere objectivist 
not-me, but which for the baby — and here‘s the key to understanding Winnicott, on my 
reading — both represents and presents both (m)other and self at the same time.  If the 
object is ―good enough,‖ the baby develops the sense that he or she creatively produces 
and partakes of — is an artist within — the world, albeit in a more or less limited fashion.  
(At first this limit is very disturbing, even ―totally‖ shocking, though this shock is 
                                                   
133
  Indeed, as we shall see, omnipotence must be placed ―underground‖ for the development of both 
objectivity and subjectivity together.  I will not emphasize the development of subjectivity here, but it 
should not be forgotten that by ―objectivity‖ we imply the simultaneous, linked, and overlapping 
appearance of ―subjectivity‖.  We can‘t develop one (the subject) without the other (the object) to the 
degree that they arrive in the splitting of omnipotence into unconsciousness and omnipotence 
(underground) and consciousness and a sense of and need for limits (overground).  So this means that the 
key distinction that I‘m making here is not between subjectivity and objectivity but rather between 
subjectivity and objectivity together as ―experience‖, on the one hand, and so-called omnipotence, or what 
we‘re also calling primitive identification, as the condition for the possibility of experience, on the other.  
See the prior footnote. 
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typically forgotten precisely in and as the formation of the organizational memory and 
forgetting system we call consciousness or experience, a system symbolically borne in 
and through this objectivity.)  As Winnicott suggests, the object is a symbol of the union 
and separation, of the difference and identity, of the baby and the mother, of both a new 
communicability and the loss of an intimacy supposedly prior to onset of 
communicability.
134
  Indeed, if we take the idea of omnipotence seriously, the object 
memorializes an immemorial closeness, a prehistorical identity, a non-place prior to the 
violent separation and (then, eventually) the mitigated separation, and so the distinction, a 
mediation, between subject and object.   
 This, then, albeit somewhat secretly, is why the transitional object implies and 
bears a relation to death, to the sacred, and, as we shall continue to see, to inscription, the 
making of meaning as world-objectification.  Let‘s take death first; indeed, let‘s take it 
first as that which precedes and follows, while never actually leaving, life.  The key 
insight here consists in this:  If for the newborn baby wishing is ―what happens‖ while 
what happens is ―wishing,‖ and so if need can‘t be distinguished from appearance, then 
for the baby not just the presence of the mother but also her absence, when she goes 
away, and so her apparent destruction, especially since she is devoured and incorporated 
in an aggressive act of feeding, will have been wished.  And not just ―will have been 
wished,‖ but, in a sense, will have been ―actual,‖ presentationally actual.  Since 
omnipotence implies a primitive identification between subject and object (before they 
emerge distinctly as subject and object) and between mother and baby (to the degree that 
                                                   
134
 As he says in ―The Location of Cultural Experience‖ (in Winnicott, 1971), the transitional object is the 
first symbolic possession, on the way to private property:  ―This symbol can be located.  It is at the place in 
space and time where and when the mother is in transition from being merged in with the infant and 
alternately being experienced as an object to be perceived rather than [as-if simply] conceived of‖ (96). 
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they are primitively and fantastically indistinguishable in the moments prior to birth), the 
mother‘s disappearance, her complete and literal detachment, will dawn in the baby‘s 
first, pre-experiential experiences not just as her death or destruction but also as his death 
or destruction, as pre-developmental death or destruction, neither here nor there (not da 
in the form of an object, as yet) since we‘re talking, after all, about destruction.135  In 
short, to the degree that omnipotence implies both creative and destructive wishes, both 
the conjuring forth and demolition of the entire ―world,‖ the first practically transitional 
object instantiates an emergent subject in an emerging and merging relationship to a 
magically surviving — even resurrected — object.  The object is conjured, ritualized, 
sacrificed or killed, and then, if it survives, it survives resurrectedly, magically returning 
from fort to da!  This is a pre-memorial emergency become emergence, the event of an 
experiential distinction between subject and object, a developmental transition from, 
within, and out of the inchoate experience of swinging back and forth between total 
intimacy and total devastation.  Indeed, this process is repeated until the imago, the 
fantasy, of the mother ―lands,‖ as it were, in the use of the object, the object subjectively 
symbolized and now partially distinguished.  Omnipotence goes underground, then, 
precisely as cognition and consciousness emerge historically above-ground, that is, as the 
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 See ―D.W.W.‘s Dream Related to Reviewing Jung‖ (in Winnicott, 1989): ―The dream can be given in its 
three parts: 1. There was absolute destruction, and was part of the world and of all people, and therefore I 
was being destroyed. (The important thing in the early stages was the way in which in the dream the pure 
destruction got free from all the mollifications, such as object-relating, cruelty, sensuality, sado-masochism, 
etc.)  2. Then there was absolute destruction, and I was the destructive agent.  Here then was a problem for 
the ego, how to integrate these two aspects of destruction?  3.  Part three now appeared and in the dream I 
awakened.  As I awakened I knew I had dreamed both (1) and (2).  I had therefore solved the problem, by 
using the difference between the waking and sleeping states.  Here was I awake, in the dream, and I knew I 
had dreamed of being destroyed and of being the destroying agent.  There was no dissociation, so the three 
I‘s were altogether in touch with each other.  I remembered dreaming I(2) and I(1).  This felt to be 
immensely satisfactory although the work done had made tremendous demands on me.  I now began to 
wake up.  What I first knew was that I had a very severe headache.  I could my head split right through, 
with a black gap between the right and left halves.  I found the words ‗splitting headache‘ coming and 
waking me up…‖(228-9). 
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beginning of objective historicization, the beginning of development in a significant 
common ground—but a common ground conditioning the possibility of private property, 
we might note to join this idea to our Marxian developmental thesis, to the degree that the 
child becomes attached to this ―mother‖ or ―father‖ object as if it were his.  As Winnicott 
(1971) playfully puts it in his late essay on ―The Use of an Object‖: 
 
After ‗subject relates to object‘ [i.e. after pre-subject relates to pre-object] comes 
‗subject destroys object‘ (as it becomes external); and then may come ‗object survives 
destruction by the subject.‘  But there may or may not be survival. [In which case pre-
subject and pre-object remain primitively identified.  With survival, however,] A new 
feature thus arrives in the history of object-relating.  The subject says to the object: ―I 
destroyed you,‖ and the object is there [da] to receive the communication.  From now 
on the subject says, ―Hullo object!‖ ―I destroyed you‖ [fort].  ―I love you.‖ ―You have 
value for me because of your survival of my destruction of you.‖  ―While I am loving 
you I am all the time destroying you in (unconscious) fantasy.‖   Here fantasy begins 
for the individual.  The subject can now use the object that has survived. (90, my 
additions in square brackets) 
 
 Now, how else does this link up, as by a string, with our Marxian developmental 
thesis?  It seems clear, of course, that there can be no simple ―paralleling‖ of individual 
development with social, cultural, and indeed, human world-historical development.  
Individual histories can be said to be limited to a single life experience while the socio-
cultural development of, say, peoples, regions, nations, and even hemispheres are 
multigenerational, shifting, and permeable, undergoing migrations, evolutions, 
revolutions.  Similarly, social groups cannot be said to have ―experiences‖ in the same 
way that individual‘s do.  So ontogeny (individual development) and phylogeny (cultural 
development) should neither be simply identified nor naively paralleled.  That said, we 
can still point out that, and continue to examine how, ontogeny and phylogeny are 
necessarily and intimately imbricated through the objective symbolization of the 
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primitively accumulative.  Between individual and cultural growth is the crossing over of 
objectivity and intersubjectivity, the reflection of the one in the other.  Thus, 
individuation requires symbolic socialization (where symbols join and separate 
individuals in their distinction) just as forms of social organization hinge upon 
symbolically mediating the antagonisms and identifications (which, primitively speaking, 
can‘t be firmly distinguished) between individuals.  And as our basic cultural rites of 
passage, our daily emotional changes and developments, as well as our potential for 
personal crises make clear, individuals certainly experience more or less private shifts, 
permutations, and even revolutions in relation to the ―objects‖ of their attachment and 
detachment.  No adult has failed to fall in and out of love, managing this experience in 
this or that way through inherited tendencies distilled through prehistorically immemorial 
conflicts and partial resolutions.  Thus, while it can still be said that cultures don‘t have 
―experiences,‖ they nonetheless embody tendencies and limits — experienced as 
customs, then as laws, then as this or that kind of state, for instance — which limit and 
channel the kinds of experiences which are possible for each culture.  Reciprocally, while 
it still can be said individuals aren‘t themselves comprised of multiple individuals, they 
nonetheless coalesce as individuals only through the somatization and objectification of 
their primitive fragmentations, the latter being the symptoms of the necessary dissolution 
of primitive unity.
136
  Notice in our account from Winnicott in this regard that the 
individual ego is not just punctuated but even originates, as it were, in and through an 
objectively (in)visibilized destruction, a primitive accumulation.   
                                                   
136
 Schizoid symptoms such as multiple personality disorder are possible, on this view, to the degree that 
every individual is made of up a multiplicity of primitive aspects of self, a multiplicity which can coalesce, 
when the parents are regarded by the child as ―good enough‖, in the child‘s use of objects, his or her 
creative and cultural activity.  Schizoid symptoms can appear when the parents are regarded as not good 
enough. 
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 What is birth?  It is a literally and metaphorically bloody detachment, at least at 
first—where this blood (and the danger of dirt, too) symbolizes the loss of something 
impossible to experience which, nonetheless, can eventually be conceptualized, under 
scientific maturation, as primitive identification.  Indeed, in relation to Marx we should 
notice that Winnicott here links the creation of value, and thus the impulse for finding 
value in objects of exchange between self and (m)other, in a seemingly and not-so-
seemingly total divorce, a split that isn‘t so much consciously remembered as it‘s lost and 
preserved or, to use a more recognizable psychoanalytic term, as it‘s sublimated into 
objective value form.  As an object of value, the breast comes first, together with and as 
lost by the mouth.  But then there is the thumb, the pacifier, stinky gifts, toys, and all 
sorts of other cultural objects of communicative value — such as the picture book, the 
commodity, money, the alphabet, etc — all of which are both expansions of and removes 
from this primitive identification and destruction.  These objects meet needs, in other 
words, by partially distorting, and so forgetting — by tucking into unconscious fantasy 
— the deathly elements of primitive life.  Value thus (mis)presents, it presents while 
misrepresenting (and vice versa), a perfection and destruction, an accumulative splitting 
of primitive unity which, in and as an emergent objectivity for building or attacking 
community, goes the way of and remains a communicative trace.  It is and remains a 
trace, a cipher, however, as we‘ll continue to see, to the degree that this objectivity can 
only ever signify that primitive accumulation is something now apparently not present.  
In short, total destruction ―vanishes,‖ true enough, but, as we saw Marx show with regard 
to money, it vanishes in and as its results, in and as objects of sacred inscriptive value.  
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Cultural and social life arises out of ―death‖ in precisely this way, such that the world 
takes on meanings that are partially forgetful of primitive identity and its destruction.  
 But we can also put this more simply, focusing for the moment on the hiero of 
hieroglyphics:  The object is sacred, even if and when we have trouble seeing or 
remembering this, precisely to the degree that, for the baby, especially at first, the entire 
world is at stake in the presence and absence of the mother, and eventually, in and as this 
or that more or less pacifying object.  Indeed, this sacredness is necessarily interpreted in 
the direction of what we would now call ―religion‖ to the degree that the initial process of 
distinguishing between internal and external, between subject and object, pivots on the 
mother‘s survival beyond ―death‖ and ―destruction.‖  This is no doubt why Winnicott, 
following Freud, uses the term ―omnipotence‖ to describe primitive identification.  The 
term refers to the sacred as a power of wishing the first particular wishes of which will 
pivot on resurrecting the dead in this or that reflective commonplace, making magic and 
religion possible as objective forms of historical fantasy.  The transitional object is 
mediated and mediating, then, despite and in the destruction of omnipotence—where the 
―of‖ in this phrase ―destruction of omnipotence‖ must again be taken in the double sense 
of the genitive, namely, as the destruction which kills omnipotence, and yet also as a 
power of destroying which belongs to an omnipotence which remains.  The sacred is both 
of these at once.  It both represents the destruction of omnipotence and at the same time, 
in a perhaps more primitive sense, it still presents this destruction which — if especially 
Winnicott and Todorov are right — hinges on the incantations of primitive feeding and 
sacrifice.   
 208 
 Indeed, in considering the birth of ―modernity‖ as a process of literal and 
metaphorical globalization,  Todorov offers in his Conquest of America, by examining 
the ―causes‖ of the Spanish conquest of the Aztecs, what we hope to show to be both a 
―Winnicottian‖ and ―Marxian‖ developmental thesis.  Todorov first considers a now-
familiar series of factors or ―causes,‖ all of which are important:  Important first of all in 
the conquest of Mexico is the military aid the Spaniards receive from the Tlaxcaltecs and 
other tribes who are resentful of their brutal Aztec overlords; there‘s also the melancholic 
and indecisive behavior of Montezuma II, the Aztec emperor, as we‘ll mention below; 
and, again, and especially, since no one fails to mention these, there‘s the biological and 
technical military advantages enjoyed by the Europeans over the Amerindians.  These 
various factors are neatly summarized and analyzed by Jared Diamond (1999), for 
example, who also examines the development and fall of other cultures in relation to ―the 
West,‖ in his book Guns, Germs, and Steel.  By the end of Conquest of America, 
however, Todorov has shifted his focus from what he calls a ―typological schema,‖ or 
what I would call a merely structural schema, to a ―developmental‖ and ―symbolical‖ 
analysis.  Indeed, to the usual question concerning the fall of the Aztec, Mayan, and 
Incan empires — how did a few hundred Spanish soldiers (in the first and third cases, 
especially) defeat these civilizations with their standing, trained armies of hundreds of 
thousands of men? — Todorov adds another question and prioritizes it well beyond the 
interests of Diamond and others:  ―Did the Spaniards defeat the Indians by means of 
signs?‖ (62).    
 His implied and argued answer, of course, is, largely, yes.  The irony, however, is 
that this response of ―largely, yes‖ is also, in a very particular sense, the response the 
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Indians give.  Indeed, while Todorov doesn‘t put it exactly in these terms, he argues that 
there is something hieroglyphically significant about the modernity which emerges with 
the literal movement and instantiation of globalization.  According to Todorov:  
 
I shall not attempt to deny the importance of these [traditionally rehearsed and 
studied] factors, but rather to find a common basis for them which permits us to 
articulate and understand them, and at the same time to add many others of which less 
account appears to have been taken.  In doing so, I tend to take literally one reason for 
the conquest/defeat that we find in the West, doubtless being regarded as a purely 
poetic formula.  The testimony of Indian accounts, which is a description rather than 
an explanation, asserts that everything happened because the Mayas and the Aztecs 
lost control of communication.  The language of the gods has become unintelligible, 
or else the gods fell silent….The Maya book Chilam Balam reiterates this piercing 
question, which can no longer receive an answer:  ―Where is the prophet, where is the 
priest who will give the true meaning of the language of this book?‖ (24).  As for the 
Aztecs, they describe the beginning of their own end as a silence that falls: the gods 
no longer speak to them.  ―They asked the gods to grant them their favors and the 
victory against the Spaniards and their other enemies.  But it must have been too late, 
for they had no further answer from their oracles; then they regarded the gods as mute 
or as dead‖ (Duran, III, 77).  [Todorov, 61-2] 
 
Notice that Todorov himself is here concerned to point out that what he‘s 
focusing on is bound to be taken by many readers — readers, say, of alphabets — ―as a 
purely poetic formula,‖ as merely metaphorical, while yet he tends to take literally the 
Mayan and Aztec description of the silenced or dead gods and oracles (without 
necessarily believing in these gods, oracles, or in God!).  Metaphor and literalness are 
thus again at issue in and through a magical sacralization, as they were more subtly in 
Marx.  Indeed, this concern itself maps onto the apparently divided communicative 
realms belonging, as if exclusively, to these respective cultural hemispheres.  Todorov 
thus asks:  ―Would it be forcing the meaning of ‗communication‘ to say, starting from 
this point, that there exist two major forms of communication, one between man and 
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man, the other between man and the world, and then to observe that the Indians cultivate 
chiefly the latter, the Spaniards the former?‖ (69).   
The Aztecs are constantly communicating with and through nature, that is, 
through natural objects, through the ―ghosts‖ that inhabit nature, through its signs, its 
gifts, its auguries, its sacred animals and totems, its crazed and benevolent ancestors.  
Destiny, omens, and prophecy play a special and prominent role, as we‘ll see.  Politically 
speaking, there is an elite caste or ―class‖ of rulers and priests; their status, however, is 
guaranteed not through the civic consent of all adults but through the patriarchal and 
continued recitation of honored oral traditions.  These traditions are commanded and 
obeyed, for the most part, in and for the order and maintenance of society.  Indeed, the 
partly-divine ―emperor‖ is strict and brutal, the head of a line of elite authoritarian priests.  
Indeed, regarding the gods, their rule is often especially brutal.  The sun-god, for 
instance, as we know, is thought to demand the sacrifice of human victims.  We should 
notice, however, that state command does not appear in a merely oral or verbal sense but 
through a combination of oral tradition and command, on the one hand, and the 
interpretation of symbolic texts, on the other.  So this moves us back into the territory of 
the glyphic, the process of inscription which makes territory something worth living and 
dying for in processes of deterritorialization, as Deleuze and Guattari might put it.  In 
Aztec inscription, pictography (drawings which picture things) blends with ideography 
(drawings meant to picture ideas), but there is not as yet a glyphic approach to 
symbolizing the sounds of verbalized speech.  ―Hieroglyphics,‖ by the way, usually 
refers to the form of writing which is both pictographic and yet incorporates rudimentary 
elements of inscribed speech-sounds (phonemes).  We‘ll return to this later.   
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In any case, and developmentally and philosophically speaking, the glyphing of 
meaning in Aztec writing is still largely ―literal,‖ that is, it‘s literal to the degree that the 
pictography is often carved into stone, gold, and other materials in the form of reliefs, 
icons, and idols;  and in this sense the glyph doesn‘t just depict the world but is an 
inscriptive part, a powerful marking of the world, of the world as sacred.  That is, these 
symbolic objects aren‘t simply ―representational‖ of some other story or sociality, a 
sacredness ―beyond‖ but, since literally sacred, they are fetishized as if they ―themselves‖ 
possessed a divine or at least spiritual power of world-destruction and world-
construction.   They are of course linked to a sacred oral tradition, for instance — in the 
songs and chants and stories passed down through priestly lines and training — but they 
are also linked to everyday religious objects, dreams, auguries, and signs;  indeed, they 
are linked to celestial objects, to the sun and moon as guardian gods, for instance, and so 
to the architecture, the textures and hollows carved into mother earth as shelters and 
sacred spaces, which the sun and moon have already determined and ―designated,‖ as it 
were, in and through their paths of light and shadow.
137
  The sacred texts don‘t just 
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 While this can be said of the Maya and Aztec worlds as well, the Anasazi Indians of Chaco Canyon are 
perhaps the best example of how an Amerindian culture took its cues for building society from nature, and 
specifically the movement of celestial bodies.  The very location of Chaco‘s regional cities and sites, let 
alone its places of worship (Kivas) and even its housing, its objects, even the very windows of its buildings 
and structures, were all ―determined‖ by the play and movement of light and shadow upon the landscape as 
cast by the sun and moon. See the film by:  Sofaer, Anna, 1999, The Mystery of Chaco Canyon, 56 minutes, 
ISBN: 1-56029-812-X, The Solstice Project.  As Sofaer (1997) has put it, ―in many Pueblo traditions, the 
people emerged in the north from the worlds below and traveled to the south in search of the sacred middle 
place. The joining of the cardinal and solstice directions with the nadir and the zenith frequently defines, in 
Pueblo ceremony and myth, that sacred middle place. It is a center around which the recurring solar and 
lunar cycles revolve. Chaco Canyon may have been such a center place and a place of mediation and 
transition between these cycles and between the worlds of the living and the dead‖.  Quoting Broda and 
Aveni, she observes, further, ―that ‗the coordination of space and time in the Mesoamerican cosmology 
found its expression in the orientations of pyramids and architectural complexes‘ and in the relationships of 
these complexes to outlying topography and buildings.  Ceremonies related to the dead and timed to the 
astronomical cycles occurred in Mesoamerican centers. In central structures of the ceremonial complexes, 
light markings commemorated the zenith passage of the sun. Certain of the ceremonial centers were 
organized on axes close to the cardinal directions‖.  See also http://www.solsticeproject.org/primarch.htm.  
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narrate, in this regard, but are a significant and signifying part of a giant cyclical 
cosmological script; like the sun casting shadowy signs upon the earth, determining 
architecture, the pictographs also carve the world up into signs and marks which foretell 
movements and events, both natural and social (to the degree that these aren‘t clearly 
distinguished).   
The Aztec calendar is incredibly important in this regard.  Running in cycles of 
fifty-two years, each cycle, determined ―as it were‖ by the celestial orbits of the sun, 
moon, and stars, is thought to be a reduplication of a prior cycle, a cycle which to this 
degree isn‘t exactly ―past‖ but, since part of a series of repetitions, is already foretold.  
But it is not just foretold in though and belief.  Here the Aztecs practice what Žižek calls 
the ―objectivity of belief.‖  The ―future‖ becomes predictable, and necessarily so, to the 
degree that it has in some obscure (or all too clear) way already happened in the form of 
objects amidst a fantastically meaningful causal influence.   Everyday social life ends up 
being a giant network of mantic symbolizations:   
 
Chief among these is cyclical divination (of which, among us, astrology is an 
example).  The Aztecs possess a religious calendar of thirteen months of twenty days; 
each of these days possesses its own character, propitious or unlucky, which is 
transmitted to actions performed on that day and even more to the persons born on it.  
To know someone‘s birthday is to know his fate…. [Todorov again quotes Durán:] 
―When a boy or girl was born, the father or relatives of the babe immediately went to 
visit the astrologers, sorcerers, or soothsayers, who were plentiful, begging them to 
state the destiny of the newborn boy or girl […].  Once the character of the day had 
been seen, prophecies were uttered, lots were cast, and a propitious or evil fate for the 
babe was determined by the consultation of a paper painted with all the gods they 
adored, each idol drawn in the square reserved for him…. One could learn whether 
the child was to be rich or poor, brave or cowardly, a priest or a married man, a thief 
or a drunkard, abstemious or lustful—all these things could be found in those 
prophetic pictures‖ (Durán II, 2).  [Todorov, 63-4] 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Thus, mother earth‘s body is inscribed and redesigned according to the ceremonial cycles of the union and 
separation of mother moon and father sun, as it were.   
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The calendar, then, plays a ―causal‖ role in this determinative influence.  In our 
language, the pictographs don‘t just ―represent‖ what will happen as by mere 
―illustration‖ but also, more primitively, and as an illustration, they present the possibility 
of this happening in the form of an illusion looking for objective appearance.  And the 
objective appearance happens quasi-naturally, for nature is distorted in the making of 
culture.  The rock is carved, opened up together with the social body.  To ―interpret‖ the  
pictograms is in this way not simply to read the past but to write the future as well, to 
bring about that which must happen since it has already been inscribed a number of 
times, apparently, and so is ―bound,‖ as it were, to happen yet again.138  This weighs on 
the ―psychology‖ of its cultural participants, then, like a stream carries a motorless boat.  
Again, since the pictograms don‘t just narrate but help to cast the world as if through a 
concretizing and productive spell, the Aztecs, for their part, ―know‖ when something is 
approaching its end, demanding a new beginning.  This is self-fulfilling prophecy of a 
sort, that isn‘t relegated to self but, much more powerfully as yet, is already determined 
in the movement of ―social‖ objects.  With the power to determine, some of these 
―things‖ are actually sacred, alive with the power of good and/or evil, health and/or 
sickness, life and/or death.  (What‘s being recycled here, as we shall see, is primitive 
accumulation, the end, beginning, redevelopment, and redestruction of the world, and of 
its loves and hates.) As Todorov elaborates:   
 
To this preestablished and systematic interpretation, which derives from the fixed 
character of each calendar day, is added a second, contextual kind of divination, 
which takes the form of omens.  Every event the least bit out of the ordinary, 
departing from the established order, will be interpreted as the herald of another 
event, generally an unlucky one, still to come (which implies that nothing in this 
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 Indeed, this is a common trait of archaic cyclical calendars, of which the Aztec is quite advanced (much 
more advanced than Greco-Roman astrology, if I understand this correctly).   
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world occurs randomly).  For instance, that a prisoner should become depressed is an 
evil omen, for the Aztecs did not expect any such thing [!].  Or that a bird should cry 
out at a specific moment, or a mouse run through the temple, or that one might make 
a slip of the tongue, or have a certain dream.  Sometimes, it is true, these omens are 
phenomena that are not only rare but distinctly supernatural…. The [soothsayer] 
replies by resorting to one of his habitual techniques of divination: by water, by 
grains of corn, by cotton threads [threads attached to a spool?].  This prognostication, 
which makes it possible to know whether an absent person is living or dead [da or 
fort], whether or not a sick person will recover [will be da or fort], whether or not an 
unfaithful husband will return to his wife [da or fort], continues in the form of actual 
prophecies, and we find the great Aztec leaders regularly consulting soothsayers 
before undertaking any important activity.  Further still, without their being asked, 
various individuals declare they have been in communication with the gods and 
proceed to foretell the future.  The whole history of the Aztecs, as it is narrated in 
their own chronicles, consists of realizations of anterior prophecies, as if the event 
could not occur unless it has been previously announced:139 departure from a place of 
origin, choice of new settlement, victory or defeat.  Here only what has already been 
Word can become Act.  The Aztecs are convinced that all such divinations come true, 
and only very rarely attempt to resist the fate declared to them; in Maya, the same 
word signifies ‗prophecy‘ and ‗law‘…. And such things indeed come to pass, since 
men do their best to bring them about; in other cases the prophecy is all the more 
accurate in that it will be formulated only in a retrospective fashion…. Hence, it is 
society as a whole —  by intermediary of the priests, who are merely the repository of 
social knowledge — that decides the fate of the individual, who is thereby not an 
individual in the sense we usually give this word. (65-67, my emphases, my square 
brackets)  
 
Of course, this ―world communication‖ of objective prophecy and magic differs 
greatly from the more or less utilitarian and secular ―inter-human‖ communication (to 
borrow Todorov‘s vocabulary) which is practiced — more self-reflectively and linearly at 
least — by the European visitors.  Indeed, according to Todorov, inter-human 
communication is initially ―victorious‖ in this confrontation to the degree that it is much 
more improvisational, spontaneous, strategic, linear, utilitarian, aggressive, and certainly 
more technologically and individualistically oriented than the ―world communication‖ of 
pre-modern mantic symbolization (i.e. of fetishism).  ―Victory,‖ however, does not imply 
any European communicative superiority.  For democide is not to be valued: 
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 This sounds strangely familiar to me. 
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This victory from which we all derive, Europeans and Americans both, delivers as 
well a terrible blow to our capacity to feel in harmony with the world, to belong to a 
preestablished order; its effect is to repress man‘s communication with the world, to 
produce the illusion that all communication is inter-human communication; the 
silence of the gods weighs upon the camp of the Europeans as much as that of the 
Indians.… The victory was already big with its defeat; but this Cortés could not 
know. (97) 
 
  Following Marx first of all, but now with Todorov and Winnicott as allies, I 
want to continue to explore the meaning of ―primitivity‖ as it‘s passed between cultures 
of mutual ―otherness.‖  In what sense, if it all, can we say that development, and in 
particular the development of modernity and of modern individuality (with its 
individualism), necessarily hinges on the destruction and symbolic effectivity of 
primitive accumulation?  And is it right to suggest that destruction can always, from 
another perspective, be an ―accumulation,‖ an appropriation with developmental 
potential?  I certainly don‘t want to throw out the notion and actuality of victimization.   
In the conquest of America, which really was and is a conquest, the native Americans are 
its victims.  What is it, something like 20 to 30 million Indians who die in the conquest?  
The numbers are staggering when one feels what they represent.  But more widely, my 
idea is to show that victimage doesn‘t rest on aggressive intent and technologically 
produced injury alone, nor simply on historically ―obvious‖ and obviously ―historical‖ 
factors like the presence and use of ―guns, germs, and steel.‖  Rather, more critically, 
which is to say more deeply, widely, and meaningfully, I want to emphasize that and how 
this tragedy is secretly conditioned through the mutual inheritance of a prehistorical, 
which is to say preverbal and to this degree a pre-dialectical, ―accumulation‖:  In the 
confrontation between the Europeans and the Amerindians, the Europeans are so 
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aggressive and democidal since they repress their primitivity in their technological and 
monolithic (mis)understanding of objectivity; on the other hand, the Amerindians, who 
are isolated from European, African, and Asian symbolism and war for upwards of 
30,000 years, are symbolically and so practically underprepared to resist such a 
repression.  The Indians are largely decimated not simply through ―guns, germs, and 
steel,‖ then, but through a sub-dialectics of primitive accumulation (conditioning the 
cultural production of guns, germs, and steel) which exists between themselves and the 
Europeans, both.  Modernity is not just borne out of European imperialism and 
Amerindian primitivity, in other words, but, more accurately and widely, more 
objectively, out of the conflict between European primitivity (in its monotheistic denial 
of magic) and Amerindian primitivity (in its magic-saturated structures of thinking).  
Both sides ―act‖ like children, we might even say, at least with respect to each other, even 
if the actors are principally adults in their own society.  Thus, more specifically, I hope to 
show, more still, that this crisis pivots precisely on a clash and exchange of cultural 
objectivities the ―objective‖ character of which hinges on inscriptive miscommunications 
regarding the illusion and disillusion of the sacred.
140
  The modern commodity and 
modern money, which develops out of this clash and exchange, is, again, the hieroglyph 
of untold primitive accumulations which have divided and, through the commodity and 
money, also united human cultures since the early epochs of humanization hundred of 
thousands of years ago.   
And yet, this is something we must stress as well:  It is in the ―nature‖ of 
―traumatological‖ development that there can be no ―direct cognitive evidence‖ for these 
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 This will be difficult for positivists and behaviorialists to see in words spelled and cast through 
alphabetic inscription, but I must say it nonetheless, hoping as I am to make a mutually educative 
exchange.   
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conclusions, drawn and pictured as they are, and only can be, in, of, and from traces, 
from the hieroglyphs of early human development.
141
  Since primitive accumulation is 
the secret condition of and for history, and since its roots remain underground to some 
degree even when they are dug up in their golden ―telling‖ splendor, this means that even 
when historical self-consciousness arrives, in the form of enlightenment philosophy for 
instance, it will never be fully able to ―grasp‖ the primitive, to positivistically relegate all 
history to knowledge and all knowledge to the historical.  For the primitive only arrives 
in shards and residues, as we‘ve seen, and indeed, on this theory, the mature and the 
developed are seasoned and distorted forms of primitivity.  The world is born(e) of ruins, 
of gaps, of distances and ―first contacts,‖ and so of prehistorical encounters the scientific 
evidence for which there are only various clues.
142
  So what do these strange and 
disparate marks mean?   
 Let‘s analyze the supposed Aztec deification of Cortés and his band of 
conquistadors, a highly contested area of research, in this regard:  How can we ―prove‖ 
that this supposed deification, and others supposedly like it, ―actually happened‖?  
Indeed, how do we ―prove‖ this thesis in the face of the criticism that the Europeans 
themselves propagated this idea to further their imperialist agendas? Obeyesekere 
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 See our Conclusion, below. 
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 When Freud moves his initial discussion of trauma in Beyond the Pleasure Principle into a discussion 
on children‘s play, he marks this transition with a gap, a short break in the text.  So while on the one hand 
there seems to be no connection between trauma and play — Freud says he is ―leaving‖ trauma behind to 
study play — I read this as Freud showing us that there is a kind of connection, albeit a secret, submerged 
one:  Since the object of play sends the most primitive of destructions into unconsciousness, those 
destructions always lie latent, as it were, both behind and in the object; so while the object puts a gap 
between it and the trauma of destruction, it also marks that destruction, and so is ―connected‖ to it through 
this marking.  That is, there is a kind of connection between objectification and trauma but this 
―connection‖ cannot appear in a positivistic form of ―evidence‖ for the unconscious since this ―evidence‖ is 
not just of a connection but largely of a gap, a necessary missing link to primitive destruction.  The 
empirical world of the objects of experience, we might say, is ―itself‖ precisely the sign that consciousness 
has left some unknowable X behind, and that this X is now directly inaccessible precisely ―because‖ of this 
consciousness.  Consciousness gets in its own way in producing evidence of the unconscious, as it were. 
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famously argues against Marshall Sahlins, for instance, that the idea of Indians 
apotheosizing Europeans is a myth invented by the Europeans as an ideological 
justification for, and indeed a weapon of, colonial imposition and violence.  To suggest 
that certain Polynesian, native American, or various other indigenous groups ―revered‖ 
the European explorers is to paint the former groups as in need of ―civilization,‖ which 
―need‖ can be used to justify colonialization, to impose it.143   By contrast, a number of 
anthropologists, archaeologists, and historians, such as Christopher Miller, George 
Hamell, Bruce Trigger, and Dorothy Hosler, as well as Sahlins, have unearthed various 
clues which support, in their view and in mine, the deification thesis.  Miller and Hamell 
mention a report, for instance, written by a sixteenth century Moravian missionary.  This 
missionary was told a story, verbally of course, by ―aged and respected Delawares, 
Momeys, and Mahicanni of the first Europeans‘ arrival at Manhattan Island.  Their 
ancestors had originally mistaken the Europeans‘ approaching ship as a large fish, but as 
it got closer they concluded ‗it to be a large canoe or house, in which the great Manito 
himself was, and that he probably was coming to visit them‖ (320).144  Salutations, 
sacrifices, and various magical ceremonies were thus prepared.  A similar tradition tells 
us that these natives took the first ship they saw ―for a walking Island, the Mast to be a 
Tree, the Saile white Clouds, and the discharging of Ordinance for Lightning and 
Thunder…. they manned out their cannowes and goe and picke strawberries there‖ 
(320).
145
   Indeed, Todorov himself also mentions the apparent deification of Columbus, 
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 Obeyesekere, 1992. 
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 Miller and Hamell, 1986, 311-328. 
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 For more on this general notion of apotheosis or deification of the Europeans, see Sahlins, 1981 and 
1995.  Also see Clayton (1996) regarding the natives of Nootka Bay, near present-day Vancouver Island: 
―In 1792 Native people told a Spanish botanist that they thought the Spanish ship was ―Quautz‖ (a deity), 
who was coming ‗to punish the misdeeds of the people.‘  Fear eventually gave way to curiosity, however, 
and there was some trade between the two groups.  These Native perceptions might usefully be put together 
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most obviously at ―first contact‖:  On Oct 12th 1492, in and despite the difficulties 
involved in verbal communication between his crew and the Indians, the constant 
gesturing of the latter to the firmament leads Columbus to suggest that ―I think they 
believe we come from the sky‖ (Todorov 72).146  
Thus, while we cannot ―prove‖ that these deifications happened — in the 
positivistic sense of being able to repeatedly produce them in experiments! — our idea is 
to show that and how something on the order of deification is a necessary part, a stage, of 
the human developmental process, a process hinging, in Winnicottian terms, on 
omnipotence and then on the disillusion of omnipotence, making sacralizations and 
deifications possible in the prehistorical development of ―objectivity.‖  Thus, while it is 
certainly and horrifically true that the Europeans used and exploited this myth of 
deification to justify their colonization of ―the other‖ around the globe, this doesn‘t mean 
that this myth is not also something which happened objectively.  Objectivity is born and 
                                                                                                                                                       
with other ethnographic fragments dealing with the arrival of [captain James] Cook‘s ships.  In the early 
twentieth century, Chief Geore of Nootka Sound related a story about how, one day, the tops of three sticks 
were seen on the horizon.  The sticks were soon identified as a watercraft, and people thought that 
Haitetlik, the lightning snake, was propelling it.  Others considered it a salmon changed by magic.  Two 
chiefs thought it was the work of Quautz.  As the craft got closer ‗all the men and women grew very much 
afraid,‘ and people were advised to hide.  ‗A woman doctor named Hahatsaik, who had power over all 
kinds of salmon, appeared with a whalebone rattle in each hand; she put on her red cedar bark cape and 
apron and sang, saying that it must be a salmon turned into a boat.‘ She called out: ‗Hello you, you spring 
salmon, hello you dog salmon, hello you coho salmon.‘… In a Native account related by Winifred David, 
the Native people of the Sound ‗didn‘t know what on earth‘ was approaching.  Two canoes of warriors 
were sent out to see, and thought it was a ‗fish come alive with people.‘  The warriors took a good look at 
the men on deck.  One of them, with a hooked nose, was thought to be a dog salmon.  A hunchback sailor 
was in Native eyes a humpback salmon.  The warriors reported home that this thing contained fish ‗come 
here as people‘‖ (106-8).   
146
 Similarly, according to Las Casas (chapter 31) in early December 1492, ―while the sailors were fishing 
on the shore, three Christians set out through the woods, where they met a group of Indians…. As soon as 
these natives saw the Christians approaching them they ran in terror to the thickest of the woods unhindered 
by any cloak or skirts.  The Christians ran in pursuit hoping to have speech with them….The next day 
[Columbus] sent nine men ashore well armed, who found nine leagues away a village of more than a 
thousand houses scattered about a valley.  When the inhabitants saw the Christians, they all rushed out of 
the village and fled into the woods.  But the Indian interpreter from San Salvador, who was with our men, 
went after them and shouted words of encouragement, saying much in praise of the Christians and 
affirming that they had come from the sky.  The natives then returned, and in awe and wonder they placed 
their hands on the heads of our men as a mark of honor and took them off to a feast, giving them everything 
they asked for without demanding anything in return‖ (85-86, The Four Voyages).  
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borne of illusion and disillusion, in gradual expansion and circumscription of objectivity.  
Indeed, an analysis of the objects of value in prehistorical exchange will prove most 
useful to us in this regard. 
According to Todorov, for instance, because the Europeans appear so alien (and 
yet somehow familiar as well), the Aztecs are unable to incorporate their arrival into 
Aztec codes for understanding human otherness and communication, or rather, if we are 
to be more specific than Todorov is here, for understanding living human otherness and 
communication.  A particular form of object exchange results by default:   
 
For Montezuma, differences between Aztecs, Tlaxcaltecs, and Chichimecs exist, of 
course, but they are immediately absorbed into the internal hierarchy of the Aztec 
world; the others are those who are subjugated and among whom are recruited the 
sacrificial victims.  But even in the most extreme cases there is no sentiment of 
absolute strangeness; of the Totonacs, for instance, the Aztecs say both that they 
speak a barbarous language and that they lead a civilized life—i.e. one that can 
appear as such to Aztec eyes.  Now, the otherness of the Spaniards is much more 
radical.  The first witnesses of their arrival hasten to report their impressions to 
Montezuma:  ―We must tell him what we have seen, and this is a terrifying thing:  
nothing of the kind has ever been seen‖ (Florentine Codex, XII, 6).  Unable to 
integrate them into the category of the Totonacs — whose alterity is not as radical — 
the Aztecs, faced with the Spaniards, renounce their entire system of human otherness 
and find themselves obliged to resort to the only other device available:  the exchange 
with the gods. (76) 
 
 How, then, can we ―justify‖ this interpretation?  The key is understand why and 
how, as Todorov suggests here, this encounter is both radical and, in this radicality, 
posits a sacralized world.  We can return to Marx in this regard:  If Marx is right that 
fetishism is linked, secretly of course, to primitive accumulation, then his linking of 
commodity and money fetishism to divine figures and figurations should also be taken 
seriously, and taken, moreover, not merely analogically.  To the degree that presentation 
hides behind and in representation, the fact that commodities and money appear as 
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―autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter into relations both 
with each other and with the human race‖ means that, at a level of thinking ―we 
moderns‖ can perhaps barely remember, money bears the sacred within it.  Money is a 
fetishized objective power to organize society, for instance.  Indeed, how soon we forget 
that ―money‖ was regarded and treated, that it was ritualized as magical not just in 
―other‖ parts of the world but also in Europe, especially in peasant societies, prior to its 
modern secularization.  Money was at least a quasi-magical object everywhere.  It is not 
Montezuma but Columbus, as we‘ll see a bit later, who tells us that gold ―can even enable 
souls to enter Paradise.‖  This is not to say that peasant cultures treat gold and other 
money-like elements and objects like we treat modern money.  Rather, these objects 
serve as obligatory gifts of reverence and influence, especially in relations like that of 
king and subject, and of lord and serf.
147
  According to the art historian Henry Maguire, 
for instance, ―in the early Middle Ages, as in the late Roman period, coins had value not 
only in the physical world of human exchange but also in the invisible world of spirits 
and demons.  Their ability to act in both places derived from the general medieval 
tendency to invest precious substances, such as gold, silver, and gemstones, with value in 
both the earthly and spiritual realms‖ (1039).148  Indeed, Maguire points out that coins 
were worn during this period as charms, as apotropaic talismans, and found in Christian 
graves alongside various religious paraphernalia—thus linking gold to ―spirituality‖ and 
―divinity,‖ to magic and religiosity, quite directly.  But this also points, then, to a 
developmental process of (dis)illusion in the transition of the use of premodern ―money‖ 
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 We should remind ourselves that ―lord‖ is not a secular term even if the relation it designates alongside 
―serf‖ seems to be but a political and economic relation.  The authority of the ―lord‖ is not merely a 
―metaphorical‖ authority—that is, it isn‘t in a presentational sense. 
148
 See, for instance, Maguire, 1997.   
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into modern money:  What begins as a sacred (illusional) gift of communicable exchange, 
sacrifice, protection, and reverence develops through necessary failures — through the 
disillusion and primitive accumulations of intercultural contact — into the secular object 
we call ―money‖ with its abstract ―value.‖  Gold becomes ―representational‖ of abstract 
value to the degree that it‘s soon discovered that the cultural ―other‖ is far from divine.   
Indeed, related to the discovery that coins served as magical devices in Christian 
graves — coins here embodying meaning and health, love and memory — Hamell, 
Miller, Trigger, and Hosler each point out that in Amerindian mythical contexts, as in 
tribal or magical societies in general, the gods are rarely simply ―divine‖ or 
―otherworldly‖; rather, they are almost invariably and precisely relatives, more or less 
distant ancestors — Hamell and Miller call them ―great grandparents,‖ following various 
Indian lores — belonging to this or that line of kinship.   Later on, we‘ll examine Hamell 
and Miller‘s important examination of post-contact Indian grave objects.  For now, 
however, we need only to see that to the degree that these polytheistic and tribal gods are 
not all-powerful, rarely exhibit perfection, and invariably demand cyclical symbolic 
exchange with their flock, with their living relatives, they are more like what we would 
call ―demigods‖ or ―epic heroes.‖  Todorov reminds us in this regard that the Aztecs 
often deemed Cortés and his band ―teules,‖ which in Nahuatl means ―demigods,‖ 
―celestial messengers,‖ and certainly ―revered ancestors.‖  More particularly, Cortés 
himself is often thought by the Aztecs, as some of the cyclical legends and fifty-two year 
calendars hint in this or that inexact way, to be Quetzalcoatl, an important demigod, 
returning from the firmament in the east.  Actually, it is more complicated than this.  It is 
not known whether Cortés is just Quetzalcoatl or if he‘s a former Toltec ruler (usurped 
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by the Aztecs long ago to form the current empire, and so another kind of god) in the 
form of Quetzalcoatl, now looking for revenge after hundreds of years.
149
  And of course 
Cortés doesn‘t let this ―Toltec‖ anxiety and deification go unnoticed and unrewarded, 
especially in his communications (now rendered by La Malinche and other translators) 
with Montezuma.  He exploits the myth to full advantage as he mercilessly attacks the 
Aztecs, their army, their institutions, and their sacred sites, all while expropriating their 
cultural riches, their land, and their gold.  Such ―conveniency‖! 
In any case, when we recognize that the social elite and especially the rulers in 
many so-called magical cultures are revered as divine themselves; when we understand 
that these elite rulers derive their power of rule through kinship lines; when we see that 
the dead ancestors of legend are invariably revered as ―sacred‖ to the degree that they 
have (in a Winnicottian sense) survived death, that they continue to have influence over 
nature and society (even and especially from the land or realm of the dead);  when we see 
that they are protective and/or dangerous in this or that way, demanding communicative 
exchange in this or that sacrificial ritual, promising intervention in the affairs of men, 
often as beasts, in this or that way; when we recognize that for these peoples the world is 
filled with divine symbols, signs, events, auguries, omens, and promises; when we 
recognize all this, the idea of an Indian apotheosis of the Europeans isn‘t as shocking as it 
might first seem.  Indeed, the Indian gods are a lot like the Epicurean gods of the 
intermundia:  They are thought to occasionally visit, crossing between overworld and 
underworld, traveling within and beyond the world‘s rim into the ―potential space,‖ as it 
                                                   
149
 The Aztecs are haunted by their prehistorical inheritance, after a world accumulative conquest of their 
own, it turns out.   
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were, between the living and the dead.
150
  In short, if one‘s entire cosmology, one‘s very 
―world,‖ is steeped in divine symbology, in ancestral prognostication, in mantic favor and 
demonstration, and if these ―great-grandparents‖ invariably send messages of what 
happened in the past, and in relation to the past ―determine‖ what is actualizable as a 
future happening, leaving traces of their prior visits in the form of sacred determinative 
signs (in the very play of light and shadow, as we‘ll continue to see), then why wouldn‘t 
they return (da) from the land of the dead (fort) to call upon their kin?  For this lies in the 
nature of things.  If one goes for hike deep in the woods, breaking trail, for days or for 
weeks, one soon sees significance in (the significance of) natural forces, of animals and 
their signs, of certain natural objects. 
As soon as the Spaniards arrive, Montezuma knows (through a terrestrial network 
of spies and communicative relays) of their every move, of their encounters with this or 
that tribe, and of their becoming aware of the Aztec empire and of the ―emperor‖ or 
―lord‖ Montezuma himself.  Thus, as soon these ―beings‖ arrive, Montezuma and his 
priestly network begin their interpretation of the vast series of pictographs, the various 
traditional lore.   Who are these teules?  Why are some of them seemingly four-legged 
beasts, or attached to beasts? (Horses, it turns out.) And how did they arrive as from out 
of the sea, this great mother of things?  What is that craft?  How do they transform other 
tribes so quickly into their vassals?  What do they want?  Why are they here?  Questions 
such as these are asked…but…but what?  The divine symbols are conflicting and 
confusing;  indeed, the omens are ill; quite often, they don‘t seem to say anything.  They 
are, as we‘ve seen Todorov mention, mute; or at least retrospectively, after the conquest, 
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 See Hamell, 1992.  Let us add to this, however, recalling our Winnicottian analysis:  Don‘t the gods, like 
mom and dad, always return?  Or better:  When they return, are they alive or dead?  
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in yet another temporal fabulation, they‘re mute.  Montezuma‘s behavior is emblematic 
in this regard.  According to Todorov, 
 
During the first phase of the conquest, when the Spaniards are still close to the coast, 
the main message sent by Montezuma is that he does not want any exchange of 
messages to take place!  He receives his information clearly, but this does not please 
him…:  ―Montezuma lowered his head, and without answering a word, placed his 
hand upon his mouth.  In this way he remained for a long time.  He appeared to be 
dead or mute, since he was unable to give any answer‖ (Duran, III, 69)…. 
Montezuma is not simply alarmed by the content of the messages; he shows himself 
literally incapable of communicating, and the text establishes a significant parallel 
between ―mute‖ and ―dead‖…. ―And when Montezuma had heard that earnestly he 
was inquired after and asked about, that the gods urgently wished to behold him 
before their eyes, he felt torment and anguish in his heart‖ (Florentine Codex, XII, 89, 
p26).  According to Duran, Montezuma‘s first reaction is to want to hide in a deep 
cave.  According to the conquistadors, Montezuma‘s first messages declare that he 
will offer them everything in his kingdom, but on one condition:  that they renounce 
any desire to come and see him. (70-1) 
 
We have the feeling that the gods stopped speaking and communicating, well, as 
soon as the ―two sides‖ entered into battle, into ―physical‖ conflict.  Key here is to 
understand that the Aztecs battled the Europeans with what we would call ―conventional‖ 
spears, arrows, and shields, but that they also battled the Europeans with magic and 
magical objects, with symbolic warfare ―techniques.‖   True, these spears, arrows, and 
shields are themselves magically elaborated.  They are marked with this or that sacred 
significance.  But the Aztecs also employ what to us will seem like ―non-utilitarian‖ 
items.   In an early effort meant to prevent Cortés from marching towards Tenochtitlan, 
for instance, the Aztecs employ some ―sympathetic‖ magic.  They commission one of 
their artist-scribe-priests to paint a portrait of Cortés.  Once the portrait is ready, it is 
framed in gold and ―wielded‖ against the conquistadores.  Indeed, in another 
confrontation, they confront Cortés with an Aztec chief who is adorned to look (and does 
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look) a lot like him (88).  This magic of resemblances for purposes of war proves futile, 
of course, especially since so many of the ―magical‖ objects that the Aztecs put to use — 
we should mention it again — are made of gold.151  Similarly, in the Florentine Codex — 
which is a huge pictographic text of Aztec life, scribed by elder Aztec ―wise-men,‖ 
commissioned by the Spaniards following the fall of Tenochtitlan, and then partially 
translated into Spanish by scribes on both sides who had who had survived the initial year 
of war — in this text, a large chapter is devoted to the numerous magical ornaments and 
techniques used by the Aztec generals and warriors in warfare (see also Todorov 88-90).  
The research of Dorothy Hosler is important here.  As Hosler shows, the Aztecs 
and Tarascans, among others, used metal to create ―magical‖ sounds as an element in war 
and other primitive accumulative ceremonies.
152
  This is a warfare, then, or at least a form 
of defense in warfare, by gongs and, well-anti-musings, a practice which was somewhat 
effective, apparently, at least until the arrival of the Spanish:
153
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 See Davies (1987): ―The commodities of long-distance trade consisted mainly of luxury products such 
as quetzal  feathers, jade, obsidian, turquoise, gold products, and various kinds of elaborately designed 
articles of clothing.‖  Davies describes these goods as ―necessary luxuries‖ in the sense that they were 
indispensable symbols of social status. They also played an important part in Aztec warfare: ―The warriors‘ 
costumes, laboriously confected out of precious feathers and other costly items, were not exactly a ‗luxury‘. 
...these costumes served the practical purpose of striking terror into the enemy. Established convention and 
respect for the gods demanded that leading warriors should enter the fray thus gorgeously attired. Had they 
denied themselves this indispensable finery, the outraged gods would have granted not victory but defeat‖ 
(135). 
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 As Hosler (1995) puts it:  ―Here I explore the meaning of bell sounds and the colors of gold and silver in 
an effort to explain why these sounds and these colors played such key roles in shaping this prehistoric 
metallurgy. The importance of metallic colors, especially of gold and silver, in myth, shamanistic 
performance, cosmological schema and political ideology has been demonstrated for the central Andes and 
Colombia…. The West Mexican experiment is unique in that artisans achieved these culturally required 
golden and silvery colors through the unusual technical expedient of using the high-arsenic and high-tin 
bronzes. Although the mechanical properties of these alloys were required by the design characteristics of 
the objects, their colors were a matter of choice, accomplished by adding the alloying element in high 
concentrations. By generating metallic sound and these metallic colors, this ancient technology served 
primarily as a visual and auditory system that symbolically defined elite and sacred spheres of activity‖ 
(102). 
153
 Before we simply assume that the Spanish were totally unaffected by Aztec ―magic‖, however, let‘s 
recall, as Todorov does, that in his declining stages, and as success seems to have abandoned him, 
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West Mexican metallurgy developed between AD 600 and the Spanish invasion.  
Laboratory evidence shows that metalworkers used a variety of metals and alloys, 
including copper-tin and copper-arsenic bronze, to craft both tools and status items.  
Nonetheless, the primary technical focus was on two non-utilitarian properties of 
metal, its sound in bells and its golden and silvery colors in bells and sheet metal 
ornaments.  Ethnohistoric and linguistic evidence indicates that the sounds of the 
bells offered protection in war and structured rituals that celebrated fertility and 
regeneration.  Metallic colors, especially of gold and silver, were associated with the 
solar and lunar deities and a shimmering sacred paradise.  In focusing on metallic 
sounds and metallic colors, this metallurgical technology in large measure constituted 
a system of visual and aural symbols that created and recreated the experience of the 
sacred. (100, my emphasis) 
 
Notice how Hosler deems this use of sound both a ―technical‖ and ―non-
utilitarian‖ process together.  This is the use of a ―natural‖ substance in a ―social,‖ 
―physical,‖ and ―mental‖ way at once, all of which are overlaid within a shared 
―illusion,‖ I am suggesting, of a fantastic magical causality.  For whom the bell tolls here, 
we might say, the bell is social, mental, physical, and objectively magical, in a powerful 
way.  Indeed, the body is susceptible to many fantastic influences; but in traditional 
societies magic predominates, by developmental necessity, whereas magic has been 
disillusioned, which is to say repressed to this or that degree, in modern societies.  But of 
course this isn‘t to say that magic has completely disappeared.   
Gold is especially ―telling‖ in this regard.  For the Aztecs, gold and silver are 
literally divinities or aspects of divinity:  ―Golden‖ and dazzling, gold is the sun or an 
aspect of the sun (appearing as Huitzilopochtli, but also, before this, as Tezcatlipoca, 
Quetzalcoatl, Tlaloc, Chalchiuhtlicue, and Tonatuih, depending on the cycle and the 
queried priestly lineage), while silver is the moon or an aspect of the moon.  But gold is 
especially important because it‘s a residue — in fact, it‘s the feces, the first internal stuff 
                                                                                                                                                       
especially in his travels in Honduras, Cortés begins to believe in the power of Indian omens, no doubt like 
he once believed in the fates of  the nursery tales of his youth.   
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made external, as we shall see  — of the sun-god‘s movements as he dies each evening in 
the west, traveling eastward beneath the soil through the land of the dead, where, after 
arriving on the eastern horizon, he is reborn each morning, that is, if he is satisfied with 
the exchanges and sacrifices offered by his privileged human flock, the Aztecs.  Gold is 
thus a trace of the sun, or a visitation by the sun.  When discovered and transformed into 
a statue, a grand calendar, an idol which doesn‘t just represent but presents the sacred, for 
instance, gold brings light to the dark and life to the crops.  It ―(re)presents‖ the sun‘s 
―presence.‖  Indeed, much as Freud (in Beyond the Pleasure Principle) understands eros 
to have been birthed from thanatos, gold is associated with the birthing, the preverbal 
birthing as shitting, of life from death.
154
  As such, gold is good and bad, an ambivalent 
gift from and for the gods.  ―Like‖ the sun, it can heal or disease, feed or burn; it is a 
distilled, principal pharmakon, a placebo and nocebo (in our vocabulary) at once or in 
alternation.  Indeed, the sacred pictographic inscriptions will sometimes ―depict‖ the gods 
eating each other‘s excrement, in the form of gold, or eating gold, rendered to look like 
excrement, as offered by humans in sacrificial exchange.  Holy shit!  Holy eaters of 
shit!
155
   
Now, while Todorov doesn‘t research the various ―powers‖ attributed to gold in 
ancient Aztec culture at length, he succeeds in marking the ironic misunderstanding 
between the Europeans and Aztecs as this emergent relation is mediated, precisely, 
through the ―exchange‖ and ―consumption‖ of this ―object.‖  For instance, while 
Montezuma and the Indians constantly offer gold to Cortés and the Europeans as a gift of 
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extreme, which is to say sacred, value, this value is filled with contradiction or at least 
with paradox; for while of great worth, it‘s also offered as a gift of resistance, deferral, 
and defense, at least to the degree that, through it, these teules are supposed to return 
(fort) to their proper place in the cosmos as soon as they accept the gift (da): ―Indeed, 
most of the Indians‘ communications to the Spaniards are notable for their 
ineffectiveness.  In order to convince his visitors to leave the country, Montezuma sends 
gold each time: but nothing is more likely to persuade them to remain‖ (87).   Since gold 
is literally an object of sacred consumption, it is fit only for the stomachs — indeed, it 
also comes from the stomachs — of the gods.  It is the material of the divine digestion of 
experience and as such, should only be handled with extreme care by trained, priestly 
specialists:  ―The Spaniards behavior seems incomprehensible to them: ‗Why do they 
want this gold?  These gods must eat it; that could be the only reason they want so 
much.‘‖ (96, Todorov here cites the Relación de Michoacán, III, 26). 
 Adult humans, then, will not eat gold, at least directly— see our opening epigraph 
— but will transform it, in a Kantian sense, into an object of taste.  Indeed, let‘s look at 
the second epigraph in this regard.  Notice that Marx himself does not fail to notice that 
various tribal groups taste the gift objects they are given in their earliest exchanges with 
the Europeans.
156
  First, fetishism is framed as a form of what Todorov is calling ―world 
communication‖ but which we might more accurately call ―object communication‖:  
―Although invisible, the value of iron, linen, and corn exists in these very articles: it is 
signified through their equality with gold, even though this relation with gold exists only 
in their heads, so to speak.  The guardian of commodities must therefore lend them his 
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tongue, or hang a ticket on them, in order to communicate their prices to the outside 
world.‖  On the one hand, value is communicated — or as we‘ve been suggesting, it is 
―represented‖ — through these objects‘ equivalence with gold.  On the other hand, since 
the relation with gold exists ―in the heads‖ of the objects and since these objects certainly 
lack tongues, this value is and remains otherwise ―invisible‖; it is presented ―inside‖ the 
gold; except that, in another sense, as if to match, measure, and represent the value of 
these objects for ourselves cognitively, we speak for the objects in the form of what we 
call ―price.‖  My point, however, is that while our notion of price does this 
mathematically in and for cognition — ―in terms of imaginary gold,‖ as Marx says, and 
so at a more developed level of communicative abstraction — gold invariably also does 
this prehistorically and sacredly, as it were.  In what Derrida would call the 
indeterminacy of its status as a transcendental signified, value remains invisible and 
indeterminable.  ―Indeterminable‖ isn‘t quite right, though, to the degree that gold 
―speaks‖ of this value by reflectively incarnating or embodying it in a ―social‖ and 
―fantastic‖ relation with other objects.  Gold‘s worth thus ends up being reflectively 
―determined‖ in and through a play of indeterminates.  Thus gold ―becomes‖ a 
signification, and so a kind of articulation, of this sacred ―invisible‖ value.  It is the 
articulation of a primitively sacred meaning; it‘s an external sacred tongue, both ―as it 
were‖ and ―really.‖  For it bears the social force of what Lacan would call the real or 
what Hegel might call reality. 
  To this account, as we know, Marx attaches the following footnote:  ―Savages and 
semi-savages use the tongue differently.  Captain Parry says of the inhabitants of the west 
coast of Baffin‘s bay:  ‗In this case they licked it (the thing represented to them) twice to 
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their tongues after which they seemed to consider the bargain satisfactorily concluded‘‖ 
(189).  While Marx doesn‘t ―explicitly‖ articulate this idea, we might say that for him the 
tongue develops (like a theoretician, a world interpreter, indeed, as a kind of world 
discoverer) in the role it assumes not so much in direct feasting or consumption but, first 
of all, in and through a kind of ―feeding by artifice‖ which ―tastes‖ its object or object-
substitute, in quite the Kantian sense, through an art of partial consumption, a non-
pretentious pretend tasting.  This is how cultural feeding-activity begins.  It is cultural in 
part because it lies in and beyond animalistic feeding-activity (which Marx refers to, we 
recall, in the 1844 Manuscripts).157  This exchanging and tasting of goods is more 
thoughtful or reflective, then, than the sheer consumption of stomachic need.  Indeed, in 
the way that this incorporation by licking is largely ceremonial, so are the feasts which 
mark the standard ―first meetings‖ of the Native Americans and Europeans.  After a 
number of such feasts, of course, there is eventually a sorting out of foods ―proper‖ to 
each culture, items of consumption which explain, make, and maintain differences.  It is 
not just eating, but the ceremonials accompanying both eating and not eating, not eating 
but sharing, not eating but playing, but building, etc, from which culture develops and in 
which development gets located.  This is culture surviving consumption.  What‘s taking 
place here, then, is an initial distinguishing between literal and symbolic consumption, in 
and as the sacred object of cultural exchange.  This is another form, another root and 
route, of primitive accumulation.  
Marx thus continues the footnote:  ―In the same way, among the Eastern Eskimo, 
the exchanger licked each article on receiving it.  If the tongue is thus used in the North 
as the organ of appropriation, it is no wonder that in the South the stomach serves as the 
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organ of accumulated property, and that a Kaffir estimates the wealth of a man by the 
size of his belly.  The Kaffirs know what they‘re doing, for at the same time as the 
official British Health Report of 1864 was bemoaning the deficiency of fat-forming 
substances among a large part of the working class, a certain Dr. Harvey (not, however, 
the man who discovered the circulation of the blood) was doing well by advertising 
recipes for reducing the surplus fat of the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy‖ (190).  What‘s 
interesting for our purposes is not only the double ―analogizing‖ of North and South with 
mouth and stomach and with England and (South) Africa — a double analogization 
which at least with regard to the link between consumption and surplus-fat is again both 
metaphorical and literal at the same time, for while the workers are undernourished the 
bourgeoisie are fattened with a surplus — but important as well is the fact that the 
somatic symbolization of wealth among the Kaffirs is both repeated and supplemented in 
England, for in England it is not just ―the body‖ but money, an apparently merely 
―external‖ object which, symbolizing wealth and elite status, the status formerly called 
―lordship‖ (as we‘ll see), is also linked to fat, as if money weren‘t merely external to the 
―the body.‖  Indeed, in a presentational sense, money is not simply ―external,‖ as the 
belly of every starving or overfed person may in part ―tell‖ us.  (For who is to say, as 
well, who is overfed and underfed, to the degree that this has largely been conditioned by 
the dynamics of each of our preverbal ―experiences‖ with breast feeding.)  
Indeed, this is no doubt why maize, since golden yellow, and since the Indians‘ 
basic unit of food, since sustaining of life like the sun itself, and since directly dependent 
on the sun and its gifts, is associated with gold, which is, again, both a nutrient and waste 
product of the gods.  Here we again encounter the fact that different groups have their 
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different tastes, apparently.  The Aztec sun, in fact, is hungry like a human baby and must 
be fed human flesh — as from a breast — to be appeased, to keep active and motile, 
indeed, to remain ―alive‖ during the journey through the land of the dead every night.  
Gold, then, is an elaboration and indirection of this direct consumption; it symbolizes and 
enacts a differential social production.  Indeed, in a very specific and literal sense, it is 
dug up from, carved out of, mother earth‘s body and is then, eventually, exchanged as the 
stuff of life, first of all in sacrificial and sacred exchange but then, through further 
primitive accumulations, in ordinary socioeconomic exchange.  
 Let‘s return to Winnicott in this regard as we continue to explore the idea that 
cultural development proceeds both ontogenetically and phylogenetically together, as the 
imbrication and mutuality of individual and social conflict and objectification.  In 
Winnicott‘s excellent book The Piggle, for instance, Gabrielle is a little girl (aged two 
through five over the course of the book) who occasionally visits Dr. Winnicott for play 
therapy to help her manage and treat her worries.  One of the basic ―objects‖ of these 
worries is an ―imaginary‖ figure she calls ―the black mummy,‖ a figure she usually meets 
at night when she‘s sleeping — while the sun is traveling underground from west to east, 
as it were — but who often plagues her thoughts and even her vision during the day.  
Later, however, with Dr. Winnicott‘s help, she learns that the black mummy is ―a 
dream‖; indeed, through the use of the toy objects in Winnicott‘s office she learns both 
conceptually and, more importantly, experientially, about the difference between the 
objects of waking and dreaming.  This is an ordinary developmental-illusional process, 
but since for Gabrielle the process has been troubled and so delayed a bit, what is 
normally a distinctly preverbal form of development we here get to witness both more 
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―objectively‖ and verbally to the degree that Gabrielle can talk about her prehistoric 
worries.   She has been regressed in trauma, we might say, but for this trauma to remain 
one, it would not develop.  In any case, the black mummy is a fantasied primal imago 
belonging to a troubled weaning and mourning process that began with the sudden loss of 
her mother when her baby sister was born.  The black mummy substitutes for and covers 
over the shock of this loss, as if to rebuff, or rather, precisely to deny the loss instead of 
remembering and symbolizing it through normal ―objective‖ — which is here to say 
seriously and shareably playful — pathways.  As Winnicott puts it, the ―black mummy 
[is] a split-off version of mother, one that does not understand babies, or one who 
understands them so well that her absence or loss makes everything black‖ (120), such 
that ―here black is partly a defense, i.e., it is not not seeing me when I am absent instead 
of remembering me in my absence‖ (153).  The black mummy arrives, then, before 
Gabrielle has developed a distinct and useful memory system, a system where meaning is 
inscribed as the externalizing and external complement of ego experience.   
Where do we put our memories, especially our ―prehistorical‖ memories?  And 
what would the transformation of bad memories into good-enough memories look like? 
What if these bad memories are pre-memorial and archaic?  A response to these questions 
which cannot deny the persistence of the primitive should emphasize, I believe, a 
movement from darkness to enlightenment, not just metaphorically or analogically, while 
also noting that, how, and where this transitional movement ―takes place.‖  For example, 
after Gabrielle in prior sessions has begun to differentiate between waking and dreaming 
to some degree, in a new session with Winnicott something appears which is significant 
to our account of objective value in primitive encounters.  Playing among Winnicott‘s 
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toys, she takes a stuffed toy faun and begins to disgorge it of its sawdust filling from the 
inside out. And while doing this she tells  Dr. Winnicott the story of a dream—now 
clearly a dream where earlier she would have told such a story, likely about the black 
mummy, as if this dark ―object‖ belonged to her waking experience.  And in a sense it 
always was a part of her experience to the degree that both could ―see‖ it and voice it, tell 
us about it.  While the first illusion (of seeing a ―black mummy‖) belongs to her fantasy 
and denial of the memory of the loss of her mother, the second illusion is shared with us, 
and is to this degree more objective.  We see in this session, then, both a transition and an 
objectification, a transition in and through a (mis)objectification of dark and light wishes:   
 
Gabrielle:  One evening I had a bad dream.  It was about… I shut my eyes.  I saw a 
beautiful horse.  It was called Stallion.  It had gold on its ears and on its mane.  It is so 
very beautiful.  Gold, nice shiny gold [she put her hand between her legs].  The 
beautiful horse was coming and trampling on the wheat [she explained that wheat is a 
sort of corn].  
  
Winnicott: You are describing a picture of daddy on mummy making new babies, 
something to do with love.   
 
Gabrielle: Yes. (127)
158
 
 
…Gabrielle:  He [the stuffed faun] is doing his brrrrrrh [meaning feces]. 
 
and she emptied the sawdust, as much as she could, out of the faun‘s belly…. (130) 
 
While Gabrielle is no Aztec, here we witness part of a larger movement, through 
an accumulative destruction, from prehistorical to historical consciousness.  Seeing signs 
of this development in an earlier session, Winnicott had then predicted that ―one can 
expect the black phenomena [principally the black mummy] also to become aspects of 
objects in the actual world external to herself, and separate from her.  Persecutory black 
belongs to the residues of merging regressively, in organized defense‖ (96).  Indeed, in 
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relation to the destructive externalization of the faun‘s bowels, he suggests that ―this 
marks [for Gabrielle] the flight from intestinal fantasy to the idea of adults and their 
capacity to give birth to real babies, i.e. acceptance of what is inside, between eating and 
defecation‖ (130).  So here Gabrielle is finally capable of digesting the disruption 
initiated with the sudden loss of her mother and the simultaneous arrival of her sister.  
She is presenting this loss not simply as a fantasy but, now more objectively, also as a 
gift of golden shit, some fantasy elaborated sawdust, something between her mother (or 
father) and herself.   There are of course all sorts of other elaborations and fantasies 
involved in this destruction and transition.  Primal scenic and oedipal elements abound 
here, as Winnicott helps make clear, but for our purposes at a more general level the 
important thing is that Gabrielle‘s primitive accumulation of the black mummy — as 
with Freud‘s grandson‘s need to cry when his mother disappeared — disappears precisely 
as she produces an object of value.  Emptying the faun of its stuffing, she transforms the 
internal-somatic darkness of an indigestibility into an objectified, dazzling value.  Hullo 
object!  Will this object be accepted?  Can it be shared?  As if enacting the fate of 
Huitzilopochtli every evening or that of the sacrificial victims (human and animal) 
required for Huitzilopochtli‘s travels, Gabrielle destroys the faun but thereby produces an 
object of value from the inside out, ―like‖ a proper feeding and digestion.  The 
transformed object is thus a useful residue, a dazzling and reflective trace of now, 
suddenly, right here (da), a partially forgotten destruction (fort).  Her focus on the black 
mummy is here beginning to fade, and she will begin to remember the lost good enough 
mother with some longing.  Indeed, in a Kantian sense she sees this material — where 
mater, again, is the root for mother — as something ―very beautiful.‖  She has thus made 
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a transition from a ―darker‖ mode of world-objectification, apparently simply of 
destruction, to a more ―productive‖ and ―enlightened‖ mode, as it were.  Interesting in 
this regard is the fact that during her dream she shuts her eyes where normally, deeper in 
her illness, she would have kept them open and ―seen‖ the black mummy in a very real 
sense—―real‖ in the Lacanian sense.  But now, as the very movement of therapy, she 
joins the voiced descriptions and interpretations of her dream (oral tradition and 
interpretation, as we‘ve seen) to a ritualized carving out of mother nature‘s insides (like 
an animal sacrifice or the work of mining, as we shall see).  In any case, here we can 
again reiterate our earlier Winnicottian lesson, namely, that objective values are secretly 
layered in darkness and destruction to the degree that destruction goes ―underground,‖ as 
it were, precisely when the object is brought ―above-ground‖ to visibly reflect the light of 
the sun.  Plato would be proud of this developmental movement in and out of ―the cave,‖ 
as it were.
159
   
Indeed, aspects of the magical priority and necessity of this developmental 
process are ―recorded‖ historically, indeed archaeologically, in gravesites world-wide.  In 
his analysis of the 6000 year old ―Varna‖ cemeteries in Serbia, for instance, the 
archeologist Colin Renfrew examines the transition from the symbolization of death by 
stone to its symbolization by copper and then, eventually, by gold.160  This developmental 
symbolization coincides, it turns out, with the birth and amplification of ―class‖ or at least 
of a social hierarchy with clear divisions between ―elite‖ and ―common‖ groups.  One of 
Renfrew‘s basic points is that while the use of copper in burial ceremony at Varna is 
associated with older, more egalitarian — and so more communal — societies, the later 
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use of gold clearly signals, and in fact it embodies, the emergence of social hierarchies, 
each headed by an elite group of men.  The point of emphasis, however, is that it is not 
simply the ―physical‖ or ―technical‖ use of metals but especially their ―aesthetic,‖ 
―magical,‖ and ―symbolic‖ use that coincides with (and in this sense perhaps helps to 
produce) stratification, such that the stratification which arrives with the dissolution of 
primitive community is born(e) in some obvious sense through the magical use of gold 
and later metals, a use steeped in aesthetic judgment.  Renfrew thus reiterates a lot of 
what we learn from Marx, Hamell, Miller, Hosler, and David Graeber.
161
  Gold is used as 
a personal adornment in close — even in inscriptive — proximity to the body, and 
especially around the face and genital areas.  It is often associated with and adorns such 
revered symbols of power, prominence, and prestige as scepters, rods, spears, and 
crowns.  In archaic societies, the rulers, are ―divine‖ to the degree that they can produce 
or procure gold; they live and die with gold; indeed, they are thought to keep living in 
part by means of it; thus, as it is for the moderns, I would say that it‘s a kind of Holy 
Grail, to, a glittering incarnation of an innermost principle of life, for the ancients too, or 
rather, or at least for the elite rulers.  By contrast, in the graves of the more common folk 
at Varna, gold is often dissembled; that is, other materials such as ―fools gold‖ are used 
and manipulated in such a way as to imitate gold, whereas gold is never imitated in the 
elite graves and is never used or mixed so as to imitate copper or stone (two ―older‖ 
symbolic substances).   
Renfrew‘s basic point, however, is that the ―magical‖ and ―prestige‖ uses of the 
―precious‖ metals precedes, or at least coincides or comes together with, these 
substances‘ more or less distinctly ―technological‖ use.  Again, development is the 
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symbolic mediation of violent disillusionment.  It is useful in the Winnicottian sense, 
where use and symbol cannot be separated.  Magic and technology aren‘t strictly at odds 
or separated, then, to the degree that the former already ―overlays‖ the latter until a 
disillusionment occurs which forces technology to appear as if it has arrived or could 
have arrived without having been grown within, say, a magical skin.  Only ―special‖ and 
―new‖ technologies seem to us still to have an ―aura‖ of ―magic.‖   In any case, Renfrew 
uses an almost ―hieroglyphic‖ analysis to elucidate this process:  ―What we appear to be 
seeing in each case is the very early use of metal in contexts that at the same time are 
documenting the emergence of personal ranking, reflected in what may have been 
individually owned goods, buried with the deceased in the grave.  Copper and gold 
clearly afford in each case a new vehicle for the expression of ranking, and thus in this 
sense a new channel of communication.  Indeed, it may be suggested that…the ownership 
and display of these valuable objects may have constituted an essential part of the 
prominence of their owner and have contributed significantly to his or her prestige‖ (156, 
my emphases).  This is ―evidenced‖ by the fact that the symbolic use of these metals, or 
at least the ―prehistorical‖ metals, always precedes their more ―obvious‖ technological 
use.  According to Renfrew:  ―In most cases early metallurgy appears to have been 
practiced primarily because the products had novel properties that made them attractive 
to use as symbols and as personal adornments and ornaments, in a manner that, by 
focusing attention, could attract or enhance prestige.  It is striking [sic, like a ―tanning‖] 
that copper had such a key place in the prestige systems of North America.  In the Old 
World we find iron in the early phases always as a material of great worth, whose context 
in rich burials and in other finds indicates a prestigious status.  Only much later was it 
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used to make productive tools, and at the same time it became commonplace‖ (146-7, my 
emphases).  Part of our point, however, is that the more primitive commonplaces, the 
commons themselves, the pre-private forms of primitive communal ―property,‖ are 
―privatized‖ precisely in and though the ―magical‖ power and use of these metals.  The 
metals mark, as by a strike, the dissolution of primitive communism.  Thus, it is a 
misconception, Renfrew says,  
 
to regard the inception of copper/bronze metallurgy, and later of iron working, [and 
the inception of gold as well] as technologically and productively significant events in 
their own right.  In most cases…it was centuries after the basic [metallurgical] 
techniques were explored and understood that they became of economic and 
productive significance.  The same observations hold for iron working.  Iron was 
known and valued in the Near East for centuries before the iron age began.  Similarly, 
there are not-infrequent finds in Mycenaean Greece at least two centuries before iron 
weapons begin to be seen in appreciable numbers. (145) 
 
This, then, is a basic lesson for us concerning these discoveries:  Before they 
emerge as technical and technological substances of productive value in ―manufacture,‖ 
shiny metals already represent and present the prehistorical formation of rank and even 
of a kind of class.  We might put it this way:  He who ―wields‖ gold in these prehistorical 
eras also wields authority, say, over a militia or set of guardian servants, or even an army, 
and so who is to say that it‘s merely the military and military technologies that are 
―effective‖ here in the primitive accumulative sense of cultural encounter, war, and 
accumulation?  Authority requires a politico-religious relation to subjects, but this 
relation is mediated by all sorts of symbols, symbols which therefore ―have‖ a kind of 
causality in relation to the always risked maintenance of that authority. But there is a 
―mysterious‖ correspondence, here, between the rise of gold and the disintegration of 
primitive communism.  We‘ll put it this way:  In marking the rise of an elite, this very 
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marking influences this disintegration into the (pre?)formation of class societies.  (It is 
perhaps a bit like the black slab, and not simply the humanizing bone that is used as a 
weapon, in Kubrick‘s 2001: A Space Odyssey, if this reference helps.  It is not merely the 
physical violence but the intimidation the bone is and represents [and that the slab 
embodies] that guarantees the rise and development of the human.)  In any case, in 
marking difference while reflecting identity (as we will continue to see), gold makes 
communication necessary by (further) breaking the group apart and marking the 
maintenance of this break.  This marking is gold‘s ―magic,‖ its power to sway or 
influence—especially the masses who lack access to it.  True, at this level of 
development it‘s forgotten that this power is ―socially constructed‖; but our point is that 
this power is not merely socially constructed but is also objectively and developmentally 
constructed along destructive routes of identification and disidentification, routes 
requiring a ―reflection‖ of cultural insides and outsides and of life and death.   For to lose 
control or gain full control over the boundary of inside and outside would be to risk 
death. 
Indeed, one of our basic ideas here , to put it in a long, ugly sentence, is that 
because these ―first contacts‖ are not simply primitively destructive but symbolically 
accumulative as well (which is to say that they‘re layered in the sacred ceremonial 
performance of community), the objects of exchange and value that resonate in and 
especially after these encounters — as soon as these ancestors board their magical craft 
and return, apparently, to the land of the dead, or wherever they‘ve come from — these 
objects will be taken, at least by the Indians, and rightly so in my judgment, as objects of 
mourning, the mourning of a sacred intimacy the communal legacy of which loss, 
 242 
however, is not totally lost to the degree that an exchange has been made.  The objects 
are mementos. 
Regarding the oral tradition we mentioned earlier of the meeting between the 
Europeans and (perhaps Lenape) Indians of Manhattan Island, for instance, Miller and 
Hamell write that 
 
this tradition also recorded that their ancestors had admired the white skins of the men 
who landed on shore in a small boat, particularly that of a man in ―red clothes which 
shone‖ who gave them presents, ―to wit, beads, axes, hoes, stockings, &c.‖  The 
Europeans then departed, promising to return…. Meanwhile, not knowing their 
utilitarian functions, the Indians suspended the axes and hoes on their breasts as 
ornaments and used the stockings as tobacco pouches.  It was not until the following 
year, when the ship returned, that the Indians were taught the practical function of 
these objects by the greatly amused Europeans. 
 
So, again, on our view, the Indians suspend these ―utilitarian‖ objects around their 
necks as ornaments as reflective memorials of a sacred encounter with the living dead.  
Perhaps this is a once in a lifetime, a once in a world cycle, event, as it seems.  Hamell 
and Miller point to an especially significant funerary discovery in this regard:  In post-
contact Indian burial sites, archaeologists sometimes find sacred Indian items made of 
such native materials as (native) copper, quartz, and flint, but they also sometimes find 
European objects or object fragments made of glass, glass beads, ceramics, iron, steel, 
etc.  The European objects are here being used, then, precisely as sacred objects of 
mourning.
162
  One of the lessons, here, I want to suggest, consists in this:  Shiny objects 
are especially valued precisely to the degree that they reflect the ―souls‖ or ―spirits‖ of 
the dead—the fleeting, ghostly sub- and/or extra-human images that gather as if within 
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 Thus, aren‘t two losses being mourned here? 
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them and through them.  What does one see in a murky mirror?  As Hamell and Miller 
put it,  
 
this incorporation of novel [European produced] materials is readily apparent in 
protohistoric Iroquois mortuary practices, in which [European] glass beads appear to 
have been preferentially disposed along with [native] shell beads…. In 1699, a ―bottle 
and the foot of a glass which they guarded as very precious‖ were observed in a 
Taensa temple, which also had preserved within it some pieces of native crystal….  
Glasswares and glazed European ceramics were among the Tunica‘s ―treasures‖ 
placed with the dead during the early eighteenth century…. Further archaeological 
and linguistic information confirms that glass was also incorporated into the native 
thought-world as a replacement for traditional divining implements.  Traditionally, 
water and crystal were widely used for such purposes, as were polished free-state 
metals, metallic-ore mosaics, muscovite mica, and perhaps water- or grease-slicked 
polished stone surfaces, in which a spirit or soul was reflected.  In 1643 Roger 
Williams noted that the Narrangansett Algonquians‘ word for soul had an affinity 
―with a word signifying a looking glasse, a cleare resemblance.‖  Nearly three-
hundred years later, in his study of the Naskapi Algonquians, Frank G. Speck 
observed that the same linguistic and conceptual linkage between ―soul‖ and ―mirror‖ 
was found over much of the Algonquian-speaking area of North America. (316-7, my 
emphasis) 
 
 What we see here, then, is what might be called a kind of  ―mirror stage‖ of 
phylogenetic development, a reflection of our own idealized communal image, but an 
image and community lost, fragmented, divided, cut into parts, and yet also — this may 
be where Lacan does not tread, but certainly it‘s where Winnicott and Marx do tread — 
preserved to some degree in the object which remains, as a fetish and cipher, of value.  
For Lacan, at least on my reading of his ―Mirror Stage‖ essay, this stage, cast in 
ontogenetic terms to describe individual development, is purely specular, hinging only 
upon a play of images, and specifically the baby‘s identification with his or her mirror 
image which identification, in forming the root of the ego but since stemming from an 
overdetermined image, forms the ego only ever as alienated, fragmented, lacking in self-
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foundation.
163
  While this may be, however, for Winnicott and Marx this identification is 
also significantly objectified such that play and its primitive work, a play which can join 
two into ―one‖ in the ―object,‖ is then not subsequently ignored.  What is important about 
the mirror (and for Winnicott of course the mother‘s face is the first mirror, conditioning 
the baby‘s seeing himself in something like an aluminum mirror) is that there is 
something alive and creative ―in‖ it, something that reflects the loss of supposedly prior 
intimacy, and so to the possibility of its recreation under different terms, at least 
eventually, as community, in part by and through the lost object.164   
 The things archaeology uproots!
165
  Indeed, Marx seems to be aware of this 
thought in Capital.  In the sections on fetishism, he recognizes the necessity of funerary 
ritual, for instance, together with the exhumation of the sacred relics of the dead that 
belongs to modernity and, in a very direct way, to capitalist development.  We will recall 
that he describes the virtual enslavement of the Indians in the American mines, for 
instance, as an ―entombment‖ (915), but an entombment, of course, meant to dig 
something else ―up,‖ to bring some shiny dirt above ground, as if this latter thing were as 
valuable as the sun itself.  These ironies would make Plato proud, would they not?  
Meanwhile, a parallel disinterring is happening in Europe.  The secularization and 
economization of value as gold and of gold as value in modernity, it seems, pivots 
precisely on the destruction, on the literal uprooting of the archaic relation to the sacred.  
As Marx puts it in a footnote: 
 
Henry III, roi tres chretian, robbed monasteries, etc, of their relics and turned them 
into money.  It is well known what part the despoiling of the Delphic temple by the 
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 Winnicott, 1971, chapter 8, 111-118. 
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 I, like the Indians, haven‘t appreciated all the uprootings. 
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Phocians [sic] played in the history of Greece.  Among the ancients, temples served 
as the dwellings of the gods of commodities.  They were ‗sacred banks‘.  With the 
Phoenicians, a trading people par excellence, money was the transmuted shape of 
everything.  It was, therefore, quite in order that the virgins who at the feast of the 
goddess of love gave themselves to strangers should offer to the goddess the piece of 
money they received in payment. (229) 
 
 Money is again here sacralized, as the fulfillment of desire, a primitive desire of 
orgy and feasting, in fact, for what is lost (like virginity).  But reflection dawns post 
festum, as we know.  Thus, to the degree that feasting can produce something reflective, 
this most Christian of Kings raids the darkness of the old tombs of Europe in a movement 
which symbolizes the birth of the age of enlightenment.  For us, the lesson is this:  These 
violent repressions (despoiling of the Delphic temple, the entombment and repression of 
the Indians at large—all the primitive accumulations of ―history‖) also involve, precisely, 
an unrepression the desirous hopes of which has come to be embodied ―secularly‖ in 
money.  This secularization is in scare quotes, though, to the degree that the persistence 
of the sacredness of primitive accumulation persists, as it must.  Indeed, Marx basic 
lesson, on my creative reading, is that capital is made possible and, in the repetitive 
destruction of the commons over the last five centuries, actual, to the degree that the 
destruction borne with this objectification of money persists in all its religious fervor, in 
all its dirt, blood, and fire. 
 My God do we miss those with whom we are or have been close to but have lost, 
don‘t we?  And so, if we are not only to lose them, where do we ―find‖ them, when we 
do, in and despite their loss?  Certainly in our dreams, most proximately.  But do we stop 
dreaming when we are awake?  The lesson here, I think — a lesson that Gabrielle learned 
late, during her verbal stage, helping those of us who‘d forgotten it in preverbality to 
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remember it now — is that we don‘t stop dreaming when we‘re awake; rather, if 
development is taking place, some wishes will go ―underground‖ to appear as dreams in 
our sleep while some wishes will rise ―above ground‖ into consciousness to ―take place‖ 
in and as objects of value, a value secretly presenting, and in some cases secretly 
mourning, primitive ―accumulation.‖  Indeed, in the cases mentioned by Hamell and 
Miller, since the reflective objects of value are found precisely in graves, they also 
―suggest‖ the necessity that their objective sacralization corresponds to a subjective one, 
a sacralization of subjects, of those we‘ve lost.  Thus, to the degree that human-like 
―souls‖ or ―spirits‖ can (still) be ―seen‖ in them, both literally and metaphorically, the 
dead and the lost are to this degree both distanced and yet contactable (as if through a 
sacred language) through the fetish.  Thus, like the transitional object, these ―objects‖ 
contain, both receptively and creatively, a there within a here, an inside in an outside, a 
gain and a loss, reflecting both self and other at once, and therefore, if and when they do 
their work, they help the living to keep underground the most difficult aspects of death.     
 Indeed, let us ask again, as seriously as possible:  Why do we tell children, 
together with ourselves, ―nursery tales‖?  And why do we tend to understand the telling 
of such tales as a ―sacred duty,‖ as Marx puts it, we recall, in the first chapter on 
primitive accumulation?  One way to get at this is to point out that while fetishism 
belongs to polytheisms and monotheisms alike, it is within the development of latter — 
and the latter‘s development arrives and begins later — that the sacred becomes much 
more ―absolutist.‖  Monotheism is absolutist to the degree that it claims a monopoly on 
the sacred in the form of its ―God,‖ the illusion of highest value.  It is generally well-
known, for instance, that whereas the Indians who the exploring Spaniards and Europeans 
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meet are typically willing to ―accept Christ‖ as one deity among others who live in the 
realm of the dead (with various other gods), the Europeans generally and often quite 
ferociously demand that the Indians fully renounce their ―heretical‖ pantheons.   
 I think it‘s no accident in this regard that Marx invokes Columbus in chapter three 
precisely as he links the formation of capital to the supposed wish-fulfilling properties of 
gold, the first substance of global or ―world money.‖  Explaining that ―the lust for gold 
awakens‖ with ―the extension of commodity circulation,‖ which extension implies an 
―increase in the power of money,‖ he adds that this is also the moment when gold 
becomes, as he puts it, an ―absolutely social form of wealth which is always ready to be 
used‖ (229, my emphasis).  That is, money is ―absolutely social‖ if and when it has much 
more literally become the ―universal equivalent,‖ that is, when it‘s as if it can be 
transformed into anything.  This happens both literally and metaphorically, together, both 
objectively and illusionally at once.  Indeed, since the world is now apparently round and 
limited and yet has also now been extended into a new, apparently edenic universe, 
gold‘s wish-fulfilling properties should extend all the way through and indeed, more than 
ever before, beyond the world as it is known.  Indeed, the ejection of ―god‖ from the 
underworld and from the earth itself in various religions strangely corresponds to the 
movement of gold from its subterranean concealment, to the earth‘s surface, upward 
(even beyond the sun!) into the ―heavens.‖  As Marx puts it, ―this contradiction between 
the quantitative limitation and the qualitative lack of limitation of money keeps driving 
the hoarder back to his Sisyphean task:  accumulation.  He is in the same situation as a 
world conqueror, who discovers a new boundary with each country he annexes‖ (231).  
My idea is that Marx is again not merely drawing an ―analogy‖ here between the 
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ideology of monetary acquisition and the discovery of ―new worlds.‖  Rather, the 
material discovery conditions the new idealization and vice versa, such that the old 
ideology of wish-fulfillment gets instantiated by, and indeed, mirrored in particular (often 
shiny) objects.  Here the ―discoverer‖ lets his highest hopes run wild for money;  indeed, 
he re-invests these hopes, as it were, in speculative practical activity, a kind of war 
against relative, non-absolutist values.  Gold becomes, or rather, it remains, as it is in 
many polytheistic cultures, a vehicle or conduit, a symbol, of divine communication 
between worlds, as we‘ll see; but here suddenly with the one-directional ―discovery‖ of 
an entirely ―new‖ world, the Christian saturates gold with wishes for an eternal blessed 
life here on earth.  Gold is to be carved out of mother earth as if in perfect denial of the 
fact that that‘s where we all end up in the end.  Talk about conveniency!   
 
With the possibility of keeping hold of the commodity as exchange-value, or 
exchange-value as a commodity, the lust for gold awakens.  With the extension of 
commodity circulation there is an increase in the power of money, that absolutely 
social form of wealth which is always ready to be used.  ‗Gold is a wonderful thing!  
Its owner is master of all he desires.  Gold can even enable souls to enter Paradise‘ 
(Columbus, in his letter from Jamaica, 1503).  Since money does not reveal what has 
been transformed into it, everything, commodity or not, is convertible into money.  
Everything becomes saleable and purchasable.  Circulation becomes the great social 
retort into which everything is thrown, to come out again as the money crystal.  
Nothing is immune from this alchemy, the bones of the saints cannot withstand it, let 
alone more delicate res sacrosanctae, extra commercium hominum.  Just as in money 
every qualitative difference between commodities is extinguished, so too for its part, 
as a radical leveler, it extinguishes all distinctions.  But money is itself a commodity, 
an external object capable of becoming the private property of any individual.  Thus 
the social power becomes the private power of private persons.  Ancient society 
therefore denounced it as tending to destroy the economic and moral order.  Modern 
society, which already in its infancy had pulled Pluto by the hair of his head from the 
bowels of the earth, greets gold as its Holy Grail, as the glittering incarnation of its 
innermost principle of life. (229-30) 
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 Recall, then, to make the point in a scientific form that even some of today‘s 
economists will recognize, that in chapter six of Capital Marx finishes comparing the C-
M-C circuit of ordinary commercial exchange to the M-C-M‘ circuit of specifically 
capitalist exchange.  He reveals that the special and specific commodity at the heart of the 
capitalist circuit, the labor-power of the wage laborer, is the only modern commodity 
which creates value.  This is in part because labor-power has craft and labor, and so 
creativity, behind it.  But its also because labor-power is the abstract capacity to labor, 
which corresponds then not exactly to the production of use-values but to the production 
of the modern capitalist abstraction called value.  The capitalist buys labor-power (M-C) 
and this power creates commodities which can then be sold by the capitalist for more 
money (C-M‘) than he or she invested at the beginning of the circuit in labor-power.166  
We thus have M-C-M‘ where the first M represents a money-wage, where C represents 
labor-power, and where the prime (‘) indicates that the money initially forwarded has 
been increased, grown in quantity.  In other words, since the amount of surplus-value a 
worker produces under conditions of wage-labor is the difference between the value he or 
she produces (which is then owned by the capitalist) and the value of his or her labor-
power (which takes the shape of a money-wage), surplus-value takes the form of 
appearance of money or, more specifically, of more money in the capitalist‘s wallet than 
was originally put forward.  The capitalist invests, the worker labors, and value grows 
abstractly, the surplus of which is appropriated not by the worker but by the capitalist.  So 
for the ―investor,‖ this takes on the appearance of money making money!  How magical!  
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 From this perspective, the value of the materials which are gathered and worked so as to enter into the 
final product also reduce to the value of the labor-power needed to acquire and prepare them. 
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Capital and its movement, however, take this magic religiously, or at least 
―monotheistically,‖ seeking value as if absolutely.   
 In chapter four, moreover, Marx more fully suggests that in capitalist exchange 
money takes on a ―character‖ which is qualitatively different from its role and use in non-
capitalist, precapitalist, or even commercial exchange.  It is not markets which are the 
problem, but capital.  In the commercial C-M-C circuit of exchange, as Marx puts it, 
money‘s form of appearance  
 
does nothing but mediate the exchange of commodities, and it vanishes in the final 
result of the movement [that is, in a commodity which is then used, consumed].  On 
the other hand, in the circulation M-C-M both the money and the commodity function 
only as different modes of existence of value itself, the money as its general mode of 
existence, the commodity as its particular or, so to speak, disguised mode.  It is 
constantly changing from one form into the other, without becoming lost in this 
movement; it thus becomes transformed into an automatic subject…. By virtue of 
being value, it has acquired the occult ability to add value to itself.  It brings forth 
living offspring, or at least lays golden eggs…. It differentiates itself as original value 
from itself as surplus-value, just as God the Father differentiates himself from himself 
as God the Son, although both are of the same age and form, in fact one single 
person; for only by the surplus value of $10 does the $100 originally advanced 
become capital, and as soon as this has happened, as soon as the son has been created 
and, through the son, the father, their difference vanishes again, and both become one, 
$110. (255-6)
167
 
 
 Against Godelier, who takes this material, truncates it, and suggests that for Marx 
capital and commodity fetishism are of apiece since they both exhibit a ―religious‖ 
obfuscation of the labor which constitutes value, Marx actually (if quite subtly and not 
always consistently) suggests that the religiosity of capital has a particular tendency to 
outstrip magic and fetishism, namely, to deny the value of particular objects (as use-
values and as exchange-values), at least insofar as capital moves, reproduces, and grows 
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 Fowkes‘ translation  is different from Godelier‘s.  Also, perhaps this is not a fair exchange, but I‘ve here 
changed pounds to dollars. 
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beyond the will of individual social actors:
168
  As opposed to the comportment of the 
ordinary C-M-C circuit where money bears the burden, as Marx says, of ―mediating the 
exchange of commodities‖ — where commodities require object-equivalents and these 
object-equivalents require other commodities in and for trade — within the capitalist M-
C-M‘ circuit money bears an unconditional aspiration to accumulate and augment fully 
abstract value.  If a capitalist has transformed $100 into $110, for instance, then if the 
capital ―in‖ this person is consistent, ―it‖ will try to do the same, through him, with this 
$110, etc, etc, etc.  The goal of capital may seem to be the accumulation of money, in 
other words, but paradoxically this accumulation can serve no need.  As Marx puts it:  
 
If...we are concerned with the valorization of value, the value of the $110 has the 
same need for valorization as the value of the $100, for they are both limited 
expressions of exchange-value, and therefore both have the same vocation, to 
approach, by quantitative increase, as near as possible to absolute wealth.... The 
simple circulation of commodities — selling in order to buy — is a means to a final 
goal which lies outside circulation, namely, [in] the appropriation of use-values, the 
satisfaction of needs.  As against this, the circulation of money as capital is an end in 
itself, for the valorization of value takes place only within this constantly renewed 
movement.  The movement of capital is therefore limitless. (252-3, my emphases) 
 
 Thus, while Godelier casually and seamlessly links these passages to the passages 
we peeked at earlier where Marx suggests that commodity exchange begins as a limited 
abstraction of and from nature worship, and thus is a kind of fetishism, Marx is here 
clearly qualitatively distinguishing commodities and money from capital, and so a limited 
ideological expression (which can still fall under the name of fetishism) from an 
apparently unlimited ideology (for which fetishism would be a misnomer, even if Marx 
once or twice speaks in volume three of Capital of the fetishism of capital).  We will 
recall from part eight of volume one in this regard that money and commodities, which 
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are produced historically well before capital, are not capital, although they can be 
transformed, repressively desublimated, as it were, into the latter: ―In themselves, money 
and commodities are no more capital than the means of production and subsistence are.  
They need to be transformed into capital…. The capital-relation presupposes a complete 
separation between the workers and the ownership of the conditions for the realization of 
their labor‖ (874).  This complete separation is won not just ―militarily‖ but 
ideologically, through a religiously monotheistic comportment to loss and the 
misobjectification of loss.  Capital is absolutist.  Whereas commodity fetishism hides the 
content of value in and as limited, albeit abstract, objects and can be satisfied to some 
degree with these objects in their fetishistic use, capitalist exchange apparently bears an 
unlimited desire for value beyond objectivity.  Capitalism is therefore the melancholia of 
history, set up through repeated ―untold‖ prehistorical accumulations.  No object of use 
or exchange of any quality or quantity can satisfy capital as capital.   So while the money 
piles up, more is wanted still, to the point that the movement of capital becomes 
something extra commercium hominum, a religious mechanism perpetuating a deep 
social split. 
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CHAPTER X 
 
INSCRIPTIVE SOCIAL HEALTH 
 
 If capital is absolutist, and to this degree a mechanism for the perpetuation of 
social illness, if it‘s a socio-political melancholia hinging upon and perpetuating class 
splitting, what does Marx want to say about the health and illness ―efficacy‖ of 
commodities and money?   
 Here is my simple response to this question:  Whereas many Marxist and non-
Marxists alike presume that Marx treats commodities and money, especially in their 
fetishism, as objects of social illness — and presume thereby that he denounces all 
competitive ―markets‖ or ―the market‖ in general — our idea is that Marx understands 
commodities and money to be socially ambivalent objects, the causal effect of which is 
placeboic and/or noceboic, objects the use of which can be either productive or 
destructive, or both at once, depending on the relation of that object to primitive needs.  
Typically, under capitalist production and exchange, the productivity and destructivity of 
commodities and money are difficult to distinguish.  Is any ―investment‖ of money where 
the money apparently ―makes money‖ destructive (to the degree that somewhere down 
the line a surplus is being drawn from the productivity and creativity of stultified wage-
work)?  Is the average land-lord a capitalist if his renters are wage-workers?  Is the 
average worker perpetuating a social illness when she asks for a pay raise but doesn‘t 
fight for a workers‘ union?  Shouldn‘t she be working against the class split that makes 
her a ―mere‖ wage-earning worker and non-owner of the means of production?  
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Regarding this last question, my response is that social health, which pivots principally 
on the principle of social justice, requires that she be allowed and encouraged to do both 
of these, to seek more personal money and yet can and perhaps should fight for 
unionization, or at least for the overcoming of the class violences between owners and 
workers; which means that while she, like everyone else, needs and fetishizes money and 
commodities, her asking for more money, hoping to purchase more commodities, is not 
necessarily illness.  Perhaps it‘s illness if her need for commodities and money damages 
her social life with family, friends, co-workers, social others, and even with her 
employer.  But to need or want money and commodities to make one‘s life better, more 
satisfying, and in fact more pleasurable is no crime, indeed, is no social illness.  What is 
and remains a social illness, on the other hand, is the splitting off of workers from any 
resources of self-production and self-transformation in and through the means of 
production.  Does this mean money is a means of production?  I think the answer can 
only be that yes, money can be.  It is a symbolic, indeed, an objectively symbolic force.  
Thus, only in those circumstances where and when it becomes clear that money and 
commodities are being used or leveraged as a form of capitalization — which is to say, 
as a form of social domination which preserves or increases class splitting — would it be 
appropriate to deem their use or fetishization an ―illness.‖  So again, while the wage-
relation in general may be a symptom of illness to the degree that it marks and 
perpetuates a social split between owners and non-owners of the means of self-production 
and transformation, the need that this or that worker expresses for his or her paycheck 
ought not to be deemed ill.  Of course, things are never simple, but hopefully this 
characterization is useful.   
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It is similar, and indeed this process is imbricated, with child‘s play:  To the 
degree that the child‘s use of an object enables or helps him or her to ―grow‖ in relation 
to others (becoming not simply independent but more abstractly dependent, which is to 
say not just ―physically‖ and ―fantastically‖ dependent but more objectively dependent 
and so seemingly independent) the object and/or relation to that object is a healthy one.  
But to the degree that the object and its use stultify the child (perhaps he or she uses the 
object to avoid socializing with others, even when such socializing would be good for 
her, for instance) it has become a symptom or object of illness.  The same can be said of 
money and its uses, and I think that when Marx gets it right, he says nothing more 
complicated than this.  Money is ―placeboic‖ to the degree that it is made transitional, 
that it is used for purposes of social and self growth.   
And yet, of course, and again, health and illness are more complicated than this, 
as Marx and Engels both know, which brings us to our more complicated response:  
While commodities and money are objects of ambivalence in terms of their participation 
in and effects upon health and illness, at a critical level of understanding this 
ambivalence, in both its participation in and effectivity upon health, stems from money‘s 
roots in primitive inscription.  If we want to understand what modern money, this point 
should not be ignored.  Take, for instance, Habermas‘s examination of Marx‘s notion of 
commodity fetishism in Knowledge and Human Interests.  Here Habermas casts the 
―objective illusion‖ belonging to fetishism as a mere illusion, as but a fetter to what he 
calls ―undistorted‖ or ―reflective‖ communication, as if illusion could be completely 
overcome or extinguished, without a trace, and as if reflection weren‘t itself precisely a 
distorting of the identifications of a presupposed primitive unity with nature.  By contrast, 
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we hope to have shown here that to the degree that communication is born(e) of primitive 
―accumulation‖ and thus, at least in part, of destruction, it always bears within it, in its 
various forms of development, reflections and indeed traces of this destruction, and that 
to this degree illusion always situates and infects communication—even the 
communicative forms and techniques of modern science and self-consciousness.
169
  
Nonetheless, Habermas is right on the mark, so to speak, to cast the grand world process 
of fetishization (as historicization) as a ―struggle‖ and ―process of reflection writ large,‖ 
as he puts it.
 
  For this is precisely what we, with the help of Winnicott and Todorov, have 
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 Here are a couple of dynamic and helpful passages on Marx‘s project from Habermas (1971):  ―Marx, 
confronted with contemporary capitalism, analyzes a social form that no longer institutionalizes class 
antagonism in the form of immediate political domination and social force; instead, it stabilizes it in the 
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Marx, the distinguishing feature of capitalism is that it has brought ideologies from the heights of 
mythological or religious legitimations of tangible domination and power down into the system of social 
labor…. The system of social labor develops only in an objective connection with the antagonism of 
classes; the development of the forces of production is intertwined with the history of revolutions.  The 
results of this struggle are always sedimented in the institutional framework of a society, in social form.  
Now, as the repeated dialectic of the moral life, this struggle is a process of reflection writ large.  In it the 
forms of class consciousness arise: not idealistically in the self-movement of an absolute mind but 
materialistically on the basis of objectifications of the appropriation of an external nature.  This reflection, 
in which an existing form of life is convicted of its abstraction and thereby revolutionized, is prompted by 
the growing potential of control over the natural processes objectified in work.  The development of the 
forces of production at any time augments the disproportion between institutionally demanded and 
objectively necessary repression, thereby making conscious the existing untruth, the felt disruption of a 
moral totality‖ (59-61, my emphases except for ―form‖).  Again, in and despite this great summary, 
Habermas‘s mistake is to characterize objective illusion as only ―restrictive‖ or ―distortive‖ of a 
communication that could otherwise, apparently, be pure.  In Marx‘s articulation, however, and as we‘ve 
begun to see, communication rests on a primitive accumulation — the archaic dividing of a prior unity, 
making communication both possible and necessary — which means that communication is precisely 
reliant, to be communicative at all, on the violences and distortions which enable a distancing of actors in 
and from their primitive identity.   Again, Marx knows very well for instance that there is no getting rid of 
money to produce a ―pure‖ socio-economic relation between subjects.  Subjects require and will continue 
to require the fetishistic use of some partially violent ―third thing‖, whatever shape and substance money 
will acquire in the future, to mediate and indeed to form their sociality.  Against this, however, just a few 
sentences after the above remarks, Habermas suggests that ―the knowing subject can only cast off the 
traditional form in which it appears to the degree that it comprehends the self-formative process of the 
species as a movement of class antagonism mediated at every stage by processes of production, recognizes 
itself as the result of the history of class consciousness in its manifestations, and thereby, as self-
consciousness, frees itself from objective illusion‖ (61, my emphasis).   
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been suggesting, that is, if by ―writ‖ we mean the literal symbolization of the loss of an 
immemorial immediacy with mother (nature), a significant carving up of primitive 
identity (the omnipotence of wishing), and so a reshaping of this identity and its carving, 
together, in and as culture.  
 Let‘s look in this regard at a series of examples, some of which we will analyze 
more than others.  I‘ll move from an important passage in Marx and Engels‘ work to the 
example of Marx‘s writing itself, then eventually to some phylogenetic historical 
examples pivoting on primitive rituals.  Indeed, if in the prior section we concentrated on 
the hieratics of the development of value, here we need to emphasize the glyphics of that 
development.   
 In the 1888 English edition of the Communist Manifesto (copies of which can be 
purchased at bookstores or found online), not Marx but Engels adds a comment to what 
Marx, who died in 1883, had offered in 1847 as the essay‘s opening, and perhaps basic, 
supposition.
170
  Whereas Marx had famously claimed that ―the history of all hitherto 
existing society is the history of class struggles,‖ Engels attaches the following footnote 
at the word ―society‖:   
 
That is, all written history.  In 1847, the prehistory of society, the social organization 
existing previous to recorded history, was all but unknown.  Since then, Haxthausen 
discovered common ownership of land in Russia, Maurer proved it to be the social 
foundation from which all Teutonic races started in history, and by and by village 
communities were found to be, or to have been the primitive form of society 
everywhere from India to Ireland.  The inner organization of this primitive 
communistic society was laid bare, in its typical form, by Morgan‘s crowning 
discovery of the true nature of the gens and its relation to the tribe.  With the 
dissolution of these primeval communities, society begins to be differentiated into 
separate and finally antagonistic classes.
171
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 Engels is writing here, then, in memory of his lost best friend.    
171
 Marx, 1978, 473.  Engels‘s emphasis.  
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 Why does Engels here emphasize written history?  Noting that Marx and Engels 
were influenced by these ethnologists,
172
 Engels‘s point seems singular and obvious:  If 
it‘s true that various primitive communistic societies had organized their collective life 
without any practice or conception of ―private‖ land ownership or of exclusive land 
―ownership‖ whatsoever, then Marx‘s original Manifesto claim would have to be 
specified and emended.  Historical materialism would now have to include the claim that 
class is not a trans-historical rule of sociality so much as it‘s something historically 
emergent, something developed both after and in the transition out of what we are calling 
prehistory.  
 This helpful interpretation agrees with the only other reading of Engels‘s footnote 
that I‘ve been able to locate.  In Bottomore‘s Dictionary of Marxist Thought, the entry for 
―class conflict‖ tells us that ―Engels modified [Marx‘s famous sentence] to refer to 
written history in order to take account of the early communal societies in which class 
divisions had not yet emerged.  Subsequently Kautsky argued that some of the class 
struggles mentioned in the Communist Manifesto were in fact conflicts between status 
groups, and this view conformed with Marx‘s and Engel‘s own observation in the same 
text that pre-capitalist societies were all characterized by ‗a manifold gradation of social 
rank.‘‖173  This of course again brings up a series of questions about the difference and 
relation, both historically and prehistorically, between social rank and class and/or 
between social and class rank, but by and large we shall let these questions remain 
questions.   
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 Engels used Marx‘s ethnological notebooks, for instance, to help him write The Origin of the Family.  
See Krader, Lawrence, editor, The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx (Assen, Van Gorcum).  
173
 See Bottomore, 1983, 78. 
 259 
 Minimally, however, we should recall that Marx and Engels both use the term 
―class‖ in a variety of ways.  Class is clearly an economic category which designates and 
distinguishes the owners from the non-owners of the basic (or the majority of the) means 
of production in this or that epochal mode of production; but then again, both ―economy‖ 
and ―means of production‖ are themselves terms the objects of which contain social, 
superstructural, and/or ideological elements, that is, seemingly meta-economic and meta-
instrumental elements.  For instance, despite Marx‘s helpful suggestion in chapter forty-
seven of Capital III that ―it is always the direct relation between the owners of the 
conditions of production and the direct producers which reveals the innermost secret, the 
hidden foundation, of the entire social edifice,‖ it is generally unclear in his writing to 
what degree ―class‖ ownership or lack of ownership of the conditions of production can 
be separated or even distinguished from ―social‖ authority and subordination, 
respectively.
174
  Class brings with it the persistence of rank, while rank is symbolized and 
guaranteed through the use and ownership of elite vs. commonplace objects.
175
  In any 
case, part of our goal is to show how and why private (as opposed to social and especially 
to communal) ownership of the means or conditions of production symbolically 
guarantees the social subordination, and often the domination, of the ―directly producing‖ 
masses.  Material history is class history, in other words, which is the development in 
stages of a surplus privatization of the ―natural‖ world, of its resources, of the instruments 
of production created out of ―nature,‖ and of the inorganic and organic means by and in 
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 ―Prestige‖ would be an important concept to investigate in this regard.   
175
 Writers like Bourdieu have made their living on insights such as this, albeit without clearly 
acknowledging the primitive accumulative and its necessity.  
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which we contest and produce culture—which means that ―class‖ is both the reified 
expression and the largest social mechanism of these processes of development.
176
   
 Though accurate, important, and useful for us, however, this explanation does not 
yet begin to answer or even to ask why Engels emphasizes written history.  But clearly 
there is something to this emphasis, even if Engels, like Marx before him, isn‘t fully 
aware of it.  After all, would he have emphasized the importance of ―written history‖ in 
the first sentence only to forget about the transitional relation between what he calls 
―prehistory‖ and ―recorded history‖ in the next sentence?  What, then, to ask this question 
again, is a ―record‖ in relation to both ―prehistory‖ and ―history‖? 
 Well, for one thing, it should be easy enough to see that this transitional relation is 
ambivalent and doubled.  On the one hand, ―written history‖ seems to show and tell us 
that ―history‖ is made of class struggle and conflict, of clashes that leave marks and 
forms of relief that ―record‖ those clashes for remembrance and recall, for historical 
consciousness.  The marks remain available to ―tell the story‖ of their origination, their 
significance.  They tell the story of the present, moreover, by recollection of a past which 
is not merely past to the degree that the marks remain marks.  So here it would seem that 
―writing,‖ ―history,‖ and ―class‖ are equiprimordial:  Class is inscriptive and inscribed as 
history, as historiography, we could say.  So this is why ―the history of all hitherto 
existing society is the [written] history of class struggles.‖  And yet, on the other hand, 
the footnote as a whole refers us to something subtextual, that is, pretextual, both with 
and against the writing of self-recognition and history; we are referred to the primitive 
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 Let us remember again, however, that class is not the same as privatization.  Class relies on the 
continued duplication of an exclusivist privatization (a reproductive monopoly) of a surplus value 
―appropriated‖ by an elite group.  So whereas privatization need not breed resentment, exclusivist 
privatization does.  
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communisms (re)discovered by modern ethnologists and archaeologists in just this 
regard.  The development of these primitive communities, in other words, at least insofar 
as we have any record of them at all, cannot not be a cipheric event.  These societies 
leave records of their daily living and so too of their social structures, but these records 
are fragments of social consciousness and not yet conceptually self-reflecting;  their form 
of self-reflection (which includes the fact that mirrors are not yet aluminum, for instance) 
is as yet quite literal, which is to say that this reflection isn‘t as abstracting and forgetful 
of the primitive as the historical records of class (and especially modern) societies.
177
  
Engels‘s claim is socially and historically performative, then, to the degree that it 
demands as a historically self-conscious text, a text self-conceptualizing its “link” with 
prehistory, that we not simply repress, that we re-recall in graphic form, the promise of 
primitive community, a community whose futural form could not remain merely 
primitive.  But this in turns demands that we understand that there is something like a 
―link,‖ or at least an unexplored necessity of simultaneity, between historiographic and in 
fact archaeological activity and the development of class relations in relation to the 
losses of primitive accumulation (again in the double sense of the genitive ―of‖).  For 
when this ―link‖ is discovered — this is crucial — it points both backward and forward to 
the possibility of social life beyond class, to a maturing community, then, although not, if 
properly understood, to social life beyond hierarchy, struggle, work, competition, and 
even antagonism and violence.  It‘s this simple:  There are better (class-less) and worse 
(class) ways of dealing with the global necessity and persistence of primitivity and 
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 Remember, for instance, that Adam Smith and the political economists in general largely deny the root 
of violence that belongs to capitalization.  This denial is not just an abstraction but a capitalized abstraction, 
the religious wish to believe that capital can be non-violent.  So here the abstraction is an active form of 
repression.   
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primitive violence.  Violence can be transformed, for instance, into play, into sports, into 
art, into festivals, into work, into science, and so into various cultural intercourses of a 
quasi-productive sort.  What‘s at stake in fetishization, then, is the ability of human 
society to record and bear its violent roots, to distort this violence significantly in and for 
remembrance and a more or less mutually productive kind of forgetfulness, for 
recollection with as little direct repetition of direct physical and psychical violence as 
possible, and thus to provide something like a marked transition from prehistory to 
history.178   
 We might put it this way:  Class emerges not simply as the gradual distributing 
but also, at least at first, as the splitting and carving up of the immemorial unitary 
(perfectly intimate) body, the presumed sacred body of unity with nature.  In general, 
then, there is something like a link, or at least a necessity of simultaneity, between history 
as historiographic production and activity, on the one hand, and the social (r)evolution of 
class formation and reformation, as the moving apart and coming together of lineages of 
people through symbolic clash, loss, and problematic reunion, on the other hand.  Thus, 
as Marx says, capitalism brings the prehistory of human society to a close, as if 
repressing this prehistory.  Socialism, in turn, remains the promise of primitive 
communism, but unlike primitive communism, socialism would have to become more 
and more aware of its developmental scars, and of the sadly irrecuperable losses these 
scars both represent, as if they were past, and present, knowing they persist. 
 How, then, is this socialism produced?  Indeed, how is it communicated and 
developed? Well, it takes commodities and money — this we hope to have shown clearly 
enough — but these aren‘t the only means to produce a world of richer and deeper 
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 Again, it is a split society, not an ambivalent one, which is the basic and corrupting problem.    
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meaning.  Commodities and money must be used to build social bonds.  Let‘s examine 
the example of Marx‘s work, his vocation as a writer, in this regard.  Indeed, as with 
Kant, Marx‘s personal activity (re)presents this problematic quite explicitly and 
aesthetically, or at least it can for readers of culture whose eyes are attuned to the 
hieroglyphic aspects of historical formation.  For ontogeny here recapitulates and 
inscribes phylogeny.  Indeed, to help us understand Engels‘ suggestion that there is an 
interconnection between historical writing and class-conflict, let‘s turn to Marx‘s letters, 
for as it turns out, his correspondence is filled with admissions and information 
concerning the strange relationship between his health and health difficulties, on the one 
hand, and his own writing and writing difficulties, on the other hand, both hands here 
being connected somehow to how his access to money marks and guarantees his class 
position.   
The fact that it was Engels and not Marx who emphasizes that the history of class 
conflict is limited to written history is interesting since Marx‘s own writing, and 
especially his more than twenty-year effort to write Capital, was itself constantly born of 
deep, primitive conflict.  (Indeed, here we find a kind of stutter mixed with silence which 
is much longer than Kant‘s stuttering eleven year ―silent‖ decade.)  Marx opens the first 
preface to Capital, for instance, by mentioning that the book took him so long to write 
―because of an illness of many years‘ duration which interrupted my work again and 
again‖ (89); and yet the brevity and nonchalance of this admission are misleading.  For, 
as Engels puts it in a letter to a friend after Marx‘s death, ―whenever the state of Marx‘s 
health made it impossible for him to go on with [his writing], this impossibility preyed 
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heavily on his mind, and he was only too glad if he could find out some theoretical 
excuse why the work should not be completed.‖  Theoretical, indeed, in practice. 
 Moreover, like Kant, as Marx grew older he underwent an increasingly intolerable 
series of illnesses.  But if Kant, say, endured the less than soundless maladies of his silent 
decade, to be exacting we should say that Marx agonized for well over a decade in 
coming to complete what was of course but volume one of Capital.179  As Francis Wheen 
writes in her recent Marx biography,  ―even in the full vigor of youth, before poverty, 
sleeplessness, bad diet, heavy drinking, and constant smoking had taken their inevitable 
toll, [Marx] was a fragile specimen.‖180  He was often sick with colds and fever when a 
professional obligation came due and especially when this obligation was to publish a 
piece of writing.
181
  And of course this meant that his greatest such obligation was in 
constant danger of being sidetracked:  Explaining why his ―economic shit‖ (Capital in its 
earliest stages, before it was titled) was overdue to a publisher in 1846 (!), he chalked the 
delay up to a need to catch up with the meaning and details of his own writing.
182
  The 
catch-up of the 1840‘s, however, was soon replaced by what he himself had ―caught‖ or 
at least had come down with.  In the fifteen or so years prior to the publication of Capital 
Marx suffered his usual relentless insomnia but he also suffered from acute headaches, 
catarrh, eye inflammations, lung abscesses, pleurisies, bronchitis, rheumatism, 
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 Some scholars even say this was a three decade project, depending on when we think Marx first 
conceived the idea to write a multi-volume ―Critique of Political Economy‖.   
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 Wheen, 14.  Also see ―Health‖ under ―Karl Marx‖ in the book‘s index.  I borrow from Wheen‘s book 
for much of the following small portrait of Marx‘s health. 
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 Just as he was about to begin his regular column for the New York Daily Tribune in 1851, for example, 
he fell ill and begged Engels to take over.  Months later, when asked to contribute to the periodical Die 
Revolution, he took to bed for a week.  
182
 Is it any wonder that Marx equates his writing here with ―shit‖?  Perhaps this had to do with his trouble 
digesting the material at a primitive level, where once again the literal and metaphorical are as yet 
indistinguishable:  ―Since the all but completed manuscript of the first volume of my book has been lying 
idle for so long, I shall not have published it without revising it yet again, both as regards matter and style.  
It goes without saying that a writer who works continuously cannot, at the end of six months, publish word 
for word what he wrote six months earlier‖.  (Letter to Leske, 1846)  See Wheen, 2000.  
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toothaches, hemorrhoids, a nasty liver condition, and lastly, in the months just prior to 
finishing, from vomiting spells.
183
  His worst and most painful ailment, however, was 
certainly the cycling series of shingled boils which began their constant eruptive 
appearance in and on his skin in 1860.  Persisting until he died in 1883, these carbuncles 
were soon the literal and socially invisible rot, the undigested primitive death, of his 
existence.  This example nicely recalls, then, both the somatization and literal 
metaphorics of primitive development which we emphasized earlier. 
 Not accidentally, but in the meantime, Capital as a text remained somehow and in 
someway just underway.  Or rather, it was obviously now, after the 1840‘s, Marx‘s ill-
health which slowed his writing.  In February 1858 he told his new prospective 
publishers in a letter that although he had ―just started‖ it — this is probably more than 
ten years into the project! — the first of his proposed six volumes of Capital would be 
ready in three months, that is, in May of 1858!  Indeed, he also proposed that the second 
volume would follow a few months thereafter, the third a few months after that, and so 
on.  By April, however, instead of black ink on white sheets — shadows of spirit 
reflected upon a bright surface? — Marx was producing, well, what was probably a black 
colored bile under his skin, not yet over it.  As he put it in a letter to Engels:  ―I‘ve been 
so ill with my bilious complaint this week that I am incapable of thinking, reading, 
writing, or indeed, of anything.  My indisposition is disastrous, for I can‘t begin working 
on the thing for Duncker until I‘m better and my fingers regain their vigor and grasp.‖  
Marx‘s wife Jenny was not surprised.  ―The worsening of his condition,‖ she wrote to 
Engels, ―is largely attributable to mental unrest and agitation which now, of course, after 
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 Padover, 1978, 639.  As gathered from Marx‘s and Jenny Marx‘s letters, Padover offers a four-page list 
of Marx‘s illnesses from 1860 through 1866.  See also F. Regnault, ―Les maladies de Karl Marx‖, Revue 
Anthropologique (Paris, 1933, XLIII, p. 293 ff). 
 266 
the conclusion of the contract with the publisher, are greater than ever and increasing 
daily, since he finds it impossible to bring the thing to a close.‖   
 Thus, although it undoubtedly would have deeply insulted him to suggest that he 
was making excuses for his delays, Marx, Jenny Marx, and Engels alike all recognized 
that Marx‘s ailments were somehow ―largely attributable to mental unrest‖ and, indeed, 
were at some level psychosomatic productions.  Marx would sometimes remark that ―my 
sickness always originates in my mind‖ and that ―there is only one effective antidote for 
mental suffering and that is physical pain.‖184  But this is not all, and indeed, it is not 
quite right.  Marx himself would prove the truth, or rather, the reality and power, the this-
sidedness of his thinking about suffering in practice soon enough.  To Engels‘ remark 
that Marx ―was only too glad if he could find out some theoretical excuse why the work 
should not be completed,‖ we must add two incidents which appeared as Marx finally, 
after decades of sickness and struggle, brought Capital to a close.  The first thing worth 
pondering over is a joke which Marx and Engels began to exchange concerning the 
significance of Marx‘s carbuncles.  The second concerns the brief reversal (or should we 
say transition?) from ill-health to an extra-rigorous health that Marx experienced, at least 
for a month, upon finishing Capital and traveling to Germany to initiate the book‘s 
official publication. 
 Our thought, then, is that Marx‘s carbuncles appeared (personally if not publicly, 
for he covered them up like so much labor under capitalist conditions of production) 
whenever his theory could not be written on paper or as if to prevent him from writing 
(writing at least in alphabetical form, as we‘ll see).  Indeed, as the manuscript for Capital 
neared completion these nasty boils became quite acute.  Since the text was nearly 
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finished, this time for real, however, the eruptions could inspire a joke in and despite their 
painfulness:  According to both Marx and Engels, when Marx‘s theory finally did 
officially make its way to sheets, it was thereby also somehow ―marked‖ or ―inscribed‖ 
by his carbuncular condition just as his carbuncles were somehow ―theoretical‖ illness 
entities.  (This again is the significance of primitive inscription, an objectification, 
extending from the body, through the hands, into the object, in a mode of self-reflection, 
as we saw earlier and will see in more detail as we conclude.)  According to Wheen:   
 
Marx was plagued by his usual physical ailments through the winter of 1866-7 but 
even they could no longer thwart his determination to finish volume one of Capital:  
He wrote the last few pages of volume one standing at his desk when an eruption of 
boils around the rump made sitting too painful.  (Arsenic, the usual anesthetic, ―dulls 
my mind too much and I needed to keep my wits about me.‖)  Engels‘ experienced 
eye immediately spotted certain passages in the text ―where the carbuncles have left 
their mark,‖ and Marx agreed that the fever in his groin might have given the prose a 
rather livid hue.  ―At all events, I hope the bourgeoisie will remember my carbuncles 
until their dying day,‖ he cursed. (294) 
 
 It is hardly surprising in this regard that after decades of illness Marx‘s health 
apparently suffered a brief but complete reversal, at least for a month, from the moment 
he officially finished his beast of a manuscript in March 1867.  With the ―precious‖ text 
of volume one in hand, he left London within a week for his publishers in Hamburg not 
simply feeling well but feeling really well, perhaps all too well.  Although months earlier 
he had suggested to Engels that he might truly die while finishing Capital and although 
some of his illnesses had augmented themselves as the text neared completion, his trip to 
Germany initiated, as Padover‘s biography has it, ―one of the happiest months of his 
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life.‖185  As Marx himself had put it in a letter to Engels upon leaving London, he 
suddenly found himself feeling ―as voraciously fit as 500 hogs.‖186   
 Waiting for the printer‘s proofs in April, he spent the month in Hanover meeting 
and then lodging with the family of a distinguished gynecologist, the socialist Ludwig 
Kugelmann.  Full of respect for Marx‘s scholarship, which at the time was certainly not 
widely known, and in fact having collected more of Marx and Engels‘ writings than the 
authors themselves owned, doctor and frau Kugelmann fanatically and unabashedly 
fussed over their distinguished guest.  And Marx himself, having become ever more 
reclusive and defensive as the years in London piled up, was suddenly charming and 
open.  He and the Kugelmann‘s nine year old daughter Franziska, not so strangely, were 
soon good friends, at ease, and in mutual admiration.  They hit it off.  As Franziska 
described this encounter years later, Marx was ―full of youthful freshness‖ in their home, 
sort of like the child herself.  Between Marx and Franziska, then, it was ―youth‖ playing 
with youth, animal with animal, and even ―god‖ with ―goddess.‖  According to Padover 
and Wheen, respectively:   
 
He would get up early for breakfast, join the Kuglemann‘s at the coffee table and chat 
for hours.  Dr. Kugelmann, not wanting to miss a word that came from the lips of his 
hero, could hardly tear himself away to attend to his medical chores.  Marx became a 
part of the family to such an extent that he gave the Kugelmanns nicknames, an 
addiction he could never resist.  Franziska became ―Madamchen,‖ [etc]….  Marx, in 
turn, reminded Kugelmann of Zeus Ostricolus, of whom he had a bust in his music 
room.  Everybody agreed that Marx, with his powerful head, splendid brow, and thick 
hair resembled the Olympian god…. [At the Kugelmann‘s bourgeois dinner parties,] 
Marx impressed everyone with his Kultur.  He could talk with assurance about all the 
major topics—art and music, science and philosophy, classic history and great 
literature…. After a long decade and a half of the bitter and pinched life of a London 
exile, Marx, enjoying carefree days in a cultured home, was at his best—a superbly 
                                                   
185
 Padover, 350. 
186
 Princess Mononoke be damned.  
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educated and entertaining Herr Doktor in the great German tradition of erudition.  
(Padover, 352) 
 
No wonder he was so chirpy.  He was in excellent health, with no carbuncle daring to 
show its ugly face and not even a trace of liver trouble in spite of boozy dinner parties 
every night.  The sleepless years of sickness, squalor, and obscurity were consigned 
to the dustbin of history.  ―I always had the feeling,‖ Engels wrote on 27 April, ―that 
that damn book, which you have been carrying for so long, was at the bottom [sic] of 
all your misfortune, and you would and could never extricate yourself until you had 
got it off your back [sic].‖  Marx wrote Engels in response that ―I hope and 
confidently believe that in the space of a year I shall be made, in the sense that I shall 
be able to fundamentally rectify my financial affairs and at last stand on my own feet 
again.‖  Again?  There had never been a moment in his adult life when Marx didn‘t 
need hand-outs.  As he admitted in a letter to Engels, ―Without you I would never 
have been able to bring the work to a conclusion, and I can assure you it always 
weighed like a nightmare on my conscience that you were allowing your fine energies 
to be squandered and to rust in commerce, chiefly for my sake, and into the bargain, 
you had to share all my petites miseres as well.‖  Only a few sentences later, 
however, angst and despondency began their nagging chorus once more.  The 
publisher expected delivery of Volumes Two and Three before the end of the year 
[and] his creditors in London were waiting to pounce as soon as he returned.  
(Wheen, 297-8) 
  
  So how are we to understand this set of affairs?  How did Marx understand it?  
Let us note first of all that as soon as Marx finished Capital, or even before this, he began 
to treat the text in large part like a commodity.  And in one respect, of course, it was 
suddenly a commodity.  It certainly had and still has it‘s price.  It was to be put on sale in 
the book-sellers‘ markets of Europe in as wide a range as possible depending on the 
success of marketing, reviews, word of mouth, etc.  It is clear, however, that for Marx the 
bringing of Capital from the realm of production to the realm of exchange also meant 
something profound for his immediate personal health (he was hungry, in need of 
consumption, but now of a more cultured sort), so profound in fact that he could both 
psychologically and physically forget, ―consign to the dustbin of history,‖ his ―sleepless 
years of sickness, squalor, and obscurity,‖ as Wheen puts it.  Indeed, when Engels joked 
that the text was somehow ―marked‖ by Marx‘s carbuncles, Marx responds by pointing 
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out that he now hoped that the bourgeoisie would remember his ―carbuncles‖ to their 
dying day, as if these livid marks on the border of the inside and outside of his body were 
marks, precisely, of social and socialist significance.  So in part the joke is about 
communicating a ―disease,‖ in the form of a Marxian commodity, to those who would 
seem to be most in need of it, that is, to those who take the commodity-form as a 
―natural‖ basis for social interchange and indeed for social health.   
 But here again, as always, the phylogenetic is imbricated with the ontogenetic.  
When Marx brings Capital forward as a value to be sold on the market, it becomes a 
means of transmitting and transforming, of revolutionizing, both social history in terms of 
health (to the degree that what it demands is social justice and the historical overcoming 
of class) and his personal health history (to the degree that his hypochondriacal noceboic 
somatizations can now be slowly transformed, to some degree, into placebos, into objects 
of art, culture, and science).  Or at least this is the objectified hope, the ontogenetically 
Marxian placebo effect.  Talk about transitional objectivity!  Indeed, we learn here that 
and how Marx fetishized Capital as a text in his personal life in very much the way he 
describes money and commodities as hieroglyphs in that text.  Notice in this regard that 
insofar as he presumes that the book‘s sales would go well and, indeed, since he thinks 
that this is finally a real opportunity ―to fundamentally rectify [his] financial affairs and at 
last stand on [his] own feet,‖ a process ―making‖ him in the space of a year, Marx treats 
Capital, perhaps the greatest critique of political economy ever written, as money in the 
bank.  Capital is thus a set of wishes the objectification of which, since involving a 
necessary disillusion of prehistorical need, condenses and distorts those wishes into this 
or that partial, and so partially failing, solution.  Indeed, it is precisely despite and in this 
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failure that we see how commodification as a hopeful monetization need not be 
considered sickness.  We see ambivalence.  As forms of cultural power, commodities and 
money can have their uses.  Marx can eventually put some kinks in the crippling cycle of 
his debt, for instance, and can actually buy his girls the proper clothes they need for 
school.  His family life becomes less chaotic.  He can repay his friends not simply with 
money, then, but with a deeper sociality that here comes together with money.  He can 
begin to partially relax.  Indeed, my suggestion is that this coming together of health and 
commodification is no accident in Marx‘s case, or rather, that it‘s no accident even if 
Marx was rarely explicitly aware that his written idea that commodities and money are 
hieroglyphs is itself hieroglyphic of his ―own‖ primitive, sacred, and glyphic struggles to 
be communal and promote community.  Was it merely an accident in this regard that the 
Kugelmanns compared Marx to Zeus — O mihi praeteritos, etc — precisely when his 
preverbal, somatized glyphics, the carving of his skin in both carbuncles and their 
lancing, had been transformed into a more abstract textual form, a form of value? 
 The point here is that these ―accidents‖ appear through an unknown and only 
mediately knowable accident, an ―emergence‖ of forms of value and violence, of 
sacredness and inscription, secretly conditioned by a necessary primitive emergency.  But 
the point is also that this hieroglyphic textuality of marks on Marx (and vice versa) 
speaks, as it did in and for Kant, of a subtext of health and development.  Take the 
following example.  In volume one, while Marx thrice mentions the unhealthy, horrible 
labors of working in a nineteenth century rag factory, the first instance encapsulates the 
whole.  Here we read, in a footnote no less, that some mill owners had been accused in 
court, given the testimony of some factory inspectors who‘d witnessed these events, of 
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endangering and overworking some of their young employees by not allowing the latter 
their (now, after various Factory Acts) legally-mandated work breaks.  These owners, 
says Marx, 
 
were accused of having kept five boys between 12 and 15 years of age at work from 
6am on Friday to 4pm on Saturday, not allowing them any respite except for meals 
and one hour for sleep at midnight.  And these children had to do this ceaseless labor 
of 30 hours in the ‗shoddy hole‘, the name for the hole where the woolen rags are 
pulled to pieces, and where a dense atmosphere of dust, shreds, etc, forces even the 
adult worker to cover his mouth continually with handkerchiefs for the protection of 
his lungs!  The accused gentlemen affirmed in lieu of taking an oath — as Quakers 
they were too scrupulously religious to take an oath — that they had, in their great 
compassion for the unhappy children, allowed them four hours for sleep, but the 
obstinate children absolutely would not go to bed.  The Quaker gentlemen were fined 
₤20. (351-2)  
 
 So, in the first place, this footnote is a good example of Marx‘s most ―obvious‖ 
understanding of health and illness, especially the latter, to the degree that it emphasizes 
how capitalist production both produces and ignores its conditioning of disease and 
physiological debilitation.
187
  Occupational health in the medical sense is a socialistic 
goal.  But the reference is also a good example of the goal of occupational health in the 
social sense and so of Marx‘s critique of social ―disease.‖  There‘s an exemplification 
and implicit criticism of an exploitative class relation (the workers are simply 
overworked while the owners lie about it), of the manipulation of youth by a presumed 
―maturity‖ (the workers are children, while it‘s the ―adults‖ who lie or dissimulate), and 
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 In the third reference to rag-factory work, we read that ―it is well known that Great Britain, apart from 
its own immense store of rags, is the emporium for the rag trade of the whole world. They flow in from 
Japan, from the most remote States of South America, and from the Canary Islands.  But the chief sources 
of their supply are Germany, France, Russia, Italy, Egypt, Turkey, Belgium, and Holland.  They are used 
for manure, for making bedflocks, for shoddy, and they serve as the raw material of paper.  The rag-sorters 
are the medium for the spread of small-pox and other infectious diseases, and they themselves are the first 
victims‖ (592).   
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of ―religious‖ hypocrisy (this dissimulation, since or while not under oath, belies what 
such an oath is apparently supposed to do).    
 But there are more primitive, hieroglyphic, subtextual elements worth noting here, 
too.  First, the children work deep in a hole, such that the ―metaphorical‖ point could be 
said to be that the above-named forms of exploitation and manipulation hinge upon a 
―literalized‖ repression, that is, a placing underground of both capitalist exploitation and 
its avowal.  Indeed, just as interesting is the partial avowal that Marx could be said to be 
making by making note of this story in the first place.  There is much ado about noting 
(and its production) here.  Were it not for the factory inspectors working for the state to 
oversee factory production, the inspectors being a product of socialist work and politics, 
these children‘s story — another kind of nursery tale — might never have been told.  
Were it not for the inspectors, Marx himself would not have been able to bring it up, even 
in a footnote, in Capital.  And so we as readers wouldn‘t necessarily have access to this 
sort of horror of factory life.   
 Second, the ―making note‖ of this story is particularly hieroglyphic and subtextual 
to the degree that Marx could be said to be secretly pointing to himself and his work in 
his reference to it, that is, in his objectification of the story as a story worth noting and 
remembering.  For as we learn later in the second and third references to rag-factory 
work, what these children are doing by tearing up woolen rags deep in a hole is helping to 
produce, among other things, paper, a material which Marx uses on a daily basis.  Indeed, 
the ironic connection is deeper still.  As we know, Engels often supported Marx with the 
profits and surplus-value the Engels family made in textile mills.  Thus, to this degree, 
Marx was being fed in a fairly direct and literal way, not just with paper but even with 
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food, by the work of children in such shoddy holes!  The point is not simply that there is 
irony in all this, that Marx, like all of us moderns, relies both directly and indirectly on 
this or that form of exploitation in daily life.  The point is also — whether Marx himself 
was ―aware‖ of this or not — that these relations, these various connections between his 
own work and the boys‘ work, could be said to be hieroglyphic, both sacred and 
inscriptive, to the degree that Marx is writing to remedy the class inscription upon these 
boys.  Everything we buy is a commodity, but while there is always distantly blood and 
dirt, some commodities are dripping in more blood and dirt than others.  The point is that 
we can do something about it.  We can educate, work, and play to sublimate the 
persistence of what this blood and dirt signify.  Indeed, and again, it is interesting in this 
regard to note how part eight of Capital on primitive accumulation constantly but subtly 
refers to the exploitation of children in the birth of capital and capitalism.
188
  It‘s as if 
Marx wanted to emphasize that it is the elite owners of the means of production who are 
the ―children,‖ the immature, of society.  For they and their surplus accumulation (their 
―feasting‖) are precisely dependent (―like‖ children) on the (as if ―parental‖) work of 
their workers.  So it‘s ―as if‖ — in fact, it‘s not just as if — the relation of dependent and 
(seemingly) independent were reversed under conditions of capitalist production.  Our 
goal, then, in the face of this, is the pedagogical building of culture.  We aim to destroy 
the supposed need to say ―never mind,‖ to fabricate ―nursery tales‖ of ―insipid 
childishness,‖ as if upon a ―sacred duty,‖ in the face of the fact that force is not just ―the 
midwife of every old society which is pregnant with a new one‖ but persists in all social 
relations.   
                                                   
188
 See also, for example, Marx‘s emphases on ―child-slavery‖ during the ―period of infancy‖ of large-scale 
industry, 922-926. 
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 Indeed, our central concern pivots on the idea that symbolization on the whole is a 
process of the development of meaning, inscribed on the forehead of the (social or 
individual) body as this or that form of illusionally abstracted value, but is also secretly 
an articulation of both primitive loss and the need to (mis)understand and 
(mis)communicate this loss, a loss which, if we are right, cannot ―in the beginning‖ be 
differentiated from a lived kind of death.  This need, then, is precisely what births 
symbolization as culture and valuation as enculturation—although by no means does this 
insight allow us to equate development or enculturation with progress, unless we insist 
that progress necessarily includes distorted and abstracted elements of regress and 
violence.  As Derrida (1976) puts it in Of Grammatology, ―writing carries death…‖ (292) 
perhaps especially when the writer writes on topics which apparently have nothing to do 
with death.  Algebra is apparently for the living, for instance!  So writing is also a 
pharmakon—not just poison but treatment, and vice versa:  ―Plato already said that the 
art or technique (technè) of writing was a pharmakon (drug or tincture, salutary or 
maleficent).  And the disquieting part of writing had already been experienced in its 
resemblance to painting.  Writing is like painting, like zoographeme, which is itself 
determined…within a problematic of mimesis; resemblance is troubling‖ (292).  Here 
Derrida is calling mimesis what we have been calling reflection or, even more deeply, 
primitive identification.  Primitive reflection, in the form of a phylogenetic and 
ontogenetic ―mirror stage,‖ becomes, with the persistent recurrence of primitive 
―accumulation‖ and with the objects of forgetfully remembering this ―accumulation,‖ 
forms of symbolic significance, the transitional and cultural inscriptions of history.  
Commodities are carved out of a loss which breaks the world open into self and other.  
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This is and remains so, in fact, to the degree that writing, as the inscription of meaning in 
whatever obvious or non-obvious form it takes, always indirectly communicates, indeed 
reflects, something of its primitive roots even if its purposes are no longer, well, aware of 
these roots.     
 Following up on many ―suggestions‖ that we and Marx have already made, one 
way to think this thought more thoroughly is to acknowledge that archaic forms of 
sacrifice are invariably bloody, where blood in particular is and marks something of 
extreme value.  Blood is a, perhaps the, primitive signifier.  Indeed, related to this 
thought, I want to very briefly mention three phylogenetic examples of presentational and 
literal (and not simply representational and metaphorical) inscriptive encounter, three 
encounters, then, of what might be called the inscription of sacred exchange.  The first 
example concerns Francis Drake‘s initial contact with the ―indigenous‖ Indians of 
Northern California (perhaps somewhere near San Francisco) in 1579.  As Drake 
understood it, this was perhaps the first encounter these Indians had had with Europeans.  
In any case, according to the account of the trip‘s historiographer:   
 
When they [the Indians] came unto us, they greatly wondered at the things which we 
brought… In the mean time, the [Indian] women remaining on the hill, tormented 
themselves lamentably, tearing their flesh from their cheeks, whereby we perceived 
that they were about a sacrifice…‖ (465).  The common sort of the people leaving the 
king and his Guarde with our Generall, scattered themselves together with their 
sacrifices among our people, taking a diligent viewe of every person; and such as 
pleased their fancie, they inclosing them about offred their sacrifices unto them with 
lamentable weeping, scratching, and tearing of the flesh from their faces with their 
nayles, whereof issued abundance of blood.  But wee used signes to them of disliking 
this, and stayed their hands from force, and directed them upwards to the living God 
(466)….189 
 
                                                   
189
 See Quinn, 1978, 475, for the Indians‘ great desire to be ―cured‖ of their ailments by these ―sacred‖ 
(European) beings. 
 277 
 The second example is told by the Spanish Historian Gonzalo Fernandez de 
Oviedo.  Oviedo tells us that the indigenes in Haiti and on the Central American 
mainland develop a black soot and powder from the pines growing there: 
  
They enclose this powder in leaves, making a lump a palm and a half long and as 
thick as the wrist.  The quantity of powder fixes the prices. They take it to the markets 
and barter it for other goods. It is their money. It is used to mark Indians as slaves, 
and devices their masters desire, and also for tattooing others for ornament. The 
manner of using it is cutting with razors of flint the face or arm lightly, which they 
wish to mark, as between the skin and flesh, and powder the cut with this soot (humo) 
when the cut is fresh, and soon it is well, and the drawing (pintura) black and very 
pretty, and the drawing is perpetual for the days which one lives, just as it is branded 
(herrado).  [The tattoos, moreover, are] images of their demons (which they call 
cemi).190 
 
 Todorov himself briefly examines our third example, which concerns the Aztec 
sacrificial flaying ritual of and for their god Xipe Totec, as relayed to us by the 
Dominican friar and historian Diego Duran.
191
  According to Duran‘s lengthy account, a 
great number of victims, usually slaves and captured enemy soldiers, are sacrificed in the 
usual Aztec manner, their hearts cut from their bodies and offered to the East where the 
sun, the giver of life, is born each morning after dying each night, passing underground 
from west to east through the underworld of the dead to be reborn again each morning—
that is, this rebirth happens if the Aztec sacrifices have properly enabled it.  In this Xipe 
ritual, however, the victims are also skinned, flayed from neck to toe with razor sharp 
obsidian, the stone resembling a ―smoking mirror‖ (the name for Xipe Totec).192  The 
skins are immediately dawned and worn by the city‘s beggars, the lowest strata or caste 
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 Sinclair, A.T., 1909.  ―The Tattooing of the North American Indians,‖ American Anthropologist 11(3), 
New Series, 365-6.   
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 Duran, Diego. Book of the Gods and Rites of the Ancient Calendar, trans. Fernando Horcasitas and 
Doris Heyden (Norman:  U. of Oklahoma Press, 1971) 172-184, cited in Todorov, 158-60.   
192
 It is probably no accident that the term ―mirror‖ occurs in this god‘s name, as we shall see.  
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of Aztec society, as various incarnations of the god and his lineage.  Further, upon the 
skins the beggars wear various forms of divine insignia which determine which 
incarnation they have become.  But this is most important for our purposes:  According to 
the Aztecs, when they dawn these skins, the beggars don‘t simply represent but 
presentationally embody, they ―become‖ one of the gods.  As Todorov puts it, ―the 
prisoner literally becomes the god: he receives the god‘s name, appearance, insignia, and 
treatment; for in order to absorb the god, his representative must be sacrificed and 
consumed‖ (158).  Indeed, at this point the gods begin to wander the city as they did long 
ago — as mortals, before they became gods — but now obtaining gifts of various sorts 
from the city‘s elite.  Among the many other significations and uses of this ritual (where 
signification and use are still not very distinguishable), then, there is here a temporary 
redistribution of wealth, an exchange of positions between lower and higher classes or 
castes, between the dependent and apparently independent.  At the same time, however, 
this ritual is a way for the living Aztecs to visit their lost dead relatives—those who 
supposedly created the world, for instance, or fought in legendary wars and were then 
destroyed with the world in one of its previous cycles.  Indeed, the issue of being related 
through lineages, and thus through blood, is brought back in the end, as it were, for at the 
end of forty days of ritualized gift-giving these ―gods‖ are themselves sacrificed and 
eaten.  Such a catholic ritual!  
 Indeed, as we know, a similarly literal metaphorics of sacrifice and consumption 
is practiced in the West.  It is on precisely this issue, in fact, that Winnicott, in a version 
of his ―Transitional Objects‖ essay, seeks to clarify the difference between what we have 
been calling presentation and representation.  For while the sacrament of incorporating 
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the gods is in some sense catholic, it is not simply Catholic or simply symbolic in the 
Catholic sense.  Indeed, we can learn something about developmental historicization 
precisely through this necessary mechanism of the sacred meal, of the eating of the ―flesh 
of the god(s).‖  According to Winnicott,     
 
the term transitional object, according to my suggestion, gives room for the process of 
becoming able to accept difference and similarity.  I think there is use for a term for 
the root of symbolism in time….  It seems that symbolism can only be properly 
studied in the process of the growth of an individual, and that it has at the very best 
variable meaning.  For instance, if we consider the wafer of the Blessed Sacrament, 
which is symbolic of the body of Christ, I think I am right in saying that for the 
Roman Catholic community it is the body, and for the Protestant community it is a 
substitute, a reminder, and is essentially not, in fact, actually the body itself.  Yet in 
both cases it is a symbol.  A schizoid patient asked me, after Christmas, had I enjoyed 
eating her at the feast.  And then, had I really eaten her or only in fantasy.  I knew 
that she could not be satisfied with either alternative.  Her split needed the double 
answer. (TPP, 233-4)
193
 
 
 The average modern observer might at this point speak up to deny the possibility 
that, were he even to have had the thought at his Christmas dinner, Winnicott had 
―really‖ eaten his patient.  This patient was surely ―mad‖ or ―schizoid,‖ yes, for clearly 
our good doctor had only eaten his (turkey or whatever) dinner.  He surely hadn‘t really 
eaten his patient; or if the thought had somehow crossed his mind at the Christmas table, 
then surely he had only ―eaten her‖ in fantasy.  Right?  Indeed, this brings up the entire 
―modern Western‖ relation to magic.  Does not scientific understanding assume its 
position as scientific precisely to the degree, at least in part, that it has overcome 
―magical‖ forms of thinking, that reality (or what we have been calling objectivity in both 
the ontological and epistemological senses) can be distinguished from fantasy?  The 
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 Winnicott, 1992, 233-4.  This passage does not appear in the Playing and Reality version of the 
―Transitional Objects‖ essay.  I don‘t know if Winnicott or the editor excerpted it, but in any case the image 
is provocative.  Indeed, notice how this example links the western Christian tradition to the ―primitivity‖ of 
other sacrificial traditions.. 
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Kantian and Winnicottian response to this, of course, is that no, actually, objectivity is 
born(e) not just out of disillusion, and so not just out of a snuffing out or extinguishing of 
magical wishes and fantasy, but out of a disillusion within which illusion persists, and so 
is alive and awake, not just underground, but also necessarily above ground insofar as 
the fantasy or wishes are partly satisfied in and as the object or symptom.   Scientific 
objectivity is born(e) out of the primitive (mis)objectification of fantasy through a 
continuing, gradual (dis)illusion of that fantasy.  Helpful here is the Freudian distinction 
(which is not a simple separation) between the primary and secondary processes.  The 
primary processes are the stuff of fantasy.  Here, there is no experienced difference (as 
yet, if we are thinking developmentally) between fantasy and reality, between the 
metaphorical and the literal.  Secondary processes, on the other hand, distinguish, have 
achieved a kind of differentiating, between fantasy and reality and the metaphorical and 
the literal, between illusion and disillusion, between wish and object, etc.  Thus, on this 
model, all Winnicott is pointing to is the fact that development ―takes place‖ to the 
degree that while the secondary processes are enabled and allowed to grow through a 
process of graduated and gradual disillusionment (say, in the positivistic or hard sciences, 
in our daily ―truth-seeking‖ activities, whenever we are searching for positive empirical 
evidence, etc), the secondary process always secretly bear within them primitive wishes 
and illusions.  Indeed, to the degree that these primitive wishes and illusions more or less 
predominate in our primitive life, it is scientifically and developmentally incorrect to 
suggest that ―magical thinking‖ of any sort is simply false.  Before scientific objectivity 
can arise, there needs to be a prehistorical reality of magical thinking and magical 
objectification.  To the degree that the secondary processes are achievements it is 
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incorrect to call magic incorrect or false.  There is a secretive magical illusion still alive 
and real, as it were, in every scientific enterprise.   
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CHAPTER XI 
 
GLYPHIC TRANSITIONS 
 
 This magical illusion, in fact, is alive and real (at least in its effects) in Marx‘s 
enterprise:  As we‘ve seen, throughout the early chapters of Capital, Marx is constantly 
slyly ―describing‖ commodities and money as if from a ―primitive‖ perspective.  Here a 
commodity is dead, a mere thing, and yet ―wills‖ or even ―speaks.‖  There a commodity 
sheds its skin in an act of transubstantiation as if becoming pure (perhaps even divine) 
value.  Indeed, in the middle of the fetishism subchapter, Marx offers an especially 
helpful passage.  In modern, bourgeois market society,   
 
the labor of the private individual manifests itself as an element of the total labor of 
society only through the relations which the act of exchange establishes between the 
products, and, through their mediation, between the producers.  To the producers, 
therefore, the social relations between their private labors appear as what they are, i.e. 
they do not appear as direct social relations between persons in their work, but rather 
as thingly relations between persons and social relations between things. (165-6) 
 
 Both sentences here are fascinating — fantastic even — but especially the second.  
Indeed, this is not a naïve or merely secondary signification.  When Marx indicates that 
social relations in modern trade ―appear as what they are,‖ namely, as ―thingly relations 
between persons and social relations between things,‖ he‘s not here merely suggesting 
that money and commodities are just metaphorically, or, say, analogically ―social.‖  Nor 
is he suggesting that money and commodities are asocial signs which signify a signified 
(―sociality‖) which is not really or already there in their activity as signs and signifiers.  
That is, he‘s not simply suggesting that money and commodities represent sociality (but 
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―really‖ aren‘t social).  He is suggesting that commodities represent human sociality, 
true, but he‘s also suggesting that in their relations both with ―each other‖ and with us 
commodities and money are social, that is, they are not merely representationally but are 
also presentationally social.  Presentation, then, isn‘t real except ―together with‖ 
representation and vice versa.  The two always come together, though it is in the modern 
era, after money has achieved a kind of ―universal‖ validity as exchange-value, that the 
two become distinguishable.  Commodities and money are ―social‖ in exchange whereas 
we are social, as it were, only, as Marx here says, ―through their mediation.‖  We cannot 
be or become social, say, in the verbal sense, without the pre-verbal mediation of objects 
of social value—where this ―of‖ must yet again be taken in the sense of the double 
genitive.  
Žižek‘s analysis of the work of Alfred Sohn-Rethel, a friend of Adorno and the 
Frankfort School, is helpful here.  Sohn-Rethel‘s thesis is fantastic in all the senses of the 
term, for it shows us how the use of the form of money in market societies fantastically 
conditions the appearance of modern individuality, ―the modern subject.‖  Marx‘s basic 
insight regarding money, Sohn-Rethel suggests, was to see in its circulatory movement 
through the social body a kind of reversal of the usual understanding of Kantian 
transcendentalism.  Where Kant is usually understood to suggest (although not by me in 
this dissertation) that the subjective form of transcendental thought supplies the 
conditions for the possibility of our experience of both objects and modern scientific 
objectivity, Sohn-Rethel reads Marx as suggesting — in subreptive Kantian fashion, I‘d 
say — that the circulation of commodified objects secretly supplies the conditions for the 
possibility of the emergence of modern subjectivity and of modernity‘s abstract-scientific 
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form of thought.  As Žižek puts it in his ―Symptom‖ essay, summarizing Sohn-Rethel‘s 
interpretation:  
 
Before thought could arrive at pure abstraction, the abstraction was already at work 
in the social effectivity of the market….  Before thought could arrive at the idea of a 
purely quantitative determination, a sine qua non of the modern science of nature, 
pure quantity was already at work in money, that commodity which renders possible 
the commensurability of value of all other commodities notwithstanding their 
particular qualitative determination….  And Sohn-Rethel demonstrated the same 
about the relationship of substance and its accidents, about the notion of causality 
operative in Newtonian science—in short, about the whole network of categories of 
pure reason. In this way, the transcendental subject, the support of the net of a priori 
categories, is confronted with the disquieting fact that it depends, in its very formal 
genesis, on some inner-worldly, ‗pathological‘ process—a scandal, a nonsensical 
impossibility from the [usual subjectivist] transcendental point of view. (17)
194
 
 
While Sohn-Rethel calls this conditioning movement of circulatory exchange the 
―real abstraction‖ belonging to commodities and money, Žižek calls it ―the objectivity of 
belief.‖  The ―reality‖ and ―objectivity‖ of commodities and money-substances does not 
simply consist in their physical, tangible properties, that is, in the sense that these 
properties determine or comprise their use-value of objects.  As Marx says, when we treat 
a commodity (merely) as a use-value, we aren‘t abstracting from it but using and 
consuming it:  ―So far as it is a use-value, there is nothing mysterious about it‖ (163).  
Abstraction, then, arrives in the act of — or as Žižek puts it, in the ―effectivity‖ and 
―objectivity‖ of — exchange.  Before the modern subject is an I that thinks, this 
distinguishing of the I has been secretly accomplished in the exchange of goods, 
especially with the universalization of money.  When we consume a use-value that we 
own, we use it.  On the other hand, when we stop using it and instead seek to trade it for 
another object, we overlook its particular physical and tangible characteristics; we 
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abstract from its utility and instead see it as an exchange-value, as something the value of 
which appears in and through its alienation, in and as another commodity.  It comes here 
to reflect a price.  As Marx puts it a bit later: ―What initially concerns producers in 
practice when they make an exchange is how much of some other product they get for 
their own:  in what proportions can the products be exchanged?‖ (167, my emphasis).  
Thus, in consumption it‘s simply use-value that matters whereas in exchange we ignore 
the utility of our object to some degree and begin to think in terms of ―proportional‖ and 
―categorical‖ relationships.  And so this is why the ―semblant objectivity‖ of the 
fetishism of commodities cannot be abolished whether we don‘t believe or do believe, in 
classical Marxian fashion, that labor is the basic source of value:  The abstraction which 
is the modern, which is the liberal individual, the transcendental subject of self-reflective 
conscious historical awareness, the foundation of scientific knowledge of the world and 
its orders, all this is already conditioned as if by the secretive causality which we call ―the 
economy.‖  As Žižek puts it, ―philosophical reflection is thus subjected to an uncanny 
experience…: there in the external effectivity of the exchange process, is your proper 
place; there is the theatre in which your truth was performed before you took cognizance 
of it‖ (19).  Our insight, however, is that this unconsciousness of the commodity form 
itself has a secret:  this fantasied immutability of money and of the force of the market at 
large can be traced back to magical practices and wishful world objectifications, to the 
production of ideological worlds to meet newly human needs which themselves point to 
primitive accumulations.  Indeed, we have seen that it is precisely the aesthetic 
materiality of money which, in reflecting this wishfulness hieratically, serves as a trace 
for this tracing.  Indeed, to the degree that this trace is an inscription, something carved 
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out of a previously uniform body, our insight also consists in seeing how this process of 
abstraction which produces the modern subject is also, and more deeply, a process of the 
glyphic development of the significance of the human.   
This brings us back, then, to Todorov, whose insights here nicely supplement 
Derrida‘s similar work in this area.  The advantage which Todorov gives us, however, is 
that he, more than Derrida, sees that the history of human meaning-making hinges on a 
prehistory which both happens and persists in the form of accumulative exchange, the 
building of culture with the first exchange of objects across temporalities, territories, and 
oceans.  In Conquest of America one of Todorov‘s concerns is to link the relative 
destruction of the three great Amerindian civilizations to how their different but related 
understandings of sacredness and their different but related forms of inscriptive literacy 
prepare or underprepare them for their respective encounters with the Europeans and their 
forms of sacredness and inscriptive literacy.  As he puts it,  
 
That the [relative] absence of writing [in these Amerindian cultures] is revelatory of 
symbolic behavior in general, and at the same time of the capacity to perceive the 
other, appears to be illustrated by another fact.  The three great Amerindian 
civilizations are not located on precisely the same level of the evolution of writing.  
The Incas are the most unfamiliar with writing (they possess a mnemotechnical use of 
braided cords, moreover one that is highly elaborated); the Aztecs have pictograms; 
among the Maya we find certain rudiments of phonetic writing.  Now, we observe a 
comparable gradation in the intensity of the belief that the Spaniards are gods.  The 
Inca firmly believe in this divine nature.  The Aztecs do so only during the initial 
period of exposure.  The Mayas raise the question to answer it in the negative; rather 
than ―gods,‖ they call the Spaniards ―strangers.‖ (80) 
 
 Todorov mentions the phonetic, syllabic, alphabetic writing system of the 
Spaniards and Europeans as a fourth gradation or development, of course.  His focus is 
on the initial ―shock‖ experienced by each Indian group, especially the Aztecs, upon 
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encountering the Spaniards and Europeans at large.  The goal is not just to investigate 
these groups‘ linguistic ―difference‖ or ―differences,‖ however, but to track their cultural 
development in the course of their inscriptive-symbolic exchanges.  The exchanges are 
not ―obvious‖ events.  They become meaningful only if we understand what each culture 
brings, we could say, ―as its world,‖ such that the meaning of human culture is in contest 
and development precisely as the gift-objects produce their effects.  But what a culture 
brings as its world it brings also as an immune system, as it were.  By the time they 
encounter the Spanish, for instance, the Maya, as distinct from the Aztecs, have already 
begun the transition from pictogrammatical and ideogrammatical world symbolization to 
what is technically called hieroglyphic writing, a script characterized in part by the use of 
phonemes, units of written language representing sounds in spoken language.195  The 
Maya are half-way, as it were, to alphabetic inscription.  And predictably enough, given 
their struggles, it is only the Maya (as opposed especially to the Inca) who understand 
that the Europeans aren‘t gods but human others.196   
                                                   
195
 Pictograms are drawn or illustrated pictures which, for intracultural participants, mimetically resemble 
what they signify, while ideograms are symbols which represent ideas.  Historically speaking, ideograms 
develop later.  A (silhouetted) crosswalk sign showing some kids crossing the road with an adult is an 
example of a pictogram.  Money symbols such as those for the dollar and euro — $, € — are ideograms.  
Here is an example of both: 
    The illusion of the dog is pictographic while the circle\slash image, indicating the idea of 
―prohibited,‖ is ideogrammatical.  But notice this, too:  Is this not also a symbol of a distinct cultural 
development in and beyond many ancient forms of totemism?  The cynic in us cannot be happy about this 
development, but some of us probably will be. 
196
 In Of Grammatology, Derrida (1976) rightly sees four major forms of writing, with links and revolutions 
between each:  There is pictographic inscription and painting (based, in its most universal form, on visual 
mimesis); there is ideogrammatical and hieroglyphic inscription (the former employing conceptual 
abstractions of the visual, the latter finally beginning to inscribe phonemes, guiding vision toward sound, if 
rudimentarily, in the form of rebuses; in our current discussion, this is where the Maya were); there is 
phonetic, alphabetic, and syllabic writing (where phonemes abstract as if ―completely‖ from visual 
mimesis; letters refer to word-sounds not to visual images);  and there are scientific languages like 
algebraic signs which, while remaining ideogrammatical, have abstracted from the phonetic to represent 
ideas as if only through an orthography, a system of representational rules).  But whereas Derrida does not 
develop a terribly explicit developmental account of these forms — continuing to think them ―types‖ as 
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 There are a couple of points to note in relation to this before we conclude:  First, 
since phonetic and alphabetic writing abstracts from pictography (and from such 
artifactual iconographies as pottery, idols, and amulets, for instance) to communicate 
instead through visual signs representing sounds, this form of writing is much more 
readily used to communicate words from another language and/or for foreign names; 
indeed, alphabets (following abjads) can be used to write the speech of foreign language.  
They are thus functionally adequate to encounters with diverse cultural others, to 
bridging cultural gaps, and so to building an intercultural system of communication.  
Indeed, alphabets have typically developed in ports and sites of cross-cultural trade, 
where various languages are spoken.  But as Derrida notes, quoting Rousseau, this is due 
both to their phoneto-syllabic functional adequacy as well as to the development of their 
ability to abstract value.  Alphabets cannot be detached from relations of power 
embedded now in what we would call the ―economy‖:   
 
One may thus borrow graphic signs, make them safely emigrate outside of their 
culture and their language of origin. ‗But though the Greek alphabet derives from the 
Phoenoecian, it does not follow at all that the Greek language derives from the 
Phoenoecian‘ [Rousseau].  This movement of analytic abstraction in the circulation of 
arbitrary signs is quite parallel to that within which money is constituted.  Money 
replaces things by their signs, not only within a society but from one culture to 
another…. That is why the alphabet is commercial, a trader.  It must be understood 
within the monetary moment of economic rationality. (300) 
 
 Thus, second, we can return to Marx who had already articulated this thought by 
calling the pecuniary form of production and exchange hieroglyphic.  The power that 
money and the economy at large embodies speaks of an originary (ursprüngliche), which 
is to say prehistorical, differentiation of primitive human community into hierarchical 
                                                                                                                                                       
much as part of an historical unfolding of human meaning in the face of cultural conflict — we shall 
emphasize the developmental here.   
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structures and strata, into forms of priestly rule, for instance, forms and hierarchies which 
eventually become classes with the rise of money in all its speculative forms.  Derrida 
follows Marx here to suggest that speculation is conditioned by the specter, the specter of 
communism.  But futural communism cannot escape its past in the persistence and 
breakdown of primitive communism.
197
  Thus, the economic is a distorted image, a secret 
developmental legacy, of this prehistorical sacred legacy, a legacy passed down 
generation to generation precisely in and through the objects which survive when people 
do not.  The people, however, inhabit these objects to the degree that that the objects 
speak of the past, of ―what happened.‖   The memorial object of value speaks like a ghost 
because it is a kind of ghost, a specter through which we can speculate, distributing the 
power of death in the distributions of social life under capital.   
 Note, for instance, that in pre-alphabetic social formations a golden crown or 
scepter, to use an obvious example, doesn‘t simply represent the authority of a king 
and/or god.  Rather, it also is the king‘s and/or god‘s authority.  It affords opportunity for 
the lived, real illusion that it is part of and so indistinguishable from the king‘s and/or 
god‘s potent body.  Indeed, as the king‘s and/or god‘s authority, the thing has that much 
more ―direct‖ force.  And as a force, it is inscriptive.  Indeed, under this gaze, the object‘s 
apparent author-ity is a force of author-ship.  It marks subjects (subjectifying and 
channeling impulses) quite literally (as we see in the case of Drake‘s expedition) as 
beholden to a form of authority.  Children need their gods, and no one who lives is not 
                                                   
197
 It would be interesting in this regard to compare Nietzsche‘s genealogy of priestly and elite rule to our 
Todorovian and Winnicottian archaeology.  Nietzsche links the development of priestly, ascetic ideals, 
after all, to transformations in language and symbolization—from the judgments of ―good‖ and ―bad‖ to 
the subreptive counter-judgments of ―evil‖ and ―good.‖ The presentational force of teeth and claws, for 
instance, is eventually displaced by the re-presentational force of cognitive value judgments.  We can still 
fight tooth and nail with words, after all.  Indeed, this revaluation of values hinges upon a forgetting or 
repression.  
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still somewhere a child, even if the gods don‘t exist.  Thus, in Foucauldian language we 
could say that the object (in a glyphed relation to the subject emerging together with it, as 
the legacy of a social split) disciplines.  Primitive tattoos exemplify this beautifully as 
well, for they are typically sacred markings that either differentiate one group from 
another or mark a developmental rite of passage into a stage of subjectivity, into puberty 
or adulthood, for instance.  They also appear precisely at the border between subject and 
object; they are not yet jewelry or amulets, for instance.  Indeed, to the degree that 
subject and object cannot be firmly distinguished in them, so too are signifier and 
signified not easily or firmly distinguished.  Similarly, the Aztec Xipe ritual exhibits this 
indistinction to the degree that the participants are not simply ―acting as if‖ or 
―representing‖ the divine.  Rather, in a more primitive sense, they ―are‖ the divine, even 
if the divine doesn‘t exist outside of these glyphs, these skin carvings.  They are 
worshipped and showered with gifts for instance.  This, then, is our point:  The ―gifts,‖ 
relics, and signs at play here are the symbols, and so are the writings, that both represent 
and bear that power.  Society lives or dies, apparently, on how the rituals of exchange go, 
on the effects of communicative inscription in exchange.  Indeed, this is where Todorov 
himself develops a developmental story.  Reflecting on the confrontation between Aztec 
sacrificial prophecy and the global vision of Christian monotheism, for instance, he 
suggests that 
 
this discussion of the characteristics of the Aztecs‘ symbolic conduct leads me to 
observe not only the difference between two forms of symbolization, but also the 
superiority of one over the other; or rather and more precisely, to turn from 
typological description to discuss a developing schema.  Do I thereby adopt purely 
and simply the inegalitarian position?  I do not believe so.  There exists a realm in 
which development and progress are beyond doubt; this is the realm of technology.  It 
is incontestable that a bronze or iron ax cuts better than one of wood or stone; that the 
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use of the wheel reduces the physical effort required.  Now these technological 
inventions themselves are not born of nothing:  they are conditioned (without being 
directly determined) by the evolution of the symbolic apparatus proper to man, an 
evolution we can also observe in certain social behavior.  There is a ―technology‖ of 
symbolism, which is as capable of evolution as the technology of tools, and, in this 
perspective, the Spanish are more ―advanced‖ than the Aztecs…, even if we are here  
concerned only with a difference of degree. (159-60) 
 
 Indeed, this ―advance‖ consists precisely in recognizing deeper and more abstract 
differences between the literal and the metaphorical.  These abstract differences, 
however, turn precisely on having forgotten that representational inscription turns on and 
develops out of presentational inscription.  The abstraction in this case is a repression of 
the memory of magic.  As Todorov puts it, a hundred pages after mentioning Xipe:   
 
Cortés affords us a splendid example of this, and he was conscious of the degree to 
which the art of adaptation and of improvisation governed his behavior.  
Schematically this behavior is organized into two phases.  The first is that of interest 
in the other, at the cost of a certain empathy or temporary identification.  Cortés slips 
into the other‘s skin, but in metaphoric and no longer a literal fashion:  the difference 
is considerable.  Thereby he ensures himself an understanding of the other‘s language 
and a knowledge of the other‘s political organization (whence his interest in the 
Aztecs‘ internal dissension, and he even masters the emission of messages in an 
appropriate code: hence he manages to pass himself off as Quetzalcoatl returned to 
earth. (248) 
 
 Let‘s explore the transition from hieroglyphic to alphabetic writing down two 
paths in this regard.  First, recall that Freud always insisted that to best understand the 
significance in dreams of spoken words or speech, the ―vocal‖ appearances or meanings 
of these images should be translated backwards into visibly inscribed appearances or 
meanings, images the significance of which would then include their presentational force 
in and despite, and despite and in, their representational status as ―reminders.‖   The 
words should be translated backward into rebuses, in other words, where the rebus 
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―speaks‖ of things that the spoken words hide in themselves.  This interpretive method 
recognizes and leaps across a gap, then, to uncover significance of the primary process in 
and behind the scriptive indications of the secondary process.   
 Indeed, secondly, we can perform this same kind of analysis in and despite the 
historical gaps in the formation of the Latin alphabet.  These gaps are necessary, after all, 
in and for the development of symbolization.  Or rather, symbols spring precisely from an 
originary splitting of the primitive social body, as our Xipe, tattoo, and Drake examples 
show.  Thus, in the case of the letters of the alphabet — which are supposed to help us 
―draw pictures‖ without actually being pictographic — the letters can be traced backward 
to various prehistorical pictographic, and fetishistic, images.  The Latin letter ―G,‖ for 
instance, derives from a Phoenician graphic sign which derives ideogrammatically from 
the symbol ―^‖ which is supposed not just to represent but also magically present a 
camel, or rather, the hump of a camel—for the camel is a sacred animal, a divine totem 
with such and such powers.  Indeed, the camel is an ancient relative, an early god such 
that those of the camel clan are of a lineage with their sacred foods and food prohibitions.  
Our phonogrammatically abstract letter ―G,‖ in other words, derives through various 
removes and gaps in its historical evolution from an image presenting the contours the 
language of sacrifice. 
 What, then, in conclusion, can we say about the origins of culture?  This must be 
brief, but on my developmentally oriented view culture is that which mediates without 
actually destroying what could be called the violence of the primitive loss of both 
―mother‖ and ―mother nature‖ together.  Culture is thus the trace, the mark, of a secretive 
and necessary loss, for as well as memorializing it, it puts this necessary loss into 
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forgetfulness, as a scar often proves to be the site of a former and current healing.  
Culture develops, then, as that which communicates by partially repressing, or we could 
say sublimating, the baggage of the past.  What remains above ground in, as, and for 
consciousness is at least a modicum of objectified pleasure, something that it is not death 
incarnate but rather a mark, a symbol of having survived death.  Communicating this or 
that in exchange, and eventually coming to represent this or that, the object buries death 
such that death persists in it.  Thus, the creation and development of culture begins and is 
maintained in memorial objects, in mementos, for instance, which, however and again, 
link and separate generations—the individual body imbricated with, as well inscriptively 
detached from, the primitive social body.
198
  Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, and vice 
versa, in other words, to the degree that generations are both bridged and gapped in the 
object which culture becomes within any historical epoch, mode of production, or stage 
of development.   
 In his play-therapy sessions with disturbed or ill children, for instance, Winnicott 
would often sit on the floor with the kids and share in some drawing with them.  He 
called this the squiggle game.  Either he or the child would start the game off with a little 
doodle or squiggle on a piece of paper.  The other‘s job was then to finish or add to the 
inscription by turning it into some other — a transformed — shape.  Meanwhile, Dr. 
Winnicott would ask the children about the drawings, about their dreams, and, if the 
conversation lead there, about their general thoughts on life, death, and loss.  And indeed, 
this latter material would often come up on paper, somewhat cryptically in and as the 
                                                   
198
 We each literally inherit a physical part of our parents, and their parents, etc, to the degree that egg and 
sperm form the first cell, which divides repeatedly to become the living unit of mother-child, which 
eventually splits to become the individual ―body‖, itself an elaboration of the physical residue, the 
combined originary seed, of the parents. 
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drawings, before it would come up subjectively or consciously.  And as if magically, that 
is, if and when a bond could be established between old and young, between one 
generation and the next through the shared art of discussion and the general ―drawing of 
pictures‖ in both a literal and symbolic way, this pair of persons would mutually create a 
world where sad and terrible things were transitionally if not finally understood and 
communicated.  What would grow in and through this shared aesthetic creation was a 
place, a common-place, for development and meaning.  A place for letting go. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
TRAUMATOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
   
 To conclude this dissertation I‘d like to paint a fairly specific picture, black on 
white, of how I understand the interrelationship between health, objectivity, and 
development.  In the course of the dissertation I examined this interrelationship by 
developing three tactics.  First, I examined the relation between health and development 
in what I take to be two of its most profound (socially) scientific analyses, namely, in 
Kant‘s critical aesthetics and in Marx‘s theory of fetishism.  Second, I occasionally 
looked to psychoanalysis to examine how human historical development pivots on what 
might be called the prehistorical differentiation of subject and object.  Third, and armed 
with the discovery that the primitive is the (distortedly) persistent, I asked larger 
questions about the relation between individual and historical development.  Does 
ontogeny recapitulate phylogeny, and vice versa?  I have suggested that they do and that 
they do so in the realm of ―value‖ through the symbolic and/or symptomatic transmission 
of the archaic.  I have therefore traced value to its secret heritage in the magic and 
fetishism of both premodern cultures and preverbal infancy.  The lesson I drew was this, 
namely, that there is something important to be learned about human health, 
development, and their relationship by studying the promise and necessary disavowals 
belonging to valuation. 
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 To help recap some of these earlier lessons here, however, I want to examine the 
interrelationship between health, objectivity, and development by means of a new 
distinction, or rather a distinction I now need to examine more explicitly.  The distinction 
is between trauma or the traumatic, on the one hand, and the traumatological funding of 
both trauma and development, on the other hand.  Here I am inheriting the basic Kantian 
distinction, fed through Marx and psychoanalysis, between the pre-experiential 
conditions of experience and the phenomenal experience of objects, between the a priori 
and the a posteriori, the noumenal and the phenomenal, but with an important twist.  This 
twist begins in Kant‘s subtle, almost invisible emphasis on subreption, an idea which 
becomes more explicitly articulated as fetishization in Marx, and then as sublimation and 
transitional objectivity in Freud and Winnicott respectively.   
 As we‘ve seen, for Kant the subject‘s experience of objects and objectivity is 
funded through hidden conditions which end up mis-appearing in and as the objects of 
experience.  So while we only have phenomenal access to the objects of experience and 
therefore can‘t know or access either them or their conditions in themselves, directly, or 
noumenally, we can nonetheless learn something about these conditions indirectly, at 
least to the degree that phenomenal objects subreptively reflect them.  Subreptively 
understood, all contemporary objects, all modern cultural things, reflect something not 
just about modern culture and its history but also about its prehistory.  This prehistory is 
important, I shall to argue, to the degree that we cannot expect to bring therapy to modern 
forms of social injustice and illness — to various forms of capitalist domination, for 
example — without addressing the root(s) of the problem.  If modern class divides and 
capitalist domination are weeds that don‘t just add to the human garden‘s productivity 
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and beauty but smother much of this garden by blocking the sunlight that could otherwise 
be shared to some greater degree in mutual (and yes mutually competitive) growth, then 
we can‘t simply cut these weeds off at the surface.  It‘s this simple and yet terribly 
difficult:  We have to dig deep into ourselves, our culture, our historical relation to other 
cultures, our entire history of globalization, to reveal and address our deeply unified and 
divided roots.
199
  But since these roots are not just unified, not simply a co-unity of 
primitive community, but are also archaically marked by division and destruction, we 
also need to accept that the roots of illness and injustice will never be completely excised.  
This is what I mean when I suggest that the traumatological makes possible both 
development and trauma.  To the degree that we continue to bring children into the world 
and that death continues to bring sadness, longing, and (sadly) even anger, and so also to 
the degree that we fail to understand the beauty of the work of raising children and the 
value of feeling sad about death and loss, there is and remains, will necessarily remain, 
plenty of work to be done.    
 Thus, the distinction I want to make between trauma and the traumatological 
inherits the basic Kantian distinction between (a) the objects and (b) the conditions of 
experience; but it also takes into account features of these conditions which Kant had 
only hinted at but which are then more deeply investigated, acknowledged, and specified 
by Marx and then by psychoanalysis—especially, I would say, by Winnicott.  As Marx 
teaches us, the hidden conditions of experience, and more particularly of the series of 
modes of production which frame historical experience epochally, are not simply given 
as a priori static structures; rather, these structures have a history, indeed a prehistory of 
violent accumulation which secretly informs each historical mode in turn.  But of course 
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 I am a global citizen. 
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this in-forming is not fully secretive.  Rather, to the degree that violence saturates the 
roots of culture, this formative process leaves traces and symptoms which to some degree 
disavow this violence and hide prehistorical rooting in and as historical objects of value, 
indeed, eventually in and as the ―universal‖ modern object of value—money.  Thus, to 
the degree that objectified values reflect not just the maintenance but also the coming to 
be of class schisms, their study also suggests that archaic human life — the stuff no one 
directly remembers but which, upon scientific investigation, has clearly had lingering 
formative influence on who we‘ve become and where we may be headed — is 
characterized by social identifications and divisions as well as by a cyclical swinging 
back and forth between these forces in the process of world formation, of globalization.  
My suggestion, following Kant and Marx as two secret forefathers of psychoanalysis, 
then, is that human development becomes possible and actual to the degree that it 
necessarily disavows and extends, mis-presenting the persistence of, its traumatological 
roots.  Development is a distortion, a subreptive (mis)placing into merely historical 
memory of its nonviolent and violent prehistory.   
 By traumatological, then, I will be referring to the originary unities and 
destructions which (paradoxically) make human production and development possible 
and actual to the degree that the destructions (at least) are partially disavowed (and, 
paradoxically once again, partially survived, despite being destructions) in a sub-dialectic 
of illusion and disillusion.  This sub-dialectic, in turn, produces a relation between 
subject and object and therefore also the possibility of developing a more or less 
objective, even scientifically objective, relation to the world.  To the degree that logos 
supersedes mythos but partially preserves the latter within its objectivity, we will 
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continue to insist that objects and objectivity never appear in themselves but must first be 
objectified, indeed, that they can only appear through the productive disavowal of their 
nonetheless persisting traumatological conditions.  It is only through the partial 
destruction of the purest form of what Kant, Freud, and Winnicott often call illusion, or 
what Marx, Freud, and Winnicott often call fantasy, that scientific analyses — such as 
this one? — can grow.  For if and when the purest of illusions or fantasies — what we 
called for Kant ―fantastic objectification‖ and what Winnicott calls ―omnipotence‖ — is 
destroyed and yet is also survived, the purity of the illusion is sent ―underground‖ thereby 
creating a difference or distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness, between 
experience and what is forgotten (i.e. what is now forgettable), between historical values 
and the traces of prehistorical destruction. 
 But if science must acknowledge the role of its persistently primitive 
traumatological conditions if it is to be developmentally objective, then it must also 
acknowledge that the destructive and divisive aspects of primitive creation and 
production make trauma both possible and, at times and in places, actual.  Trauma is the 
worst of things.  Partly distinct from the traumatological, it is destruction of already (at 
least partly) integrated culture; it is a disintegration of already objectified lines of 
development.  It is the cutting off of (at least some) productive roots.  Indeed, if we recall 
that development hinges on the necessary disavowal and extension of traumatological 
conditions, we can say that trauma ―develops,‖ or rather that it dawns, when the closure, 
experience, and history this disavowal implies are violently opened up.  This opening is 
invariably felt as a wounding, or at least it is felt this way nachträglich to the degree that 
any opening up of pre-experiential and pre-historical conditions within experience and 
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history cannot be immediately ―experienced‖ or understood.  This is why (the symptoms 
of) traumas appear in delay and deferral.  For upon wounding, archaic and prehistorical 
— and so, for historical consciousness, largely unrecognizable — destructions and 
identifications are ―unrepressed‖ and released.  They are secretly reactivated, forcing 
themselves onto current experience even when they are not recognized as archaic.  
Trauma is thus almost unimaginably painful at times, if we are to believe the stories and 
symptoms of the traumatized, which we must, I say, if we want to work for developing 
more justice and beauty in the world.  For trauma is violation and breach, a forced 
regression to preverbal or precognitive states where inside and outside (and mind and 
body, too) are either more or less indistinguishable or, alternately, almost fully 
dissociated.   
 This, then, should help us understand why the ―causality‖ of trauma is so slippery 
and strange.  To the degree that the structures of primitive identification and division 
which had made experience possible are brought forward and reactivated to mix with 
current experience and the conscious content of its memories, it is difficult to tell whence 
the wounding had come.  The trauma will almost certainly seem to be only current and to 
come solely from outside.  A car accident, for example, does occur in the present.  
Whatever intrusions and shocks are sustained, these are intrusions and shocks.  They 
happen in and as a contemporary event.  The psychoanalytic suggestion here, however, is 
that if these intrusions and shocks end up dawning traumatically — which means that the 
sufferer may suffer from the delayed, uncontrolled repetition of nightmares, 
hallucinations, psychosomatic disturbances, and/or various other symptoms of ego 
disintegration, and that he or she will not begin to recover even when most people would 
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expect him or her to have recovered; rather, for him or her the accident will have become 
a persisting and recurrent crisis — then ―the‖ event is not singular at all; it does not just 
happen as a ―current‖ event the cause of which came merely from ―outside.‖  Rather, 
while trauma predominantly and certainly at first appears as a contemporary and singular 
event caused by a shocking intrusion of outside objects or events — an empirical set of 
objects or events in the Kantian sense of ―empirical‖ — it is also a more or less secret 
opening up and reawakening of forgotten primitive happenings, structures, and emotions, 
of the traumatological conditions of identity and division which had made and invariably 
make objectivity, experience, history, and development possible and, in good-enough 
environments, more or less actual.  Recalling our earlier ―metaphor,‖ we could say in this 
regard that trauma is a violent uprooting and at least partial destruction of developed and 
so previously buried roots.   
 Human rooting, however, is complex.  More obviously than in the case of other 
animals and especially of plants, for instance, our ―rooting‖ takes place precisely through 
something on the order of an originary ―uprooting.‖  Human birth, after all, is a 
necessarily bloody dislodging, a literal un-anchoring, a primitive dividing of a unity or 
identity into that which can then begin to relate as subject and object, here and there, 
inside and outside, mind and body, etc.  Indeed, following Freud in such works as Totem 
and Taboo and Civilization and its Discontents, my suggestion has been that we can say 
something like this not just of individuals but also, to the degree that ontogeny and 
phylogeny are imbricatedly recapitulative, of the species.  What I want to do in what 
follows, then, is to accomplish two tasks, namely, on the one hand, to show how and why 
my emphasis in this dissertation concerning the vicissitudes of human development has 
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been on the relationship between objectification and destruction and, on the other hand, 
to articulate how and why this root of destructive objectification is also the root of illness 
and health.  In general, I want finish by stating as clearly as possible why I think 
development ―moves forward‖ only to the degree that various forms of division, splitting, 
and destruction are to some degree disavowed, preserved, buried, and yet raised in and as 
symbolic objects of meaning and shared value.  These objects are objects of health if and 
when they help us to mourn current, historical, and prehistorical destructions and losses.  
Here they are placebos.  They are objects of illness, or nocebos, on the other hand, if and 
when they present primitive destructions and losses in more or less isolated and 
melancholic repetition.  Many objects, however, are not so easily or neatly distinguished, 
or they vacillate between these poles depending on circumstance and environment.  Thus, 
to exhibit the complex relation between placebos and nocebos, together with the 
importance of the relation between the traumatological and the traumatic within the 
former relation, I here want to revisit some pivotal, indeed critical, problematics as these 
are brought forward and examined by Freud, Winnicott, Marx, and then, to come full 
circle, by Kant.  What I hope to have developed here in conclusion, then, is not just a 
theory of trauma but a useful integration of a psychoanalytically based trauma theory 
with a distinctly modern philosophical theory of developmental health.  
 Let me begin, then, with what many scholars, including Winnicott and myself, 
consider to be one of Freud‘s most insightful examples and analyses of development, 
namely, once again, the fort-da game from the second chapter of Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle.  Recall that Freud here links the peek-a-boo and hide-and-seek structure of 
children‘s play to the advent of cultural processes in general.  The object of early play, he 
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suggests, is culturally developmental to the degree that the renunciation of instinctual (i.e. 
natural or immediate) satisfaction which ―takes place‖ in it nonetheless arrives with a 
modicum of pleasure.
200
  This renunciation of instinct is therefore an extension and 
distortion of what Freud calls the pleasure principle into what he then calls the reality 
principle.  The pleasure principle is here turned back on itself in the objectification of 
reality much like presentation is turned back on itself, as I have articulated and used these 
terms, in representation: 
 
The child cannot possibly have felt his mother‘s departure as something agreeable or 
even indifferent…. It may perhaps be said in reply that her departure had to be 
enacted as a necessary preliminary to her joyful return, and that it was in the latter 
that lay the true purpose of the game.  But against this must be counted the observed 
fact that the first act, that of departure, was staged as a game in itself and far more 
frequently than the episode in its entirety, with its pleasurable ending…. We are 
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 ―Object‖ could here be understood variously as ―goal,‖ and/or as the physical thing of the child‘s 
attention, as the gift of the mother and/or father, as the presentation of the mother or father, as the child‘s 
external memory, as the site where conflicting wish-fulfillments persist, as the site of the child‘s growing 
sense of objectivity or (to use Freud‘s phrase) of reality, etc. The notion of ―objectivity‖ that pivots on all 
these understanding of ―object,‖ then, is richer and deeper, I would suggest, than the interpretivistic or 
objectivistic notion of objectivity.  By reducing the possibility of understanding the world and its objects to 
perspectives shared within this or that intersubjective grouping, interpretivism more or less abandons the 
notion of objectivity.  For if ―objectivity‖ is limited to cultural perspectives and if cultures can be utterly 
different, as many interpretivistic theories suggest, then world understanding becomes limited to 
interpretations within a culture.  See the work of Peter Winch, for instance.  As a kind of positivism, on the 
other hand, objectivism presumes that objectivity can be achieved as if beyond perspective.  In presuming 
that subjects can have direct epistemic access to things or objects ―in themselves,‖ in other words, 
objectivism fails to account for the subjectivity and in many cases even the intersubjectivity involved in 
world understanding.  From my perspective, then, we need an account that not only balances the 
exaggerations of these two versions of objectivity but, more importantly, one that shows how we develop 
both perspectives and our sense of encountering objects directly.  So this is why I follow Kant‘s lead.  
Further, throughout this dissertation I have been suggesting on the one hand that objectivity is something of 
instrumental concern, that is, it‘s about the means by which subjects and objects come to appearance as 
subjects and objects .  Subjects with their perspectives and objects as if in-themselves appear through 
instrumental objectifications.  Therapeutic objectivity, in this respect, concerns both the psychosocially 
constructed beliefs, hopes, and fears (the interpretivistic or hermeneutic objects) as well as the 
biomechanically active objects (the objectivistic or biological objects) we incorporate as means to health.  
On the other hand, however, objectivity is something of epistemic concern, a way of understanding the 
vicissitudes of health and illness coherently, cosmopolitanly, broadly, that is, as objectively as possible 
while still being limited to the constraints of intersubjectivity and something else.  Inheriting Kant‘s and 
Marx‘s insights on this issue, however, psychoanalytic theory attempts to track and promote developmental 
health through the age- and stage-appropriate use of objects and reflective objectivity.  Indeed, it is the 
primitively destructive aspect of what I just called ―something else,‖ then, which escapes many, indeed 
most theories of objectivity and which marks this one as unique and, dare I say, more objective.   
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therefore left in doubt as to whether the impulse to work over in the mind some 
overpowering experience so as to make oneself master of it can find expression as a 
primary event, and independently of the pleasure principle.  For in the case we have 
been discussing, the child may, after all, only have been able to repeat his unpleasant 
experience in play [by throwing the toy spool away, fort, ―ooo‖] because the 
repetition carried along with it a yield of pleasure of another sort…. It can also be 
observed that the unpleasurable nature of an experience does not always unsuit it for 
play.  If the doctor looks down a child‘s throat or carries out some small operation on 
him, we may be quite sure that these frightening experiences will be the subject of the 
next game. (15-16)  
 
 Notice that Freud here describes the child‘s experience with the doctor as 
―frightening.‖  This description is quite interesting but especially so if we recall that just 
before he turns to children‘s play as a cultural practice apparently not beyond the pleasure 
principle, Freud had described fright as one of two factors characterizing the strange 
etiology of the traumatic neuroses, of events and desires perhaps beyond the pleasure 
principle. There is a puzzle here, then, related to the fact that the ―shell-shock‖ 
experienced by many soldiers in WWI devolved upon some of them well behind the front 
lines as well as upon some about to return to the trenches from a leave of absence.  
Indeed, this puzzle also relates to the fact that these affected soldiers didn‘t just exhibit 
psychological symptoms (like stuttering, depersonalization, memory loss, emotional 
swings, and especially serial nightmares) but also somatic symptoms (such as 
neuromuscular tics and tremors, chronic pain, sight disturbances, balance issues, and 
localized paralyses).  We thus learn that trauma is a complicated disorder the causality of 
which is distinctly, indeed specifically, strange: 
 
In the case of the war neuroses, the fact that the same symptoms sometimes came 
about without the intervention of any gross mechanical force seemed at once 
enlightening and bewildering.  In the case of the ordinary traumatic neuroses, two 
characteristics emerge prominently:  first, that the chief weight in their causation 
seems to rest upon the factor of surprise, of fright; and secondly, that a wound or 
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injury inflicted simultaneously works, as a rule, against the development of a 
neurosis. (10-11) 
 
 
Here then is our puzzle, circumspectually oriented but focused for the moment on 
fright:  In the case of the boy, fright seems to push him to act out his experience in a 
rather monotonous form of play which, though somewhat repetitive, is a developmental 
distortion of a prior state, and so which is also a mark of his growing up, his very 
enculturation.  For Freud this play is developmental to the degree that it replaces the 
boy‘s prior crying fits, fits he would ―throw‖ when his mother or father wasn‘t available 
at his demand, upon his desire.  In the case of the embattled soldier, on the other hand, 
fright pushes him toward trauma, toward personal disintegration.  Indeed, this is a helpful 
way of seeing (how) the oppositional direction of the movements here (relate).  In the 
case of play, fright catalyzes a more or less healthy and integrating response whereas, 
again, in the case of war it catalyzes disintegration.  Or rather, in the latter case it does so 
as a rule, says Freud, if the fright is not adequately objectified, for instance, in the 
somatic form of a bloody breaking of skin.  So what is going on here?  What lessons 
might we learn about the relationship, including a possible link, between development 
and trauma?    
On the one hand, there would seem to be no link.  As soon as he is finished 
examining shell-shock, for instance, Freud inserts a break, a gap in the text and then 
turns, quite deliberately, as if to change the subject and object of analysis to children‘s 
play:   
 
At this point I propose to leave the dark and dismal subject of the traumatic neuroses 
and pass on to examine the method of working employed by the mental apparatus in 
one of its earliest normal activities—I mean in children‘s play. 
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  On the other hand, however, as we‘ve already begun to see, Freud gives a 
number of hints that play might secretly contain various ―dark and dismal‖ elements, 
factors resembling those of the shocks of war.  We have already mentioned the first of 
these hints, namely, that being suddenly frightened is a principal ingredient, a kind of 
catalyst, both in trauma and in early, primitive development.  Fright thus seems to be a 
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for both trauma and enculturation.  We could 
read the above passage with its break or gap  subreptively in this regard, that is, we can 
suggest that despite and in appearances, various dark and dismal elements are not simply 
passed over by play, as if play escapes, nullifies, or overturns their influence, but rather 
that these elements are secretly ―passed on‖ to play, into and as the play which has 
thereby already sublimated them, tucking them ―underground‖ such that they remain 
presentationally alive, albeit in fantasy.  Play is never, after all, without its violences.   
Similarly, in the next chapter, Freud himself seems to ―link‖ culture (and play) to 
trauma (and war) by examining another important ingredient which is apparently or 
perhaps common to both, namely, what he calls here the (non-pleasing or meta-pleasing) 
compulsion to repeat, or repetition.  He introduces repetition by noting how some persons 
fall into the ―same‖ cryptic relational patterns, even while exhibiting a complete passivity 
toward these patterns; they thus seem to be ruled by a ―fatality‖ (24) or ―compulsion of 
destiny‖ (25).  One of the examples Freud gives is of a woman ―who married three 
successive husbands each of whom fell ill soon afterwards and had to be nursed by her on 
their death-beds‖ (24).  Thus, ―if we take into account observations such as these, based 
upon behavior in the transference and upon the life-histories of men and women, we shall 
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find courage to assume that there really does exist in the mind a compulsion to repeat 
which overrides the pleasure principle.  Now too we shall be inclined to relate to this 
compulsion the dreams which occur in traumatic neuroses and the impulse which leads 
children to play‖ (24).  So, against the ―obviousness‖ of Freud‘s suggestion that he was 
―leaving‖ the subject of trauma and ―passing on‖ to play and enculturation, he here again 
―links‖ trauma and culture at least indirectly, as through a thick mirror.   
Or should we emphasize that he seems to link trauma and culture?  After all, if we 
read this statement with care, the meta-pleasing compulsion to repeat is not identified 
with what is here called play but rather, more specifically, with ―the impulse which leads 
to play.‖  Play — and with it what we might call objective cultural development — is not 
coincident or identical to the impulse and compulsion — these are related — to repeat, 
for play is what is lead to through the compulsion and impulse.  How, then, in human 
development does something which is apparently pre-cultural — a mere impulse — lead 
to enculturation?  What we must insist here is that even if the impulse is a mere force or 
mechanism of biological continuity, the playful effect to which this impulse leads is not 
simply a mechanism or force.  Nor is it strictly continuous with biological continuity.  
Rather, it is something like the metaphorization, the distortion and disavowal, of that 
which leads to it or, perhaps more accurately, had lead to it.
201
   In the terminology of this 
dissertation, I have often called this metaphorization process ―symbolization.‖  As a 
symbol, the object of play is neither the effect of a mechanical cause nor a moment in a 
biological continuity.  Rather, as Kant would put it, there has here been a check to the 
vital forces, now deployed as play between imagination and understanding.  Indeed, it is 
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 As we shall see momentarily, this is omnipotent illusion turned upon itself, creating a break and marking 
the latter in its own enlivening capacity.  
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this check that the symbol signifies as both loss and gain (among many other dualisms we 
will highlight and examine momentarily), and so as meaningful.  Not just the ―spool‖ but 
the soldier‘s ―wound‖ too, then, makes sense of the world in the face of an incredible 
surprise or shock.  Of course, this brings up yet another question:  Isn‘t there an important 
difference to recognize here between surprise and shock?  And if so, where and when is 
this difference made?   
Let‘s recall at this point that for Winnicott a transitional object is precisely 
symbolic, and even the siting of the power of symbolization, to the degree that it both 
merges and separates the child and parent as well as representing this merger and 
separation.  It can be developmental, in other words, when in symbolizing the loss of 
what is then presupposed as a prior unity with the mother it also helps to create a 
relation.  For again, as he says in ―The Location of Cultural Experience,‖  
 
This symbol can be located.  It is at the place in space and time where and when the 
mother is in transition from being merged in with the infant and alternately being 
experienced as an object to be perceived rather than [as-if simply] conceived of.  The 
use of an object symbolizes the union of two now separate things, baby and mother, 
at the point in time and space of the initiation of their state of separateness. (96-7)  
 
Winnicott says here that these things are ―now separate‖ as if this was simply the 
case, but actually a page later he clarifies this matter by highlighting the necessary 
paradox that this separation isn‘t just real or objective but is and remains illusional.  This 
is a difficult but important point to understand and we shall take our time here to convey 
it.  It is difficult because it suggests that the archaic illusional perspective of the child is 
not simply false.  It is illusional, not delusional.  Similarly, this perspective doesn‘t just 
represent an emergent reality, but also presents it, we could say.  When the child has the 
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illusion, in and through the object, that he and his mother are still literally connected, as if 
both were together continuous and not merely contiguous parts of a greater fluid plenum 
for instance, this illusion is as good as real, for it is objective, illusion objectified.  
Indeed, despite suggesting above that the object symbolizes two ―now separate things,‖ 
Winnicott soon suggests that this object ―is the place that I have set out to examine, the 
separation that is not a separation but a form of union.‖  So on the one hand the object 
symbolizes (represents and presents ) a separation and on the other hand it symbolizes 
(presents and represents) a union of mother and child.  So my point here is that neither 
this separation nor union is more real than the other, at least when by ―transitional object‖ 
we are referring to the first not-me possession.  For ―possession‖ means here to be 
possessed by the thing but also to own it as a commonplace.   
How so?  Recall that for Winnicott before union or separation there is what we 
must presuppose to be identity, or what I like to think of as an undifferentiated unity, an 
undifferentiatedness that must be divided through repeated constitutive violences into 
places, into this and that.  Undifferentiation is carved up, in other words, making words 
and concepts possible, into what first then appears as a world to the degree that an 
inchoate subject here begins its emergent relation to inchoate objects.  This is world-
objectification and, like the writing that eventually develops from out of it, it is very 
significant, for it is the birth of the need for signification amidst the violence of birth.  
Birth is the uprooting root of signification.  The state of developmental potential which is 
uprooted here in and for the actualization of human rooting is called omnipotence or 
omnipotent illusion.  The term omnipotence is used to specify, as Kant is perhaps the first 
to specify (in the third Critique), that wish and actualization are one.  Imagine a baby in a 
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mother‘s womb.  As yet, this baby may not have distinct wishes, but certainly he has a 
capacity of and for wishing, a power of fantastic objectification in the Kantian sense.  
This power of illusion, however, cannot as yet be distinguished from its effects or non-
effects, from any worldly appearances.  Thus, for the baby, significance hasn‘t arisen on 
and despite various biological compulsions and happenings.  Indeed, even after birth and 
plenty of development and maturation, this hypothesized power of illusion cannot be said 
to have disappeared without a trace, that is, without objects and symptoms in fact being 
its trace, as we shall see.  In any case, as yet, before language predominates, illusion is 
the rule.  As Winnicott puts it in the ―Transitional Objects‖ essay, ―the mother, at the 
beginning, by an almost 100 percent adaptation affords the infant the opportunity for the 
illusion that her breast is part of the infant.  It is, as it were, under the baby‘s magical 
[wishful] control…. There is no interchange between the mother and the infant.  
Psychologically, the infant takes from a breast that is part of the infant, and the mother 
gives milk to an infant that is part of herself‖ (11-12).202  This, in turn, can be boiled 
down to the bidirectional (even ―bipolar‖) illusional structure we specified earlier:  Since 
the behest of wishing is simultaneously what happens just as what happens is 
simultaneously the behest of wishing, omnipotence implies that need (or wishing) is 
identical to what happens (or appearance) and vice versa.    
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 Or as he puts it more accessibly elsewhere: ―Imagine a baby who has never had a feed.  Hunger turns 
up, and the baby is ready to conceive of something;  out of need the baby is ready to create a source of 
satisfaction, but there is no previous experience to show the baby what there is to expect.  If at this moment 
the mother places her breast where the baby is ready to expect something, and if plenty of time is allowed 
for the infant... the baby ―creates‖ just what is there to be found.  The baby eventually gets the illusion that 
this real breast is exactly the thing that was created... and after a while the baby may be creating something 
like the very breast that the mother has to offer.... A thousand times before weaning the feeling has existed 
that what was wanted was created, and was found to be there.  From this develops a belief that the world 
can contain what is wanted and needed, with the result that the baby has hope that there is a live 
relationship between inner reality and external reality, between innate primary creativity and the world at 
large which is shared by all.‖ See Winnicott, 1992, 90. 
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 Development, however, as we know, requires that omnipotence be ―checked‖ and 
then ―mediated,‖ that it somehow ―fail‖ and in failing give birth to distinctions and 
worldliness.  Similarity and difference must be born(e) out of undifferentiatedness.  But 
how might this be possible?  How does one limit omnipotence?  Indeed, if omnipotence 
implies that what happens happens at the behest of wishing, then isn‘t everything that 
happens omnipotently wished for?
203
  Winnicott‘s suggestion that paradox is both 
necessary for, and must be tolerated in and for, development is helpful here.  For here is 
the point:  In order for such distinctions as subject and object, self and not-self, wish and 
object, here and there, etc, to arrive, to first emerge and then develop, in order for the 
world to open up as a world, omnipotence must be destroyed and yet the thing which is 
destroyed in this destruction must also somehow survive.  Let‘s revisit, then, one of 
Winnicott‘s most interesting and famous articulations of this paradox: 
   
Should the philosopher come out of his chair and sit on the floor with his patient, he 
will find... that after ―subject relates to object‖ comes ―subject destroys object‖ (as it 
becomes external);  and then may come ―object survives destruction by the subject.‖  
But there may or may not be survival.  A new feature thus arrives in the theory of 
object-relating.  The subject says to the object: ―I destroyed you,‖ and the object is 
there to receive the communication.  From now on the subject says: ―Hullo object!‖ 
―I destroyed you.‖ ―I love you.‖ ―You have value for me because of your survival of 
my destruction of you.‖ ―While I am loving you I am all the time destroying you in 
(unconscious) fantasy.‖ Here fantasy begins for the individual.  The subject can now 
use the object that has survived. (Winnicott 1989, 222) 
 
There are a number of important lessons to learn here:  First, if Winnicott is right 
about the legacy or fate of illusion in this primal scene, then we can say that despite and 
in the goals of the positivistic or natural sciences, disillusion is never complete, even 
when we‘re being scientifically objective—for objectivity both is prompted and, at a 
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 Recall that this question lies at the heart, and so the eros, of Kant‘s hypochondriacal worrying. 
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hidden level, even contains illusion.  Both against and in disillusionment, in other words, 
illusions and wishes are kept radically alive, active, and even fulfilled ―beneath‖ 
consciousness — but here‘s the Kantian subreptive rub — right when and where external 
objectivity takes place.  Objectivity and illusion aren‘t exactly or fully contraries, then, 
despite the history of positivistic science and its theories.  On the contrary, objectivity 
requires illusion to persist somewhere, in order to appear at all.  In short, even with and 
upon violence and disillusion, illusion secretly persists in and as objectivities of various 
sorts.  The baby first has to learn, after all, that he or she is emerging as a self to be 
developed, that two comes out of what can then be retrospectively presupposed as a prior 
oneness (a prior undifferentiated plenum), and that this self must be distinguished but can 
never be fully divided-off from (or identical to) others and/or objects.  The object can 
―signify‖ something like this, moreover, if and to the degree that it helps to symbolize 
loss, indeed, to contain destruction in a gain and production of another sort, in something 
liked and useful if also quite imperfect.  Of course, the object can also fail to contain the 
destruction, and in such cases it becomes a symptom, not so much a symbol.  There is a 
continuum of better and worse, of more and less communally social possibilities for 
objectivity. 
Relative to its hypothesized pure state, however, the initial mediation of 
omnipotence is more like a gigantic destruction, a total world catastrophe of pure 
impotence, than what can later come to appear as plain old mediation.  For no one given 
their womb-life, after all, could possibly be prepared for the splitting, divisions, blood, 
and labors of birth.  Talk about surprise!  This is the surprise belonging to and persisting 
in all future surprises.  Imagine again, then, a neonate just out of the womb.  This creature 
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is ready to attack and devour something fit to be attacked and devoured.  And imagine 
that the thing — the breast — is already there and that the attack happens.  My suggestion 
is that this feeding will both prolong and ―remind‖ the baby about something he couldn‘t 
possibly directly remember, namely, the omnipotent undifferentiatedness of womb-life.  
But imagine then this scene after various repetitions of feeding (attachment and identity) 
and the end of feeding (detachment and separation).  Suddenly we have what Marx calls a 
post festum state, a situation wherein the breast has gone missing, fort.  Indeed, imagine 
that the breast is ―wished for‖ but doesn‘t readily appear, as is custom. Regarding the 
absent breast, does not the baby here not just think but literally live something verging on 
―I destroyed it.‖  For what happens must have been wished for, right?  Or is this now just 
being realized?  What?  There might be an inside and an outside, wishing and a world, a 
world and wishing?  And wishing doesn‘t actualize its objects?  This is a sign of 
experience, something to be tested out via the object. 
On a different tack, why do neonates at times scream ―bloody murder‖?204  What 
does a screaming baby want?  What did/do we want?  What, similarly, but at one 
developmental remove from screaming, does a crying baby want?
205
  And a baby playing 
with a spool or pacifier?  Perhaps we should reverse this question and point to something 
that this last baby, at least, apparently doesn‟t want.  In his play with the transitional 
spool, after all, the boy of our example throws the object away, as if angered, disgusted, 
or frustrated:  Fort!  But under a Winnicottian lens this already points not simply at a pre-
experiential destruction but also at production, at objectification.  Indeed, to the degree 
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 In the beginning…. 
205
 I learned just the other day something I imagine myself to have known much longer, namely, that 
neonates only begin to cry tears after a couple of months.  At first their crying is tear-less.  I like to think of 
tears, in this regard, as internally produced mourning paint or ink. 
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that the mother and her entire technique of holding and feeding is for the newborn baby 
the entire world, this production is sacred world-production.  It is (destructive) world-
making.  As Winnicott puts it, ―if all goes well the infant can actually come to gain from 
the experience of frustration [of wishing but not immediately receiving], since incomplete 
adaptation [by the mother] to [the infant‘s] need makes objects real, that is to say hated as 
well as loved‖ (11).  The pre-world is here made into a world; it is objectified as worldly, 
even if the world is as yet one object, say, a breast, thumb, or pacifier.   
This hate, however, is related to the sense that the breast, and thus the world, is 
destroyed when it‘s out of wishful reach.206  This destruction, however, is paradoxical all 
the way down — like turtles — such that it is not simply we observing adults who see 
this matter objectively.  Rather, objectivity is born(e) of (and by) a meeting of both 
perspectives, archaic and mature, in the object placed there by the mother for the baby‘s 
use.  As Winnicott puts this delicate point, ―it is not only that the subject destroys the 
object because the object is placed outside the area of omnipotent control.  It is equally 
important to state this the other way round and to say that it is the destruction of the 
object that places the object outside the area of the subject‘s omnipotent control‖ (90).  
Or put in more traditional language, but just as concisely:  ―It is generally understood that 
the reality principle involves the individual in anger and reactive destruction, but my 
thesis [with which this writer agrees] is that the destruction plays its part in making the 
reality, placing the object outside the self‖ (91, my emphasis).  This is the crucial point 
we have been building up to, namely, that not simply production but archaic destruction 
is the secret condition of the worlding of the world, to borrow a Heideggerian formula 
and give it more meaning. 
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 A war-zone of sorts. 
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 In my current terminology, I would call these archaically destructive makings of 
reality and objectivity traumatological.  They are traumatological but not traumatic to the 
degree that, even while it plays a principal role in the course of events, destruction is here 
not simply destructive but is also secretly and predominantly put into the service of a 
more or less social and communal world-objectification.  The destruction destroys the 
object and omnipotence to boot.  That is, paradoxically, it destroys omnipotence by 
sending it underground, fort, but now — suddenly, in a great surprise appearance — in 
and as the appearance of the thing as an object.  Voila!  Ta-daa!  In Winnicott‘s 
terminology, the thing is thereby no longer merely a subjective object.
207
  It is an 
emergently objective object, even if barely so, quite temporarily so.  Indeed, this 
emergence via emergency is and marks the subreptive rub:  In making the object appear, 
the destruction is and remains something livable, something sustaining.  Originary loss 
enables growth.  We can‘t enter culture without being weaned.  We wake up, as it were.  
Trauma, on the other hand, is predominantly not productive of something mutually 
sustaining, of something supportive of mutuality, even if produces symptoms and even if 
it may end up requiring (or perhaps even eventually being?) a renewal of traumatological 
productions.
208
  (On the contrary?...)  As forced regression, as a destruction of already-
achieved cultural symbolizations, trauma tends toward world-destruction even if the 
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 Winnicott‘s terminology here is of course a bit misleading to the degree that there are no developed 
forms of subject or object as yet, that is, prior to this first destructive objectification which is 
simultaneously a subjectification. 
208
 I am arguing here against a tendency in much of the Lacanian literature or, for instance, against Judith 
Butler‘s (1997) suggestion in The Psychic Life of Power that melancholia, like mourning, is constitutive of 
subjectivity.  Like various Lacanians, Butler seems to conflate archaic traumatological destruction (which 
is productive of culture, subjects, and objects in its division of primitive undifferentiation) and trauma (or 
here melancholia, both of which are destructive and regressive).  For in the latter what is divided and 
destroyed is not just a presupposed archaic unity but also already-developed cultures, subjects, and objects.  
Especially for those who experience trauma, moving backward is not the same thing as moving forward, 
even if the two are ―linked‖ in archaic destruction.  I think it is critically important not to conflate these, 
then, for history and its understanding, after all, are at stake. 
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world that belongs to its decay had been newly nascent and can, with work, love, and 
play be rebuilt.   
 This is not to say, however, that the borderline between trauma and the 
traumatological is not fuzzy.  Both, after all, hinge on destruction, indeed, on a persistent 
archaic destruction.  The traumatological conditions of prehistorical life are brought 
forward, are unrepressed, in historical trauma.  Further, if trauma is survived, it may well 
then appear as if it was a necessary traumatological, and hence (potentially) world-
productive, series of events all along.  Similarly, we wouldn‘t want to deny that 
destruction is more or less explicitly required for and is part of any and all major 
historical or ―life‖ transitions.  To build one must take something apart, rework it.  To 
build a home, one must destroy some trees as well as one‘s life as a mere child.  
Similarly, albeit perhaps in a different way, if someone has been traumatized, the 
traumatological destructions that are released as symptoms in him or her still produce a 
―world‖ of sorts.  As self-cutters, injured soldiers, and various tribal peoples well know, 
for instance, the somatic wound can be an anchor, a site not just for disintegration but 
even one for integration!  And yet this wound can be used to attack, as well.
209
  Let us be 
clear, then, that there is no firm or clear dividing line between symptoms and objects, 
between destructive worlds and productive worlds.  Thus, similarly, I am not saying that 
the borderline between the traumatic and the traumatological is always, or even often, 
clear and distinct.  This line is the difference, respectively, between cultural 
disintegration and disintegration.  Omnipotence is destroyed as total destruction is 
destroyed in the making of the world of tension and/or symbiosis between me and not-
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 No suicide attempt is not also a murderous attack of the ―other.‖ 
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me.  Nonetheless, and again, while trauma and its destructive regressions may make 
something like rebirth possible, trauma in-itself — whatever this would be besides being 
a hypothetical non-experiential ―pure culture‖ of death — is destruction definitely not, or 
not yet, in the service of making culture.  As usual, Winnicott has a profound and 
profoundly simple way of putting all this, so I will let him and his mature youthful 
perspective speak here at length.  I do, however, have one suggestion for reading the 
following paragraphs.  To better understand or recall what it is like to be a neonate or to 
be regressed, we might think the phrase ―the livable world‖ wherever ―the mother‖ 
appears:  
 
It is perhaps worthwhile trying to formulate this in a way that gives the time factor 
due weight.  The feeling of the mother‘s existence lasts x minutes.  If the mother is 
away more than x minutes, then the imago [which the baby has built up of her 
through incorporations] fades, and along with this the baby‘s capacity to use the 
symbol of the union ceases.  The baby is distressed, but this distress is soon mended 
because the mother returns in x+y minutes.  In x+y minutes the baby has not become 
altered.  But in x+y+z minutes the baby has become traumatized.  In x+y+z minutes 
the mother‘s return does not mend the baby‘s altered state.  Trauma implies that the 
baby has experienced a break in life‘s continuity, so that primitive defenses now 
become organized to defend against a repetition of ‗unthinkable anxiety‘ or a return 
of the acute confusional state that belongs to disintegration of nascent ego structure. 
We must assume that the vast majority of babies never experience the x+y+z quantity 
of deprivation.  This means that the majority of children do not carry around with 
them for life the knowledge from experience of having been mad.  Madness here 
simply means a break-up of whatever may exist at the time of a personal continuity 
of existence.  After ‗recovery‘ from x+y+z deprivation a baby has to start again 
permanently deprived of the root which could provide continuity with the personal 
beginning.  This implies the existence of a memory system and an organization of 
memories. 
By contrast from the effects of x+y+z degree of deprivation, babies are constantly 
being [restored] by the mother‘s localized spoiling that mends the ego structure.  This 
mending of the ego structure re-establishes the baby‘s capacity to use a symbol of 
union; the baby then comes once more to allow and even to benefit from separation. 
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 Now, in Part II of this dissertation my suggestion has been that Marx develops a 
traumatological theory of historical development the destructive and productive 
ambivalence of which is conditioned by an archaic series of expropriations of the means, 
especially of the common means, of world production.  The primitive civilizing process 
leads, at least, up to its current discontents in capitalist accumulative crises.  The 
capitalistic world has grown like a plant, perhaps a weed, from what we can presuppose 
as the seed of our prior unity with nature, a seed split, divided, destroyed in its seediness 
to become a not merely natural primitive community which mediates the soil and 
material of nature, ―distancing‖ itself from nature in the production of culture.  Marx and 
Winnicott thus clearly agree on a great number of things.  They clearly agree, for 
instance, that trauma is disintegrative, deprivational, and expropriative.  For both, to 
deprive someone or a group of a means of their world production is to strip them of it, 
even if there are no protections or laws as yet through which we could ideologically 
condemn or prosecute such acts.  So even though the American Indians didn‘t 
―understand‖ property as exclusive private property, this doesn‘t mean that the arriving 
European explorers and especially the colonizers didn‘t deprive them of the land and 
various other means, including various institutional structures.
210
  The land, mother earth 
herself, however, was primary.  This mix of prehistorical and historical deprivation must 
not be forgotten, for it is tragic and horrible, and although both sides now suffer in 
different ways, this is much more debilitatingly so for the Indians.  This is something that 
still needs to be addressed with care, grace, and maturity.  But this primitive 
accumulation didn‘t just happen in the Americas, of course, and on my reading it has 
been happening since the first moments of the destructive making of objective culture 
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hundreds of thousands if not millions of years ago.  In any case,  we should not be at all 
surprised that Marx offers a plainly Winnicottian interpretation avant la letter of the 
development of English capitalism:  Paraphrasing Thornton late in volume one of 
Capital, he declares that ―the English working class was precipitated without any 
transitional stages from its golden age to its iron age‖ (879, my emphasis).211  The free 
land- and tool-owning yeomen, after all, were kicked off their lands in various ways, 
forced to urbanize, thereby becoming the proletariat, a workforce with no means of 
symbolic self- and world-production other than those ―rented‖ from the capitalists 
through wage-for-labor-power exchanges and purchased as commodities.  
 One of the keys to understanding the above (x+y+z) passage from Winnicott, 
then, lies in realizing that whatever trauma is, it is something partially experienced, 
which is to say that the ego or culture at hand has developed to some degree and is 
therefore able to undergo, and to some degree experience, disintegration.  Disintegration 
requires prior (individual and cultural) integration.  As a disintegration, however, trauma 
is also something partially not-experienced.   Recall that the traumatic process opens up 
and recalls traumatological, which is to say pre-integrated (possibly integrating), 
destructions.  Since these traumatological destructions are first undergone before ego- or 
cultural-development (and can secretly form ego- and cultural-development to the degree 
that they happen together with archaic incorporations and identifications), they are to this 
degree never directly experienced and so cannot be remembered in the ordinary sense of 
the term.
212
  In other words, current, historical, or empirical traumas are invariably 
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 Being on the front lines of a war, or in a traffic accident, or in an intense broken love, or in a relation of 
complete dependence on one‘s parents, etc, must and will have some resemblance to archaic world 
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funded in, although not wholly determined by, prehistorical conditions which themselves 
don‘t, indeed cannot, directly appear.213  In this regard trauma is not just 
representationally but presentationally a gap in life, a gap happening in life as a break in 
the continuity of experience with one‘s roots and heritage, which means that trauma can 
and will be experienced if it ―happens,‖ but only in and as an experiencing after the fact 
of something that is in-itself inexperienceable, even unlivable.  Winnicott articulates this 
thought in a concise, profound, and forceful way:  In the traumatic process, he says, 
―again, it is the death that happened but was not experienced that is sought.‖  I can think 
of no scientifically or philosophically better formula for understanding traumatic 
repetition than this.  
 And yet, and again, even if trauma ―in-itself‖ is inexperienceable or indigestible 
in and despite its happening, is it not also, as a conjuring forth of the traumatological 
conditions of human living, symbolizable, that is, (mis)symbolizable as culture?  In order 
for trauma to be symbolized, however, it must be survived.  Thus, for Winnicott, because 
it is possible that ―while I am loving you I am all the time destroying you in 
(unconscious) fantasy,‖  the objectification of hate can appear precisely as conscious 
mediated love.  In loving the mother through what we recognize as a pacifier, for 
instance, the baby has his secret aggressions, his murderous fantasies.
214
  But of course, 
                                                                                                                                                       
dissolution.  For there is division of erotic identification and/or an uprooting from a primitive intimacy 
involved in all these scenes.     
213
 Who, after all, remembers their birth, that wake-up call from nothing, as it were?  
214
 Winnicott relates one of the more important dreams of his ―adult‖ life to all of this material in some 
notes which were eventually published alongside the above material on objectifying destruction. Indeed, 
although we will not analyze this aspect of it, notice how the dream resembles the movement, in a certain 
psychoanalytic and Marxian way, to the Hegelian dialectic:  ―The dream can be given in its three parts: (1) 
There was absolute destruction, and I was part of the world and of all people, and therefore I was being 
destroyed. (The important thing in the early stages was the way in which in the dream the pure destruction 
got free from all the mollifications, such as object-relating, cruelty, sensuality, sado-masochism, etc.)  (2) 
Then there was absolute destruction, and I was the destructive agent.  Here then was a problem for the ego, 
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this symbolizational process can happen in more or less healthy ways.  The hate can be 
dreamed instead of acted out.  In fact, dreams are necessary for this.  This baby can play 
with his or her toys, consciously forgetting the disaster which had lead him to scream or 
cry bloody murder.  Another baby, however, has not found the mother and her attention 
or inattention good enough, and so may ―play‖ with too much aggression, an aggression 
that therefore isn‘t shared in a common place where the mother and baby ―merge‖ but is 
―bottled up‖ inside and then expressed outside in cyclical revolts.  
 Marx, too, highlights the symbolic disavowal of primitive violence in and as 
forms of value, but symbolism is here called by other names, including especially 
fetishism.  Recall for instance that sixteenth and seventeenth century Western European 
―accumulation‖ was largely ―carried on by means of individual acts of violence against 
which legislation, for a hundred and fifty years, fought in vain.  The advance made by the 
eighteenth century shows itself in this, that the law itself now becomes the instrument by 
which the people‘s land is stolen‖ (885).  Here the earlier explicit act of brute violence, of 
thug expropriation, is repressively sublimated, as it were, into a ―soft‖ legal or hegemonic 
violence.  So while the more primitive violence is disavowed, it also persists in a higher 
or suspended form.  
                                                                                                                                                       
how to integrate these two aspects of destruction?  (3)  Part three now appeared and in the dream I 
awakened.  As I awakened I knew I had dreamed both (1) and (2).  I had therefore solved the problem, by 
using the difference between the waking and sleeping states.  Here was I awake, in the dream, and I knew I 
had dreamed of being destroyed and of being the destroying agent.  There was no dissociation, so the three 
I‘s were altogether in touch with each other.  I remembered dreaming I(2) and I(1).  This felt to be 
immensely satisfactory although the work done had made tremendous demands on me.  I now began to 
wake up.  What I first knew was that I had a very severe headache.  I could see my head split right through, 
with a black gap between the right and left halves.  I found the words ‗splitting headache‘ coming and 
waking me up….‖  See ―D.W.W.‘s Dream Related to Reviewing Jung‖ in Winnicott, 1989, 228-9.  
Winnicott‘s dream, we should remember, can also be lived out in waking life to some unfortunate extent. 
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 Bourgeois ideology produces and is the production of a similar amnesiac 
softening.  While ―in actual history, it is a notorious fact that conquest, enslavement, 
robbery, murder, in short, force, play the greatest part,‖ well, ―in the tender annals of 
political economy the idyllic reigns from time immemorial‖ (874).  Talk about a reversal 
of hate and love.  Indeed, this reversal is embodied in a practical relation between 
production and exchange together with a fetishistic symptom.  The wage-form of 
exchange between worker and capitalist facilitates and marks exploitation by cloaking the 
extraction of surplus-value from workers.  Thus, the surplus-labor of workers comes to 
appear as a profit made by the capitalist through his investment of resources, including 
the resource of labor-power.   The money-wage thus marks where the worker and society 
as a whole have forgotten that the working class once had but no longer has possessive 
forms of access to various familial, clan, tribal, and in any case to more or less communal 
means of production.  Indeed, it is here forgotten that ―long, long ago‖ human societies 
existed free of class divide, where elite groups did not appropriates social surpluses on 
the backs and through the work of the commoner.  So while bourgeois ideology sees, 
defends, and touts fair exchange, and while the worker does get the fair exchange his 
wage-contract stipulates as the price of labor, this same exchange and contract disavow 
the primitive expropriation which had made the wage-relation possible and actual in the 
first place.  What is forgotten is the cyclically returning deprivations of commoners of 
lands and tools in the name of exclusive privatization and monopolization.  Thus, like 
Winnicott, for Marx ―primitive‖ doesn‘t just mean first, early, or previous but also 
necessarily marks the forgetting, in and as an objectification, of a prior and persistent 
uprooting.
215
  Indeed, at times Marx puts this in almost Winnicottian terms, as we‘ve 
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seen:  ―How does the transition from landed property to wage labor come about?‖  The 
basis of Marx‘s answer in the Grundrisse is that the newly hatched landed proprietors 
―clear‖ the land  
of its excess mouths, tear the children of the earth from the breast on which they were 
raised [the agricultural land], and thus transform labor on the soil itself, which 
appears by its nature as the direct wellspring of subsistence, into a mediated source of 
subsistence, a source purely dependent on social [money and contract] relations…. 
Only in this way is the application of science possible for the first time, and the 
development of the full force of production.
216
   
 
 The word ―purely‖ here, of course, is not helpful or accurate, but the point 
remains helpful.  The developmental process hinges on an uprooting which is then, as if 
merely by reaction, mediated socially into something differently, developmentally 
productive, albeit in a perpetually conflicted sense to the degree that the primitivity of 
this accumulation rests on the ineliminability of its violent elements.  Indeed, the 
ambivalence here is palpable.  It can be put in one‘s wallet, for instance, or perhaps it will 
be accounted for at the level of the body if it can‘t be placed in one‘s wallet.217  Not only 
is the ―child of the earth‖ uprooted from the soil of nature, but it is precisely this 
uprooting which, strangely enough, also makes money and science possible—presumably 
science has its funding in archaic accumulations of symbolic objectivity.  Money is 
hieratic, then, because it is near the source of human beginnings.  It is first of all a non-
alienable sacred object.  But then, in the meetings of various cultures, it gets disillusion at 
some level, becoming a general then universal medium of exchange and measure of 
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 Money is social power, so lack of it will often mean insecurity, and if insecurity has been there from 
―the start,‖ it may need to be registered as a congenital ailment.  Whatever else it is, in other words (and as 
a kind of speaking, a writing under the skin), physical illness is always also a production borne of a 
primitive symbolic injury, an archaic nocebo. 
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value.  As value, however, it retains a trace of the sacred.  Thus, on the one hand, the 
uprooting of the agricultural laborer is clearly disintegrative of various peasant, feudal, 
yeomanic, and/or guild communities and forms of organization in various times, places, 
and ways;  the history of peasantry must be an interesting one.  The uprooting will thus 
also have its indirections, its metaphorized ―productions,‖ its symptomatic objects which, 
when put to use as part of capitalist production, can be put to use, as it were, in the 
reorienting and even reintegrating of the dispersed elements.  Crises mix things around 
not just horizontally, but vertically as well.  So yes, the uprooting casts symptoms in 
various socially negative but also in various positive ways.  In my judgment, this is why 
Marx still occasionally calls primitive expropriation ―accumulation.‖   
 Take capital.  Capital is the perhaps the modern era‘s nastiest, far-reaching 
symptom.  It is and instantiates domination.  It is the mark of prior and current class 
schisms, of a series of breaks in the continuity of human world community.  In this 
respect, capital appears as social paranoia (―we‖ hate ―them‖ and ―they‖ hate ―us‖ to the 
degree that we‘ve forgotten our common roots), the speculative financial fevers of 
fictitious wealth (take the current bank and mortgage crises, where fictitious capital was 
allowed to grow without any monitored tethering to real hard work, to labor in 
production), as war (in the middle east, for instance, as if ―we‖ hated ―them‖ and vice 
versa), and as class, international, and corporate hegemonies of various sorts.  This is 
sordid stuff the evidence of which is piling up.
218
  And yet at the same time, the 
movement and growth of capital has enabled tremendous growth in technical forms of 
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cooperation, in the forces and instruments of world-production, in instrumentalized 
hierarchical relations, as well as in various ―progressive‖ cultural forms such as public 
parks, schools, and libraries, in the advance of human and individual rights, and in the 
expansion of modern education (the moneyed alphabet) to what Marx once infamously 
called ―rural idiocy.‖  A reading peasantry may prove necessary, as the peasantry 
themselves come to understand.  In and despite its obvious atrocities, then, capitalist 
production, Marx will occasionally say, has a ―civilizing influence‖ as well.219   
 Marx of course knows that in general wage-labor is a much more just and 
developed social-relation than slave-labor, for instance, even if the latter was and 
occasionally still is secretly used to promote capitalist accumulation.  But this isn‘t a 
transhistorical statement.  Rather, it‘s a statement belonging to the objectivity of 
development and the development of objectivity.
220
  It‘s another aspect of the symbolic 
―softening,‖ the metaphorization, the remaking in symbolically productive form, of 
primitive destruction.  As money mediates sacredly, for instance, it is a type of 
developmental glyphics.  It marks, under capital, not just exploitation, but exploitation as 
a development beyond direct brute domination.  Thus, the relation of worker to employer 
is no longer so strictly or literally a relation of bondage and lordship, and this counts for a 
lot.  I take it as obvious that it is good that the worker is no longer merely an object 
himself but is partially a subject.  Perhaps he is a transitional subject-object on the way to 
socialism?  In any case, while capitalism is often brutal, especially at its edges, 
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partially understood by reading the traces of the forgetting and gaps.    
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destroying the ―outer world‖ as if to rebuild it imperialistically in its own self(-image), it 
is not, at least more internally and closer to its center, a system of slavery or even feudal 
bondage.  In Capital, we read about how the wage-laborer has developed new powers of 
adaptability and flexibility.  Marx shouldn‘t say ―fully‖ in the following passage, but 
nonetheless, the modern worker is and has a general industriousness that didn‘t 
previously exist;  he or she is ―the fully developed individual, fit for a variety of labors, 
ready to face any change of production, and to whom the different social functions he 
performs are but so many modes of giving free scope to his own natural and acquired 
powers‖ (488).221  And of course this civilizing influence reaches well beyond the 
individual worker.  This is world-cultural development under high anxiety.  Under 
capitalism‘s accumulative drive, steeped archaically in destructive-accumulative 
repetitions, production and consumption must be constantly increased to as if to stabilize 
―growth,‖ which means that together with the destructions of capitalization we also find a 
developed legacy of primitive community.  We find:  
 
exploration of all of nature in order to discover new, useful qualities in things; 
universal exchange of the products of all alien climates and lands, new (artificial) 
preparation of natural objects, by which we are given new use values.  The 
exploration of all the earth in all directions, to discover new things of use as well as 
new useful qualities of the old; such as new qualities of them as raw materials, etc.; 
the development, hence, of the natural sciences to their highest point; likewise the 
discovery, creation and satisfaction of new needs arising from society itself; the 
cultivation of all the qualities of the social human being, production of the same in a 
form as rich as possible in needs, because rich in qualities and relations — 
production of this being as the most total and universal possible social product, for, in 
order to take gratification in a many-sided way, he must be capable of many 
pleasures, hence cultured to a high degree — is likewise a condition founded upon 
capital.
222
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 Now, while Kant may not have understood himself to be any kind of socialist, his 
aesthetic theory rightly locates the heart of human world developmental processes in a 
power of desire which, while split, and because antagonistic, demands the work and play 
of and toward the commonplace of culture.  It is this root of a demand of and for the 
commonplace, then, that links Kant, albeit atavistically, to Marx, Freud, and Winnicott 
alike.  The power here is a power of actualizing our wishes as if instantly while the 
demand stems from our need, indeed our drive, to survive the fact that these wishes often 
miserable fail, at least until we are able and fortunate enough to wish less contradictorily 
and more in the direction of the common.
223
   
 Why the commonplace?  For Kant, the beautiful object is a site of common sense, 
an actual shared sensibility.  As an object, though, it is something given and taken.  But 
this taking is also a mis-taking:  Recall that when a subject judges an object as beautiful, 
the pleasure she feels is taken to stem either from the object or from her merely 
subjective preferences.  And yet this judgment, we recall, is secretly made possible 
through the disavowal of a nonetheless persistent archaic illusion.  Kant calls this 
disavowal of illusion ―subreption.‖  So while the object ―itself‖ appears beautiful and will 
thus seem to some degree to be the cause of the subject‘s pleasure, this causal sense 
hinges on a secret placeboization, as I have called it, a primitive conflict in wishing 
which is (mis)objectified.  Indeed, for Kant, to the degree that a judgment of taste is not 
merely empirically determined, it becomes the site for debate and reflection such that it 
also instantiates and demands the development of culture.  If one can not fight over it, it 
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is a site for cultural building.  Indeed, part of the objectivity of the beauty here is the not 
fighting over it.  Thus, in all these sly ways, beauty (mis)objectifies the healthy 
development of human (a)sociality.   
 And of course, Kant‘s other term for this process, following upon an initial 
somatization, is symbolization.  And this too is why we can here again speak of symbols 
as placebos and/or nocebos, as sites of commonplace health and illness.  Since symbols 
(mis)present an archaic causality in and as causes, pleasing symbols mark the place 
where the emergent subject is making self-secretive use, as the appearance of culture, of 
the conflation of and split between me and not-me.  The sense of causality, too, is 
important.  The split between too much fantastic causality (where every thing seems to 
arrive as by perfect actualization) and too little fantastic causality (where what is felt is 
lack of a power to produce anything) is mended, as Winnicott puts it, through the 
commonplace of wish and object.  In other words, since we can transcendentally assume 
that desire is ―the power of being the cause, through one‘s presentations, of the actuality 
of the objects of these presentations‖ (16=177) and empirically ―assume [that there are] 
as many different kinds of causality as there are specific differences among natural 
effects,‖ (24=185) the aesthetic fallout of transcendental causality into symbolic, which is 
to say significant, causes enables us to begin to recognize, albeit minimally and through 
repetitive rituals, that some of these causes are ―inside‖ us and some ―outside‖ us, that 
some are wishful ―self‖ causes while some are causes ―external‖ to wishing, and indeed, 
that some are causes somatically ―attached‖ and some somatically ―detached.‖  Our 
initial state of confused dependency is to this degree purposively enabled to live with 
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purposes, that is, to the degree that health and development are linked through our 
objectification of valued (archaic) objects.   
 By contrast, if we look at health science in institutions such as biomedicine and 
cognitive-behavioral therapeutics, we find the guiding assumption that health and illness 
are invariably produced only by at least hypothetically knowable, locatable, mechanically 
efficient causes, by what a Kantian might call empirical causes.  To the degree that the 
causes of health and illness, whether these are somatic, psychological, or behavioral, are 
invariably believed to be empirical, then what is ruled out in the contemporary health 
sciences is a philosophy of health which takes note of and theorizes the role of 
precognitive and unconscious elements in health and illness.  For example, when 
someone goes the doctor in need — whether this need is predominantly psychological, 
physical, or a combination of both — my idea is that because the doctor stands in a 
relation of authority to the patient‘s disorder and dependency, this relation between need 
and authority secretly replays and engages the intense relation between need and 
authority which was initially structured and developed in the patient‘s infancy.  Thus, my 
thesis is that while every object of health (or illness) is causally and cognitively registered 
at one level, it is more accurate and thoughtful, and so more scientific, to judge these 
objects as placeboically causal to the degree that unconscious wishes are covertly at play 
in relations of need and power.  Further, to the degree that prehistorical wishing secretly 
influences how historical objects appear, it turns out that health and sickness are also 
secretly indices of development, of regression and progression in tension. 
 Kantian taste, then, is a kind of life-long weaning process.  Indeed, as I hinted 
above, it‘s a rather socialistic symbolization process:  As the site of and for the education 
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of a pleasing art of communicating and sharing need, where carnal demand is confronted 
with moral imperatives, the Kantian symbol is a place to grow up, to build a partially, 
hopefully largely, shareable world.
224
  Indeed, if what enables this transition is (a) 
archaic, pre-experiential desire, (b) nature‘s failure to instantly meet this desire, and (c) 
the objectification of an object which is taken to be the cause of a pleasure the emergent 
subject feels, then what she needs in order to develop is not just direct access to 
gratifying objects, nor unrelenting loss or reminders of loss only, but a regimen of work, 
play, and symbols which enables her to digest both object presentation and object loss.   
 This helps us understand why art therapy often helps the traumatically disturbed:  
While such therapy may involve ―higher‖ cognitive functions such as philosophical or 
conceptual narrative, alphabetic writing, and adult forms of representation — what Freud 
might class under the title of the higher ―secondary processes‖ — it also certainly 
involves plenty of pre-conceptual, pre-alphabetic, pre-representational, and so 
presentational or primary processes.  So, while the therapy reaches down deep into 
archaic presentational (illusional) processes, it also partakes of early forms of 
representation and so can help the sufferer externalize and symbolize his or her damage. 
The damage doesn‘t simply repeat as a presentation, then, but is developed into a 
representation ―containing‖ the presentation, and this begins to make a difference.  Sigh. 
 And this in turn brings us back full circle:  Imagine that a womb, like a breast, 
like a blanket, like a teddy bear, like a mom and dad, like a brother and sister, like a 
house full of people and things, like a neighborhood, like a public event, like the whole 
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earth full of people and things, is a livable world.
225
  Is not every newborn baby faced, in 
and through birth, with the threat of disaster and loss ―just like‖ the soldier?  My 
suggestion is ―yes.‖226   The soldier‘s wound can be significant, can make a whole world 
of significance, to the degree that the whole ―world‖ was just threatened.  This is what the 
battlefield can be like for those in it.  It‘s ―as if‖ death were present — which means: no 
desire, or desire‘s instant fulfillment, or desire‘s complete impotence — but suddenly 
gives birth to life.  How did I survive that?  I am not that!  This is the significance of 
having a world birthed here.   
And yet, on the other hand, since this archaic destruction, since archaic, happens 
before subject and object are clearly distinguished (it is not experienced directly), the site 
of this destruction will not just appear with the sudden appearance of the object and its 
external objectivity.  Since his omnipotent illusion has yet to go firmly underground and 
become unconscious destructive fantasy in and as (the survival of) the object, the baby 
still cannot as yet firmly distinguish inside from outside and himself from his mother‘s 
comings and goings, which means that her failure to survive — if she retaliates, for 
instance — must dawn world-apocalyptically not just “for her” but “for him” as well.  If 
the hungry neonate could signify with words at this point instead of, say, with her 
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a world distinct from self.  The embattled soldier just missed — or did he? — becoming once again 
identified, one, with the world, with mother nature.  When do departures begin?  When is a departure not a 
departure but the beginning of a relation?  In any case, the division of the mother‘s body is bloody, visceral, 
and quite the ordeal.  Was it not?  How are we to make meaning of this?  Let us create the world anew.  But 
how to begin?  
 332 
pacifier, she might say:  What is happening?  There is want.  What is this wanting to do?  
Now (with the breast) there is pleasure, satisfaction.  Now (with the breast‘s 
disappearance) there is destruction…… Then again, there is want…  Still wanting….  
There is hunger.   What has happened to the thing?  Is it dead?  Did I destroy it?  Indeed, 
if I‘m not distinct from it, am I dead?   
My point here, then, boils down to recognizing two alternative fates for the 
objectivity of death:   The fact of being born, of having to live intersubjectively, and of 
apparently having to live completely without omnipotent illusion, dictates that death 
happens not just metaphorically or representationally but also quite literally or 
presentationally in every severely mentally ill person‘s daily life, in some people‘s early 
life, and all the time in every normal adult‘s unconscious life.  Indeed, it secretly happens 
all the time ―in‖ and ―as‖ objects of value. What happens to death‘s happening — how it 
evolves and whether it is ―survived,‖ ―experienced,‖ or not — thus depends foremost on 
how the earliest relationships proceed over the years, and especially at first.  If a person 
has never been able and enabled to (mis)present or (mis)experience death into and as a 
transitional object, that is, into and as any socially useful and sunny object, this 
happening will remain for him quite undigested, dark, and in need of repetition.  Here we 
have the reverse of transitional objectivity or what might be called less-than-transitional 
objectivity, or, say, autism in its varying degrees of severity.  Here objects are often 
nocebos.  They symbolically injure.  Since his attempts to (mis)objectify the death that 
happened to him into a transitional experience have repeatedly come up empty-handed, 
as it were, a deprived infant, child, or traumatized individual will have the tendency to 
more or less strictly present and incorporate death, the break in life‘s continuity, as if it 
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could be ―purely experienced‖ and digested.  Here, I think, we have the ―source‖ of any 
and all suicidal tendencies. On the other hand, in Winnicott‘s sunny ―Use of an Object‖ 
vignette as well as in the fort-da game, we find that if a primitive wish is enabled through 
good enough care to present death‘s happening in and as an object, this externalization 
allows the wisher to mispresent and excorporate death more strictly, as if death could 
never even appear or misappear in life.  This person thus creates needs other than the 
obsessive need to make death the ―object‖ of his concern literally and repeatedly.  In 
other words, by producing death in its consciously ―forgotten‖ form, that is, in and as an 
aesthetically pleasing or beautiful object, morbid symptoms are put to good use and in 
fact ―hidden‖ away.  Voila value.  Freud releases play from his quest for a presentation of 
the death drive in ―pure culture,‖ we recall, since playing with an object expresses 
pleasure over pain.  On our account, then, play also sublimates death into radically alive 
unconsciousness.   
So this is how force or mechanism becomes symbolic.
227
  In short, as a symbol, 
the object allows us to at least partially understand ―what happened‖ even if it can‘t fully 
explain it.  To the degree that both objects — ―spool‖ and ―wound‖ — help to ―contain‖ 
the breaking apart and destruction of the experienced world, they make sense of, give 
―objective‖ meaning to, they sublimate world-catastrophe to the point that the catastrophe 
is now less ―directly‖ presented — in the child‘s screams or the soldier‘s dreams, for 
instance — than re-presented, distorted into representational form.  The ―catastrophe‖ — 
                                                   
227
 I am not one for violent world revolution but for recognizing that one can revolutionize the world 
through symbolic inscriptions—such as writing to communicate the value of living and sharing life and the 
means of life.  And what is not a means of life?  War, I suppose, or at least trauma.  What about birth for 
the neonate?  And what about the disappearance of the first breast?  The irony here is that while the child‘s 
merely natural sustenance — say, in mother‘s milk — seems to be departing (at least when we try to 
conceptualize this event) in the breast‘s disappearance, new means of life become available, and these have 
a wider meaning, to the degree that same and different arise here; or is it there?  
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now in scare quotes — is here at least rudimentarily re-presented; it is ―externalized‖ at 
least to the surface of the skin, if not beyond it.  ―It‖ has been symbolized.    
 Thus, for Freud, Marx, Kant, and Winnicott, culture is a developmental and 
developing extension of the need to make some sort of aesthetically shared sense, a 
mutual symbolization, of the loss both of merely natural mothering and of the 
identifications and divisions be-longing initially to birth and then later still to social life.  
Human development is enculturation, and yet enculturation is a form of rooting, as we‘ve 
said, the point of departure of which, paradoxically, is a departure from merely natural 
rooting.  If we say that biological development is merely natural growth, for instance, we 
should say that cultural development is our growing up on top of this, even despite this.  
In short, then, human development is and remains complex and conflicted, marked by 
antagonism, to the degree that it isn‘t just built with or upon (mother) nature but also in 
and through a splitting-off from what must be presupposed as an immediacy or primitive 
identification with nature.   
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